CHAN CHUN HEI RYAN v. HANG SENG BANK LTD

DCMP 1602/2025

[2026] HKDC 91

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 1602 OF 2025

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JUDGMENT

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A.  INTRODUCTION

1.  This case gives rises to an important and fundamental question: whether, and under which provisions, the District Court has jurisdiction to grant relief under Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excuse Commissioners [1974] AC 133 (“Norwich Pharmacal” / “Norwich Pharmacal relief”).

2.  There have not been many judgments discussing this issue. As far as I am aware, although District Judges have on numerous occasions granted Norwich Pharmacal relief, there are only two District Court decisions in which the question of jurisdiction was expressly discussed. Neither of those decisions is binding on me.

3.  As will be seen below, I agree with the learned Judges’ conclusion that the District Court does have jurisdiction to grant Norwich Pharmacal relief. However, I respectfully differ from their respective reasoning as to the basis upon which such jurisdiction is founded.

B.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND

4.  What follows is a summary of the factual background as set out in the two affirmations of the Plaintiff.

5.  In June 2021, the Plaintiff became acquainted with one Lam Wei Chuen Joe (“Lam”) through a car enthusiasts’ club, and the two subsequently became close friends.

6.  In or around August 2022, the Plaintiff and Lam entered into an oral agreement (“the Card Agreement”), pursuant to which the Plaintiff agreed to grant Lam two supplementary cards from two American Express accounts (“the Cards”), on the condition that Lam would repay all expenditures incurred by him no later than the repayment date stated on the monthly charge card statements issued by American Express. It was further agreed that, should Lam fail to make repayment, he would be liable to pay interest at the rate of 28.74% per annum, being the equivalent to the default interest charged by American Express.

7.  From August 2022 until November 2023, Lam used the Cards and made timely repayment in accordance with the terms of the Card Agreement.

8.  Between November 2023 and January 2024, Lam incurred total expenditures of HK$1,919,471.46 on the Cards. He failed to make any repayment of these sums.

9.  The vast majority of Lam’s spending was paid to a company named “Jose Travel & Wedding Services Limited”, now known as “Jose Travel Limited”, of which Lam’s wife, Leung Pik Kwan, is the sole director and shareholder.

10.  In or around February 2024, the Plaintiff demanded repayment from Lam, but Lam did not comply.

11.  On 8 January 2025, Lam delivered two post-dated cheques to the Plaintiff. The first was dated 15 January 2025 in the sum of HK$80,000 (“the 1^st Cheque”), while the second was dated 30 January 2025 in the sum of HK$126,920 (“the 2^nd Cheque”).

12.  Both cheques were drawn by one Chung Mei Ling (“Chung”) on an account held with the Defendant bank.

13.  On 15 January 2025, the Plaintiff deposited the 1^st Cheque. On 17 January 2025, his bank informed him that the cheque had been dishonoured.

14.  On 30 January 2025, the Plaintiff deposited the 2^nd Cheque. On 4 February 2025, he was informed by his bank that the cheque had also been dishonoured.

15.  The Plaintiff intends to sue Chung in respect of the two dishonoured cheques. However, he does not know Chung and has no means of contacting her.

16.  By way of an Originating Summons, the Plaintiff makes a Norwich Pharmacal application and seeks an order that the Defendant do disclose to him or his legal representatives all bank statements and transaction information relating to Chung from 1 January 2025 onwards, as well as the last known address of Chung.

17.  At the hearing before me, Mr James Chan, counsel for the Plaintiff, sensibly confined his application to seeking only the last known address of Chung. It is said that the information is necessary for the Plaintiff to commence legal proceedings against Chung.

18.  The Defendant has taken a neutral stance and has not appeared in these proceedings.

C.  JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURT TO GRANT NORWICH PHARMACAL RELIEF

C1.  The Plaintiff’s submissions on jurisdiction

19.  The Plaintiff relies on (i) inherent jurisdiction of the District Court; (ii) Section 47A of District Court Ordinance (Cap 336) (“DCO”); and (iii) Order 24 rules 7A(1) and 11A of the Rules of District Court (Cap 336H) (“RDC”) as the bases upon which this Court may grant Norwich Pharmacal relief to him.

20.  With respect, the Plaintiff’s reliance on these sources is misconceived.

21.  The District Court is a court of limited civil and criminal jurisdiction. Under section 3(2) of the DCO, the District Court’s jurisdiction and powers are limited to what is conferred upon it by the DCO and by any other enactment for the time being in force. Unlike the High Court, it does not possess inherent jurisdiction to hear any case.

22.  Section 47A of the DCO does not assist the Plaintiff. Section 47A provides that:

“A person who appears to the Court to be likely to be a party to subsequent proceedings may apply to the Court for an order for discovery of documents against a person who is likely to be a party to the proceedings and who has in his possession, custody or power documents directly relevant to an issue arising out of the claim.”

23.  In the present case, the Defendant bank is plainly an innocent third party. It is not likely to become a party to any subsequent proceedings. Further, the relief sought by the Plaintiff is the disclosure of Chung’s last known address. This is not a “document” within the meaning of section 47A.

24.  As to Order 24 rules 7A(1) and 11A of the RDC, they merely provide for rules for applications made under section 47A of the DCO. They do not themselves confer jurisdiction.

C2.  The origin of the Norwich Pharmacal relief

25.  To understand the foundations of the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction, it is necessary to trace briefly its historical origin and the context in which it was developed.

26.  Prior to 1873, common law and equity were administered by separate courts, with equity being administered in the Court of Chancery. Proceedings in the Court of Chancery were commenced by filling “bills”, which were formal written complaints (analogous to modern pleadings) seeking equitable remedies.

27.  The Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction is derived from the previous equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery in the 19^th century to entertain “bills for discovery”. In essence, a bill of discovery sought disclosure of facts known to the defendant or documents in their possession to enable the applicant to prosecute or defend other proceedings. This was subject to the rule against compelling a “mere witness” to provide discovery. For a fuller account of the historical development of bills of discovery, see Norwich Pharmacal at 191E-193D (per Lord Cross).

28.  Following the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, the High Court was established and was vested with the jurisdiction to administer both common law and equity.

29.  Turning to Norwich Pharmacal itself, the appellants were the owners of a patent of a chemical compound called furazolidone. Upon finding out that furazolidone was being imported without the appellants’ consent, they commenced proceedings against the Commissioners of Customs and Excise seeking disclosure of information, including the names and addresses of the importers. As Lord Cross observed at 191C, it was a “pure action for discovery”.

30.  The House of Lords held that the Commissioners were obliged to disclose the information sought. The governing principle was formulated by Lord Reid at 175B-C:

“if through no fault of his own a person gets mixed up in the tortious acts of others so as to facilitate their wrong-doing he may incur no personal liability but he comes under a duty to assist the person who has been wronged by giving him full information and disclosing the identity of the wrongdoers.”

31.  In recognising this principle, Lord Reid noted that it can trace its roots back to its equitable origins, where equity allowed discovery in aid of contemplated litigation regarding the identities of wrongdoers and potential defendants (173E-G):

“Discovery as a remedy in equity has a very long history. The chief occasion for its being ordered was to assist a party in an existing litigation. But this was extended at an early date to assist a person who contemplated litigation against the person from whom discovery was sought, if for various reasons it was just and necessary that he should have discovery at that stage. Such discovery might disclose the identity of others who might be joined as defendants with the person from whom discovery was sought.”

32.  A similar account was given by Sir Robert Megarry VC in British Steel Corporation Respondents v Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096 at 1104F:

“The [Norwich Pharmacal] action is a descendant of the old bill of discovery in Chancery. Under the auxiliary jurisdiction, equity used to aid litigants in the courts of law, as well as litigants in equity, by compelling discovery; the courts of law had no means of doing this. But in addition to this process, which has now long been part of the ordinary process of litigation, there was a procedure whereby a would-be plaintiff could bring a bill of discovery in equity in order to find out who was the proper person to bring his action against; and it is this process which led to the Norwich Pharmacal case.”

33.  It is also important to note the observation of Lord Kilbrandon in Norwich Pharmacal at 205D, emphasising that the obligation arises not because of any substantial right in the plaintiff, but because of the court’s duty to administer justice. Citing Colonial Government v. Tatham (1902) 23 Natal LR 153, at 158 (per Beaumont AJ), he remarked:

“The duty is said to lie rather on the court to make an order necessary to the administration of justice than on the respondent to satisfy some right existing in the plaintiff.”

34.  Subsequently, Norwich Pharmacal was consistently applied in Hong Kong. In A Co v B Co [2002] 3 HKLRD 111, Ma J (as he then was) reaffirmed at §10 that the jurisdiction to grant Norwich Pharmacal relief is grounded in the court’s equitable jurisdiction:

“10. Where innocent parties are caught up or have become involved in the tortious or wrongful activities of others, thus facilitating the perpetration (or continuation) of such activities, justice may require (and therefore the court may order) that such innocent persons come under a duty to assist the victim of the tort or wrongful activities, by the provision of full information even though such innocent persons cannot be shown to incur any personal liability at that stage. The foundation of the court's jurisdiction here is its equitable jurisdiction. The court's ability to make such orders was confirmed by the House of Lord's decision in Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133: see in particular the speech of Lord Reid at pp.173F-175E. The principles and approach established by that decision have consistently been applied in Hong Kong.” (Emphasis added)

C3.  The two previous decisions on District Court’s jurisdiction

C3.1  A v B

35.  In A v B [2019] HKDC 594, the plaintiff sought a Norwich Pharmacal order compelling the defendant to disclose bank records relating to a specific transaction, and a gagging order restraining the defendant from disclosing these proceedings to any third party.

36.  At §3 of his judgment, Deputy District Judge Kenneth KY Lam stated:

“Section 52 of the District Court Ordinance (Cap 336) gave this Court statutory powers to grant “injunctions of whatsoever nature” in all matters affecting movable property, including money and choses in action, where the amount or value thereof did not exceed HKD 3 million. Norwich Pharmacal and Gagging Orders are within the ambit of Section 52.”

37.  With respect, I do not consider that a Norwich Pharmacal order falls within the ambit of section 52 of DCO.

38.  As early as 1745, it was mentioned in Jesus College v Bloom (1745) 26 ER 953 that “bills for discovery” and “bills for injunction” were different types of bills that could be lodged with the Court of Chancery. As discussed above, Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction developed from the bills for discovery. This distinction itself indicates that Norwich Pharmacal relief did not historically originate from the equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctions.

39.  In Hong Kong, the Court of Appeal has observed (albeit obiter) in Manufacturer's Life Insurance Co of Canada v Harvest Hero International Ltd [2002] 1 HKLRD 828 that Norwich Pharmacal was concerned strictly with discovery and was with injunctive relief. At 837D, Rogers VP and Le Pichon JA stated:

“17. If, for the sake of argument, the Judge was correct in reaching the conclusion that the only jurisdiction to order discovery in aid of foreign proceedings is statutory, how is one to explain the countless orders made, based on the Norwich Pharmacal principle, compelling the disclosure of names and other information in aid of potential foreign proceedings, of which Sony Corp v Anand [1981] FSR 398 and Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd v Global Pharmaceutics [1986] RPC 394, are examples? In Hong Kong, there has been a long-standing practice from the 1970s, whereby identities of those, including parties known to be overseas, who have been responsible for tortious activities, have been ordered to be disclosed, together with details of their actions. Mr Chua [for the first defendant], was driven to devise some separate category into which those decisions could be put. He submitted that these were explicable on the basis that they came within the court’s jurisdiction to grant ancillary relief when exercising its powers under s.21L of the High Court Ordinance (Cap.4). But that is no explanation at all. The Norwich Pharmacal case was not about injunctive relief: it was an action solely for discovery. Mr Chua's submission is therefore one which we are unable to accept.” (Emphasis added)

40.  That said, recent UK Supreme Court and Privy Council authorities have, in passing, referred to Norwich Pharmacal orders as a “kind of injunction”. In Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies and Travellers [2024] AC 983 at §§20 and 22, Norwich Pharmacal order was mentioned as an example of a new kind of injunction that was developed over time in the interests of justice:

“20. The point is illustrated by the development in recent times of several new kinds of injunction in response to the emergence of particular problems: for example… the Norwich Pharmacal order, also known as the third party disclosure order, which takes its name from the case in which the basis for such an order was authoritatively established (Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs [1974] AC 133 ); the Bankers Trust order, which is an injunction of the kind granted in Bankers Trust Co v Shapira [1980] 1 WLR 1274…

[…]

22. These dicta are borne out by the recent developments in the law of injunctions which we have briefly described. They illustrate the continuing ability of equity to innovate both in respect of orders designed to protect and enhance the administration of justice, such as freezing injunctions, Anton Piller orders, Norwich Pharmacal orders and Bankers Trust orders…” (Emphasis added)

41.  Similarly, in the Privy Council decision of Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2023] AC 389, at §48, Norwich Pharmacal relief was described as a “major new type of injunction which the courts have developed”.

42.  A comparable categorisation was made in Abbasi v Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2025] 2 WLR 815 at §49, where Lord Reed PSC and Lord Briggs JSC cited Norwich Pharmacal orders to illustrate the point that “the absence of a cause of action against a defendant is not in itself an insuperable objection to the granting of an injunction”.

43.  However, these observations were obiter dicta, as Norwich Pharmacal relief was not the central issue in any of those cases. Importantly, none of these authorities suggest that the jurisdiction to grant Norwich Pharmacal relief is derived from section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 regarding powers of the High Court with respect to injunctions and receivers (equivalent to section 21L of the High Court Ordinance section 21L and section 52 of the DCO).

44.  On the contrary, in Harcus Sinclair LLP and another v Your Lawyers Ltd [2022] AC 1271, it was observed that Norwich Pharmacal relief originated in the court’s historically inherent equitable jurisdiction and developed as a distinct category of equitable relief, separate from the English Court’s statutory jurisdiction to grant injunctions. At 1317A-B, the Court explained:

“139. …A similar technique was deployed in relation to the power to grant injunctions, in section 25(8) of the 1873 Act [the predecessor of section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981]. This did not replace the previously inherent equitable jurisdiction, and it has continued to develop and extend into new fields, such as… the Norwich Pharmacal and Bankers Trust orders (see Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs [1974] AC 133 and Bankers Trust Co v Shapira [1980] 1 WLR 1274 )...” (Emphasis added)

45.  In my view, these Supreme Court and Privy Council authorities should not be read as classifying Norwich Pharmacal relief as a type of injunction. At most, they suggest that Norwich Pharmacal relief is an illustration of how the Court’s equitable jurisdiction has developed to accommodate new emerging needs. In any event, post-1997 decisions of the House of Lords or UK Supreme Court are to be treated with “great respect” but remain persuasive only: Solicitor (24/07) v Law Society of Hong Kong (2008) 11 HKCFAR 117 at §§15-17. For present purposes, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal’s obiter observation in Manufacturer's Life Insurance that Norwich Pharmacal “was not about injunctive relief” is more directly pertinent.

46.  In this regard, with respect, I have reservations about the comments made by Deputy District Judge J. Remedios at §85 in Kwong Sin Yee Florence v Cathay Pacific Airways Limited [2025] 5 HKC 819 ([2025] HKDC 1251). Although the learned judge concluded that a Norwich Pharmacal order is not an injunction within the ambit of section 52 of the DCO, he characterised Norwich Pharmacal applications as “procedural” in nature. I respectfully disagree with that characterisation.

47.  In my view, an application for Norwich Pharmacal relief is a standalone action seeking substantive equitable relief. As Sir Robert Megarry VC explained in British Steel Corporation Respondents v Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096 at 1114C-D:

“…Even if one says that ordinary discovery as part of the process of litigation has shed its equitable nature because it is now regulated by rules of court, that leaves untouched an action [i.e. the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction] in which the substantive relief sought is or includes an order disclosing the names of certain persons. Such an action seems to me to be just as much an action for equitable relief as an action for specific performance or an injunction.” (Emphasis added)

48.  The same point was made in Kensington International Ltd v ICS Secretaries Ltd [2008] 4 HKLRD 589 at §22:

“22. Whereas those who are erudite in the intricacies of legal history will be cognisant of the distinction between a bill of discovery and a bill of relief in the courts of Chancery prior to the reforms in the second half of the 19^th century in England, such intricacies are of no more than a matter of historical curiosity and interest. The fact remains that relief by way of a Norwich Pharmacal order is something which a party may claim provided the basis can be established. The party that proves a right to the information without claiming any other substantive relief generally has to pay the costs, as Lord Reid said. As any other equitable relief it is discretionary, but that discretion is exercised on settled principles.”

C3.2  Kwong Sin Yee Florence v Cathay Pacific Airways Limited

49.  In Kwong Sin Yee Florence, the plaintiff suffered an injury onboard a flight operated by the defendant airline, when a heavy object fell and struck her head. Believing the object belonged to a fellow passenger, she intended to commence proceedings against the said passenger on the basis of negligence. She therefore sought, by way of  Norwich Pharmacal relief, disclosure of the passenger’s personal information, from the defendant airline.

50.  Deputy District Judge J. Remedios held that there was no express provision for the District Court’s power to grant Norwich Pharmacal relief, but such power is derivable by statutory implication. He stated at 836E to I:

“100. As the power is not expressly provided to the District Court by statute, the question then is, whether such power can be said to exist by implication, in the manner prescribed by the Court of Final Appeal in PCCW-HKT Telephone Ltd. Specifically, is such a power necessary in the sense of “reasonably required” for the effective exercise of the statutory jurisdiction expressly conferred on this Court?

101. In my judgment, the power to grant Norwich Pharmacal relief, is a power which I consider as derivable by statutory implication, and which is reasonably required for the effective exercise of jurisdiction expressly conferred on this Court, in this case, by section 32 of the DCO.

102. A party may have a legitimate claim which engages and falls within the jurisdiction of the District Court under section 32, 33, 35 or 37 of the DCO. Without the ability to apply for a Norwich Pharmacal order, that party’s ability to commence and/or formulate a claim under those sections may be fettered, potentially resulting in that party being denied the justice to which they may be entitled. Such fetters may, for example, come in the form of not knowing the identity of potential defendants and/or not knowing the recipient(s) of funds or assets over which the plaintiff asserts an entitlement or claim.

103. Therefore, without the power to grant Norwich Pharmacal relief, it could be said that the District Court may be denied the ability to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it by sections 32, 33, 35 and 37 effectively or, in some instances, at all.”

51.  With respect, I am unable to agree with the learned Judge’s reasoning.

52.  The Court of Final Appeal held in PCCW-HKT Telephone Ltd v Telecommunications Authority (2008) 8 HKCFAR 337 that a power can be implied if it is reasonably required for the effective exercise of the statutory jurisdiction expressed conferred on an inferior court. However, in my judgment, the power to grant Norwich Pharmacal relief is not reasonably required for the effective exercise of the jurisdiction under Part 4 of the DCO.

53.  It is important to appreciate that Norwich Pharmacal relief is not confined to facilitating the commencement of civil claims. As noted in Kensington International Ltd at 599, the information obtained pursuant to a Norwich Pharmacal order may be sought and used for purposes other than bringing civil proceedings in the District Court:

“21. The Norwich Pharmacal case was an intellectual property case: it related to infringement of a patent. Many of the succeeding cases have been intellectual property cases. However, the principle has been applied to many other types of situations. Whereas it is sometimes suggested that the right of the applicant, or plaintiff, is to names and addresses, it is clear that it is not so limited. If the plaintiff establishes that it is a defendant's duty to provide the information, it can be “full information” as was said by Lord Reid. Certainly in the more than 30 years since the decision of the House of Lords there have been many cases where the information sought and ordered to be given was more than mere names and addresses. The information has been sought and the courts have accepted that the information could be sought on the grounds that it would be used for many other purposes than the bringing of a civil claim within the court's jurisdiction. Those purposes have included the bringing of criminal prosecutions both within the jurisdiction and outside, as well as using the information as a basis for dismissing an erring employee.” (Emphasis added)

54.  It is therefore difficult to justify the District Court’s jurisdiction to grant such relief on the basis that it is impliedly necessary to ensure that “potential claims” within the District Court’s jurisdiction can be effectively commenced. The relief is neither confined to enabling proceedings to be brought in the District Court; its scope is materially wider.

C4.  My view on jurisdiction

55.  In my view, there is a direct route to concluding that the District Court has jurisdiction to grant Norwich Pharmacal relief. This arises from a combined reading of Part 4 and section 48 of the DCO.

56.  Part 4 of the DCO sets out the District Court’s civil jurisdiction. In summary:

(i)  Section 32(1) confers jurisdiction to hear and determine any action founded on contract, quasi-contract or tort where the claim does not exceed HK$3,000,000;

(ii)  Section 33(1) confers jurisdiction to hear and determine actions for the recovery of money (not exceeding HK$3,000,000) by virtue of any enactment in force;

(iii)  Section 35 confers jurisdiction to hear and determine actions for the recovery of land where the annual rent, or the rateable value, or the annual value, whichever is the least, does not exceed HK$320,000;

(iv)  Section 36 confers jurisdiction to hear and determine actions in which the title to an interest in land comes into question, subject to the same limit; and

(v)  Section 37(1) sets out the District Court’s equity jurisdiction in matters such as administration of estates, execution of trusts, foreclosure or redemption of mortgages, proceedings for specific performance, rectification, or recission of an agreement for the sale, purchase or lease of property, infants, winding-up of partnerships, and relief against fraud or mistake, subject to the value limit under section 37(2).

57.  Turning to its ancillary jurisdiction, section 48(1)(a) provides that the District Court has the same power as the Court of First Instance to grant “the relief, redress, or remedy or combination of remedies… which ought to be granted or given”. Section 48(2) further provides that the District Court has to administer law and equity, and in cases of conflict the rules of equity shall prevail.

58.  In every application for Norwich Pharmacal relief, the plaintiff must identify an underlying cause of action or complaint against a wrongdoer. In my view, if the District Court is satisfied that the underlying cause of action or complaint falls into one of the jurisdiction-conferring provisions in Part 4, then the District Court may invoke its ancillary jurisdiction under section 48 to grant equitable relief in the form of Norwich Pharmacal order.

59.  Take Kwong Sin Yee Florence as an illustration. The plaintiff’s underlying claim against the other passenger was premised on the tort of negligence. The application for Norwich Pharmacal relief is an action “founded on …tort” within the meaning of section 32(1). If the claim does not exceed HK$3,000,000, the District Court would have jurisdiction under section 32(1) to hear and determine the application. And the District Court has the power to grant the Norwich Pharmacal relief ancillary to that jurisdiction under section 48(1).

60.  The case of Chen Yue v Arthur Kuan [2025] HKCFI 4172 supports this reading of Part 4 of the DCO. There, the plaintiff sought pre-action discovery under section 41 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) and Order 24, rules 7A(1) and 11A of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A), and obtained leave to serve the Originating Summons on the defendants located in the United States. The defendants sought to set aside the order granting leave for service-out. They argued that the application did not fall within the contract or tort “gateways” for service-out under Order 11, rule 1:

(i)  As to the contract gateway, Order 11 rule 1(1)(d)(i) provides that: “the claim is brought to enforce, rescind, dissolve, annul or otherwise affect a contract, or to recover damages or obtain other relief in respect of the breach of a contract, being (in either case) a contract which… was made within the jurisdiction”.

(ii)  For the tort gateway, Order 11 rule 1(1)(f) provides that: “the claim is founded on a tort and the damage was sustained, or resulted from an act committed, within the jurisdiction”.

61.  Deputy High Court Judge Gary CC Lam rejected the defendant’s narrow construction and held that a pre-action discovery application is itself a “claim”. At §§37 and 39, he reasoned:

“37. In an application for pre-action discovery, the applicant would still have to state the intended cause of action he would rely on after the discovery. A breach of contract can be one of such intended causes of action that could, in appropriate circumstances, sustain an application for pre-action discovery. Such a claim for pre-action discovery is, in my view, ‘a claim… to obtain other relief in respect of the breach of a contract’, by its natural and ordinary meaning. I do not see any reason, as Mr Joffe urges me, to construe the phrase so narrowly as to confine the claim to a claim for substantive relief based on the breach of a contract. ‘In respect of’ is a phrase wide enough to include a claim for pre-action discovery in respect of the breach of a contract.

[…]

39. Similarly, an intended cause of action founded on tort committed in Hong Kong and/or resulting in damages sustained in Hong Kong could, in appropriate circumstances, sustain an application for pre-action discovery. ‘In respect of’ is not used here. However, in my view, just like ‘damage’ is not intended to mean technically ‘damage’ that completes the cause of action of a tort: see Fong Chak Kwan v Ascentic Ltd, supra at §107 but by its natural and ordinary meaning, a claim for pre-action discovery is, in my view, still ‘a claim… founded on a tort and the damage was sustained, or resulted from an act committed, within the jurisdiction’, by its natural and ordinary meaning. I do not need to stretch the meaning of any words there.”

(Emphasis added)

62.  Although Chen Yue v Arthur Kuan concerned an application for pre-action discovery sought against a party to the proceedings under section 41 of High Court Ordinance, the learned Judge’s reasoning equally  applies to Norwich Pharmacal applications, even though such applications are made against innocent third parties.

63.  As mentioned earlier, one of the essential elements of Norwich Pharmacal relief is the existence of tortious or wrongful conduct. In practice, applicants invariably identify the intended cause of action they would rely on after obtaining Norwich Pharmacal disclosure.

64.  In this context, the phrase “founded on…” in section 32(1) of the DCO must be given its natural and ordinary meaning. It is sufficiently wide enough to encompass an application for pre-action discovery, including one made by way of Norwich Pharmacal relief, so long as it is predicated upon an underlying cause of action within the District Court’s jurisdiction.  Where the threshold is met, section 48 empowers the District Court to grant the equitable relief necessary to give effect to that jurisdiction.

65.  As to the meaning of “action”, section 2 of the DCO defines it as “a civil proceeding commenced by writ of summons or in such manner as may be prescribed”. This definition is sufficiently broad to encompass a Norwich Pharmacal application commenced by way of Originating Summons.

66.  Furthermore, section 37(1)(g) of the DCO (“proceedings for relief against fraud or mistake”) is likewise wide enough to include Norwich Pharmacal applications based on claims for equitable relief, such as an equitable proprietary claim or constructive trust claim for the traceable proceeds of fraud.

67.  Viewed in this light, where the plaintiff’s underlying cause of action or complaint falls within the District Court’s jurisdiction under Part 4 of the DCO, a Norwich Pharmacal application predicated on that cause of action or complaint can properly be treated as falling within the corresponding jurisdiction-conferring provision.

68.  Thus, in negligence cases such as Kwong Sin Yee Florence, the plaintiffs may rely on section 32. In cases involving email fraud, common causes of action against fraudsters include unjust enrichment and proprietary claims. Unjust enrichment would fall within “quasi-contract” in section 32(1), while proprietary and constructive trust claims would fall within the Court’s equitable jurisdiction to grant relief against fraud under section 37(1)(g).

D.  THE PLAINTIFF’S NORWICH PHARMACAL APPLICATION

69.  I now turn to consider whether this Court has jurisdiction to grant Norwich Pharmacal relief in the present case.

70.  The Plaintiff’s underlying claim against Chung concerns two dishonoured cheques, in a total sum of HK$206,920. I am satisfied that the application is an “action founded on contract… where the amount of the plaintiff’s claim does not exceed $3,000,000”.  Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the application under section 32(1), and to grant the Norwich Pharmacal relief sought pursuant to its ancillary powers under section 48.

71.  The conditions for granting Norwich Pharmacal relief are well-established. The Court must be satisfied that:

(i)  There was cogent and compelling evidence to demonstrate that serious tortious or wrongful activities have taken place;

(ii)  The order will very likely reap substantial and worthwhile benefits for the plaintiff; and

(iii)  The discovery sought must not be unduly wide.

See A1 & Anor v R1 & Others [2021] HKCFI 650, at §56.

72.  I am satisfied on the evidence before me that serious wrongful conduct has occurred, namely the dishonour of the 1^st and 2^nd Cheques issued by Chung to the Plaintiff.

73.  The Plaintiff states that he does not know Chung and has no means of containing her.  The last known address of Chung is sought for the purpose of commencing legal proceedings. Without this information, the Plaintiff would be unable to identify or serve the originating process on her. I am therefore satisfied that the discovery sought is likely to reap substantial and worthwhile benefits for the Plaintiff.

74.  The discovery sought is limited to Chung’s last known address, and is plainly not unduly wide.

75.  The Defendant takes a neutral stance.

76.  In the circumstances, I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case to grant Norwich Pharmacal order. I therefore exercise my discretion to allow the Plaintiff’s application.

E.  DISPOSITION

77.  For the reasons stated above, I allow the Plaintiff’s application and make an order in terms of the draft Order submitted by Mr Chan to this Court, save that paragraph 1 should be amended to read as follows:

“The Defendant do disclose to the Plaintiff the last known address(es) of Chung Mei Ling, the holder of the bank account number… maintained with the Defendant”.

78.  I make no order as to costs.

79.  I thank Mr Chan for his assistance rendered to this Court.