莊裕安 v. 張舉能 AND OTHERS

HCAL 679/2023

[2024] HKCFI 2596

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 679 OF 2023

________________________

________________________

AND

HCAL 696/2023

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 696 OF 2023

________________________

________________________

AND

HCAL 924/2023

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 924 OF 2023

________________________

________________________

AND

HCAL 925/2023

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 925 OF 2023

________________________

________________________

AND

HCAL 1718/2023

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1718 OF 2023

________________________

________________________

AND

HCAL 1827/2023

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1827 OF 2023

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________________________

(Heard together)

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D E C I S I O N

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A. Introduction

1.  The heading to this Decision could be considerably longer than the body of the Decision if I were simply to say, as I have concluded, that none of the applications made have any merit at all, and therefore all six applications stand to be dismissed.

2.  However, it is appropriate to identify some reasoning as to why the applications have no merit, and why they in fact constitute an abuse – where all of the proceedings essentially arise out of the same underlying complaint and where the Applicant seeks to attack a wide and increasing range of targets as putative respondents, often simply on the basis that they refused to engage in a reply to his correspondence or act in the way he wants them to.  In substance, all six applications are disguised complaints renewed against or about judges who have rendered judgments and orders in concluded actions to which the Applicant had been a party.

3.  It can be noted that Anthony Chan J made a Restrictive Proceedings Order (“RPO”) against the Applicant on 2 November 2023 in HCAL 1243/2023, [2023] HKCFI 2840 – see more detail below.  He did so precisely on the basis that the Applicant had abused the court processes by bringing repeated applications of no merit relating to the same underlying complaint.  However, the RPO had no retrospective effect, and all six of the applications presently under consideration were issued before it was made.

4.  The Applicant had previously applied by summons for the first four applications in numerical order above to be dealt with separately and/or by a different Judge and/or with the appointment of an amicus curiae, but I declined to make those orders: see my Decision dated 22 August 2023, [2023] HKCFI 2174.

5.  Those four matters were fixed for hearing on 20 September 2023, but adjourned on that date because of the Applicant’s claimed ill-health.  The matters ultimately came to a hearing on 21 November 2023, by which date the last two of the captioned applications had also been issued, and one of which I had already fixed to be dealt with on the same occasion.  Though the Applicant asked at the hearing for the very last issued application to be dealt with later, I declined to do that and I heard all six matters together.

6.  At the hearing, the Applicant had the benefit of a Chinese/English interpreter, albeit that the Applicant plainly speaks excellent English, having apparently been educated in the UK.  Indeed, he says that he should be permitted to have an oral hearing in part so that, if necessary, he can correct any mistake in court interpretation.

7.  At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision to be handed down later.

8.  The Applicant requested that I should hand down six separate decisions, so that (if they were to go against him) he could appeal each of them separately, and not hand down all six decisions in ‘one go’, which might make it prohibitively expensive for him to launch his posited appeals.  I decline to meet that request.  Such is the degree of overlap and duplication between these applications that it seems to me to be both appropriate and sensible for them to have been dealt with together, and for my Decision to deal with all of them together.

9.  This is my Decision.

B.  Litigation Background

10.  As already stated, the present applications arise out of the Applicant’s previous litigation history.  For present purposes, the following summary will suffice.

11.  On 18 August 2016, the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal (“CFA”) dismissed the Applicant’s leave to appeal to the CFA in FAMV 3/2016 (on application for leave to appeal from CACV 62/2014), FAMV 4/2016 (on application for leave to appeal from CACV 115/2014), FAMV 12/2016 (on application for leave to appeal from HCMP 1411/2015 and CACV 46/2014), FAMV 28/2016 (on application for leave to appeal from CACV 225/2013) and FAMV 38/2016 (on application for leave to appeal from CACV 95/2016). The focus of the Applicant since then has mainly been on the first four applications and decisions mentioned.

12.  Broadly speaking, the underlying disputes related to two matters.  One arose out of the Applicant’s removal from the membership of the Professional Insurance Brokers Association in about 2005 (for the factual background, see the judgment of the Court of Appeal (“CA”) dated 1 April 2016 in CACV 225/2013 and the judgment dated 21 August 2015 in CACV 62/2014).  The other arose out of an incident where the Applicant’s late father’s grave in Shenzhen was damaged in 2011 (for the factual background, see the CA’s judgment dated 24 June 2016 in CACV 95/2016).

13.  The Applicant then commenced HCA 244/2017 against the CFA, the Registrar of the CFA and three permanent judges of the CFA on various matters concerning the proceedings in FAMV 3/2016, FAMV 4/2016, FAMV 12/2016 and FAMV 28/2016 (i.e. the four applications).  The action was struck out, with appeal dismissed and leave to appeal refused in CACV 185/2017 – see [2018] HKCA 325, [2018] HKCA 762 – and in FAMV 98/2018.

14.  The Applicant then commenced HCAL 950/2017 against the listing officer and the Registrar of Civil Appeals of the High Court for matters concerning the listing of his appeal in CACV 185/2017.  The application was dismissed, with appeal dismissed and leave to appeal refused in CACV 31/2018 – see [2018] HKCA 502, [2018] HKCA 730.

15.  The Applicant commenced HCAL 1699/2018 and HCAL 25/2019 against the Registrar of the CFA and the Chief Executive for essentially the same complaint concerning the proceedings in FAMV 3/2016, FAMV 4/2016, FAMV 12/2016 and FAMV 28/2016.  The applications were dismissed – see [2019] HKCFI 1073 – with appeal dismissed and leave to appeal refused in CACV 216/2019 and CACV 217/2019 – see [2020] HKCA 177, [2020] HKCA 587 – and in FAMV 178/2021.

16.  The Applicant commenced HCAL 2941/2019 against the CFA for matters concerning the former Chief Justice’s alleged disqualification to hear his cause in FAMV 98/2018.  The application was dismissed – see [2019] HKCFI 2846 – with appeal dismissed and leave to appeal refused in CACV 552/2019 – see [2020] HKCA 970, [2021] HKCA 102.

17.  The Applicant commenced HCAL 765/2020 against the Chief Executive and 67 members of the Legislative Council concerning the nomination of the Chief Justice to the CFA.  The application was dismissed – see [2020] HKCFI 1795 – with leave to appeal out of time refused – see [2023] HKCFI 2144.

18.  The Applicant commenced HCAL 112/2021 against the CFA and the Department of Justice for matters concerning FAMV 98/2018 and CACV 552/2019.  The application was dismissed – see [2021] HKCFI 988 – with appeal dismissed and leave to appeal refused in CACV 184/2021 – see [2022] HKCA 380, [2022] HKCA 883.

19.  The Applicant commenced HCAL 1264/2022 against the Chief Executive and the Secretary for Justice over matters concerning the Applicant’s email enquiries.  The application was dismissed by me – see [2023] HKCFI 1178 – with appeal dismissed in CACV 151/2023 – see [2023] HKCA 1184.

20.  The Applicant commenced HCAL 1243/2023 against the Secretary for Justice, the former Chief Justice and the Chief Justice, three permanent judges and three non-permanent judges of the CFA, one Justice of Appeal of the CA, the former Secretary for Justice and the former Chairman of the Bar Association.  On 2 November 2023, as well as dismissing the application for leave to apply for judicial review in HCAL 1243/2023, Anthony Chan J made the RPO against the Applicant, by which the Applicant is restricted from commencing, without leave of the Court, fresh proceedings concerning any matters involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in FAMV 3/2016, FAMV 4/2016, FAMV 12/2016, FAMV 28/2016, HCA 244/2017, CACV 185/2017, FAMV 98/2018, HCAL 2941/2019, CACV 552/2019, CACV 216/2019, CACV 217/2019 and FAMV 178/2021.

21.  As already stated, the RPO would have covered the present six applications, but for the fact that they were each issued before 2 November 2023.

C.  Summary of Intended Targets

22.  By way of setting the scene, a brief summary of at least the ‘target’ putative respondents of the various applications can be given as follows.  Although the Applicant chose to address the applications in a different order at the hearing, I shall follow the numerical order in which they were issued.  The overlap and/or duplication in the applications is immediately apparent.

23.  In HCAL 679/2023, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review against the Chief Justice, three permanent judges and three non-permanent judges of the CFA, the Chief Judge of the High Court and two Justices of Appeal of the CA of the High Court.

24.  In HCAL 696/2023, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review against 15 members of the Legislative Council.

25.  In HCAL 924/2023, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review against the former Chief Justice, the Chief Justice, two permanent judges and two non-permanent judges of the CFA, the Registrar of the High Court, and two Justices of Appeal of the CA of the High Court.

26.  In HCAL 925/2023, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review against the former Chief Justice, the Chief Justice, one Justice of Appeal of the CA of the High Court, the former Secretary for Justice, the former Chairman of the Hong Kong Bar Association, a newspaper company and an individual who was a campaign advisor to the Chief Executive.

27.  In HCAL 1718/2023, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review against two permanent judges and one non-permanent judge of the CFA.

28.  In HCAL 1827/2023, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review against the Director of Liaison Office of Central People’s Government in HKSAR, the Director of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office in Beijing, the Chief Executive, the Secretary for Justice, and the Chief Justice of the CFA.

29.  Before turning to the merits of each individual application, a few common remarks can be made.

30.  As I pointed out in in my earlier case management decision, I had taken pains to explain to the Applicant that, in its judicial review jurisdiction, the Court exercises a supervisory jurisdiction over administrative action.  The focus is on the integrity of the decision-making process.  An applicant for leave to apply for judicial review is required by the Rules of the High Court to identify (a) the impugned decision, judgment or order, (b) the public law grounds of the intended review, and (c) that those grounds are reasonably arguable.  If there is no identified decision the subject matter of the intended challenge, and/or there are no identified grounds of review, and/or the grounds identified are not reasonably arguable, then leave to apply for judicial review will be refused.

31.  Therefore, a Form 86, which has no entry in the boxes intended to identify the impugned decisions and/or the grounds of intended review – except perhaps to say ‘see attached’ – is not a sound start to an application for leave to apply for judicial review.  Many of the Applicant’s applications fall into that category.

32.  As the documents filed by the Applicant are mostly in Chinese, I have relied on English translation provided by the Court interpreter.  As the CA observed in CACV 151/2023 – see [2023] HKCA 1184, at §12 – it is proper for the Court to rely on the translation or interpretation provided by the Court interpreter.

D.  HCAL 679/2023

33.  I will deal with this application in some detail – much more detail than is strictly necessary for its resolution – as it is emblematic of the type of application repeated again and again in other applications.

34.  The Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review against the Chief Justice, three permanent judges and three non-permanent judges of the CFA, the Chief Judge of the High Court and two Justices of Appeal of the Court of Appeal of the High Court.

35.  The Applicant’s Form 86 dated 9 May 2023 has appended a separate document entitled “Notice of Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review” (申請司法覆核許可的通知書), which sets out court documents and HKSAR Basic Law provisions related to the relief sought (尋求濟助所關乎的法庭文件及香港特區基本法條例), the relief sought and the grounds for seeking the relief.  The Applicant purports to amend his Form 86 by way of his 4^th supporting affirmation dated 19 October 2023, enclosing an amended Notice of Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review, in which he seeks an additional form of relief.  I have taken into account the latest Form 86 and its attached document.

36.  The Applicant seeks the following relief (in English translation):

(1)  Request the Court to publicly interpret and explain clearly the statutory provisions of sections 5 and 18 of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance Cap 484 (“HKCFAO”), to avoid judicial misinterpretation and misunderstanding of Hong Kong SAR residents.

(2)  Request the Court to publicly confirm the public statement made by Lam VP, currently a permanent judge of the CFA, on 9 September 2020 at the hearing of CACV 552/2019, which is a judicial conclusion, namely “the Court of Final Appeal will surely not have enough lawful presiding judges to hear the above four interrelated Applicant’s applications for leave to appeal to CFA”, to avoid judicial conflicts and inconsistencies with the provisions regarding the constitution of the Appeal Committee in the HKCFAO.

(3)  Request the Court to order the 1^st putative respondent (i.e. the Chief Justice) to the 10^th respondent to reply specifically in respect of the Applicant’s judicial enquiries by letters to the CFA on 13 September 2021, 4 July 2022, 28 December 2022 and 17 April 2023.

(4)  Request the Court to consider seeking an interpretation of Article 25 of the Basic Law from the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, to ensure smooth judicial operation, protect judicial rights of Hong Kong residents and ensure that Hong Kong residents are all equal before the law, if the Court confirms Lam VP’s conclusion that it will be impossible to form a lawful Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal to hear the Applicant’s four applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

(5)  Request the Court to order without any condition that all judicial rights and litigation claims in the above four appeal cases (CACV 31/2018, CACV 216/2018, CACV 217/2019 and CACV 552/2019) be granted to the Applicant, if the Court does not consider seeking an interpretation from the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.

37.  As it is not really apparent from the Form 86, I asked the Applicant at the hearing to identify the actual decision the subject of his intended challenge.  He referred to the fact that he had written four letters to the Chief Justice, but had received no reply to them.  Therefore, he confirmed orally that the subject matter of the intended challenge was the Chief Justice’s failure to respond to his enquiries.

38.  As must be obvious, that does not provide fertile ground for a judicial review challenge, not least when there is no clear articulation of any public law complaint.  In oral submission, he merely suggested that if the Chief Justice keeps silent, his judicial rights could not be protected when he wishes to go ahead with further judicial review cases.

39.  Further, identifying the subject matter of the intended challenge in that way – being a complaint about the Chief Justice failing to respond to his enquiries – immediately begs the question why any of the 2^nd to 10^th putative respondents were named as such.

40.  For these reasons alone, the application stands to be dismissed.

41.  Further, as identified in the “court documents” related to the relief sought, the Applicant’s complaints arise from concluded actions in CACV 31/2018, CACV 216/2019, CACV 217/2019, CACV 552/2019, CACV 185/2017, FAMV 98/2018 and FAMV 178/2021.  The “four applications for leave to appeal to CFA”, as disclosed by way of the four copies of Form A exhibited to the Applicant’s supporting affirmation dated 9 May 2023 (and also his 5^th supporting affirmation dated 7 November 2023), are respectively (1) the Applicant’s intended application against the judgment dated 8 April 2021, [2021] HKCA 406, in CACV 31/2018, (2) the Applicant’s intended application against the judgment dated 26 April 2021, [2021] HKCA 494, in CACV 216/2019, (3) the Applicant’s intended application against the judgment dated 26 April 2021, [2021] HKCA 494 in CACV 217/2019, and (4) the Applicant’s intended application against the judgment dated 27 November 2020, [2020] HKCA 970, in CACV 552/2019.  Incidentally, as regards the last one, the Applicant enclosed wrong judgment [2021] HKCA 102, where the CA refused leave in repeated motions.

42.  As seen from the litigation history above, these four applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal all arose from judicial review applications against the judges and other judicial officers in respect of the proceedings in (1) CACV 185/2017, (2) FAMV 3/2016, FAMV 4/2016, FAMV 12/2016 and FAMV 28/2016, and (3) FAMV 98/2018.  The connection between the current application and the concluded actions is also acknowledged by the Applicant in his grounds for seeking reliefs, namely that the four applications for leave to appeal to the CFA involved in the present application for leave to judicial review all stemmed from CACV 185/2017 and FAMV 98/2018 (申請人本司法覆核申請涉及之四宗終審上訴申請案皆源自上述同一相互關連案(CACV 185/2017 & FAMV 98/2018)).

43.  It appears that the gist of the Applicant’s complaints is that, as many of the judges of the CFA were either made a defendant in CACV 185/2017 or presided over the proceedings in FAMV 98/2018 which he further challenged, Lam VP (as he then was) gave an indication on 9 September 2020 in CACV 552/2019 that there were insufficient judges of the CFA to constitute an Appeal Committee for the Applicant’s cause, which the Applicant contends would contradict sections 5 and 18 of the HKCFAO.  In his 5^th affirmation dated 7 November 2023, the Applicant expands the provisions allegedly contravened to include sections 6, 13 and 16.  The Applicant’s explanation for seeking relief is (in English translation):

1.  When considering whether to grant this application for judicial review, the only thing the Court needs to do is to confirm from the judicial perspective the actual identity of the judges involved in the above four related cases – whether they were defendants or presiding judges, rather than to waste (time and resources) to find out if the decisions in those cases are right or wrong, the reason being that the approach adopted would prove decisive in the ultimate selection of judges who would make up the Full Court of 5 judges and the Appeal Committee of 3 judges in the above four related CFA appeals.

2.  The 1^st and 3^rd to 5^th defendants in the original actions (CACV 185/2017 & FAMV 98/2018) are Geoffrey Ma, Roberto Ribeiro, Robert Tang and Joseph Fok, whilst the Chief Justice Andrew Cheung and non-permanent judge Patrick Chan are the judges hearing the CFA appeal in FAMV 98/2018. Except for former Chief Justice Ma who has retired, from 4 February 2017 until now, the above-mentioned 5 judges have remained in office among the 8 presiding judges of the Court of Final Appeal.

3.  The four applications for leave to appeal to CFA involved in the present application for leave to judicial review all stemmed from CACV 185/2017 and FAMV 98/2018, the same interrelated cases mentioned above.

4.  Mr Justice Lam VP (as he then was), when hearing the appeal in CACV 552/2019 on 9 September 2020, considered the need for recusal where the relevant judges involved had been a defendant or a presiding judge in the case, and pursuant to the provisions governing the composition of the Appeal Committee under the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap. 484) stated in open court that there would be insufficient number of CFA judges to constitute the Full Court of 5 judges and the Appeal Committee of 3 judges to hear the above four applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal; on top of that, he further specified to the Applicant that in terms of the composition of the Appeal Committee, it is plainly against the requirement of the statutory provisions to have the Committee comprising only of three non-permanent judges of the Court of Final Appeal.

5.  Before the Court of Final Appeal hears an application for leave to appeal, a Full Court of 5 judges and an Appeal Committee of 3 judges must be formed in accordance with the requirements in sections 5 and 18 of the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484:

•  The Full Court of 5 judges and the Appeal Committee of 3 judges shall be formed one after another in a sequential order.

•  Step 1: A legally effective Full Court of 5 judges shall be formed according to the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance.

•  Step 2: Select 3 judges from the 5 of the Full Court to form the Appeal Committee.

•  Step 3: The Appeal Committee of 3 judges would then commence hearing the application for leave to appeal.

•  The Full Court of 5 judges shall include the Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal, and/or 3 permanent judges of the Court of Final Appeal.

•  Before hearing any application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, the Full Court of 5 judges and the Appeal Committee of 3 judges should be legally formed and must exist in advance. If the Court of Final Appeal believes that the application for leave to appeal will not be granted and therefore handle the matter hastily by forming the Appeal Committee of 3 judges only, that would be a glaring omission of the Full Court from the system and a clear demonstration of the Court’s pre-existing stance that “they can make prejudgments”, and that is against the administration of justice!

6.  When the Applicant applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal in respect of CACV 552/2019 on 4 December 2020, he had already obtained from the Court of Appeal two CD-ROMs for the purpose of appeal. As for the judicial direction given in court by Mr. Justice Lam, permanent judge of the Court of Final Appeal, the audio recordings on the CD-ROMs can prove all that the Applicant has said are true.

44.  There is no merit whatsoever in the Applicant’s argument. First, an indication or observation made by Lam VP (as he then was) at a hearing is not amenable to judicial review.  It is trite that the judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court does not extend to a judicial decision of the High Court and the Court of Final Appeal: see, for example, Re Racal Communications Ltd [1981] AC 374, 384F-G, 392G-H; P v Commissioner of Independent Commission Against Corruption (2007) 10 HKCFAR 293, at §37; Chong Yu On v Court of Final Appeal [2020] HKCA 970, [2020] 5 HKLRD 780, at §§37-39.  I should note, that at one point, the Applicant contended that he raises no legal disputes but merely seeks this Court’s confirmation of “existing facts and evidence”, which is not the function of judicial review.  Again for this reason alone, I would dismiss the Applicant’s application.

45.  Second, this Court has no Pinochet jurisdiction (even assuming the Pinochet jurisdiction is available) to address an alleged injustice in the judgment of an ultimate court of appeal, when the proper venue is the CFA (as the CA observed in Chong Yu On v Court of Final Appeal at §§40-42).

46.  Third, even if this Court were prepared to look at the substance of the Applicant’s complaints, it is clear that the Applicant’s allegation has no substance.  First, the Applicant’s complaint against the former Chief Justice’s alleged disqualification in respect of CACV 185/2017 and FAMV 98/2018 had already been dealt with in Chong Yu On v Court of Final Appeal.   Further, as the judgment rendered from the hearing on 9 September 2020, [2020] HKCA 970 reveals at §§75-76, Lam VP (as he then was) held that there would in fact be a sufficient number of judges to constitute the Appeal Committee, as the Chief Justice is empowered to appoint more than one non-permanent judge to sit in one Appeal Committee when such necessity arises.

47.  I would add that it is the Applicant’s decision to launch groundless attacks against the judges of the CFA and of the High Court (who also enjoy judicial immunity from legal action in the performance of their judicial functions pursuant to Article 85 of the Basic Law) that lands the Applicant in the situation where he finds himself.  However large the pool of judges may be, if the Applicant continues to make whoever hears his case a defendant in an action or a subject of his challenge (as he did), he must most certainly find himself in the situation where a quorum cannot be formed without the judge who is being sued or challenged: see Chong Yu On v Court of Final Appeal at §67.

48.  Fourth, though the Applicant makes reference to Article 25 of the Basic Law (equality before the law), that provision is not engaged.  There is nothing that can be arguably said to amount to unequal treatment for the Applicant.  The specific law that he is invoking, namely the HKCFAO, does not differentiate between people and treats him and other Hong Kong residents equally.

49.  The Applicant’s application is clearly an abuse of the court process.  As is evident in the voluminous materials enclosed to the Applicant’s application, his true motive is to ventilate his discontent against the judges and other judicial officers who were involved in the concluded actions mentioned above, since when the Applicant has continuously made serious allegations against the judges and the judicial officers and has filed various complaints at the Secretariat for Complaints against Judicial Conduct.  Those complaints are groundless, have been rejected in other actions and have no direct bearing in this application.

50.  It is also abusive to seek to make collateral attacks on previous court decisions.

51.  I would add that an application for leave to apply for judicial review should be properly framed when first issued.  The judicial review application procedure is not intended to be some rolling process where an applicant gradually adds matters by way of a series of affirmations following the original application.  Yet that is the approach adopted by the Applicant, as I have previously observed: see [2023] HKCFI 2840 at §22.  He may act in person, but he is actually a reasonably sophisticated court user, with more experience of litigation than perhaps many junior barristers.  As has been remarked before, the Applicant has the sophistication to seek to camouflage his proceedings as if they were for various different purposes, other than the actual collateral attacks which they make on previous judgments of the Court.

52.  In his supporting affirmation dated 9 May 2023, the Applicant has enclosed his letters dated 13 September 2021, 4 July 2022, 28 December 2022, 17 April 2023, in which (in addition to the complaints summarized above) he accused three permanent judges of the Court of Final Appeal of “at the same time unanimously ma[king] false declaration to directly pervert the course of justice” and various judges of “treat[ing] Article 25 Chapter III of the Basic Law as nothing” and mounted a groundless allegation against the Chief Justice.  There is no substance in the Applicant’s serious allegations, which either stem from his misunderstanding of the court procedures or are simply baseless conjecture.

53.  In his 2^nd supporting affirmation dated 4 September 2023, the Applicant has enclosed his application to fix a date for the hearing and various court letters in CACV 185/2017, the order from FAMV 98/2018, a complaint letter by him dated 24 March 2020, a newspaper article dated 18 February 2021, and various provisions from the HKCFAO.  The Applicant’s intention, it appears, is to repeat his complaint against the former Chief Justice for his alleged disqualification in respect of CACV 185/2017 and the serious allegations against the Chief Justice.  As I have said above, the Applicant’s complaint against the former Chief Justice had been dealt with, and there is no substance in his serious allegations against the Chief Justice.

54.  In his 3^rd supporting affirmation dated 11 September 2023, (in addition to the complaints summarized above, for which the Applicant has enclosed further documents such as his correspondence with the court in respect of FAMV 98/2018, his application to fix a date for hearing and other correspondence with the court in respect of CACV 552/2019), the Applicant has enclosed his 13 written complaints of various dates lodged at the Secretariat for Complaints against Judicial Conduct against various judges and other judicial officers.  The Applicant’s written complaints do not have a direct bearing on this application, which in any event centre on his complaint against the former Chief Justice for his alleged disqualification to hear FAMV 98/2018 and the serious allegations against various judges for “turn[ing] themselves into accomplices to perverting the course of justice”.  I can dismiss them as irrelevant and groundless.

55.  In his 4^th supporting affirmation dated 19 October 2023, the Applicant has enclosed two pages of the daily cause list of the High Court on 13 March 2018 and two webpage excerpts relating to a judge who was not involved in the Applicant’s actions and an individual who was a member of the Chief Executive’s council of advisers, which have nothing to do with the Applicant’s application.

56.  In his 5^th supporting affirmation dated 7 November 2023, other than re-enclosing his amended Notice of Application dated 19 October 2023, the Applicant has enclosed numerous documents, whereby he alleges various provisions of the Basic Law were contravened.

(1)  In respect of Article 48 of the Basic Law (the Chief Executive’s powers and functions), it appears that the Applicant’s complaint is that the Chief Executive and the Secretary for Justice by emails dated 26 and 28 July 2023 had blocked his emails dated 23 and 25 July 2018.  As I held in HCAL 1264/2022, [2023] HKCFI 1178, there is no substance in the Applicant’s complaint.

(2)  In respect of Articles 27 (freedom of speech) and 30 (freedom of privacy and communication) of the Basic Law, the Applicant demands that Google must unblock his YouTube and email account.  The Applicant fails to identify any plausible basis for this Court to exercise its judicial review jurisdiction over private companies who were not exercising a public function.

(3)  In respect of Article 90 of the Basic Law (Chief Justice’s qualification requirement), again it appears that the Applicant repeats his serious allegations against the Chief Justice.  As I have held above, there is no substance in the Applicant’s complaint.

(4)  In respect of Article 25 of the Basic Law (equality before the law), the Applicant has re-enclosed court documents in respect of CACV 185/2017 and FAMV 98/2018.  As I have held above, this complaint has no merit.  Under the same complaint, the Applicant has also enclosed court documents from the concluded actions of FAMV 3/2016, FAMV 4/2016, FAMV 12/2016, FAMV 28/2016, FAMV 38/2016, FAMV 178/2021 and even underlying documents concerning the incident regarding his late father’s grave in Shenzhen.  It is unfortunate that I must again emphasize that judicial review is not the venue for re-opening and re-litigating issues already concluded in the judicial process.

(5)  The Applicant has re-enclosed written complaints against various judges dated 16 and 17 August 2021 and 8 December 2021.  For the same reason I have given, I do not find such materials helpful for the Applicant’s application.

(6)  In respect of Article 22 of the Basic Law, the Applicant has enclosed his correspondence with the putative respondents. Again, the Applicant fails to identify any plausible basis for this Court to exercise its judicial review jurisdiction over each of putative respondent, or otherwise identify or establish a public law error committed by each of them.

57.  In summary, the Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law ground of review with any realistic prospect of success.  Rather, he has abused the court process by seeking to re-litigate matters already concluded, or to repeat allegations previously dealt with and/or which have absolutely no merit or basis.  He has also deluged the Court, on a rolling basis, with voluminous documents, the bulk of which is obviously entirely irrelevant even to the complaints he seeks to raise.

58.  The application for leave to apply for judicial review is therefore dismissed.

E.  HCAL 696/2023

59.  The Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review against 15 members of the Legislative Council.

60.  The Applicant’s Form 86 dated 11 May 2023 has appended a Notice of Application for Leave for Judicial Review, which fails to identify any judgment, order, decision or other proceeding in respect of which relief is being sought against the putative respondents.  This is in breach of the mandatory requirements of Order 53, and is itself fatal to the application.

61.  Instead, the Notice sets out “email documents and Hong Kong Basic Law Ordinance provisions” related to the relief sought (尋求濟助所關乎的電郵文件及香港基本法條例), which the Applicant adduces by his supporting affirmation.  As well as documents concerning the Applicant’s email enquiries and YouTube account and the alleged relevant provision of the Legislative Council Ordinance Cap 542, the Applicant has again also enclosed the documents relating to (1) his serious allegations against the Chief Justice, (2) the former Chief Justice’s alleged disqualification in respect of CACV 185/2017 and FAMV 98/2018, and (3) the concluded actions in FAMV 3/2016, FAMV 4/2016, FAMV 12/2016 and FAMV 28/2016, which he has submitted in HCAL 679/2023.  For the re-submitted documents, it appears the Applicant only relies on them for the background to the Applicant’s complaint regarding his email enquiries, and I will not deal with these allegations again.

62.  The Applicant seeks the following relief (in English translation):

(1)  Request the Court to confirm that the issues mentioned in the four letters sent by the Applicant to the Chief Executive and the Secretary for Justice dated 23 and 25 July 2022 are all related to judicial interests or the public and to the possible violation of the Basic Law by the judicial officers of Hong Kong.

(2)  Request the Court to order the Legislative Council, chaired and headed by the President of the Legislative Council, to convene a public hearing for the Chief Executive and the Secretary for Justice to publicly reply to the Applicant’s four emails sent on 23 and 25 July 2022.

63.  In his grounds for relief sought, the Applicant alleges that as the Chief Executive has an unavoidable responsibility to give an account or make clarifications at the public hearing on behalf of the Government under Article 18 of the Basic Law in light of possible violations of the Basic Law, the Legislative Council has the responsibility to report to the society and thoroughly monitor the effective administration of the Hong Kong SAR, steadfastly safeguard the Basic Law, and ensure the Basic Law is fully implemented.  The Applicant also suggests that the 15 members of the Legislative Council had no legal basis to veto the public hearing, who were in no position or capacity to form any conclusion on behalf of the Chief Executive.

64.  First, this application is a re-run of his application in HCAL 1264/2022, [2023] HKCFI 1178, in which he asked the Court to order the Chief Executive and the Secretary for Justice to respond to the same four emails mentioned above.  In part, I dismissed his application for his failure to identify a public law error on the part of the Chief Executive or the Secretary for Justice: §§13-20. It follows that there is no plausible basis for the Legislative Council to be ordered to convene the public hearing for the Chief Executive or the Secretary for Justice to respond to the four emails mentioned above.

65.  The Applicant relies on section 16.8 of A Companion to the history, rule sand practice of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong SAR, which sets out the general procedure for convening a public hearing.  I do not think that this item would arguably give rise to a duty on the Legislative Council to hold a public hearing relating to any and all email enquiries as may be sent to the Chief Executive or the Secretary for Justice.

66.  In the Applicant’s 2^nd supporting affirmation dated 4 September 2023, the Applicant has enclosed his application to fix a date for the hearing and various court letters in CACV 185/2017, the order from FAMV 98/2018, a complaint letter by him dated 24 March 2020, a newspaper article dated 18 February 2021, and various provisions from the HKCFAO, simply duplicating what he submitted for HCAL 679/2023, and which I have dealt with above.

67.  In the Applicant’s 3^rd supporting affirmation dated 11 September 2023, the Applicant has enclosed more of the same materials which he also submitted for HCAL 679/2023.

68.  The Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law ground of review with any realistic prospect of success.

69.  The application for leave to apply for judicial review is therefore dismissed.

F.  HCAL 924/2023

70.  This was the application which the Applicant chose to address first in his oral submissions.

71.  The Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review against the former Chief Justice, the Chief Justice, two permanent judges and two non-permanent judges of the CFA, the Registrar of the High Court, and two Justices of Appeal of the Court of Appeal of the High Court.

72.  The Applicant’s Form 86 dated 12 June 2023 has appended a Notice of Application for Leave for Judicial Review, which sets out the court documents in respect of CACV 185/2017 and FAMV 98/2018, along with the extracts from the Guide to Judicial Conduct (2022), a 4-page note setting out what seems to be a general introduction to the offence of perverting the course of justice in various common law jurisdictions, the provisions of the Chinese Constitution and Basic Law Article 25 (equality before the law) and Article 35 (right to confidential legal advice and access to court and right to institute legal proceedings against acts of executive authorities), which the Applicant adduces by his supporting affirmation of the same date.

73.  The relief sought by the Applicant includes that:

(1)  the Court must abide by the Basic Law and the Guide to Judicial Conduct and magnify the importance thereof;

(2)  the Court must confirm the identities of various judges and judicial officers in HCA 244/2017, CACV 185/2017 and FAMV 98/2018;

(3)  the Court must confirm whether the procedure and process in FAMV 98/2018 contravenes Article 25 of the Basic Law and to condemn the relevant judicial officers for violating Article 25 of the Basic Law, the Guide to Judicial Conduct and for perverting the course of justice.

74.  It is self-evident that most (if not all) of the relief sought is not proper relief to be granted by this Court in a judicial review application.

75.  The Applicant’s grounds for relief add nothing, but merely point to the court documents as clear proof of the identities of the judges and judicial officers and repeat the allegation about a violation of the Guide to Judicial Conduct and the legal guidelines for perverting the course of justice.

76.  The complaints are in substance the same as those advanced in HCAL 679/2023.  The only new point raised is the allegation regarding the violation of Article 35 of the Basic Law.  However, Article 35 of the Basic Law is clearly not engaged, as the Applicant completely fails to identify the alleged denial of any of his rights to confidential legal advice and choice of lawyers (where he has engaged no legal representation) as well as access to courts and to judicial remedies (where he has had access to courts in respect of various actions mentioned above).

77.  In three further affirmations, the Applicant has enclosed the same documents as those filed in HCAL 679/2023.  This is unsurprising, as it is evident that this application is another attempted re-run of the Applicant’s application in HCAL 679/2023.

78.  In his oral submissions, the Applicant essentially repeated the same complaints about the former Chief Justice, namely that the former Chief Justice was disqualified from hearing his application under FAMV 98/2018 because he was a party to the proceedings.  But, the CA has already at some length explained that the former Chief Justice was not a party to that application, or the proceedings below in HCA 244/2017 and CACV 185/2017: see [2020] HKCA 970 (CACV 552/2019).

79.  The Applicant also repeated the allegation of inequality before the law, the alleged violations of the Guide to Judicial Conduct, and complaints about previous dealings with judges and judicial officers.

80.  The Applicant further referred to a public meeting at which he says he asked a former Chief Executive whether the former Chief Justice had committed a violation of the law, to which (the Applicant says) the answer was ‘yes’, and the Applicant was asked to send materials to him, though he had never received a response.  Whilst there must be at least some serious doubt that the former Chief Executive would actually have suggested that the former Chief Justice had committed a violation of the law, whether there has been a breach of the law is decided by the Courts.  The Court has already decided that there was not, and explained why not (see above).

81.  The Applicant also suggested he had made a report to the Police in November 2021 and provided the materials, which either are the same as or echo the materials provided in these various applications.  With respect, it does not seem to me to matter, against the litigation background I have identified, what any response of any individual police officer might have been to that material.  The relevant question has already come before the Court and been determined.

82.  The Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law ground of review with any realistic prospect of success.

83.  The application for leave to apply for judicial review is therefore dismissed.

G.  HCAL 925/2023

84.  It will be noted that this application is consecutively numbered immediately after the previous application.

85.  The Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review against the former Chief Justice and the Chief Justice, one Justice of Appeal of the Court of Appeal of the High Court, the former Secretary for Justice, the former Chairman of the Bar Association, a newspaper company and an individual who was a campaign advisor to the Chief Executive.

86.  The Applicant’s Form 86 dated 12 June 2023 has appended a Notice of Application for Leave for Judicial Review, which sets out the “news, Hong Kong Basic Law Ordinance provisions and documentary proof” related to the relief sought, including Article 90 of the Basic Law, a 1-page note which seems to contain certain statements relating to the recommendation process of the Chief Justice of the CFA, a news article allegedly authored by the 6^th putative respondent on 18 February 2021, the extracts from the Guide to Judicial Conduct (2022) and a 2-page complaint by the Applicant containing serious allegations against the Chief Justice (which just replicate the Applicant’s grounds for relief), which the Applicant adduces by his supporting affirmation of the same date.

87.  The relief sought by the Applicant includes that the Court must abide by the Basic Law and the Guide to Judicial Conduct and magnify the importance thereof, that the Court must confirm whether there was a violation of Article 90 of the Basic Law, and whether the 6^th putative respondent’s statement involved fabrication and libel.

88.  As well as by now sounding in part familiar, it is again self-evident that most (if not all) of the relief sought is not proper relief to be granted by this Court in a judicial review application.

89.  The Applicant’s grounds for relief contain serious allegations against the Chief Justice, other judges, the former Secretary for Justice and the former Chairman of the Bar Association for committing “an act of fraud on the Basic Law, which was a breach, and even involved underhand secret dealings of government resources” and for violating the Guide to Judicial Conduct.  As I have held above, there is no substance in the Applicant’s serious allegations, which are simply baseless conjecture.

90.  The Applicant’s reliance on Article 90 of the Basic Law is misplaced, because that provision is not engaged.  Article 90 stipulates that, inter alia, the Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal shall be a Chinese citizen who is a permanent resident of Hong Kong.  There is nothing to suggest, and neither does the Applicant suggest, that the Chief Justice has not satisfied the requirement under this Article.

91.  As to the former Secretary for Justice, the Applicant simply fails to identify or establish a public law error committed by the former Secretary for Justice or otherwise substantiate his serious allegations.

92.  As to the former Chairman of the Bar Association, the Applicant also fails to identify or establish a public law error committed, fails to establish a plausible basis for this Court to exercise its judicial review jurisdiction, and fails to substantiate his serious allegations.

93.  As to the 6^th and 7^th putative respondents, the Applicant fails to identify any plausible basis for this Court to exercise its judicial review jurisdiction over private companies and individuals who were not exercising a public function.  Indeed, the Applicant has made no complaint whatsoever and sought no relief against the 6^th putative respondent, and rather sought to vindicate and support the 7^th putative respondent.

94.  With this application, the Applicant has again enclosed the same documents as those filed in HCAL 679/2023, by a series of further affirmations.  Much of the material has no apparent connection with this application or it adds nothing to this application.  In any event, I have dealt with the materials above.

95.  The Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law grounds of review with any realistic prospect of success.

96.  The application for leave to apply for judicial review is therefore dismissed.

H.  HCAL 1718/2023

97.  The Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review against two permanent judges and one non-permanent judge of the Court of Final Appeal.

98.  The Applicant’s Form 86 dated 26 September 2023 has appended a Notice of Application for Leave to Judicial Review, which refers to – and hence duplicates – the same documents as those enclosed to his 5^th supporting affirmation dated 7 November 2023 filed in HCAL 679/2023 relating to his allegations regarding Article 25 of the Basic Law, which the Applicant adduces by his supporting affirmation in this action. The Applicant has further enclosed his written complaint dated 17 August 2021 against two permanent judges of the CFA lodged at the Secretariat for Complaints against Judicial Conduct, Article 25 of the Basic Law and the extracts to the Guide to Judicial Conduct (2022), which he has submitted in HCAL 679/2023 and HCAL 924/2023.  The Applicant has also enclosed two excerpts of what seems to be news articles in respect of an unrelated matter, which have no apparent connection with this application.

99.  The relief sought by the Applicant is highly similar to that sought in HCAL 924/2023, and includes that the Court must confirm that the putative respondents perverted the course of justice and violated Article 25 of the Basic Law and the Guide to Judicial Conduct and to publicly condemn such violations.  Rather glaringly, the Applicant also requests the Court to re-open the issues in concluded actions, i.e. to “confirm that the judgments in the above 6 final appeal cases are null and void and are in breach of Article 25 of Chapter III of the Basic Law; and order that the Applicant’s 6 final appeal cases (FAMV 3-4-12-28-38/2016 and FAMV 178/2021) be allowed without condition attached. And the claims of the relevant six appeals and interests vested to the winning party shall all be to the Applicant”.  That is plainly not the function of the Court exercising its judicial review jurisdiction.

100.  The Applicant’s grounds for relief sought are but a repetition of his allegations against the three permanent judges in his supporting affirmation dated 9 May 2023 filed in HCAL 679/2023.

101.  Again, the Applicant has filed further evidence on a rolling basis.  In his 2^nd affirmation dated 24 October 2023, the Applicant enclosed documents either in connection to an unrelated judge or an unrelated matter, the extract of the daily cause list on 13 March 2018 in different matters, a direction made in a different matter, and the directions and correspondence in CACV 185/2017, FAMV 38/2016 and FAMV 98/2018.  The Applicant’s apparent intention, as it appears from the description of the documents above and his written complaints against two judges dated 16 August 2021 and 19 August 2021 lodged at the Secretariat for Complaints against Judicial Conduct, seems to be to assert an alleged double standard by two judges (other than the putative respondents), which has no apparent connection with this application.

102.  In his third supporting affirmation dated 7 November 2023, the Applicant has enclosed the same documents as those enclosed for HCAL 679/2023.  Indeed, it is quite clear that this application is but another re-run of some of the Applicant’s complaints against the judges in HCAL 679/2023 and HCAL 924/2023.

103.  In his oral submissions, the Applicant again referred to the various previous CFA applications, and repeated his complaints about the way with which they were dealt by the CFA – including where the applications were dismissed under the Rule 7 procedure, though that was a matter previously explained by Registrar Lung in his Decision in HCA 244/2017 at §§13-14 and by Chow J in [2019] HKCFI 1073 at §§5-8.

104.  The complaint was also again about whether individual judges could or could not read Chinese, and the Applicant complained that if there had been a hearing he could have corrected any mistake in the interpretation.  He emphasised his submission that, from prior experience, the Court will not prepare English versions of documents, so his applications must have been dealt with without an English version provided, and without a hearing at which any interpretation (if made) could be corrected by him.  But, with respect, this is simply repeating points made numerously in earlier matters, and the applicable principles were set out by the CA in CACV 151/2023, [2023] HKCA 1184.

105.  The Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law grounds of review with any realistic prospect of success.

106.  The application for leave to apply for judicial review is therefore dismissed.

I.   HCAL 1827/2023

107.  The Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review against the Director of Liaison Office of Central People’s Government in HKSAR, the Director of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office in Beijing, the Chief Executive, the Secretary for Justice, and the Chief Justice of the CFA.

108.  The Applicant’s Form 86 dated 11 October 2023 has appended a Notice of Application for Leave for Judicial Review, which refers to the same documents as those enclosed to his 5^th supporting affirmation dated 7 November 2023 filed in HCAL 679/2023, which the Applicant adduces by his supporting affirmation of the same date.

109.  The relief sought by the Applicant includes that:

(1)  The Court must order the Chief Executive to duly perform his duties and order the Chief Executive and the Secretary for Justice to respond to the Applicant’s four email enquiries (notably being the same emails as were considered in HCAL 1264/2022: see above).

(2)  The Court must order the Chief Justice to respond to the Applicant’s written enquiries sent on 8 April 2021, 13 September 2021, 4 July 2022 and 28 December 2022 (notably being the same as those considered in HCAL 679/2023: see above).

(3)  The Court must order the Secretariat for Complaints against Judicial Conduct to immediately follow up and give an account of the Applicant’s written complaints filed on 16 and 17 August 2021 and 8 December 2021.

(4)  The Court must confirm that the China Liaison Office of HKSAR has the right to supervise Hong Kong affairs including the implementation of the Basic Law and order or remind the China Liaison Office and the Hong Kong and Macau Office to perform their duties.

110.  The Applicant’s grounds for relief merely point to the relevant putative respondents’ lack of response and repeat his serious allegations against the judges of the CFA.

111.  In his second supporting affirmation dated 24 October 2023, the Applicant has enclosed the same documents as those filed in HCAL 1718/2023.

112.  It is clear that the relief against the Secretariat for Complaints against Judicial Conduct is not properly sought, which is not a putative respondent in this application.

113.  As to the Directors of the China Liaison Office and the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, the Applicant fails to identify any plausible basis for this Court to exercise its judicial review jurisdiction over them, or otherwise identify or establish a public law error committed by either of them.  In his oral submissions, the Applicant was unable to answer my question as to why I might have jurisdiction over officers of the Liaison Office or the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office.  The Applicant simply said that the reason for these proceedings was because he happened by chance upon an article dated 20 April 2020 which said that the Liaison Office has power to supervise on behalf of the Central People’s Government.

114.  As to the Chief Executive and the Secretary for Justice, the Applicant’s complaints are the same as those advanced, and dealt with by me, in HCAL 1264/2022, [2023] HKCFI 1178.

115.  As to the Chief Justice, I have already dealt with those matters under HCAL 679/2023.

116.  The Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law ground of review with any realistic prospect of success.

117.  The application for leave to apply for judicial review is therefore dismissed.

J.   Conclusion

118.  To conclude, the Applicant completely fails to identify any plausible or reasonably arguable ground for judicial review.  I accordingly dismiss each and every one of the Applicant’s applications.

119.  I make no order as to costs.

K.  Restricted Proceedings Order

120.  As already stated, Anthony Chan J made the RPO, by which the Applicant is restricted from commencing, without leave of the Court, fresh proceedings concerning any matters involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in FAMV 3/2016, FAMV 4/2016, FAMV 12/2016, FAMV 28/2016, HCA 244/2017, CACV 185/2017, FAMV 98/2018, HCAL 2941/2019, CACV 552/2019, CACV 216/2019, CACV 217/2019 and FAMV 178/2021.

121.  Having considered the circumstances of the Applicant’s applications, I respectfully agree and I am likewise satisfied that the making of a RPO was both necessary and appropriate.  The RPO might also have referenced other previous decisions, such as HCAL 765/2020, HCAL 112/2021, HCAL 1264/2022, and CACV 151/2023, but as they in effect deal with the same issue as those which are mentioned, that is unnecessary.

122.  As Anthony Chan J said, the Applicant is of course entitled to his own views on judgments of the court, but he is not entitled to abuse the process of the court for the purpose of making collateral attacks on those judgments.  I entirely agree with the view that the Court must act to put a stop to the Applicant’s abuse of process, and so as to preserve the Court’s limited and precious resources for proper distribution amongst court users.  Had an RPO not already been put in place, I would (subject to hearing from the Applicant) very likely have made such an order.

123.  In short, enough is enough.