HKSAR v. LI WENBO

DCCC 618/2025

[2026] HKDC 544

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CRIMINAL CASE NO 618 OF 2025

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REASONS FOR SENTENCE

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1.  Mr Li pleaded guilty before me to one charge of Dealing with property known or believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offence, contrary to section 25(1)  and (3)  of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance, Cap 455. Particulars are that he, between 2 September 2024 and 25 October 2024, both dates inclusive, in Hong Kong, together with other person(s)  unknown, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that property, namely a total sum of $3,316,063.43 Hong Kong currency in the bank account with Livi Bank Limited, account number 388756061057922, in whole or in part directly or indirectly represented any person’s proceeds of an indictable offence, dealt with the said property.

Facts admitted by Mr Li

2.  Mr Li is and was a resident of Mainland China and a holder of a two-way permit.

3.  At around 12:27 pm on 24 September 2024, Ms CHEUNG Po Chun (hereinafter “PW1”), then aged 66, received a call from an unknown person (hereinafter “X”), who claimed to be a staff member of a telecommunications company and said that PW1 had purchased a data package costing HK$7,104.  After PW1 denied making such a purchase, X said the relevant fees could be waived and referred PW1 to his colleague (hereinafter “Y”). Y then asked PW1 to provide her bank account details to arrange the waiver.  PW1 believed these representations were true and therefore disclosed her online banking account numbers, passwords, and verification codes for her Hang Seng Bank Limited account (hereinafter “PW1’s Account 1”)  and her Bank of China (Hong Kong)  Limited account (hereinafter “PW1’s Account 2”).

4.  At around 2:55 pm on the same day, PW1 received notifications from the banks showing unauthorized transactions in PW1’s Account 1 and PW1’s Account 2 made that day.  PW1 then realized she had been defrauded and reported the case to the police.

5.  On that day, a total sum of HK$801,763 was transferred from PW1’s Account 2 to a ZA bank account owned by an individual named YAN Bo (hereinafter “YAN”).  Of that amount, HK$360,000 was transferred on the same day from YAN’s bank account to Mr Li’s Livi Bank Limited account, numbered 388756061057922 (hereinafter the “Subject Account”).

6.  At 12:50 pm on 25 October 2024, DSPC 54465 (hereinafter “PW2”)  arrested Mr Li when the latter requested access to the Subject Account at a counter in the Livi Bank office.  At that time, Mr Li was accompanied by a woman.  During the preliminary investigation, Mr Li said that he was the sole account holder of the Subject Account and that his purpose in going to the Livi Bank office that day was to make arrangements for the Subject Account.  He remained silent under caution.

7.  In the video-recorded interview, Mr Li told DPC 60194 (PW3), inter alia, the following:-

(i)  He resided in Jiangxi and had received junior secondary education.

(ii)  His occupation was a cryptocurrency trader in Hong Kong. Prior to that, he worked in the eyeglasses industry in Mainland China.

(iii)  He did not have many assets in Mainland China, was almost bankrupt, and was repaying debts. He applied for jobseeker’s allowance in September 2024 and received 1,100 Yuan Renminbi per month. He rented his residence for HK$400 per month.

(iv)  His wife was in the garment industry, earned 2,000 to 3,000 Yuan Renminbi per month, and was responsible for household expenses of the second half of 2024.

(v)  He downloaded the Livi Bank mobile application and opened the Subject Account in September 2024. The sole purpose of opening the Subject Account was to buy and sell cryptocurrencies. No physical bank cards were issued for the Subject Account. He and an individual named “Wen Jie” would earn 20% and 80% respectively of the profit from each USDT (a type of cryptocurrency)  transaction.

(vi)  He purchased cryptocurrencies at a lower price and sold them at a higher price, thereby earning the difference.

(vii)  He became acquainted with “Wen Jie”, who said she could provide him funds to trade cryptocurrencies. On some occasions, “Wen Jie” transferred cryptocurrencies into his crypto account; on other occasions, she topped up his crypto account with cash at a shop in Admiralty. Purchasers of USDT transferred money to the Subject Account. Upon confirming that the transferor’s name matched the name of the person who placed the order on the online trading platform, he transferred the relevant USDT to the purchaser.

(viii)  He was not acquainted with YAN. YAN transferred HK$360,000 to the Subject Account at the material time because YAN placed an order to purchase 46,541.61 USDT. He earned around HK$100 as a result of this transaction. He then transferred HK$191,106 to “Wen Jie”’s bank account.

(ix)  He went to the Livi Bank office on 25 October 2024 to inquire why the bank had not unfrozen the Subject Account because, according to his friends, banks normally unfreeze accounts after a month and “Wen Jie” repeatedly asked him to return the sum to her. He therefore brought “Wen Jie” to the bank that day. He was intercepted by the police while waiting for the bank staff’s reply.

8.  The bank records for the Subject Account show that the Subject Account was opened online by Mr Li on 2 September 2024 using his Mainland China identity card and his two-way permit.  Selfies were taken when the Subject Account was opened.  Mr Li was the sole signatory of the Subject Account.

9.  In the opening mandate of the Subject Account, Mr Li claimed that he was a managerial staff member in the wholesale, retail, import and export trade industry.  He also claimed that the reasons for opening the account were to repay loans and cover daily expenses, and that the sources of the funds would be salary and investment returns.  His reported monthly income was HK$25,001 – 50,000, and his expected monthly transaction amount was HK$50,001 – 150,000.

10.  The transaction records of the Subject Account covering the period from 2 September 2024 to 25 October 2024 indicate 64 deposits totaling HK$3,316,063.43 and 43 withdrawals totaling HK$2,995,683. The transactions were in a mirror pattern.  Withdrawals were usually made on the same day as deposits into the Subject Account or on the following day.

11.  Mr Li now admits the Particulars of Offence of the charge.

Criminal record

12.  Mr Li has a clear record in Hong Kong.

Antecedents

13.  Mr Li, born in Jiangxi, is aged 47 (46 at the time of the offence), educated to secondary level in Mainland.  He previously worked as an eyeglasses salesperson.  Mr Li’s wife lives with his parents in Jiangxi.  Mr Li has a son and a daughter living in Guangdong.

Mitigation

14.  Mr David CW Cheung of counsel assigned by the Director of Legal Aid mitigated on behalf of Mr Li.  The following is a summary of the mitigation submissions.

15.  Mr Li lived in Mainland with his parents (both in 70s), his wife, and two children.  Over the past few years, up until his arrest, Mr Li was the sole income earner of the family.

16.  Mr Li was educated up to Form 3.  Prior to coming to Hong Kong, he worked as a salesperson earning about RMB6,500 Yuan per month.

17.  Mr Li pleaded guilty, saving the court’s time and resources.  He was previously of clear record.

18.  Mr Li did not know the nature of the predicate offence.  He did not actively participate in the predicate offence.  He did not have actual knowledge that the money going into his account represented proceeds of an indictable offence.

19.  Mr Li is a hardworking family man who just wanted to earn some more money.  He acknowledges he made a mistake.  Mr Li has learnt his lesson and will not be repeating his mistake.  He asks the court for leniency.

20.  In HKSAR v Boma [2012] 2 HKLRD 33, the Court of Appeal opined that it was difficult and undesirable to offer guidelines for the offence of money laundering.  However, the Court did provide a non-exhaustive list of considerations that should be taken into account when sentencing:

(a)  The nature of the predicate offence;

(b)  The state of the offender’s knowledge;

(c)  Where the operation involved an international dimension, this would be a significant aggravating feature;

(d)  The sophistication of the offence, including the degree of planning;

(e)  Where the offence was committed by or on behalf of an organized criminal syndicate, this would be an aggravating feature;

(f)  Whether there was one transaction only or many and the length of time over which the offence was committed;

(g)  Whether the offender continued to launder funds after he had discovered the nature of the funds were proceeds of an offence or a serious offence was involved;

(h)  The role of the offender and the acts performed by him.

21.  In Secretary for Justice v Wan Kwok Keung [2012] 1 HKLRD 201, the Court of Appeal referred to HKSAR v Hsu Yu Yi [2010] 5 HKLRD 545, noting that for money laundering charges involving sums between $1m and $2m, the starting point would be “3 years or so”; between $3m and $6m, it would be “4 years or so”; and where it is above $10m, it “could be over 5 years”.

22.  Mr Cheung then referred to two District Court sentencing cases[1] for comparison purpose.

23.  In the present case, the amount involved is HK$3,316,063.43.  It is submitted that the monetary amount should not be the sole consideration of the court.  Mr Cheung urges the court to be as lenient as possible and consider a starting point of less than 4 years.

24.  Mr Cheung does not object to the receipt of the written statement furnished under OSCO, Cap 455, in support of the prosecution’s application for sentence enhancement.  Mr Cheung notes that both the number of money laundering cases (involving stooge accounts)  and the reported monetary losses for 2025 have decreased compared to 2024, but acknowledges that those numbers remain high.  Mr Cheung accepts that money laundering is still a prevalent problem in Hong Kong.

25.  Mr Cheung asks the court to take into account the decline in numbers when considering the appropriate level of sentence enhancement in this case.

26.  Upon enquiry by the court, Mr Cheung acknowledged that Mr Li did continue to operate the Subject Account from time to time and did play a role in the transactional parts of the offence but with the lesser mens rea of having reasonable grounds to believe and not actual knowledge.

Sentence

27.  This case has the following features.  The amount laundered was $3.3 million.  The offence lasted just less than 2 months.  There were 64 deposits and 43 withdrawals.  Mr Li operated the Subject Account himself, though purportedly without full knowledge of the facts.

28.  Bearing in mind Wan Kwok Keung para 15, and noting Mr Li played more than a minimal role, I adopt as a starting point 3 years and 3 months’ imprisonment.

29.  Mr Li pleaded guilty in good time earning for himself the full 1/3 sentencing discount.  There are no other mitigating factors of weight to justify another sentence reduction.

30.  Prosecution sought to furnish information pursuant to section 27(2)  of OSCO, Cap 455, with a view to showing prevalence of money laundering offence and the harm caused to the community be recent occurrences of this offence. Subject to the court’s satisfaction of the relevant conditions, prosecution will ask for enhancement of sentence against Mr Li.

31.  Mr Cheung has no objection to either the reception of the information or the associated request for enhanced sentence.

32.  I duly received the witness statement of CIP Li Yiu Nam dated 5 March 2026.  I have considered the figures in Table A of the statement.  I am satisfied that money laundering offence is still prevalent in Hong Kong.  I have considered the figures in Table B of the statement and the information in para 18 of the statement.  I am satisfied that the extent of harm caused to the community by recent occurrences of money laundering offence is still substantial.

33.  I am of the view that my power to enhance sentence under section 27(11)  of OSCO, Cap 455, is engaged.  As regards the scope of enhancement, because of the state of the statistics, I adjudge that a 20% enhancement is sufficient to pose as an additional deterrence against Mr Li and would-be followers.

34.  As an act of mercy, I will discard decimal places in the calculation of the sentence in terms of months.

(Mr Li, please stand)

35.  The sentence is 31 months’ imprisonment.