THE HONG KONG SETTLERS HOUSING CORPORATION LTD v. FUNG TAK LOK

DCCJ 39/2024

[2025] HKDC 261

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 39 OF 2024

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REASONS FOR DECISION

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I.  INTRODUCTION

1.  Upon hearing arguments on 14 February 2025:-

(1)  I allowed the defendant’s application (the “Setting-aside Application”) by summons filed on 25 April 2024 (the “Defendant’s Summons”) to set aside the judgment entered in default of notice of intention to defend on 12 April 2024 (the “Default Judgment”); and

(2)  I dismissed an application (the “Joinder Application”) in the same Defendant’s Summons to join her brother as the 2^nd defendant to the proceedings.

2.  I also heard arguments on costs after my decisions, and I will make costs orders here.

3.  I shall give the reasons for my decision to allow the Setting-aside Application first.

II.  BACKGROUND

4.  The background has been set out in §§2 – 6 of my decision ([2024] HKDC 2110) (the “CMC Decision”) delivered at the Case Management Conference (the “CMC”) on 16 December 2024, and I shall not repeat the same here.

5.  In respect of the procedural history specific to the present action:-

(1)  The writ of summons was issued on 4 January 2024, claiming possession of the property (the “Premises”) known as Flat No 111, 1/F, Man Lee House, Tai Hang Sai Estate (“THSE”). The writ was endorsed with a statement of claim. The plaintiff’s claim is on the ground of termination of tenancy between the plaintiff as landlord and the defendant as tenant. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the subject tenancy agreement (the “Tenancy Agreement”) dated 25 February 2022 had expired on 31 July 2022 and continued on a monthly basis thereafter, or alternatively on a month-to-month tenancy at will. On 30 November 2023, a notice of termination was served on the defendant requiring the defendant to quit and deliver vacant possession by 31 December 2023, but the defendant refused;

(2)  The writ of summons was served by inserting the same into the letterbox on 8 January 2024 for the address (the “Address”) of the Premises;

(3)  On 12 April 2024, the defendant having filed no notice of intention to defend, the Court entered final judgment; and

(4)  On 25 April 2024, the defendant filed the Defendant’s Summons.

III.  LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN RELATION TO SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

6.  The legal principles in relation to setting aside default judgment are trite. Where the service of the writ is regular, then the Court would have to consider whether there is real prospect of success in the defence. If so, the Court would usually set aside the default judgment, although it still retains discretion not to do so considering all the relevant circumstances. If the service of the writ is irregular, then the Court would usually set aside the default judgment without consideration of merits, although again it still retains discretion not to do so considering all the relevant circumstances.

IV.  SERVICE

7.  There is no dispute that the Address was the usual and last known address. The defendant also effectively deposed that he received the writ on 8 January 2024 (the date of the insertion of the writ into the letterbox). The service was regular.

V.  MERITS OF DEFENCE

8.  One of the defences raised by the defendant is essentially the same as the grounds of judicial review in the Form 86 of the judicial review (HCAL 1600/2024) (the “Judicial Review”) mentioned in §1 of the CMC Decision and summarised in §18 of my decision of 16 January 2025 in DCCJ 5582/2023 ([2025] HKDC 97) (the “DCCJ 5582/2023 Decision”).

9.  In the light of the DCCJ 5582/2023 Decision as well as my decision in DCCJ 5579/2023 ([2025] HKDC 142), Mr Michael Lok (leading Mr Paul Law), counsel for the plaintiff, fairly makes no submissions on the merits of the defence. I shall just briefly explain my reasoning here.

10.  As I said in §24 of the DCCJ 5582/2023 Decision, grounds in public law may constitute a valid defence to a private claim: Wandsworth LBC v Winder [1985] 1 AC 461 at 506C-D, 509E-H; North British Housing Association v Matthews [2005] 1 WLR 3133 at §12; Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] 2 AC 465 at §60.

11.  Further, Coleman J’s grant of leave for the Judicial Review in [2024] HKCFI 2592, as explained in my decision in DCCJ 5579/2023 at §16, means that the grounds in the Judicial Review are reasonably arguable “having realistic prospect of success”.

12.  This in my view means that there is a real prospect of success in the defence of the Judicial Review to the plaintiff’s claim.

13.  Given my view on the defence of the Judicial Review, I do not need to scrutinise the merits of the defendant’s other defences, save and except that provisionally, I have quite some doubt over the merits of the other defences. I also make a note here that the plaintiff makes it clear that it refrains from making submissions on these other defences.

VI.  RESIDUAL DISCRETION

14.  This usually is sufficient to set aside the judgment. However, in determining how to exercise my discretion, the Court has to consider all relevant circumstances depending on the individual facts of that case, for example, why the default occurred; the defendant’s conduct after he had notice of the proceedings; an explanation for the time taken for the delay; and any prejudice to the plaintiff and third parties. That said, “[t]he consideration of merits would usually transcend any reasons given by the defendant for the delay in making the application… This may be so even where the explanation given by him on oath is false…”: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2025 Vol 1 §13/9/13.

15.  Further, “the right to apply to set aside on the ground of a meritorious defence is not lost even if the defendant, having had the judgment entered against him in default of acknowledgement of service, obtained from the plaintiff time in which to pay”: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2025 Vol 1 §13/9/15.

16.  In summary, the defendant gave the following reasons for the default in filing acknowledgement of service:-

(1)  She was not legally represented at the material times;

(2)  The service of the writ of summons on the defendant caused tremendous pressure to her. At that time, she was a mother of two children, one aged 9 and one aged 5 months only, and she had a job as an insurance agent. She had to work during the day and take care of the children during the night. Further, at that time, she had not fully recovered from the delivery of his second child;

(3)  She applied for legal aid on 17 January 2024, and believed that the proceedings would not proceed until the determination of her legal aid application. The application was refused on 27 March 2024; and

(4)  On 17 April 2024, when the plaintiff notified her of the Default Judgment, she then realised that “[her] belief was wrong and these proceedings had not been stayed pending the determination of [her] legal aid application”.

17.  As regards (1), the Court of Appeal has time and again emphasised that litigants, whether legally represented or not, shall comply with the legal procedures and practice directions: see 朱賽金 對 高等法院司法常務官 [2020] HKCA 914 at §21. Further, the acknowledgment of service specifically stated in Chinese and English that the defendant had to return the acknowledgment of service to the Court. Thus, the mere fact that she was not legally represented is not a good reason.

18.  As regards (2), the situation may be difficult for the defendant, but there was nothing to prevent the defendant from at least making a request to the plaintiff in writing for more time, rather than simply doing nothing.

19.  As regards (3) and (4), her legal aid application was refused on 27 March 2024. So, even according to her own belief, she should be aware that the time started to run again after 27 March 2024.

20.  Mr Lok, for the plaintiff, highlights the fact that the plaintiff had engaged solicitors even before the commencement of the present action, and the solicitors went off the record only when they were asked whether they had instructions to accept service. Mr Lok asks me to consider the evidence holistically and find that the defendant’s conduct was deliberately evasive. While the solicitors went off record when asked whether they had instructions to accept service, concern over costs rather than evasion of service might be the true reason. Having considered the evidence holistically, I do not think there is sufficient evidence before me to come to a rather serious finding that the defendant deliberately evaded service.

21.  In the circumstances, the only delay for which I find good reason is the stay period upon her legal aid application from 17 January 2024 to 27 March 2024.

22.  For the delay from 8 January 2024 to 17 January 2024 and 28 March 2024 to 25 April 2024 (totalling about one month), I find no good reason. Be that as it may, the delay is about one month only.

23.  As regards prejudice, the plaintiff says that if I would set aside the Default Judgment, the plaintiff would have to incur extra costs which the plaintiff would find it difficult to recover from the defendant who has allegedly lack of financial resources.

24.  In my view, the extra costs cannot be a prejudice. As the defendant has a defence of real prospects of success, it is too early to say that the plaintiff would be awarded costs order. In any event, difficulty in recovering costs is always inherent in any litigation. If the plaintiff’s point is valid, then every plaintiff would find a way to raise this as a ground to object to setting aside default judgment. This, in my view, is absurd.

25.  The plaintiff also says that in refusing to set aside the Default Judgment, the defendant would suffer no prejudice because the defendant no longer lives in the Premises.

26.  However, in my view, if the defendant has a valid defence, then it is her right that would be prejudiced if I am not to set aside the Default Judgment. Although she does not reside in the Premises anymore, whether she has a valid defence or not clearly would affect the parties’ positions in, for example, how the redevelopment could be carried out.

27.  Lastly, Mr Lok, for the plaintiff, complains that the defendant only raises the defence of Judicial Review in her reply affirmation, but not in the draft defence and counterclaim. I accept that the defendant did not clearly raise the defence in the draft defence, and the defendant’s such conduct is not satisfactory, but given that the defendant has made it clear that she now relies on the defence of the Judicial Review as well, I have no doubt that her legal representative would amend the draft defence clearly to reflect this latest position. (The defendant would only have herself to blame if she does not make such amendment to the draft.) In this regard, I see no prejudice that would be suffered by the plaintiff, who, as I said, has fairly refrained from making submissions on the merits of this defence. It is not a situation where the plaintiff complains that because this defence was raised in the reply affirmation, the plaintiff had not been given sufficient opportunity to respond.

28.  Having considered the above, namely the short delay and lack of any real prejudice, and especially the real prospect of success in the defence of the Judicial Review, I find it appropriate to exercise my discretion to set aside the Default Judgment.

VII.  CONCLUSION ON SETTING-ASIDE APPLICATION

29.  In the circumstances, I allowed the Setting-aside Application.

30.  As regards costs, there are two sets of costs, namely, costs of the Setting-aside Application itself and costs of the hearing for the application. Having heard counsel’s submissions, for the costs of the Setting-aside Application itself, despite the shortness of delay, I have still found that there is no good reason for the delay.

31.  Ms Leung (for the defendant) submits that the costs after the CMC of 16 December 2024 or after my DCCJ 5582/2023 Decision on 16 January 2025 should be to the defendant because by then the plaintiff should have known that its opposition to setting aside would be unmeritorious. I do not agree that by the CMC of 16 December 2024, the plaintiff would have such knowledge. As regards 16 January 2025, Ms Leung’s argument bites the defendant as well – the plaintiff did not prepare any further papers in opposition to the setting aside application after 16 January 2025, but on the contrary, it was the defendant who still kept preparing affirmation in support and in reply. If by 16 January 2025, according to Ms Leung, the plaintiff should have known its opposition to be unmeritorious, the flipped side is that the defendant should also have known that there was no need to file any further evidence, and it would be the defendant’s own fault in incurring costs for such further evidence.

32.  Overall, I still think that the defendant should pay the plaintiff the costs of the application itself. The costs is summarily assessed at HK$75,000.

33.  As regards the costs of the hearing itself, as I have allowed the Defendant’s Summons, the costs of the hearing should follow the event. Unfortunately, in breach of PD14.3, the defendant did not file and serve the statement of costs together with her skeleton submissions. Based on Au-Yeung J’s warning in §44 of Huang Chang Fa v Tong Yuk Ping [2023] HKCFI 1894, I gave a stern warning in §26 of my decision in DCCJ 5579/2023 ([2025] HKDC 142) that if the plaintiff’s solicitors would fail again to comply with PD 14.3 the plaintiff’s solicitors may be met with personal costs order. Ms Leung (for the defendant) did refer to this decision in her written submissions for other matters. Thus, the defendant’s solicitors, assumed to have read their own counsel’s submissions in discharge of their duties as solicitors, should have had knowledge of my stern warning. Despite such knowledge, they still failed to comply with PD14.3. Ms Leung accepted that there was no good reason for the non-compliance, and although the warning there was made to the plaintiff’s solicitors, I do not think that any reasonable legal practitioners would therefore think that they could still continue to disregard PD14.3 in the circumstances. To save her solicitors, Ms Leung submits that a statement of costs would have to be filed and served together with the skeleton submissions only if they would seek summary assessment but she would like to seek taxation instead. I do not accept such submission because the default rule for costs of interlocutory applications has been summary assessment since CJR was launched more than 15 years ago.

34.  I assess the costs to be HK$17,580, and I give a 20% discount representing HK$3,516 deduction. But for this relatively minor sum, I would have directed proceedings for personal costs against the defendant’s solicitors under Order 60 rule 8 of the Rules of District Court. However, I direct the defendant’s solicitors to explain specifically to the defendant that the deduction of HK$3,516 was a consequence of the failure to comply with PD14.3.

35.  After setting off of the two sets of costs (HK$75,000 – HK$14,064), the defendant shall pay the plaintiff costs of HK$60,936.

VIII.  JOINDER APPLICATION

36.  By the Joinder Application, the defendant seeks an order to join her brother Fung Dickson as the 2^nd defendant.

37.  The general legal principles in relation to a joinder application are set out in Elysium Ltd v Sum Ka Kuen Dominic [2023] 5 HKC 508 at §§20-24. In particular:-

(1)  The jurisdiction is discretionary;

(2)  “The rule requires some interest by the would-be intervener which is directly related to the subject matter of the action. A mere commercial interest in the outcome of the action divorced from its subject matter is not sufficient. The interest of the intervener must raise an existing pleaded issue not merely a contingent one…” (§22);

(3)  “The mere fact that relief may affect someone who is not a party in respect of his rights or obligations is not enough to give rise to jurisdiction under Order 15 rule 6(2)(b)…” (§23); and

(4)  “Whilst the Court will not at the joinder stage engage itself in a scrutiny of merits or an adjudication of facts, it does not mean that the Court would take an intervener’s assertion of sufficiency of interest at face value and ignore any obvious legal impediments to its claim. The Court will not exercise its discretion in favour of joinder if it is plain and obvious that the joinder of the proposed intervener would be pointless and futile…” (emphases added) (§24).

38.  With respect to Order 15 rule 6 of the Rules of District Court, a liberal application should be adopted to ensure that “all matters in dispute between the parties are completely and finally determined, and all multiplicity of legal proceedings with respect to any of those matters is avoided”: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2025 Vol 1 at §15/6/1.

39.  With respect to the Court’s power to join a person under Order 15 rule 10 of the Rules of District Court:-

“any person in actual possession of land who is not made a party to an action for possession of that land by a plaintiff against a defendant is entitled to be added under O. 15 r. 10 as a defendant before or after judgment, provided he has a bona fide independent claim to be in possession. However…, if the applicant has no independent claim because his rights are wholly dependent upon those of the defendant in the action, out he must go”: (emphasis added) see Yu Wing Kan v Lau Shuk Lan [1990] 2 HKLR 583 at 590.

40.  Ms Lydia Leung (leading Mr Christopher KH To), counsel for the defendant, time and again emphasises that for determining a joinder application, the Court should refrain from examining the merits of the claim or defence of the intended party. However, this is not what the legal principles are. As mentioned §37(4) above, “if it is plain and obvious that the joinder of the proposed intervener would be pointless and futile”, or as mentioned in §39 above, if the claim is not “bona fide”, that is, a claim that has not even a prima facie case and thus would deliberately or not just obscure any real issues, the joinder application should not be allowed. In my view, this means that the Court should still examine the merits to ensure that the claim or defence is not plainly and obviously pointless, futile, or without bona fide, and such approach makes eminent sense. If it were otherwise, this would mean the Court would have to let any plainly and obviously pointless, futile, less-than-a-prima-facie case proceed with the other parties, and this would waste the parties’ time and costs and the judicial resources. One may argue that any party after the joinder could apply to strike out if the case is plainly and obviously pointless, futile, less-than-a-prima-facie case. Such an approach would again unnecessarily waste the parties’ time and costs and judicial resources. The right course to take at the joinder application is that the Court should ensure that the intended party’s claim or defence should have a serious issue to be tried, and the burden to prove that of course lies upon the applicant for the joinder.

41.  Ms Leung summarised the grounds in support of the Joinder Application in §43 of her skeleton submissions as follows:-

“(1) Fung Dickson’s right of residence does not solely derive from the [Tenancy Agreement], but instead has been established since he was born… and therefore the termination of the [Tenancy Agreement] concerns Fung Dickson’s legal rights in the [Premises];

(2) Fung Dickson was initially qualified to resettle to the newly redeveloped Tai Hang Sai Estate. The Notice of Termination of Tenancy has the effect of terminating Fung Dickson’s approved right of residence and disqualifying him from the resettle…

(3) Hence, these proceedings does not concern [the defendant’s] right of residence but also Fung’s right of residence despite [that] he was not a signatory of the [Tenancy Agreement];

(4) The sole involvement of [the defendant] in these proceedings fails to adequately resolve the issues of (i) Fung Dickson’s rights and interest in the Premises; and (ii) whether any reasonable rehousing and relocation arrangement and assistance is required to be provided for him who was qualified to resettle…

(5) The Judicial Review Defence mentioned hereinabove is directly applicable to Fung Dickson, who was directly affected by [the plaintiff]’s decisions to limit rehousing and relocation arrangement and assistance to a one-off rental subsidy, and to evict him from the Premises…

(6) Should the [Judicial Review] be ruled in favour of the applicant therein, Fung Dickson would have a defence in these proceedings that [the plaintiff] does not have power to commence these proceedings…”

42.  I have no doubt that Fung Dickson, as an occupant of the Premises, would be affected by the present proceedings and the plaintiff’s decisions on rehousing and evicting the occupants of the Premises. However, the mere fact that he would be so affected does not mean that there are any issues between the plaintiff and Fung Dickson that would require the resolution by the Court. The fundamental question is on what basis Fung Dickson has occupied the Premises.

43.  First, in my view, it is plain and obvious that there is no basis for saying that “Fung Dickson’s right of residence does not solely derive from the [Tenancy Agreement], but instead has been established since he was born”:-

(1)  The defendant alleges that “my father Fung Kwok Chu and his family members were classified as approved occupiers under the second category of residents in accordance with the Memorandum of Association of the Plaintiff in 1952”. However, Fung Dickson was born in 1974. Thus, Fung Dickson is not an approved occupier back in 1952. In any event, I do not see how the status as an approved occupier would confer any right upon Fung Dickson, given that the Memorandum of Association of the plaintiff is a contract as between the plaintiff and its members and among its members only: see Company Law in Hong Kong - Practice and Procedure, 2023, §8.065;

(2)  Insofar as the Schedule to the Tenancy Agreement (the “Schedule”) and the past tenancy agreements, where Fung Dickson was listed therein as “Family of Tenant”, the Schedule is attached in relation to the provision in the Tenancy Agreement and the past tenancy agreements that the tenant (currently the defendant and the defendant’s father previously) agree “not to use [the Premises] except as a private residence for the Tenant himself and members of the Tenant’s family set out in the Schedule hereto”. This provision limits the tenant’s right as to whom the tenant can license to stay in the Premises, and does not confer any enforceable rights or benefits on the members listed in the Schedule enforceable against the plaintiff. Put another way, if the tenant does not allow a certain member listed out in the Schedule to live in the Premises, that member cannot commence an action against the plaintiff to say that he has a right to live in the Premises. As regards whether he has any right enforceable against the defendant, it is a matter between him and the defendant, which does not concern the plaintiff at all;

(3)  In respect of the defendant’s contention that there is an implied covenant or an implied term in the Tenancy Agreement in favour of Fung Dickson, such contention is stated to be rejected. Fung Dickson has never been a party to the Tenancy Agreement, and thus there simply is no basis for such an implied covenant or implied term that would be enforceable by a non-party;

(4)  Insofar as to any contention that the plaintiff’s eviction of Fung Dickson would amount to derogation from grant or the Tenancy Agreement was entered into with unequal bargaining power and so Fung Dickson should not be evicted, these grounds are only available to contractual parties but not any non-privy like Fung Dickson; and

(5)  While the plaintiff offered Fung Dickson as “qualified for resettlement” some compensation or payment for him to move out and resettle, this does not confer any right or interest on Fung Dickson in the Premises: see 香港平民屋宇有限公司 對 黃錫添 [2025] HKDC 143 at §5(6). Insofar as Ms Leung (for the defendant) suggests that Fung Dickson’s right for resettlement arose from his capacity as an “approved occupier” or the implied covenant, I repeat my view in subparagraph (1) – (3) above. I also note that at the CMC on 16 December 2024, Ms Leung told me that she had been preparing the papers for an application for leave to apply for judicial review based on this status of approved occupier (although it is not clear at all to me how the grounds would be run in the intended judicial review), but despite two months having passed, Ms Leung confirms that there is still no such an application. If there is any serious ground about such an application, I see no reason why this application is still up in the air.

44.  Second, Madam Leung who commenced the Judicial Review was the tenant herself, and thus the issues in the Judicial Review are issues between the plaintiff and its tenants but not others. The “Eviction Decision” being the subject decision in the Judicial Review (see §18 of the DCCJ 5582/2023 Decision) is the plaintiff’s decision to terminate the tenancy and evict her. Here, as between the plaintiff and Fung Dickson, there has never been any tenancy. In this regard, I note that there has been no judicial review commenced by a non-tenant at all. Insofar as a non-tenant would rely on the tenant’s right to stay, I would understand why the non-tenant has not commenced any judicial review. However, insofar as a non-tenant would rely on the Judicial Review to say that he himself has a right to stay independent of the tenant, it is plain and obvious to me that a non-tenant such as Fung Dickson could not avail himself of the Judicial Review (concerning tenants only) to confer upon him some interest in the cause or matter to be joined to the plaintiff’s claim.

45.  I would like to stress that I am not being technical here to differentiate between tenants and non-tenants. Legally, it is only the tenant who would have the obligations (and as quid pro quo, rights), for example, the obligation to pay rents, the obligation to ensure the proper use of the Premises, and so on. If there is any breach of the tenancy agreement, it is the tenant who would have to take up the liability, but not the members listed in the Schedule.

46.  Ms Leung (for the defendant) contends that the Rehousing Arrangement Decision, being the other decision in the Judicial Review (see §18 of the DCCJ 5582/2023 Decision), may benefit Fung Dickson but not the defendant. Her contention is that there may be a scenario where the Eviction Decision is lawful so that the plaintiff could terminate the tenancy and evict the defendant, but as against Fung Dickson, the Rehousing Arrangement Decision is unlawful so that the plaintiff would still not be able to exercise its power to obtain possession of the Premises. Therefore, Ms Leung contends, Fung Dickson should be joined to ensure that the plaintiff’s entitlement to the relief of possession of the Premises could be properly determined.

47.  I disagree that this could constitute a valid reason for joinder, for the following reasons:-

(1)  The validity of the Eviction Decision hinges upon the lawfulness of the Rehousing Arrangement Decision. If the latter is found to be lawful, then the plaintiff could terminate the tenancy and evict the tenant. If the latter is found to be unlawful, then the plaintiff could not;

(2)  For the sake of argument, assuming, without ruling, that in making the Rehousing Arrangement Decision, the plaintiff should consider not only the existing tenants but also occupants like Fung Dickson, in determining whether any of the grounds of the judicial review is established, the situation of occupants like Fung Dickson would be considered by the Court. If none of the grounds is established, this would just mean that even if Fung Dickson would be able to argue the matter independently, he would fail. Further, if none of the grounds is established in such situation, the plaintiff would be entitled to make the Eviction Decision to evict the tenant and any occupants, whose rights to stay are rights to stay as licensee, parasitic upon the tenant. On the contrary, if any of the grounds of the Judicial Review is established such that the Eviction Decision would be quashed, then occupants like Fung Dickson would still be able to stay in the Premises subject to the tenant’s licence;

(3)  If in making the Rehousing Arrangement Decision, the plaintiff should consider the existing tenants only but not occupants like Fung Dickson, then it is futile to allow Fung Dickson to raise matters based on his personal circumstances. Similarly, if none of the grounds is established in such situation, the plaintiff would be entitled to make the Eviction Decision to evict the tenant and any occupants, whose rights to stay are rights to stay as licensee and are parasitic upon the tenant. If any of the grounds of the Judicial Review is established such that the Eviction Decision would be quashed, then occupants like Fung Dickson would still be able to stay in the Premises subject to the tenant’s licence; and

(4)  If Fung Dickson is concerned that his personal situation has not been ventilated out properly or at all as a matter for consideration in the Judicial Review, it is his decision whether or not to join the Judicial Review, whether or not to offer to make affirmations for the Judicial Review or whether or not to commence a judicial review application himself. That should be the more appropriate forum to make such point because the Court of First Instance is now seized of the matter and all relevant matters should be considered and determined in one go. Making such point here in the District Court would put the District Court into an unenviable situation of difficulty and embarrassment and may even prolong the proceedings unnecessarily. In particular, joining him for such point may even disable the District Court in the present proceedings from determining all the issues completely and finally because such point could have been better considered in the Judicial Review and/or by the Court of First Instance.

48.  In the circumstances, I find it plainly and obviously that Fung Dickson has no bona fide independent claim in the present matter. I also find that joining him to the present proceedings is plainly and obviously pointless and futile, and is not conducive to a complete and final determination of all the issues. Joining him would only unnecessarily waste the parties’ time and costs and the judicial resources.

49.  Therefore, I refused the Joinder Application.

50.  Costs should follow the event. I order that the defendant do pay the plaintiff costs of the Joinder Application, summarily assessed at HK$90,000.