X v. Y COMPANY

DCMP 5633/2025

[2026] HKDC 549

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 5633 OF 2025

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BETWEEN

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REASONS FOR DECISION

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A. INTRODUCTION

1.  This is the first hearing of the action commenced by the plaintiff (“P”) against the defendant (“D”) by originating summons issued on 13 October 2025 (“OS”) for various heads of relief, including a Norwich Pharmacal order, a gagging order and an order that no inspection of the court file be allowed except with leave of the Court, arising from an alleged internet fraud. Unless otherwise specified, all references to Orders, rules, forms and appendices are to those in the Rules of the District Court, Cap 336H.

2.  As is commonly the case, D acknowledged service but indicated its intention not to defend the action. It maintains a neutral stance towards the OS and did not appear at the hearing.

3.  Originally listed in Chambers (not open to public), the hearing was adjourned to Chambers (open to public) upon P’s confirmation of no objection. At its conclusion, I granted an order based on the draft order included in the hearing bundle (“Draft Order”), subject to various amendments agreed upon by P.

4.  On its face, this appeared to be a routine proceeding which, regrettably, arises with some regularity given the prevalence of internet fraud. There are, however, a number of procedural features in this case which justify the publication of these reasons for practitioners’ reference.

B. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

5.  The factual background is drawn from P’s supporting affirmation filed on 13 October 2025. Details capable of revealing the parties’ identities have been withheld.

6.  The underlying dispute arose from a typical internet fraud. In mid-2024, P was added by an unknown person to a WhatsApp group. One of the members induced P to download a purported mobile “investment application” and register a purported “investment account” therein for investing in Mainland stocks.

7.  P was required to transfer funds into the “investment account” before she could trade through the “investment application”. She made enquiries with two customer service officers, one via the “investment application” and the other through a mobile number provided by the aforesaid unknown group member.

8.  In September 2024, P, acting on the instructions of the customer service officers, transferred various funds from her local bank account to four accounts with D in the names of four different persons (“the 1^st Tier Recipients”). A small withdrawal from the “investment account” was initially permitted, but a subsequent larger request was refused. P thereby lost all her savings (“the Defrauded Sum”), which falls within the jurisdiction of the District Court.

9.  Shortly thereafter, P reported the matter to the police. Some six months later, by the letter dated 22 April 2025, P’s solicitors requested D to disclose the correspondence addresses, Hong Kong Identity Card number and current balance figures of the four bank account holders and their accounts, with the names of the 1^st Tier Recipients and their account numbers specified. D replied two days later, declining the request on the grounds of customer confidentiality, and indicating that a court order would be required for further consideration.

10.  In May 2025, the police informed P in writing that one of the aforesaid accounts had been temporarily suspended. They did not respond to the request of P’s solicitors for disclosure of the Defrauded Sum, the correspondence addresses of the 1^st Tier Recipients, or the sum “presently frozen”.

11.  By the letter dated 28 July 2025, P’s solicitors notified D of its intention to seek a Norwich Pharmacal order and enclosed, in draft form, an originating summons, order and P’s supporting affirmation for D’s “further understanding”. The letter concluded as follows:

“In the meantime, we request your bank to withhold from informing the abovementioned bank holders of the present update, so as not to stifle investigations and other recovery work being undertaken. If legal action becomes unavoidable, our client reserves the right to seek protection from a gagging order against your bank to prevent disclosure of the existence of court proceedings.”

12.  By the letter dated 5 September 2025, P’s solicitors sent, in draft form, an originating summons, and order to D’s solicitors for consideration. By the letter dated 19 September 2025, D’s solicitors provided comments on the draft documents.

13.  By the letter dated 19 September 2025, D commented on the draft originating summons and order and indicated its intention to adopt a neutral stance without contesting the proposed action. No positive response was given to P’s request that the 1^st Tier Recipients not be informed of the information provided up to that point.

14.  By the letter dated 26 September 2025, P’s solicitors sent a revised draft originating summons and order to D for confirmation.

15.  By the letter dated 29 September 2025, D made minor comments on the drafts, indicated its intention to remain neutral and not contest the action, and requested that its attendance be excused in the proposed proceedings.

16.  However, the draft documents enclosed with the letters dated 28 July 2025, 5 September 2025 and 26 September 2025 were omitted from the exhibited copies. It is therefore difficult to understand D’s comments thereon.

17.  By the OS filed on 13 October 2025 in Form No 8 in Appendix A (the use of which is in accordance with the judgment of Chow J (as he then was) in Leung Yiu Ting v MTR Corp Ltd [2019] 5 HKLRD 14 at §§12-15), P commenced this action against D for the following relief:

(1) A Norwich Pharmacal order for “the personal particulars [of the 1^st Tier Recipients] … including the correspondence address, the Hong Kong identity card number and current balance of such bank accounts held by [the 1^st Tier Recipients]”.

(2) A Norwich Pharmacal order for all available documents or records in the possession, custody or power of D, including “account statements, withdrawal or deposit slips, electronic transfer instructions, cheques, written and email correspondence, and any document or record in the ordinary business of the Defendant” relating to the relevant transactions in the accounts of the 1^st Tier Recipients, the opening of these accounts, their contact details, the personal and contact details of person(s) responsible for providing instructions on behalf of the 1^st Tier Recipients and “the destination and/or recipients of any money transferred out of” these accounts.

(3) Leave to use the information and documents obtained above for the purpose of: (a) investigating the whereabouts of the Defrauded Sum and the identities and wrongdoings of the persons or entities involved therein; and/or (b) commencing civil and/or criminal proceedings against the persons or entities involved.

(collectively the “Norwich Pharmacal Order”)

(4) A gagging order restraining D from disclosing the existence of this action to anyone, including the 1^st Tier Recipients, except with the prior written consent of P, or to the police or bodies authorized by law to obtain the same, subject to D’s right to apply to vary or discharge the same.

(5) An order that the court file in relation to this action be sealed and no inspection of the same is allowed save with leave to the parties thereto and/or their legal representatives (“No Inspection of Court File Order”).

(6) Costs of and occasioned by this action (including costs of compliance thereof) be paid by P to D to be taxed on indemnity basis if not agreed.

18.  In the affirmation filed in support of the OS on 13 October 2025, P deposed in paragraphs 25 and 26 to the fact that “the 1^st Tier Recipients’ correspondence address, their Hong Kong Identity Card number and their respective balance in their bank accounts for the purpose of commencing civil proceedings” and “such disclosure order would enable me to take appropriate actions to preserve the Defrauded Sum and/or the traceable proceeds”. P confirmed in paragraph 31 that D’s letter dated 29 September 2025 was its “latest reply” up to that day.

19.  As explained above, the draft documents sent by P’s solicitors for D’s comments were not exhibited, so the Court was left with the impression that the terms in the OS reflected the latest stance of the parties.

20.  On 13 October 2025, P took out an ex parte summons. The only relief sought was a gagging order that D “should not disclose to any party of the existence of the present proceedings until the hearing of the Originating Summons on (the date was left blank) or such further period as the Court may allow”.

21.  On 17 October 2025, P’s solicitors wrote to the Court, stating that they would take out an inter parte summons for an (interim) gagging order and apologising for the confusion caused. The ex parte summons was clearly not pursued. In fact, P’s solicitors did not issue any inter parte summons as indicated. On the same day, D acknowledged service of the OS but stated that it did not intend to contest the action.

22.  By the notice of appointment filed on 24 October 2025, the first hearing was listed before a judge in chambers. This notice, however, contained a number of special features.

23.  First, the scope of the order sought was wider than that in the OS. While the Norwich Pharmacal Order (§§1-3) and No Inspection of Court File Order (§8(1)) largely mirrored the terms in the OS, the gagging order sought (§5) (“the Gagging Order”) was slightly broader than the one in the OS. Significantly §§8(2) and 8(3) of this notice sought two additional orders not appearing in the OS, namely:

(1) “All hearing of these proceedings be held in chambers not open to the public” (“Private Hearing Order”); and

(2) “This matter be referred to and identified in the daily cause list by its action number and not by reference to the names of parties, who shall be referred to as X and Y company.” (“Anonymity Order”)

24.  Second, in the absence of any application for the Private Hearing Order (interim or otherwise), the notice, in typed words, requested that the first hearing be heard “in Chambers (not open to public)”, and the hearing was listed accordingly.

25.  Third, P sought the Anonymity Order in the absence of any interim order to protect the anonymity of the parties before the first hearing.

26.  Some two months later, on 31 December 2025, P lodged the hearing bundles for the first hearing to be held on 8 January 2026. These bundles contained the “Draft Order” which reflected the relief sought in the notice of appointment. The preamble to the Draft Order stated, inter alia, that the order was to be made upon the ex parte summons filed on 13 October 2025. This seems to be inconsistent with P’s message to the Court in its letter dated 17 October 2025.

27.  On 5 January 2026, Miss Vienna Fong, counsel for P, helpfully lodged a Skeleton Argument. Although it stated that the hearing was for a Norwich Pharmacal order and a gagging order, P sought an order in terms of the “Draft Order”, which included the additional relief of the Private Hearing Order, Anonymity Order, and No Inspection of Court File Order.

28.  On 7 January 2026, the Court requested P’s solicitors to provide evidence of D’s position on the “Draft Order” in the hearing bundle which sought additional relief not contained in the OS. P’s solicitors clarified that the Draft Order was in fact the final draft sent to D for comments by the letter dated 26 September 2025, and the OS was filed with such content because they had wrongly used a previous draft.

C. THE PROCEDURAL FEATURES WARRANTING ATTENTION

C.1 Listing of hearing in Chambers (not open to the public)

29.  O 28, r 3A provides that an originating summons must be heard in open court unless the Court otherwise directs. Paragraph 2(a) of Practice Direction 5.8 states that the first hearing is to be heard “in chambers”.

30.  Paragraph 2 of Practice Direction 25.1 (which came into effect on 13 February 2017) provides for the default position that all chambers hearings shall be held in public “except in the instances set out in paragraphs 3, 4(a) and 5.”

31.  Paragraph 3 provides that proceedings shall be “not open to the public” as required by statutory provisions, such as those listed in Schedule 1. Other examples include Beddoe applications (paragraph 15 of Practice Direction 20.3) and applications under Part II of the Mental Health Ordinance, Cap 136 (paragraph 9.02 of Practice Direction 30.1). Paragraph 4(a) states that proceedings listed in Schedule 2 would “usually” not be open to the public.

32.  An action for a Norwich Pharmacal order and ancillary gagging order does not fall within any of the above exceptions. The default position, therefore, is that the first hearing of such action shall be listed for hearing in Chambers (open to the public).

33.  In fact, cases involving victims of fraud seeking Norwich Pharmacal orders and gagging orders do not invariably take place in private. There have been cases where the hearings took place in chambers or even open court: NEC Tokin Hong Kong Ltd v Hong Kong Property Services (Agency) Ltd HCMP 453/2013 (unreported, 25 March 2013); A v P company [2018] HKCFI 907; Twenthe v Hang Seng Bank, Ltd [2018] HKCFI 2831; Asiya Asset Management (Cayman) Ltd v Dipper Trading Co Ltd [2019] 3 HKC 145; [2019] HKCFI 1090; Goliath Far East Ltd v Teng Fei Run Trade Ltd [2019] 4 HKLRD 282; Pacific Andes Enterprises (BVI) Ltd (in liquidation) v HSBC Ltd [2019] 4 HKLRD 621 (CA); MCT Enterprises Ltd v Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd [2020] HKDC 396; A v B [2022] HKDC 492; A v B [2022] HKDC 833; Chen Bei v HSBC Ltd [2023] HKDC 788; and Swire Energy Services Sdn Bhd v HSBC Ltd [2025] HKCFI 2797.

34.  The default position is important for at least two reasons. First, paragraph 1 of Practice Direction 25.1 states that a “hearing not open to the public is a closed one where the press and the public are excluded from attending.” Paragraph 2 of Practice Direction 25.2 further states that “No report should be made of any proceedings (including the judgment) held in chambers not open to the public without the authority of the master or the judge before whom the proceedings were conducted.”

35.  Second, filing a summons or notice of appointment for hearing “not open to the public” beyond the clear examples set out in Practice Direction 25.1 may cause confusion for, and unnecessary burden upon, the Registry staff, and even Judges, who would have to make enquiries with the parties to ascertain the basis for such a request.

36.  Paragraph 5 of Practice Direction 25.1 states that the court may order a chambers hearing to be closed to the public wholly or partly where the court is of the view that one or more of the reasons in Article 10 in section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 are satisfied. It relevantly reads:

“The press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice;”

37.  A party seeking a private hearing shall therefore follow the procedure under paragraph 7 of Practice Direction 25.1, which provides:

“Any party to an inter partes application who wishes to apply for an order referred to in paragraph 4(b) or paragraph 5 shall, as soon as practicable, and in any case not less than 2 clear days before the hearing apply in writing to the court with grounds in support thereof, giving notice to all other parties to the application. Any party who opposes the application shall state his grounds in opposition which shall reach the court and the party who has applied for the order no later than the day before the hearing. Such application will be dealt with by the court on paper unless the court directs that an oral hearing be held.”

38.  The above is entirely consistent with the observations of Chu J in Re Z (Minor) (Declaration of Non-Parentage) [2023] 2 HKLRD 772 at §8:

“The Applicant had also in the present originating summons sought directions for an expedited hearing, that all hearings be conducted in chambers (not open to public), and an anonymity order throughout the proceedings and in the daily cause lists. Such directions should normally be sought from the Court prior to the issue of the originating summons and before the fixing of the hearing date, as otherwise, the purpose of seeking such directions would be defeated.”

39.  Seeking a Private Hearing Order in this case may be problematic because, unless the Court directs that the hearing shall be held in public prior to the hearing to override the position set out in the notice of appointment, the OS would have been disposed of in private, so the question relating to the openness of the hearing (or the so-called subsequent proceedings) would be a fait accompli.

40.  The fact that the notice of appointment seeks an Anonymity Order is no answer to the problem. The Court’s power to hear proceedings in private (with its entailing restriction on reporting) “overlaps with, but is not entirely the same as” the Court’s jurisdiction to make an anonymity order: see Re BU [2012] 4 HKLRD 417 at §12, per Cheung CJHC (as the Chief Justice then was). The seeking of the Private Hearing Order must be separately justified pursuant to Practice Direction 25.1.

C.2 Interim relief for Anonymity Order and No Inspection of Court File Order

41.  The observations of Chu J in Re Z (Minor) (Declaration of Non-Parentage) [2023] 2 HKLRD 772 at §8 apply with equal force to the Anonymity Order and No Inspection of Court File Order.

42.  In this case, P has never sought any interim order to protect the anonymity of the parties. The public could have obtained the names of the parties to this action through the “Information for parties to proceedings” section of the Judiciary website, or at least the Daily Cause List published before the hearing commenced. Even if this Court were to make the Anonymity Order at the conclusion of a private hearing, the Daily Cause List would already have disclosed the names of the parties to the general public.

43.  Having considered the matter, I exercised the implied jurisdiction on the day before this hearing to make an interim anonymity order so that the parties’ names would not be shown in the Daily Cause List pending the first hearing of the notice of appointment. In Devonport Ltd v HSBC Ltd [2018] HKCFI 326 at §41, DHCJ David N Francis made a similar interim order at the invitation of the plaintiff’s solicitors. In DBP v Scottish Ambulance Service [2026] ICR 89 (EAT), a case involving some unusual facts, Judge Barry Clarke at §2 made an interim anonymity order of his own motion to “hold the ring” pending the remitter of an application for anonymisation by the Employment Tribunal.

44.  Similar considerations apply to the No Inspection of Court File Order. Under O 63, r 4(1)(a), “Any person shall, on payment of the prescribed fee, be entitled … to search for, inspect and obtain a copy of any of the following documents filed in the Registry, namely― (a) the copy of any writ of summons or other originating process”. In the absence of any interim order, the OS has been open for inspection by “any person” for nearly three months since its date of issuance on 13 October 2025.

C.3 Parties’ stance on the orders sought in notice of appointment

45.  Pursuant to O 28, r 2(1), the plaintiff issuing an originating summons shall file a notice of appointment in Form No 12 in Appendix A to obtain an appointment for the first hearing, which, ordinarily, is for “directions”: paragraph 2(a) of Practice Direction 5.8 (which applies to the District Court by virtue of paragraph 28 of Practice Direction 27). O 28, r 3(3) requires such notice to “specify what orders or directions the party serving the notice intends to seek at the hearing”.

46.  As an exception to the above normal practice, a plaintiff may seek summary disposal pursuant to O 28, r 4, see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026, at §28/4/2.

47.  Where a plaintiff seeks orders by summary disposal beyond the scope of the originating summons, the proper procedure for amendment under O 20, rr 5 and 7 must be followed. A plaintiff should also seek the views of the defendant on the proposed amendments, whose neutrality or consent shall be reflected in evidence filed in good time before the hearing.

48.  As Miss Fong fairly accepted, there was no evidence before this Court as to D’s stance on the “Draft Order” containing these two additional orders sought as discussed at paragraph 23.

49.  The draft documents enclosed in the relevant letters were removed apparently because it was thought that they could be “inserted” in the hearing bundle. After a short adjournment, P’s solicitors helpfully provided the Court with a copy of the letter dated 26 September 2025 enclosing the draft documents. Having regard to the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that D maintained a neutral stance to the “Draft Order” and the OS need not be amended.

50.  While “Court documents, such as probates, letters of administration, orders, affidavits or pleadings, should never be exhibited” (paragraph 4(c) of Practice Direction 10.1 which applies to the District Court by virtue of paragraph 29 of Practice Direction 27), parties are reminded of the importance of exhibiting the draft documents enclosed in correspondence, so that the Court can properly understand the parties’ comments thereon and any consensus reached, as necessary and in accordance with Practice Direction 10.1. A party cannot give factual evidence through the descriptions in the bundle index or the way in which a hearing bundle is prepared.

C.4 Interim Gagging Order

51.  In Asiya Asset Management (Cayman) Ltd v Dipper Trading Co Ltd [2019] 3 HKC 145, DHCJ Maurellet SC suggested at §25 that the correct procedure for applying for gagging orders is as follows:

(1) “First, the plaintiff seeks on an ex parte without notice basis a gagging order against the bank pending the hearing of the Norwich Pharmacal discovery against the bank either on an inter partes basis or at the very least on an ex parte basis but with notice. … The notice period to be given should normally be sufficiently long so that the bank can meaningfully make submissions, if it thinks appropriate to do so.”

(2) “Second, at the hearing of the Norwich Pharmacal discovery application against the bank, the Court will then have the benefit of the submissions of the bank, if any, while the plaintiff on the other hand will be protected by the gagging order until the conclusion of such proceedings.”

(3) “Third, the Court can in an appropriate case grant a further brief period for the gagging order to continue, to allow the plaintiff to make such applications as it sees fit to protect its interests.”

52.  In A1 v R1 [2021] HKCFI 650, Coleman J at §24 agreed that the above procedure was the correct one, and “it should be followed in all save the most exceptional of cases”. His Lordship further noted at §26 that the correct procedure “provides the proper balancing of interest between (a) the party seeking the information from the bank and (b) the bank's customer”; and “those safeguards cannot be avoided in the name of convenience or to save costs, and are not overridden by the understandable wish to obtain information as quickly and cheaply as possible”. Although the correct procedure was not followed and the bank was merely requested to refrain from taking any steps contrary to a purported gagging order (which had not yet been made) (§§15-16), a gagging order was eventually granted (§62).

53.  In the absence of an interim gagging order, parties should avoid requesting banks not to disclose intended proceedings to relevant account holders. The rationale has been explained by Coleman J in A1 v R1 [2021] HKCFI 650 at §16:

“[Banks are] in effect being asked and trusted not to do something contrary to a gagging order which had not yet been made, and which might not be made [and] this approach might have placed the Banks in a difficult position vis-à-vis their own customer, to whom they owe certain obligations or duties arising from the banker/customer relationship.”

C.5 Pre-action correspondence would negate urgency or secrecy required for ex parte procedure

54.  In A1 v R1 [2021] HKCFI 650, the applicants sought Norwich Pharmacal order and gagging order against the banks on ex parte on notice basis, on grounds of urgency and secrecy. Yet, five days before delivering the papers to Court, their solicitors wrote to the banks to inform them of the intended application and provided in draft form the originating summons, affidavit materials, order, skeleton argument, and even list of authorities (§15). As observed by Coleman J at §26:

“The approach adopted by the Applicants in this case showed the application was not in fact urgent and that secrecy had been given up. The correct procedure identified above would not have been to the Applicants’ detriment.”

55.  A party who engages in pre-action correspondence with the banks cannot properly seek ex parte relief, as such conduct likely negates urgency and secrecy—the usual foundations of that procedure.

C.6 Exhibiting screenshots of WhatsApp messages

56.  In this case, nearly 300 pages of colour-printed screenshots of WhatsApp messages were exhibited to P’s supporting affirmation. As is usually the case, the affirmation did not depose to how the screenshots should be interpreted.

57.  The adducing of WhatsApp messages by way of screenshots has presented the Court with a number of difficulties:

(1) The messages bear no specific dates, are selectively captured from a rolling screen in a manner suggesting continuity, and often compel legal representatives to make impermissible factual assertions as to how they should be read—for example, whether a date on one page applies to messages several pages later. The Court is thereby required to spend time merely inferring the dates of each message.

(2) The top and bottom of each page inevitably repeat content from adjoining pages, while large portions are occupied by blank spaces or non-textual graphics that rarely bear relevance to the issues before the Court.

(3) Pictures attached to WhatsApp messages cannot be shown clearly in screenshots, as they are invariably reduced in size. In the present case, the screenshots were printed in colour and enlarged, seemingly for no purpose other than to render the attached pictures legible.

(4) Screenshots cannot convey the content of documents attached to WhatsApp messages, save perhaps an incomplete file name appearing in the text. On the rare occasions when a party separately adduces such documents, there are no straightforward means of identifying their source or the date and time of their attachment.

(5) Viewed collectively, the manual production of screenshots consumes excessive time, unnecessarily expands the volume of papers the Court must review, and increases the legal costs of the proceedings.

58.  In light of the duty of parties and their legal representatives to further the underlying objectives of the District Court Rules under O 1A, r 3, I would suggest that—subject to technological developments—the usual practice for adducing WhatsApp chat messages should be as follows:

(1) Parties are expected to prepare exported chats and insofar as necessary and relevant together with media. Where only the textual messages are relevant, the chat .txt file (or an equivalent electronic format) should be exhibited both in printed form and electronically, the latter enabling keyword search.

(2) Where selected attachments are also relevant, a party should in general exhibit both the electronic files (with the original file names shown in the chat .txt file) and also its printed version (with clear indication of the aforesaid file name).

(3) The requirement to exhibit printed copies is always subject to the circumstances of individual cases: see the cogent observations of Coleman J in Hwang Joon Sang v Golden Electronics Inc [2021] 2 HKLRD 87 at §24.

(4) Unless compliance is impossible—for example, due to technical reasons—the above practice should be followed. Any departure must be justified. It is difficult to conceive that screenshots themselves could convey more relevant information than an exhibit prepared in accordance with the above, save in the rarest and most exceptional circumstances.

D. DISCUSSION

59.  The merits of this action are straightforward, given D’s indication of no objection to the Draft Order.

D.1 The Private Hearing Order

60.  Pursuant to the notice of appointment, the hearing initially commenced in Chambers (not open to public). At the outset, Miss Fong realistically accepted that the hearing could proceed in public. The hearing was therefore forthwith adjourned into Chambers (open to public).

61.  Miss Fong further informed the Court that the Private Hearing Order would be abandoned. To ensure fairness of the proceedings, and to avoid jeopardising the relief sought, the Court indicated that no matter likely to identify the parties would be mentioned during of the hearing.

D.2 Norwich Pharmacal Order

62.  The three main requirements for Norwich Pharmacal relief are well-settled. In A1 v R1 [2021] HKCFI 650, Coleman J summarised at §56:

(1) “there must be cogent and compelling evidence to demonstrate that serious tortious or wrongful activities have taken place (where allegations of fraud or something similar requires the degree of proof to be correspondingly high)”;

(2) “it must be clearly demonstrated that the order will or will very likely reap substantial and worthwhile benefits for the plaintiff, and where a tracing claim is made that the discovery sought will either allow the plaintiff to preserve what may well be his assets or realistically lead to the discovery of such assets”; and

(3) “the discovery sought must not be unduly wide, so any order must be specific and also restricted to those documents or those classes of documents that are necessary to enable the plaintiff to preserve or discover assets.”

63.  Ordinarily, a defendant who is not the wrongdoer is compensated by an order for costs on an indemnity basis, covering both the action and compliance with the order: Hwang Joon Sang v Golden Electronics Inc [2021] 2 HKLRD 87 at §§9 & 11, per Coleman J.

64.  On the evidence, I am of the view that the first two requirements are clearly satisfied. First, there is cogent and compelling evidence of internet fraud. Second, the order sought will likely reap benefit for P and enable P to at least assert her interests in one of the four accounts.

65.  As to the width of the order sought, I observed at the hearing that requesting “the personal particulars [of the 1^st Tier Recipients] … including the correspondence address, the Hong Kong identity card number and current balance of such bank accounts” was too wide. “Personal particulars” is undefined, and “including” renders the listed categories illustrative only. As the purpose of the relief is to commence civil proceedings, P’s solicitors are best placed to specify the relevant particulars. It would be unfair to impose on D an open-ended duty of disclosure. Miss Fong accepted that “namely” should replace “including”. On that basis, I agree the third requirement is satisfied.

D.3 Gagging Order

66.  In A v B [2022] HKDC 833, a similar action for Norwich Pharmacal relief, the plaintiff sought a gagging order but failed to follow the proper procedure for interim relief (§29). DDJ Teresa Wu noted at §30 that, effectively, “the defendant was entrusted not to disclose these proceedings and the intended claim to third party contrary to the intended Gagging Order without it even being made in the first place”. Notwithstanding such non-compliance, the learned deputy judge granted the gagging order for 60 days, having regard to the neutrality of the defendant and the absence of evidence that the bank account holders had given instructions regarding its operation (§41), and the real prejudice and serious implications to the plaintiff if a gagging order were refused (§42).

67.  Notwithstanding P’s failure to follow the proper procedure as explained above, I am satisfied that the Gagging Order sought should be made. First, D maintained its neutrality in this action and there is no evidence that the 1^st Tier Recipients ever gave any instructions regarding the operation of their accounts. Second, having regard to the nature of the fraud practised upon P, real prejudice would be suffered by P if an order is refused.

68.  It should be noted that, if a party seeks the bank’s view on a proposed gagging order, the proposed date of expiry should be stated clearly.

D.4 Anonymity Order

69.  The applicable principles on anonymity orders have been summarised by HHJ Harold Leong in X v Stefano [2024] HKDC 636 at §§6-8:

(1) The “starting point and general rule of open justice is that judicial proceedings are held in public and the parties are named in judgments. Open administration of justice is a fundamental principle of common law” (X & Y v Z [2020] HKCFI 826 at §58 per Coleman J).

(2) “This general principle of open justice is of great importance from the perspective of administration of justice for a number of reasons. Amongst such are that: the public nature of proceedings deters inappropriate behaviour on the part of the court; it maintains the public's confidence in the administration of justice; and it makes uninformed and inaccurate comment about the proceedings less likely” (Asia Television Ltd v Communications Authority [2013] 2 HKLRD 354 at §19 per Cheung CJHC (as the Chief Justice then was).

(3) In X & Y v Z [2020] HKCFI 826 at §§59-69, Coleman J set out the matters for consideration in relation to derogations from this principle which have been summarised as a weighing exercise as follows:

(a) “One most important, if not decisive, consideration is that the nature or circumstances of the particular proceedings are such that the application of the general principle in its entirety would frustrate or render impracticable the administration of justice, but any derogations from the general principle of open justice must be strictly necessary as measures to secure the proper administration of justice”;

(b) “Besides this, considerations of relevant interests, rights and freedoms involved (eg Articles 10 and 16 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights of Cap 383) must also be taken into account in a balancing act”;

(c) “It can only be justified in exceptional circumstances”;

(d) “Facts and issues are specific to each application”;

(e) “Establishing such derogation from the general principle […] requires clear and cogent evidence and the burden lies with the applicant”;

(f) “Any derogation granted, where justified, should be no more than strictly necessary to achieve the purpose”; and

(g) “After applying this test, the court is under the duty to either grant or refuse the derogation as a matter of obligation and not a question of discretion”.

70.  While the facts and issues are specific to each application, I note that the parties in similar cases also obtained anonymity orders: see, for example, the authorities considered under the Gagging Order. Having regard to all the circumstances of this case, and for the purpose of maintaining consistency with other orders granted, I am satisfied that the Anonymity Order is justified.

D.5 No Inspection of Court File Order

71.  O 63, r 4 draws a distinction between “(a) writ of summons and other originating processes” and “(b) any judgment or order given or made in Court” on the one hand, and “(c) any other documents” on the other hand. The former, described as an entitlement, does not require the leave of the Court while the latter does so.

72.  The statutory regime under the Rules of the District Court is analogous to that under the Civil Procedure Rules in England (“CPR”). CPR 5.4C(1)(a) allows non-parties to obtain from the court records a copy of “a statement of case, but not any documents filed with or attached to” it; while CPR 5.4C(2) allows a non-party to obtain a copy of “any other document filed by a party” with permission of the Court. In Various Claimants v Mercedes-Benz Group AG [2025] EWHC 1931 (KB), Constable J summarised the relevant principles relating to CPR 5.4C(1) at §21 as follows:

(1) “CPR 5.4C(1) creates a “presumption” amounting to “a very clear default principle" that a non-party should be entitled to obtain unredacted copies of statements of case, judgments and orders”.

(2) “as such, orders under CPR 5.4C(4) [restricting access to the statement of case] are derogations from the principle of open justice. They must be ordered only when it is necessary and proportionate to do so, on the basis of a clear justification, with a view to protecting the rights which claimants (and others) are entitled to have protected by such means”.

(3) “where the applicant is generally entitled to a document as of right under rule 5.4C, as it is under CPR 5.4C(1), the reasons why it wants it are of little or no importance unless it can be said that the document is sought for some improper purpose … As such, there is not a burden upon the applicant specifically to identify how the application advances the principle of open justice. That public availability of unredacted pleadings does so is inherent in the very clear default position under CPR 5.4C(1)”.

(4) “the justification for departure is acutely fact-sensitive, but likely to include and probably most likely to be established by reference to one or more of the matters set out in CPR 39.2(3)(a)–(g) … This includes circumstances in which publicity would damage confidential information”.

(5) “when an order restricting the CPR 5.4C(1) right is required, it must be limited in scope to reflect the minimum necessary incursion into the principle of open justice”.

73.  In A1 v R1 [2021] HKCFI 650 at §63, Coleman J observed that an anonymity order goes hand-in-hand with, and has similar justification to the Gagging Order, and all those orders seek to ensure that the court proceedings and the process are rendered effective and just.

74.  Having regard to the overall picture, this order is appropriate to maintain consistency with other orders made. In any event, the prohibition under this order is always subject to the Court’s power to grant leave to a particular person for inspection.

E. POSTSCRIPT ON JURISDICTION

75.  This Court has substantively considered the question of jurisdiction on two occasions. In Kwong Sin Yee Florence v Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd [2025] HKDC 1251, the plaintiff, while on board a flight, was allegedly struck by luggage falling on her head from the overhead locker by the negligent act of a fellow passenger. She sought, inter alia, Norwich Pharmacal relief against the flight operator based on her “intention to commence proceedings” against that passenger for negligence (§19). DDJ Jose Remedios held at §104 that the jurisdiction to grant such relief “arises by way of implication from the jurisdiction expressly conferred on the District Court by sections 32, 33, 35 and 37” of the District Court Ordinance, Cap 336 (“DCO”).

76.  In Chan Chun Hei Ryan v Hang Seng Bank Ltd [2026] HKDC 91, the plaintiff lent money to an acquaintance (Lam), who purported to repay the loan by delivering two post-dated cheques drawn by another (Chung). Both were dishonoured. The plaintiff sought Norwich Pharmacal relief against the bank for information as to Chung’s bank statements, transactions information and last known address since he “intends to sue Chung” (§§15-16). DDJ Simon Wong held that “if the District Court is satisfied that the underlying cause of action or complaint falls into one of the jurisdiction-conferring provisions in Part 4 [of the DCO], then the District Court may invoke its ancillary jurisdiction under section 48 [of the DCO] to grant equitable relief in the form of Norwich Pharmacal order.” (§58)

77.  Two points arise from these decisions. First, it is well established that section 48 of the DCO confers jurisdiction to grant relief “ancillary to” or “in aid of” other relief which this Court has power to give in an existing action: R v Cheshire County Court Judge and United Society of Boilermakers, ex parte Malone [1921] 2 KB 694, 699-700 (Lord Sterndale MR), 706-707 (Scrutton LJ) and 715 (Younger LJ) interpreting section 89 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873 (equivalent to section 74 of the County Courts Act, 1959 from which section 48 of the DCO was derived); applied in The Excelsior v Bernard N Da Silva [1976] HKDCLR 32 at 36 (DJ Liu).

78.  Second, where there is no existing action, but pre-action relief is necessary in aid of an imminent action, the analyses of the learned deputy judges are of assistance. For example, it cannot be seriously disputed that this Court possesses the jurisdiction to grant pre-action Mareva injunction on an interim basis: see O 29, r 1(3). One of the standard undertakings requires the plaintiff to issue a writ “as soon as practicable” (Paragraph (3) of Schedule 2 to Practice Direction 11.2, applied to the District Court by virtue of paragraph 30 of Practice Direction 27). This could be explained as an implied jurisdiction since apparently there has yet to be “matter” under section 52 of the DCO, or “action or proceedings” under section 52B of the DCO; or even “general ancillary” jurisdiction under section 48 of the DCO.

79.  However, the position remains unclear in cases such as the present where there is merely an asserted “intention” to commence an action which may or may not eventuate. In cases of internet fraud, a plaintiff would sue the third party only when the disclosure shows that such action would be fruitful, eg the third party’s account still has a credit balance representing at least part of the sum defrauded.

80.  In this kind of case, whether this Court has jurisdiction to grant what I would call “freestanding” Norwich Pharmacal relief is a difficult question. In the absence of submissions, I would leave this question open, subject to the following observations.

81.  First, it is difficult to see how section 52 of the DCO, on its proper construction, could be an express source of jurisdiction. To describe Norwich Pharmacal orders as “injunctions of whatsoever nature” would effectively transform every court order into a mandatory injunction. Nor is it apparent how an originating summons seeking disclosure could be said to be a matter “affecting” (movable or immovable) property. To hold otherwise could have far-reaching consequences on the registration of lis pendens under the Land Registration Ordinance, Cap 128.

82.  Second, the District Court does not possess “inherent jurisdiction” in the strict sense. It is thus erroneous to describe the present action as being in the matter of the “inherent jurisdiction” of this Court. The relevant question is whether the power to grant such relief exists as a matter of statutory implication, which should be approached by asking whether it is “reasonably required” for the effective exercise of the statutory jurisdiction expressly conferred: PCCW-HKT Telephone Ltd v Telecommunications Authority (2005) 8 HKCFAR 337 at §60 per Ribeiro PJ (with whom Li CJ, Chan PJ and Sir Anthony Mason NPJ agreed).

83.  Third, the jurisdiction to grant Norwich Pharmacal relief is equitable in nature. It originated from the bill of discovery in the Court of Chancery: Bray, The Principles and Practice of Discovery (1885), pp 610-619. An early example was Abery v Williams (1681) 1 Vern 27; 23 ER 282, where the Lord Chancellor dismissed a bill of discovery brought by a creditor of a bankrupt against a bona fide purchaser of the bankrupt’s property, seeking disclosure of what goods had been purchased. In Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133 at 191-192, Lord Cross said “a bill of discovery properly so called was a bill which simply asked for the disclosure of facts known to the defendant or of documents in his possession to aid the petitioner in prosecuting or defending other proceedings and asked no other equitable relief”.

84.  Fourth, it appears that the District Court and its predecessors have never possessed jurisdiction to grant freestanding equitable relief, but only relief ancillary to, or in aid of, proceedings within its jurisdiction.

85.  The origin of the District Court can be traced to the Supreme Court Ordinance (No 15 of 1844), establishing the Supreme Court as, inter alia, “a Court of Equity, with such, and the like jurisdiction, as the Court of Chancery in England” (section 14), with additional power and authority to determine “in a summary way” a restricted list of matters without mention of any equitable jurisdiction (section 113).

86.  That the summary jurisdiction did not extend to equitable relief based on various bills (including the bill of discovery) is clear from section 4 of the Supreme Court Ordinance (No 3 of 1858), which reads:

“It shall not be necessary to institute any proceeding on the Equity side of the [Supreme] Court, for the purpose of bringing before the Court any equitable claim, defence, or question, incident or collateral to, or arising out or in the course of, any proceeding on any other side of the said Court (except the Summary Jurisdiction thereof), or in aid of such last-mentioned proceeding: But every such claim, defence, or question may be so heard, and determined, on petition presented, or motion made, and instituted respectively in such last-mentioned proceeding, or as the Court shall direct: And in every such case the said Court shall have the like power to direct inquiries, accounts, and other preliminary or consequential matters, and to enforce its said directions, and to make interlocutory or final orders and decrees in the premises respectively, as in a suit or proceeding commenced by bill, petition, claim, case, or summons, on the Equity side of the said Court.” (emphasis added)

87.  The summary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was later transferred to the Court of Summary Jurisdiction established by the Court of Summary Jurisdiction Ordinance (No 7 of 1862), and re-enacted by the Supreme Court Summary Jurisdiction Ordinance, 1873 (No 14 of 1873) (in particular section 19), until its repeal by the District Court Ordinance, 1953.

88.  The newly established District Court was designed to have “the jurisdiction … exercisable by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction immediately before this legislation comes into operation”: see paragraph 4 of Objects and Reasons to District Court Bill 1953; Doris Buntzen (No 1) v Mrs G P Baglin [1953-55] HKDCLR 1; and section 14 and First Schedule to District Court Ordinance, 1953.

89.  Paragraph 2 of the Objects and Reasons to the District Court (Civil Jurisdiction and Procedure) Bill 1962, deriving from the English County Courts Act, 1959, stated that Part II (equivalent to Part 4 of the DCO) “seeks to establish the civil jurisdiction presently conferred on the District Court by the enactments mentioned above, without any change of substance”.

90.  It is noteworthy that after jurisdiction in equity was first conferred on the County Courts in England by the County Courts (Equity Jurisdiction) Act 1865, Andrew Thomson stated in The Principles of Equity and the Equity Practice of the County Court (1896) that “There is no jurisdiction to commence in the County Court an action for discovery only” (p 102), referring to the Norwich Pharmacal relief granted in Orr v Diaper (1876) 4 Ch D 92.

91.  In 1991, the Chief Justice appointed a working party chaired by Kempster J to consider, and recommend draft amendments to, the DCO. In the Report of the Working Party on Amendments to the District Court Ordinance and Civil Procedure (General) and (Forms) Rules (Cap 336) published in June 1993, the opening words of section 48 were not recommended to be changed (pp 18-19 of Schedule 1). Yet, in the District Court (Amendment) Bill 1999, these were proposed to be amended from “The Court, as regards any cause for the time being within its jurisdiction, shall in any proceedings before it” to its current version, namely “The Court has the same power as the Court of First Instance in any proceedings before it”. There is nothing to suggest this textual change was intended to effect substantive enlargement of jurisdiction.

92.  Fifth, in Sir Elly Kadoorie & Sons Ltd v Bradley [2026] HKCFA 2, Cheung CJ and Lam PJ (with whom the other members of the Court agreed) confirmed at §36 that: ―

“it is not a pre-condition of the exercise of the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction that the applicant should have brought, or be intending to bring, legal proceedings against the wrongdoer. It is sufficient that the applicant intends to seek some forms of lawful redress for which the information is needed.” (emphasis added)

93.  In Rugby Football Union v Consolidated Information Services Ltd [2012] 1 WLR 3333, Lord Kerr JSC (with whom the other members of the Court agreed) held at §15 that “any form of redress (for example disciplinary action or the dismissal of an employee) will suffice to ground an application for the order”: see British Steel Corpn v Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096, 1174D (Lord Wilberforce), 1184A-E (Viscount Dilhorne), 1200E-G (Lord Fraser) and 1204B (Lord Russell).

94.  It would seem incongruous that, although an intention to bring proceedings is not necessary for the grant of Norwich Pharmacal relief, such an intention would nevertheless be treated as sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the District Court, even though its realisation is contingent on the usefulness of the information obtained.