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HCAL 608/2026
[2026] HKCFI 2723
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 608 OF 2026
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| BETWEEN |
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SHAHZAD ALI |
Applicant |
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DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION DEPARTMENT |
Putative |
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Respondent |
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| Before: |
Hon Coleman J in Chambers (Open to Public) |
| Date of Hearing: |
11 May 2026 |
| Date of Decision: |
12 May 2026 |
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D E C I S I O N
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A. Introduction
1. By my Decision dated 30 March 2026 [2026] HKCFI 1829, I dismissed the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review to challenge two decisions of the Director of Immigration, rejecting his application for extension of stay.
2. The factual background was set out by me in §§5-11 of the Decision. In short, the Applicant was granted a dependant visa, as dependant of his wife as sponsor, which was last extended until 23 July 2025. Prior to that date, in around March 2025, the Applicant and his wife separated. Therefore, when the Applicant sought a further extension of stay on 21 July 2025, the Applicant was no longer eligible under the dependant visa policy. He applied for a further extension of stay on his own merits, but that was refused by the Director on 1 September 2025 (“Initial Decision”). He then filed a request for reconsideration, which was also refused by the Director on 9 March 2026 (“Reconsideration Decision”).
3. The Applicant sought to advance two grounds of review, asserting that the Initial Decision and the Reconsideration Decision were wrong in principle, unreasonable and procedurally unfair. For the reasons explained by me at §§14-28 of my Decision, I held that neither ground identified any reasonably arguable public law ground of review with any realistic prospect of success.
4. I held that, as the formulation of the Applicant’s case made plain, he simply disagrees with the Director as to the Initial Decision and the Reconsideration Decision, and thinks that the Director should have given different weight to the factors relied upon by him. This does not arguably establish unreasonableness in the public law sense, nor any procedural unfairness. I also held that posing a hypothetical counterfactual is not the basis upon which the application would be considered, and does not identify any arguable public law error.
5. I further pointed out that the making of the request for reconsideration of the Initial Decision did not of itself necessarily extend the time for any intended judicial review challenge, so that there was at least significant doubt as to whether the proceedings had been brought in time.
6. The time for any intended appeal from my Decision expired on 13 April 2026. No appeal was brought in time. However, by summons dated 24 April 2026, the Applicant seeks leave to appeal out of time.
7. I heard the application on 11 May 2026, when the Applicant appeared in person (assisted by an interpreter). At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision to be handed down the following day. This is my Decision.
B. The Application
8. The Applicant also filed an affirmation in support of the application. In it, he stated (in my summary of its contents):
(1) He did not receive the letter from the High Court containing my Decision, the Order and the Form CALL-1 all dated 30 March 2026.
(2) He only became aware of the Decision on 20 April 2026, when he attended the Immigration Department to make an application for deferral of departure.
(3) He obtained copies of the relevant documents from the High Court Registry, and downloaded the Decision from the Judiciary website.
(4) Hence, the delay in filing the intended appeal was only because he did not receive the letter from the Court, and he took active steps to obtain the documents after becoming aware of the Decision.
(5) The delay is not substantial and would not prejudice the Director.
(6) The conclusion in the Decision that neither ground identified any reasonably arguable ground of review with any realistic prospect of success is wrong, because the points raised are reasonably arguable.
(7) This is because the Director only considered the fact that the Applicant’s wife had refused to continue sponsoring his stay in Hong Kong, but other considerations were totally ignored, especially when the Director stated that he did not find strong extenuating grounds justifying exceptional consideration in the Applicant’s case.
(8) The Court should intervene so that the Director must consider all the exceptional circumstances fairly and reasonably.
(9) The request for reconsideration of the Initial Decision was to pursue an alternative remedy before any application for judicial review, and during the reconsideration the Applicant submitted further documents as requested by the Director.
C. Whether Extension of Time to Appeal
9. It is trite that, in considering whether to grant any extension of time for an appeal, the Court will take into account the circumstances including at least (1) the length of the delay, (2) the explanation for the delay, (3) the apparent merits of the intended appeal, and (4) questions of prejudice arising from the grant or refusal of the additional time.
10. The length of the delay is approximately 10 days, which is not particularly significant. However, there must be at least some doubt as to the explanation offered for the delay. Notice of handing down of my Decision was sent to the Applicant in advance, by post to the address for service given by him. Similarly, the Decision, the Order and the Form CALL-1 were also sent to the Applicant by post to the address for service given by him. Neither document was returned through the postal system as undelivered. The Applicant was unable to explain why he did not in fact receive the documents, when he claimed to check his post box on a daily basis. It can also be noted that the Applicant did receive the notice of hearing, sent to the same address, because he attended it.
11. However, more importantly, I do not see any merit in the intended appeal. There is no basis for the Applicant to suggest that his considerations were totally ignored, when the Applicant himself has recognised that the Director had informed him that the Director did not find strong extenuating grounds justifying exceptional consideration in his case. Again, with respect, what is said by the Applicant in his affirmation merely puts forward the Applicant’s disagreement with the Director’s Decisions.
12. Where there is no reasonably arguable merit in an intended appeal, there is no point in extending time to permit that appeal. In those circumstances, there is no need to go on to consider matters of potential prejudice.
D. Result
13. In the circumstances, the Applicant’s application for an extension of time within which to appeal from my earlier Decision is dismissed. I make no order as to costs.
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(Russell Coleman) Judge of the Court of First Instance High Court
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The applicant, acting in person
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