AHMED JUNAID v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 407/2020

[2025] HKCFI 5869

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 407 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  By a summons dated 25 September 2025, the applicant applied for an extension of time to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the order dated 30 July 2025, dismissing his application for leave to apply for judicial review against the Torture Claims Appeal Board.

2.  The hearing for the summons was fixed to be heard on 27 November 2025. Before the hearing, the court had sent to the applicant by ordinary post to his last known address with a notice of hearing dated 31 October 2025 with a reminder of the consequence of absence[1]. The notice of hearing was returned on 21 November 2025. As a result, my clerk immediately telephoned applicant on 21 November 2025 and he was able to speak to him. He was reminded of the hearing on 27 November 2025. The applicant did not turn up at the hearing. A telephone call was made to the applicant’s given telephone number on the day of the hearing, the applicant said he was still home. He did not indicate that he wanted to come to the hearing.

3.  In the circumstances, this court will dispose of the summons according to the materials already placed before the court.

The law

4.  Pursuant to O 53 r 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, the time limit for an appeal to the Court of Appeal is 14 days (after the order of the court). The deadline for the applicant to file his appeal would have been 13 August 2025. The applicant is therefore more than 1 month’s late.

5.  The guidelines governing the discretion for an extension of time to appeal against a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review therefore apply. A Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of success of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted: see Re MK HCMP 2609/2016, 10 January 2017; Chu On Fong Winter v The Appeal Panel (Housing) HCMP 982/2017, 20 July 2017; Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017; Re Gurang Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346; and Nguyen Thi Hong Thuy [2024] HKCA 1172.

Discussion

6.  Whilst it is accepted that the delay in the present case is not substantial, I do not regard the delay as a mere inadvertence or an oversight. In such a case, a good explanation is required. Apart from stating in his affirmation in support of the summons that he was late because he did not receive any judgment or letter from the court, the applicant did not provide any other reasons to explain for the delay. Neither has he advanced any grounds of appeal in support of the summons.

7.  At the hearing of the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review on 27 May 2025, the applicant appeared in person. Before the hearing, through the assistance of the interpreter, the applicant signed to confirm his updated address (“Confirmed Address”). The Order together with the Decision of this court were sent to the Confirmed Address. On 18 August 2025, the court received the returned post of the Order and the Decision that were sent to the Confirmed Address. In the summons, the applicant provided a different address to the Confirmed Address.

8.  Whilst it was accepted that the applicant might not have received the Order and the Decision of the court, I do not find that it provides a good reason for the delay. The applicant has the responsibility to notify the court any change of address. He cannot take advance of his own default. The applicant has not advanced any grounds in support of the intended appeal.

9.  In the absence of good reason to explain for the delay and any proposed grounds for his intended appeal, I am not satisfied that there is a good prospect of success in his intended appeal.

10.  For the reasons stated above, this court is disinclined to exercise its discretion to grant any extension of time to him to appeal, and accordingly dismiss his summons.