CHONG YU ON v. PHYLLIS MCKENNA, OFFICIAL RECEIVER AND ANOTHER

CACV 503/2025

[2026] HKCA 1402

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 503 OF 2025

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JUDGMENT

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The Court :

I.  The appeal

1.  This is an appeal by the applicant against the decision of Anthony Chan J (as he then was) refusing to grant leave to the applicant to commence proceedings to apply for leave to  apply for judicial review (‘the Application’).

2.  We will give the judgment in English as we will refer to cases written in English.  It is also apparent from the previous judgments of the Court that the applicant is conversant in English and was previously educated in the United Kingdom.  It should also be pointed out that, although the applicant lodged the following documents in Chinese, namely, the Application, Notice of Appeal, two written submissions (one without leave) and his oral submission is also in Chinese, when he applied on 15 July 2025 to list the appeal for hearing, he specifically requested the hearing to be heard by English speaking judges.  He also lodged one submission (without leave) in English.

II.  The procedural background

3.  The applicant was made a bankrupt on 18 November 2024 by the order of Peter Ng J.

4.  On 10 June 2025, the applicant launched the Application by lodging a Form 86 naming the Official Receiver as the 1^st Putative Respondent and the Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal as the 2^nd Putative Respondent. 

5.  The High Court Registry on the same day issued a ‘Notice to Litigants Subject to a Restricted Proceedings Order’ to the applicant informing him that the Application may fall within the terms of a Restricted Proceedings Order (‘RPO’) dated 2 November 2023 made by Anthony Chan J in HCAL 1243/2023 and the Application would be sent to a designated Judge to decide whether it is within the ambit of the RPO.

6.  On 18 June 2025, Anthony Chan J, as the designated Judge, dismissed the Application and the applicant was informed by letter dated 19 June 2025.  Upon further inquiry by the applicant, the Court by letter dated 30 June 2025 further informed him of the order made by Anthony Chan J.

III.  The Application

1)  Form 86

7.  The Application lodged by the applicant consisted of the Form 86 and a five‑page attachment.  In the attachment, the applicant first listed 25 items of documents consisting of 42 pages said to be concerned with the Application.  He then set out the reliefs that he sought and reasons for the reliefs.  The applicant, however, did not identify the ‘Judgment, order decision or other proceeding in respect of such relief is sought’ which is expressly required in the Form 86.

8.  The main reliefs sought by the applicant were an order requiring the Official Receiver to pursue nine cases that the applicant had commenced and an order requiring the Chief Justice to constitute lawful and effective tribunals to determine his cases.

9.  We will set out here the English translation of the Notice of Appeal, while the Chinese counterpart is attached to this judgment as Attachment 1.

2)  Relief sought

‘ (1) An order directing the [Official Receiver] to perform its duties of supervision, protection, pursuit and recovery of all debt-related rights and interests of the relevant creditors, which concern the bankrupt’s [namely, the Applicant’s] existing assets and recoverable assets following the bankruptcy. The recoverable assets include the judicial compensation that had been actively pursued by the Applicant in nine High Court claims prior to the making of the Bankruptcy Order on 18 November 2024, in particular, HCPI 471/2019 and HCAL 679-924/2023 involving the recovery of monetary compensation of not less than $68.9 million.

(2)  An order directing the [Official Receiver] to continue to discharge its duties in pursuing and advancing the compensation claim in HCPI 471/2019, and further permitting the applicant to select and instruct, from the Government’s panel of external counsel, a barrister on the Hong Kong Bar List, for the purpose of acting on behalf of the applicant to follow up with the said compensation proceedings.

(3)  The Court is requested to openly confirming, the identities of the defendants in the applicant’s other eight High Court proceedings, (HCAL 1264/2022 (and) HCAL 679-696-924-925-1243-1718-1827/2023) and the interest between such defendants and the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal.

(4)  An order directing the [Chief Justice], having regard to the requirements governing the constitution of the five-member Court of Final Appeal and the three-member Appeal Committee under the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap. 484), and subject to the principles of avoiding apparent conflict of interest and recusal applicable to the seven judges already involved in the cases, to propose a lawful and effective five-member Court of Final Appeal and the three-member Appeal Committee for the determination of the Applicant’s eight applications for leave to appeal (HCAL 1264/2022 (and) HCAL 679-696-924-925-1243-1718-1827/2023).

(5)  Alternatively, if the [Chief Justice] is unable lawfully to constitute a five-member Court of Final Appeal and the three-member Appeal Committee, a court order directing the [Chief Justice], as the head of the Judiciary, to provide appropriate judicial compensation in respect of the said eight claims, including the monetary compensation of not less than HK$68.9 million in the two cases (HCAL 679-924/2023).

(6)  An order directing the [Official Receiver] to continue to follow up all necessary judicial procedures in relation to the nine actions and claims referred to above, so as to ensure that any attempt by the [Official Receiver] to breach Article 35 of Chapter III of the Basic Law by assisting the related government officials to avoid facing the judicial litigation brought by the Applicant will not succeed.  Those officials include Hospital Authority and seven Justices of the Court of Final Appeal, namely Andrew Cheung Kui‑nung, Roberto Alexandre Vieira Ribeiro, Joseph Paul Fok, Johnson Lam Man‑hon, Robert Tang Kwok‑ching, Patrick Chan Siu‑oi, and Syed Kemal Shah Bokhary.

(7)  An order directing the [Official Receiver], given that the eight proceedings (HCAL 1264/2022 (and) HCAL 679-696-924-925-1243-1718-1827/2023), cannot practically obtained an effective determination through judicial procedures, to make written representations to the [Chief Justice] for him to make a reasonable compensation proposal to the applicant with a view to pay off the debts due to the creditors.

(8)  The Court to direct the [Official Receiver] and [Chief Justice] to adopt the objective and fair opinions and proposals provided by AI Artificial intelligence Software, so as to efficiently reach a resolution of the outstanding legal disputes between the parties.

(9)  The Court to direct the [Official Receiver], for the protection and safeguarding of the rights and interests of creditors, to convene a meeting of creditors for the purpose of discussing the most appropriate course of action in relation to the judicial compensation arising from the nine actions referred to above.

(10)  The Court to openly affirming and giving effect to Article 25 of Chapter III of the Basic Law, namely that all Hong Kong residents shall be equal before the law.

(11)  The Court to openly affirming and giving effect to Article 35 of Chapter III of the Basic Law, so as to prevent government officials from avoiding judicial litigations and the relevant legal liabilities.’

3)  Grounds for the Relief Sought

‘ (1) In respect of the eight High Court claims referred to in the present Application for Judicial Review, the applicant’s sole purpose is to seek confirmation by the Court of the identities of all defendants and the nature of their respective interest with the Court of Final Appeal. The correctness, merits, gravity or extent of the judgments in those eight High Court actions, are in fact wholly irrelevant. There is no need for the Court to spend time examining the contents of those judgments, or to deflect attention by conducting unnecessary discussion and handling in the judicial process.

(2)  Regardless of the outcome of the aforesaid eight High Court proceedings, the unsuccessful party would inevitably seek leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  Ultimately, the Court of Final Appeal will be unable to constitute a lawful three‑member Appeal Committee, resulting in no effective or lawful final determination that may be obtained by either party.  The administration of justice would be undermined, and thereby directly infringing and depriving the litigants’ legal rights and interests.

(3)  Alternatively, if the Court of Final Appeal were unable to constitute a three-member Appeal Committee and the Applicant’s eight intended final appeals were barbarically left undetermined, such a situation would effectively confer upon the Justices of the Court of Final Appeal privileges and de facto immunity from legal accountability.  This is completely contrary to Article 25 of Chapter III of the Basic Law, which provides that all Hong Kong residents shall be equal before the law.

(4)  By letter dated 25 November 2023, the applicant brought the aforesaid judicial impasse to the attention of the [Chief Justice] and directly sought judicial compensation.  The [Chief Justice] has been ignoring its duties and insisting in dodging, keeping silent and evading the issues.  Following the making of the Bankruptcy Order on 18 November 2024, the [Official Receiver] has been acting in synergy to avoid getting on the nerves of the [Chief Justice] and has not addressed the Applicant’s claims for judicial compensation.

(5)  Based on the argument in paragraph 2 above, the [Official Receiver] should already have grasped the existence of the judicial impasse.  Relying on judicial proceedings to resolve the compensation issue has, fundamentally, become a road that leads nowhere.  The only way for the [Official Receiver] to discharge its duties is to write directly to the [Chief Justice] and request the [Chief Justice] to put forward a reasonable solution for judicial compensation, rather than wasting effort during the six-month bankruptcy period on how to conduct litigation by word of mouth. Therefore, the deliberate neglect of duty and dereliction of responsibility on the part of the [Official Receiver] are beyond doubt.

(6)  As for paying in advance the filing fees for appeals to the Court of Final Appeal in respect of the eight claims, it is fundamentally neither here nor there and is of no assistance whatsoever.  The reason is that, in fact, whether the fees are paid in advance and whether the cases are filed have, from beginning to end, been incapable of resolving the problem that the eight claims will ultimately be unable to obtain any effective and lawful judicial process before the Court of Final Appeal.  Still less can such steps enable the litigants ultimately to obtain an effective and lawful final judgment from the Court of Final Appeal.

(7)  The contents and reasons set out in the applicant’s letters dated [25 November 2024, 8 May 2025, 9 May 2025 and 27 May 2025], respectively addressed to the [Chief Justice], High Court Master Angela Kot, and the [Official Receiver], have generally targeted the [Official Receiver’s] and the [Chief Justice’s] avoidance of their responsibilities, as well as the issues which they have continuously been required to face and resolve.’

IV.  Grounds of appeal

10.  The gist of the applicant’s appeal is that the Application is not within the ambit of the RPO.  As his estate is vested in the Official Receiver by reason of his bankruptcy, the Official Receiver is responsible to pursue the cases he had commenced to seek ‘judicial compensation’ so that the compensation would be used to set off his debts owing to creditors, one of whom is the Department of Justice which is pursuing him for costs imposed by the Courts against him.

V.  Our view

1)  The RPO

11.  Before we deal with the terms of the RPO in HCAL 1243/2023, we would refer to the background of that case.  The applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review.  The putative respondent was the Secretary for Justice and eleven putative interested parties which included the previous and the current Chief Justice, three Permanent Judges of the Court of Final Appeal (‘CFA’) and three Non‑permanent Judges of the CFA.  Anthony Chan J held that although it seemed that the decision which was intended to be challenged was the Secretary for Justice’s decision to prosecute Mr Lai Chee Ying under the National Security Law, the true motive of the applicant was to ask the Secretary for Justice to prosecute these putative interested parties :

‘ 7. It appears that the real motive of this application has been laid bare by the relief sought by Chong, namely, an order to immediately dismiss all the charges against Lai, otherwise in parallel with the proceedings against Lai, prosecution should be brought by the [Secretary for Justice] against the 11 putative interested parties so as to ensure that he applies a uniform standard of prosecution.’

12.  Anthony Chan J dismissed the application and reviewed the cases that the applicant had brought in the Courts.  Arising from his dissatisfaction with the Courts’ rejection of his earlier claims against the Professional Insurance Brokers Association and a matter concerning the damage to his father’s grave, the applicant had been pursuing numerous proceedings under different guises and forms against judges, public officials and legislators on matters that he had litigated and rejected by the Courts. The matters that were dealt with in these claims included but not limited to the applicant’s challenge against the Court of Final Appeal of the use of Rule 7 of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Rules (the ‘Rules’) (Cap. 484A) to dismiss applications for leave to appeal which discloses no reasonable ground or is frivolous or fail to comply with the Rules, the alleged impropriety of judges hearing his cases and the constitution of the five member Court of Final Appeal and three member Appeal Committee under sections 5 and 18 respectively of the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap. 484). The applicant continued to spin the subject matters of these cases out of control and when HCAL 1243/2023 came before Anthony Chan J, he held that the applicant had abused the process of court and made the RPO against him :

‘ Abuse of process

12.  Chong may be described as a habitual user of the Court’s resources.  It appears that he has a deep‑seated dissatisfaction with a number of Judgments or Orders of the Court which had gone against him. He is of course entitled to his own views on the Judgments of the Court, but he is not entitled to abuse the process of the court for the purpose of making collateral attacks on the same. 

13.  Chong’s grievances may be traced to 4 Orders of the CFA (Ribeiro PJ, Tang PJ and Fok PJ) all dated 18 August 2016 made in FAMV 3/2016, FAMV 4/2016, FAMV 12/2016 and FAMV 28/2016 by which Chong’s applications for leave to appeal to the [Court of Final Appeal] were dismissed on the ground that they disclosed no reasonable grounds for leave to appeal in accordance with Rule 7(2) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Rules, Cap 484. 

14.  These dismissals triggered off an action by Chong in HCA 244/2017 (“Action”) by which the [Court of Final Appeal], the Registrar of the [Court of Final Appeal] and the 3 Permanent Judges mentioned above were sued in relation to the dismissals.  Amongst others, allegation of dereliction of duty on the part of the Permanent Judges was made based on Chong’s opinion that the [Court of Final Appeal] had not taken sufficient time over his applications.  In his submission, Chong also said that 2 of the Permanent Judges are monolingual and were unable to read the Chinese documents in his cases.

15.  However, the Action was struck out by Registrar Lung as being unfounded in his Decision dated 21 April 2017.  It should be noted that in the Decision the learned Registrar made references to the principles of abuse of process.  Chong appealed against the Decision, which was heard before Mr Justice Chow (as he then was).  In his Decision dated 28 July 2017, the learned Judge held that the Action was not based on any reasonable cause of action.  It constituted “malicious slander, and was trivial, vexatious and an abuse of the court’s process”.  Chong’s appeal was dismissed.

16.  Chong then further appealed to the Court of Appeal (“CA”) in CACV 185/2017, which was dismissed ([2018] HKCA 325). His application for leave to appeal to the [Court of Final Appeal] was also dismissed by the CA ([2018] HKCA 762).  Chong’s application to the [Court of Final Appeal] for leave to appeal was also dismissed under Rule 7(2) by Ma CJ, Cheung PJ and Chan NPJ (FAMV 98/2018).

17.  Chong then changed his tact and launched 2 applications for leave to apply for judicial review in HCAL 1699/2018 and HCAL 25/2019 to challenge the adoption of the Rule 7 procedure by the Registrar of the [Court of Final Appeal] in, inter alia, FAMV 3/2016, FAMV 4/2016, FAMV 12/2016 and FAMV 28/2016.  The applications were dismissed by Chow J on 26 April 2019 ([2019] HKCFI 1073).  Chong’s appeal to the CA (CACV 216 and 217/2019) were dismissed ([2020] HKCA 177) and his applications for leave to appeal to the [Court of Final Appeal] were dismissed by both the CA ([2020] HKCA 587) and [Court of Final Appeal] (FAMV 178/2021).

18.  Chong made another application for leave to apply for judicial review in HCAL 2941/2019 to challenge the decision in FAMV 98/2018.  By a Decision dated 22 November 2019 ([2019] HKCFI 2846) the leave application was dismissed by Chow J as not reasonably arguable. Chong’s appeal to the CA (CACV 552/2019) was dismissed ([2020] HKCA 970).  His application for leave to appeal to the [Court of Final Appeal] was also dismissed by the CA ([2021] HKCA 102).

19.  On 1 February 2021, Chong made yet another application for leave to apply for judicial review (HCAL 112/2021) to challenge, inter alia, the dismissal of his appeal by the CA in CACV 552/2019 under [2020] HKCA 970.  It was dismissed by Chow J on 20 April 2021 as “misconceived and amounts to an abuse of process” ([2021] HKCFI 988).

20.  It is self-evident that the above proceedings had taken up an extraordinary amount of the Court’s precious resources.  None of Chong’s complaints had been founded by the Court to be properly grounded. To give an example, Chong has been complaining incessantly that Ma CJ was disqualified in hearing his application under FAMV 98/2018 because he was a party to the proceedings.  However, in [2020] HKCA 970 (CACV 552/2019), the CA went to considerable length to explain that “Ma CJ was not a party to FAMV 98/2018 or the proceedings below in HCA 244/2017 and CACV 185/2017”, and dismissed the complaint. 

21.  All the above proceedings had been determined by Court under its due process.  Save for HCAL 112/2021 ([2021] HKCFI 988), Chong had exhausted the avenue of appeal.  As for HCAL 112/2021, the appeal period had long expired. 

22.  It should also be added that Chong seems to have the habit of filing affirmations in his proceedings as and when he liked without regard to orderly litigation conduct or proportionality, thereby adding to the burden of the Court unnecessarily.  Although I accept that he was (and is) unrepresented, given his sophistication and experience as a court user, he should know better in organising his evidence.

23.  Despite repeated warnings by the Court, Chong is unremorseful in his abuse of the court’s process to the prejudice of other users.

24.  It has not escaped the Court that Chong has the sophistication to camouflage his proceedings as one for a different purpose (other than a collateral attack of the Judgments of the Court), but the true objective normally reveals itself when the evidence is reviewed.  This case serves to illustrate the point.  I cannot accept Chong’s submission that the intended judicial review is to ensure that the [Secretary for Justice] applies his prosecutorial policy even‑handedly.  The true purpose of this leave application is to ventilate yet again Chong’s complaints against various Judgments or Orders and against various members of the judiciary who had dealt with his cases.  Indeed, the submissions made by Chong during this application consisted of such complaints and little else.  

25.  Further, it appears that the evidence adduced in this case, which basically consisted of Chong’s complaints were, and are, used in many, if not all, of his other cases.

26.  It should be emphasized that the above do not represent all of Chong’s proceedings.  My research shows that there was at least one other application for leave to apply for judicial review, namely, HCAL 765/2020 which was largely a disguised collateral attack of the Judgments of this Court.  The application was dismissed by Madam Justice L Wong on 31 July 2020 ([2020] HKCFI 1795).  Chong’s subsequent application for leave to appeal out of time was also dismissed by the learned Judge ([2023] HKCFI 2144). 

27.  The Court must act to put a stop to Chong’s abuse of process, and to preserve its precious resources for properly distribution amongst court users. 

28.  Chong was given a fair opportunity to address the Court on whether a Restricted Proceedings Order should be made against him.  There is nothing which he has said which can militate against such an Order.  I would mention a few of his submissions.

29.  As regards his complaint that the [Court of Final Appeal] had failed to deal with his applications properly under the Rule 7 procedure, the matter was explained by Registrar Lung in his Decision in HCA 244/2017, [13]‑[14] and by Chow J in [2019] HKCFI 1073, [5]‑[8].

30.  In respect of Chong’s complaint about the inability of monolingual Judges to read Chinese documents.  The point was dealt with by the CA in CACV 151/2023 ([2023] HKCA 1184), [12].

31.  I am unable to accept Chong’s submission that this judicial review application raises brand new point and not aimed at attacking the Judgments of the Court.  I have adequately dealt with this point in paras [24] and [25] above.

32.  For these reasons, and applying the principles laid down in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Ltd [2005] 1 HKLRD 473, I make the following Restricted Proceedings Order against Chong.’

13.  Paragraph (1) of the RPO prohibited the applicant from commencing any fresh proceedings, without the leave of the Court of First Instance, by whatever originating process, in the High Court or District Court concerning any matters involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in the following 12 cases, namely,

1)  FAMV  3/2016; 2)  FAMV  4/2016;  3)  FAMV 12/2016;

4)  FAMV  28/2016; 5)  HCA 244/2017; 6)  CACV 185/2017;

7)  FAMV 98/2018; 8) HCAL 2941/2019; 9) CACV 552/2019;

10)  CACV  216/2019; 11)  CACV  217/2019;  and

12)  FAMV 178/2021.

2)  The Official Receiver to pursue the eight HCAL cases?  

14.  We now turn to the cases that the applicant seeks the Official Receiver to pursue.  Eight of them are judicial review cases.  Six of these cases are HCAL 679, 696, 924, 925, 1718, 1827 of 2023.  They are again applications for leave to apply for judicial review brought by the applicant against various parties, including the Chief Justice, Permanent and Non‑Permanent Judges of the Court of Final Appeal, Court of Appeal Judges, Legislative Councillors and other parties.  These six cases were issued before Anthony Chan J’s RPO of 2 November 2023 but heard by Coleman J after the RPO.  Coleman J dismissed the six cases on the ground that there were not reasonably arguable public law grounds of review with any realistic prospect of success.  He also referred to the RPO and came to the view that the six cases were abuse of process.  He held that :

‘ 2. …..In substance, all six applications are disguised complaints renewed against or about judges who have rendered judgments and orders in concluded actions to which the Applicant had been a party.

3.  It can be noted that Anthony Chan J made a Restrictive Proceedings Order (“RPO”) against the Applicant on 2 November 2023 in HCAL 1243/2023, [2023] HKCFI 2840 – see more detail below.  He did so precisely on the basis that the Applicant had abused the court processes by bringing repeated applications of no merit relating to the same underlying complaint.  However, the RPO had no retrospective effect, and all six of the applications presently under consideration were issued before it was made.’

15.  Coleman J examined the six cases individually.

(1)  HCAL 679/2023

16.  In HCAL 679/2023, the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review against the Chief Justice, three permanent judges and three non-permanent judges of the Court of Final Appeal, the Chief Judge of the High Court and two Justices of Appeal of the Court of Appeal of the High Court.  Coleman J identified the complaint raised by the applicant which arose from concluded actions :

‘ 41. Further, as identified in the “court documents” related to the relief sought, the Applicant’s complaints arise from concluded actions in CACV 31/2018, CACV 216/2019, CACV 217/2019, CACV 552/2019, CACV 185/2017, FAMV 98/2018 and FAMV 178/2021. The “four applications for leave to appeal to [Court of Final Appeal]”, as disclosed by way of the four copies of Form A exhibited to the Applicant’s supporting affirmation dated 9 May 2023 (and also his 5^th Supporting affirmation dated 7 November 2023), are respectively (1) the Applicant’s intended application against the judgment dated 8 April 2021, [2021] HKCA 406, in CACV 31/2018, (2) the Applicant’s intended application against the judgment dated 26 April 2021, [2021] HKCA 494, in CACV 216/2019, (3) the Applicant’s intended application against the judgment dated 26 April 2021, [2021] HKCA 494 in CACV 217/2019, and (4) the Applicant’s intended application against the judgment dated 27 November 2020, [2020] HKCA 970, in CACV 552/2019. Incidentally, as regards the last one, the Applicant enclosed wrong judgment [2021] HKCA 102, where the Court of Appeal refused leave in repeated motions.

42.  As seen from the litigation history above, these four applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal all arose from judicial review applications against the judges and other judicial officers in respect of the proceedings in (1)  CACV  185/2017, (2)  FAMV  3/2016,  FAMV  4/2016, FAMV  12/2016 and FAMV  28/2016, and (3)  FAMV 98/2018.  The connection between the current application and the concluded actions is also acknowledged by the Applicant in his grounds for seeking reliefs, namely that the four applications for leave to appeal to the [Court of Final Appeal] involved in the present application for leave to judicial review all stemmed from CACV 185/2017 and FAMV 98/2018 (申請人本司法覆核申請涉及之四宗終審上訴申請案皆源自上述同一相互關連案(CACV 185/2017 & FAMV 98/2018)).’

17.  Coleman J also addressed the applicant’s complaints about the composition of the Court of Final Appeal and its Appeal Committee.  He concluded :

‘ 57. In summary, the applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law ground of review with any realistic prospect of success. Rather, he has abused the court process by seeking to re-litigate matters already concluded, or to repeat allegations previously dealt with and/or which have absolutely no merit or basis. He has also deluged the Court, on a rolling basis, with voluminous documents, the bulk of which is obviously entirely irrelevant even to the complaints he seeks to raise.’

(2)  HCAL 696/2023

18.  In HCAL 696/2023, the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review against 15 members of the Legislative Council.  Coleman J held :

‘ 61. ….the Applicant has again also enclosed the documents relating to (1) his serious allegations against the Chief Justice, (2) the former Chief Justice’s alleged disqualification in respect of CACV 185/2017 and FAMV 98/2018, and (3) the concluded actions in FAMV 3/2016, FAMV 4/2016, FAMV 12/2016 and FAMV 28/2016, which he has submitted in HCAL 679/2023.

…

64.  First, this application is a re-run of his application in HCAL 1264/2022, [2023] HKCFI 1178, in which he asked the Court to order the Chief Executive and the Secretary for Justice to respond to the same four emails mentioned above.  In part, I dismissed his application for his failure to identify a public law error on the part of the Chief Executive or the Secretary for Justice: §§13-20.  It follows that there is no plausible basis for the Legislative Council to be ordered to convene the public hearing for the Chief Executive or the Secretary for Justice to respond to the four emails mentioned above.’

(3)  HCAL 924/2023

19.  In HCAL 924/2023, the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review against the former Chief Justice, the Chief Justice, two permanent judges and two non-permanent judges of the Court of Final Appeal, the Registrar of the High Court, and two Justices of Appeal of the Court of Appeal of the High Court.  Coleman J at [77] held that the complaints were in substance the same as those advanced in HCAL 679/2023 and it was an attempt to re‑run HCAL 679/2023 :

‘ 78. In his oral submissions, the Applicant essentially repeated the same complaints about the former Chief Justice, namely that the former Chief Justice was disqualified from hearing his application under FAMV 98/2018 because he was a party to the proceedings. But, the [Court of Appeal] has already at some length explained that the former Chief Justice was not a party to that application, or the proceedings below in HCA 244/2017 and CACV 185/2017: see [2020] HKCA 970 (CACV 552/2019).’

(4)  HCAL 925/2023

20.  In HCAL 925/2023, the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review against the former Chief Justice, the Chief Justice, one Justice of Appeal of the Court of Appeal of the High Court, the former Secretary for Justice, the former Chairman of the Hong Kong Bar Association, a newspaper company and an individual who was a campaign advisor to the Chief Executive.

‘ 89.  The Applicant’s grounds for relief contain serious allegations against the Chief Justice, other judges, the former Secretary for Justice and the former Chairman of the Bar Association for committing ‘an act of fraud on the Basic Law, which was a breach, and even involved underhand secret dealings of government resources’ and for violating the Guide to Judicial Conduct.  As I have held above, there is no substance in the applicant’s serious allegations, which are simply baseless conjecture.’

(5)  HCAL 1718/2023

21.  In HCAL 1718/2023, the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review against two permanent judges and one non-permanent judge of the Court of Final Appeal.  Coleman J held that the applicant was seeking the same relief that he had sought in previous applications :

‘ 99. … Rather glaringly, the Applicant also requests the Court to re-open the issues in concluded actions, i.e. to “confirm that the judgments in the above 6 final appeal cases are null and void and are in breach of Article 25 of Chapter III of the Basic Law; and order that the Applicant’s 6 final appeal cases (FAMV 3-4-12-28-38/2016 and FAMV 178/2021) be allowed without condition attached. And the claims of the relevant six appeals and interests vested to the winning party shall all be to the Applicant”. That is plainly not the function of the Court exercising its judicial review jurisdiction.’

(6)  HCAL 1827/2023

22.  In HCAL 1827/2023, the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review against the Director of Liaison Office of Central People’s Government in HKSAR, the Director of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office in Beijing, the Chief Executive, the Secretary for Justice, and the Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal.  Coleman J at [109] set out the relief sought by the applicant which included :

‘ (2) The Court must order the Chief Justice to respond to the Applicant’s written inquiries sent on 8 April 2021, 13 September 2021, 4 July 2022 and 28 December 2022 (notably being the same as those considered in HCAL 679/2023: see above).’

23.  Coleman J held that the applicant was repeating the same grounds that he had already addressed in other applications brought by him :

‘ 121. Having considered the circumstances of the Applicant’s applications, I respectfully agree and I am likewise satisfied that the making of a RPO was both necessary and appropriate. The RPO might also have referenced other previous decisions, such as HCAL 765/2020, HCAL 112/2021, HCAL 1264/2022, and CACV 151/2023, but as they in effect deal with the same issue as those which are mentioned, that is unnecessary.

122.  As Anthony Chan J said, the Applicant is of course entitled to his own views on judgments of the court, but he is not entitled to abuse the process of the court for the purpose of making collateral attacks on those judgments.  I entirely agree with the view that the Court must act to put a stop to the Applicant’s abuse of process, and so as to preserve the Court’s limited and precious resources for proper distribution amongst court users.  Had an RPO not already been put in place, I would (subject to hearing from the Applicant) very likely have made such an order.’

(7)  HCAL 1264/2023

24.  Of the two remaining cases, one was Coleman J’s decision in HCAL 1264/2022 which he had referred to when he discussed HCAL 696/2023.  The Court of Appeal in CACV 151/2023 affirmed the HCAL 1264/2022 decision.

(8)  HCAL 1243/2023

25.  The eighth case was Anthony Chan J’s decision in HCAL 1243/2023 of 2 November 2023 in which he imposed the RPO.  The Notice of Appeal against the decision was expunged from the Court file because the applicant purported to join another party to the proceedings as the 2^nd respondent without leave.  The Court of Appeal in CACV 366/2023 affirmed the expunction order.

26.  It is abundantly clear that the applicant’s claim for ‘judicial compensation’ by reference to these eight cases are matters that he had previously pursued and dismissed by the Courts. His request that the Court should order the Official Receiver to continue to pursue these claims is a blatant attempt to litigate in a different guise and form subject matters that he had already litigated and failed and covered by the terms of the RPO.  His request for the Court to order the Chief Justice to constitute an effective and lawful tribunal to try the eight cases is again a repetition of the matters that he had already pursued and failed.

27.  Despite the applicant’s denial that the Application is not within the ambit of the RPO, his Notice of Appeal confirms that he is resuscitating the previous failed attempts for judicial compensation as shown, for example, by the following paragraphs (English translation).  The Chinese version is attached as Attachment 2.

Translation

‘ 8.• The purpose of referring to the eight High Court actions in this application for judicial review [Form 86] is to request the Court to confirm the identities of the Justices involved in those cases. The correctness, merits, gravity or extent of the judgments in those eight High Court actions, is in fact wholly irrelevant to the present judicial review application. There is therefore no need for the Court to spend time examining the contents of those judgments. The Court of Final Appeal Justices concerned are Andrew Cheung Kui‑nung, Roberto Alexandre Vieira Ribeiro, Joseph Paul Fok, Johnson Lam Man-hon, Robert Tang Kwok‑ching, Patrick Chan Siu‑oi, and Syed Kemal Shah Bokhary.

….

11.  The duties of the Official Receiver’s Office include the protection, pursuit, recovery and proper administration of all rights and interests of both creditors and the debtor [namely, the [Applicant]].  Such duties extend to economic interests that may be recovered after the [Applicant’s] bankruptcy, including the [Applicant’s] beneficial economic interests in real property assets located in Dongguan, Mainland China, the right to claim damages in the medical negligence action (HCPI 471/2019), and the entitlement to pursue the Court of Final Appeal in relation to the eight claims due to the fact that no judicial process could ultimately be carried out by the Court of Final Appeal in those matters, (let alone any lawful final judgments being delivered), thereby giving rise to the need to pursue the judicial responsibility and financial compensation arising from the multiple personal acts of the seven Justices of the Court of Final Appeal in contravening the Basic Law.

12.  As the matters in issue concern solely and directly the personal acts of the seven Justices involved in the contravention of the Basic Law, they are unrelated to the scope of the doctrine of judicial immunity afforded to judges in the exercise of their judicial functions under the judicial system of the (Hong Kong) Special Administrative Region.

….

15.  Pursuant to the provisions of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap. 484), the seven Justices of the Court of Final Appeal concerned would, by reason of actual or apparent conflict of interest, be required to recuse themselves from the matters in question.  Consequently, it would be impossible to constitute a valid and lawfully constituted Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal to hear the [Applicant’s] eight related appeals.  Any appellate proceedings before the Court of Final Appeal could therefore not lawfully proceed, let alone result in the delivery of a final judgment.  Save for the judge with foreign nationality (Stock), the Court of Final Appeal should bear responsibility arising from the personal acts of the seven Justices of the Court of Final Appeal [namely Andrew Cheung Kui-nung, Roberto Alexandre Vieira Ribeiro, Joseph Paul Fok, Johnson Lam Man-hon, Robert Tang Kwok‑ching, Patrick Chan Siu‑oi, and Syed Kemal Shah Bokhary], in contravening the Basic Law.  Apart from making judicial compensation to the [Applicant], the (Hong Kong) Special Administrative Region Government and the Court of Final Appeal have no other means of resolving the matter unless an interpretation of the Basic Law is sought from the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress!  The Official Receiver, as a matter of professional legal principle, should also understand and appreciate the judicial impasse arising under the above statutory framework, and ought forthwith to write directly to the Court of Final Appeal to pursue a solution by way of recovery of judicial compensation.

16.  As there are no legal proceedings requiring further following up, the sole responsibility of the Official Receiver is to write to the Court of Final Appeal to make inquiries and pursue recovery.  Whether such efforts ultimately succeed is a matter for future determination.  However, the Official Receiver has failed even to discharge the first step of that responsibility, namely, to write to the Court of Final Appeal to make inquiries.  Its administrative maladministration, characterised by delay, evasion, and inaction, is beyond dispute.’

28.  As the claims relied upon by the applicant in the Application clearly fall within the ambit of the RPO of matters ‘involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to’ to the proceedings identified by Anthony Chan J in HCAL 1234/2023, he was absolutely right to dismiss the Application in respect of those matters.  

3)  The Official Receiver to pursue HCPI 471/2019?

29.  HCPI 471/2019 was an action brought by the applicant and another against the Hospital Authority and others in respect of the treatment received by the applicant’s mother in the Prince of Wales Hospital.  As pointed out earlier, the applicant did  not identify what was the decision of the Official Receiver in respect of that case that he wished to challenge.  It is simply not good enough for the applicant to exhibit the correspondence between him and the Official Receiver without complying with the mandatory requirement as provided by the Rules of the High Court of identifying the decision under challenge.  As stated by Coleman J in his judgment on the six HCAL cases :

‘ 30. ….. An applicant for leave to apply for judicial review is required by the Rules of the High Court to identify (a) the impugned decision, judgment or order, (b) the public law grounds of the intended review, and (c) that those grounds are reasonably arguable. If there is no identified decision the subject matter of the intended challenge, and/or there are no identified grounds of review, and/or the grounds identified are not reasonably arguable, then leave to apply for judicial review will be refused.’

30.  In our view, when Anthony Chan J exercised his inherent jurisdiction to examine if the Application had breached the RPO, he was entitled to refuse to grant leave to the applicant to pursue an application to apply for leave to apply for judicial review which had not even identified the impugned decision.  He was not under any duty to sift though a Form 86 and the supporting documents which failed to properly identify the decision sought to be challenged.  Further, as revealed by the applicant at the hearing before us, HCPI 471/2019 was dismissed by the Court.  The Court record shows that the action was dismissed by Master Kot on 20 November 2025 based on the letter of the Official Receiver dated 7 November 2025 and upon hearing the lawyer for the Hospital Authority and the applicant.  It would be an abuse of process to require the Official Receiver to pursue a claim that had since been dismissed.  We see no valid ground against Anthony Chan J’s decision to dismiss the Application.

VI.  Conclusion

31.  The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.

Attachment 1

「 所尋求的濟助：

1)  要求法庭勒令建議第一答辯人履行責任之《監管、維護、爭取、追討》相關債權人的一切債務權益，這涉及破產人(即本申請人)於破產後的《現存資產》及《可追討資產》，而《可追討資產》包括申請人於破產令前(2024 年11 月18 日)一直追討之9 宗高院索償案的司法賠償，尤其(HCPI 471/2019)及(HCAL 679-924/2023)索償案的金錢賠償追討之涉及最少港幣6890 萬元。

2)  要求法庭勒令建議第一答辯人繼續爭取索償案 (HCPI  471/2019)賠償要求的責任，且允許申請人自行從政府外委大律師名單上揀選一位香港註冊大律師、代為跟進索償訴訟事宜。

3)  要求法庭於聆訊上公開確認申請人之另外8 宗高院索償案 (HCAL 1264/2022, HCAL 679-696-924-925-1243-1718-1827/2023)的各被告人身份、及各被告人與終審法院之間的利害關係。

4)  按《終審條例第484章》之組成《5人合議庭及3人上訴委員會》的規定、以及7位涉案法官一律須要遵守避嫌及避席的原則下，要求法庭勒令建議第二答辯人在符合法理下、提出有效及合法的《5 人合議庭及3人上訴委員會》組合以審理8 宗終審上訴申請(HCAL 1264/2022, HCAL 679-696-924-925-1243-1718-1827/2023)。

5)  如建議第二答辯人確無法組成《5人合議庭及3人上訴委員會》，要求法庭勒令作為司法部門首長之建議第二答辯人、向申請人就上述8宗索償案作出相關的司法賠償，尤其(HCAL 679-924/2023)兩案提出的金錢賠償涉及最少港幣6890 萬元。

6)  要求法庭勒令第一答辯人履行其責任跟進前後9 宗索償案之司法程序，以避免第一答辯人企圖違反《基本法第3 章第35 條》之規定，從而幫助相關政府官員避免面對申請人提出的司法訴訟，這政府官員包括《醫管局及7 位涉案終審法院大法官之張舉能、李義、霍兆剛、林文瀚、鄧國楨、陳兆愷、包致金》。

7)  要求法庭勒令建議第一答辯人就申請人現時進行之8 宗索償案 (HCAL 1264/2022, HCAL 679-696-924-925-1243-1718-1827/2023)之注定無法經任何司法程序獲得有效判決下，自行以書面要求建議第二答辯人向申請人提供合理賠償方案、以償還債權人債務。

8)  要求法庭指示建議第一及第二答辯人採納《AI人工智能的軟件》所提供之客觀公正意見及提議，從而有效解決現時申請人及建議第一及第二答辯人之間懸而未決的司法問題。

9)  為維護及保障債權人權益，要求法庭指示建議第一答辯人召開債權人會議、以商討9 宗索償案涉及之司法賠償的最佳處理方式。

10)  要求法庭公開認同並維護《基本法第3 章第25 條》之法例規定：香港居民於法律面前一律平等。

11)  要求法庭公開認同並維護《基本法第3 章第35 條》之法例規定，從而阻止政府官員逃避面對司法訴訟及相關法律責任。」

「所尋求濟助的理由：

1)  於本司法覆核申請書中提及之8 宗高院索償案，申請人的唯一目的是要求法庭確認所有被告人的身份、以及各被告人與終審法院的利害關係；至於8 宗索償案的高院判決之《對與錯、是與非、輕與重、多與少》實際上無關痛癢，法庭無需花時間琢磨各相關判決的內容、或轉移視線於司法上作出無謂的討論與審理。

2)  無論上述相關8宗索償案於高院司法程序上所作出的任何判決，《任何敗訴一方》都肯定最終向終院提出終審上訴申請，最終出現終院面對無法組成3 人上訴委員會而無法進行任何司法程序，以致訴訟雙方都最終未能獲得任何有效而合法的終審判決，司法公義亦因此無法彰顯，從而直接侵犯及剝削訴訟人的司法權益。

3)  否則，如終審法院面對無法組成3 人上訴委員會而蠻橫將申請人之相關8 宗終審上訴案置之不理，這無形中提供各終審法院大法官特權及一《免死金牌》而無須承擔任何法律制裁，這完全抵觸《基本法第3 章第25 條》規定：香港居民於法律面前一律平等。

4)  申請人就上述司法困局於(2024 年11 月25 日)致函建議第二答辯人，並直接要求司法賠償，但建議第二答辯人至今一直罔顧其職責而堅持鵪鶉、沉默及逃避；而建議第一答辯人自(2024 年11 月18 日)破產令生效後，亦一直配合避免觸動建議第二答辯人的神經之須要面對及解決申請人的司法賠償問題。

5)  基於上述第2點的論述，建議第一答辯人應早已掌握司法困局的存在，依賴司法程序解決相關賠償問題、根本上已經此路不通。而建議第一答辯人履行職責之唯一途徑就是直接去信建議第二答辯人、並要求建議第二答辯人提出合理司法賠償的解決方案，而非於6  個月破產期間、浪費精神於《口頭上如何打官司》上。因此，建議第一答辯人的刻意怠職失責、毋庸置疑。

6)  至於先行就8宗索償案繳交終審上訴之立案費用、根本上無關痛癢兼於事無補，因事實上《預先繳費及立案與否》、由始至終都未能解決8 宗索償案最終無法有效及合法獲得進行任何終審上訴的司法程序，遑論訴訟人最終獲取有效及合法的終審判決。

7)  申請人於(2024 年11 月25 日、2025 年5 月8 日、5  月9 日、5 月27 日)分別致函建議第二答辯人、高院聆案官葛倩兒及建議第一答辯人之內容及理據，已概括針對建議第一答辯人及建議第二答辯人之逃避職責、以及其一直須要解決面對的問題。」

Attachment 2

「 8.•  本司法覆核申請書提及之8宗高院索償案 (FORM 86)，申請人目的是要求法庭確認涉案大法官的身份，反而8宗索償案的高院判決之《對與錯、是與非、輕與重、多與少》實際與本司法覆核申請無任何關係，法庭根本無需花時間琢磨判決內容；而涉案終院大法官為《張舉能、李義、霍兆剛、林文瀚、鄧國楨、陳兆愷、包致金》。

…

11.  《破產管理署》職責包括《維護、爭取、追討、妥善管理》債權人及債務人(即上訴人)的一切相關權益，這包括上訴人破產後可供追討的經濟權益，如上訴人於內地東莞物業資產的經濟權益，醫療意外索償案(HCPI 471/2019)的要求賠償權益，以及8宗索償案件因為終審法院最終無法進行任何司法程序(遑論最終達成任何合法的相關終審判決)、而追究終審法院須就7位終院大法官違反多項《基本法》之個人行為所必須承擔的司法責任及經濟賠償。

12.  由於只是直接關乎涉案7位大法官違反《基本法》的個人行為，因此，這跟特區司法制度所賦予法官審案時的司法豁免權無關。

…

15.  按照《終審條例第484章》的法例規定下，由於7位終審法院大法官因涉案之須避嫌避席而注定無法組成任何有效合法的終審上訴委員會、以審理上訴人8宗相關索償上訴案，任何終審上訴司法程序亦當然無法合法進行，更遑論作出終審判決的可能；除外籍法官(司徒敬)外，終審法院須就7位終審法院大法官(張舉能、李義、霍兆剛、林文瀚、鄧國楨、陳兆愷、包致金)之違反《基本法》的個人行為而承擔責任。《特區政府及終審法院》除向上訴人作出司法賠償外，根本並無其他解決方法，否則尋求向《人大釋法》!而第一被告人《破產管理署》於專業法理上亦當然理解及掌握上述法規制度下所發生的司法困局、而應即時直接去信終審法院並尋求追討司法賠償的解決方案。

16.  既無官司需跟進，《破產管理署》唯一職責是去信終審法院質詢及追討，至於成功與否就留待下回分解；但《破產管理署》並無履行第一步職責去信終審法院質詢，行政失當之《拖延、逃避、不作為》毋庸置疑。」