SHAHZAD ALI v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION DEPARTMENT

HCAL 608/2026

[2026] HKCFI 1829

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 608 OF 2026

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D E C I S I O N

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A.  Introduction

1.  By Form 86 dated 20 March 2026, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review so as to challenge two decisions of the Director of Immigration, being (1) the decision of the Director made on 1 September 2025 (“Initial Decision”), rejecting his application for extension of stay, and (2) the decision of the Director made on 9 March 2026 (“Reconsideration Decision”), rejecting his application for reconsideration of the Initial Decision.

2.  I can refer to the Initial Decision and Reconsideration Decision together as the Decisions.

3.  The Form 86 identifies that the relief sought is an order to quash the Decisions rejecting his extension of stay application, and that the grounds upon which that relief is sought are in the Applicant’s affirmation.

4.  Having considered the materials, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to deal with this case on the papers. This is my decision.

B.  Background

5.  The Applicant is a Pakistani national. He came to Hong Kong in around September 2019. He was issued a one-year dependant visa, as the dependant of his wife as sponsor.

6.  He applied for a first extension of stay, seeking an extension of three years. However, the Applicant was only granted an extension until 23 July 2022, because his Pakistani passport was valid until only 23 August 2022.

7.  In around July 2022, he applied for a second extension of stay, seeking an extension of three years. He was granted an extension until 23 July 2025.

8.  In around March 2025, the Applicant and his wife separated. Therefore, when he sought a further extension of stay on 21 July 2025, his wife ceased to be his sponsor under the dependant visa policy. Instead, the Applicant applied for a further extension of stay on his own merits, on the basis that he had taken Hong Kong as his only place of residence since arrival in September 2019, had lived a law-abiding life in Hong Kong, and had never relied on any assistance from the Government. The Applicant says that, in support of his application, he submitted documents to demonstrate strong local ties, a stable financial standing, and information about his accident at work.

9.  The Director rejected the application on 1 September 2025, i.e. the Initial Decision.

10.  The Applicant filed an application for reconsideration. In support of that application, he submitted further documents in relation to his work injury. The Applicant also specifically asked the Director to consider that he had previously applied for and been granted two extensions of stay, when ordinarily they would have been for three years each, and the first extension was for a shorter period only because his passport was expiring. If he had been granted the usual three year extension on first extension application, the extension would have been until 28 September 2023, and the subsequent second extension of three years until 23 September 2026 would have made him eligible for right of abode in Hong Kong.

11.  The Director rejected the application on 9 March 2026, i.e. the Reconsideration Decision.

C.  Intended Grounds of Review

12.  The Applicant has advanced two intended grounds of review:

(1)  Ground 1: The Decisions were wrong in principle, and were procedurally unfair because the Director failed to follow proper procedures assessing his eligibility for extension of stay on his own merits when he had strong grounds for the application to be approved.

(2)  Ground 2: The Decisions were unreasonable and there was procedural unfairness by the Director when considering extenuating grounds which warrant exceptional consideration.

13.  I can deal with each of the Grounds in turn.

D.  Ground 1

14.  The Applicant complains that the Director’s only reason for the Initial Decision was that there was a substantial change in the Applicant’s circumstances because his wife was unwilling to continue sponsoring the Applicant’s continued stay in Hong Kong.

15.  The Applicant asserts that the Director failed to consider that:

(1)  He had resided in Hong Kong for about six years, and had not relied on any assistance from the Government because he always had a stable job and income.

(2)  He had sustained injuries in the course of employment and his treating doctors had given him sick leave until 15 May 2026.

(3)  If he departs Hong Kong, he will not be able to receive proper treatment in Pakistan, and would be denied the right to compensating resulting from the injury sustained.

(4)  Had he been granted the usual three year extension when he applied for the first extension of stay, he would have got the extension until 28 September 2023, and the second extension of stay of three years would have rendered him eligible for right of abode in Hong Kong.

16.  These points do not seem to me to identify any reasonably arguable public law ground of appeal with any realistic prospect of success. They do not identify any procedural unfairness.

17.  The starting point is, as the Applicant has been informed by the Director in the Decisions, that under the existing immigration policy, a person may be allowed to remain in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“HKSAR”) as a dependant provided that, amongst other things, he or she has an eligible sponsor in the HKSAR. The Applicant was also informed that an application for extension of stay is not granted automatically, but only where the Director is satisfied that circumstances have not changed since the original approval for residence was granted.

18.  Therefore, once the Applicant’s wife ceased to be a sponsor, the Applicant necessarily fell outside the dependant visa policy. It seems that the Applicant accepts that position, because he sought to stay in the HKSAR on his own merits. In that context, the strict approach to immigration matters – which has consistently been upheld by the Courts – is applicable.

19.  The Initial Decision nevertheless also informed the Applicant that, based on the available information, the Director did not find strong extenuating grounds justifying exceptional consideration in the case, and therefore the application for extension of stay was refused.

20.  There is no reasonably arguable basis for the Court exercising its judicial review supervisory function to interfere with that conclusion.

21.  Immigration decisions are a matter for the Director, not for the Court (subject only to interference on established public law grounds). The strength or otherwise of the merits of an application is for the Director to weigh and decide. It is also trite that, when making immigration decisions, the Director is not obliged to take into account compassionate or humanitarian factors. Further, if the Director does take such factors into account, the weight to be accorded to them in the overall balancing exercise is a matter for the Director.

22.  As the formulation of the Applicant’s case makes plain, he simply disagrees with the Director as to the Initial Decision and the Reconsideration Decision, and thinks that the Director should have given different weight to the factors relied upon by him. This does not arguably establish unreasonableness in the public law sense, nor any procedural unfairness.

23.  Further:

(1)  The period of time during which an applicant might have lawfully resided in the HKSAR with a visa permitting his stay does not necessarily mean or lead to the grant of a further visa. Each application will be dealt with on its own circumstances at the time it is made.

(2)  That the Applicant may have suffered an injury in his employment also does not give rise to any entitlement to stay. It is at most a compassionate factor, to be weighed by the Director.

(3)  Whether the Applicant can or cannot receive appropriate medical care outside the HKSAR is also at most a compassionate factor, to be weighed by the Director.

(4)  If the Applicant is entitled to compensation as a result of injury in employment, he can claim that if necessary from outside the HKSAR.

(5)  On the facts, the Applicant was not granted a first extension of three years. Posing a hypothetical counterfactual is not the basis upon which the application would be considered, and does not identify any arguable public law error.

(6)  In any event, it is clear that the sponsor withdrew support from the Applicant, and he was no longer her dependant, as from March 2025.

E.  Ground 2

24.  Under this ground, the Applicant asserts that there exist exceptional, humanitarian and compassionate grounds to justify his extension of stay in Hong Kong, because his return to Pakistan would lead to his suffering from extreme hardship.

25.  The Applicant asserts that the Director failed to consider the extent of his injuries, especially since he has been on sick leave since 14 April 2025. He says his injuries are serious in nature, and that is the only reason why he has been granted over one year’s sick leave and that treatment is still ongoing.

26.  Hence the rejection of his application for extension of stay is, the Applicant asserts, “unfair”, and it “should have been approved”.

27.  Again, with respect, this ground merely puts forward the Applicant’s disagreement with the Decisions. As stated above, the Director is under no obligation to take into account humanitarian and compassionate grounds, and if he does so the weight to be given to them is a matter for him (absent an irrationality challenge).

28.  In the Initial Decision the Director said in terms that no strong extenuating grounds were found to justify exceptional consideration. There is no basis to suggest that the Director has given irrational weight to any relevant matter in the decision-making process leading to the Initial Decision and/or the Reconsideration Decision.

F.  Potential Delay

29.  It is trite that an application for leave to apply for judicial review must be made promptly, and in any event within three months of the making of the impugned decision. It is also trite that seeking reconsideration of a decision does not of itself stop the clock, particularly if no new material of substance is provided on the reconsideration request.

30.  The Initial Decision was made on 1 September 2025. The long stop time within which any challenge should have been brought to that decision expired on 1 December 2025. However, the present application was made more than three and half months after that. The making of the reconsideration request did not extend the time.

31.  There is at least significant doubt as to whether these proceedings have been brought timeously at all.

G.  Result

32.  Neither Ground 1 nor Ground 2 identify any reasonably arguable public law ground of review with any realistic prospect of success.

33.  Therefore, the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed. I make no order as to costs.