香港特別行政區 訴 葉鑑霆

DCCC 699/2023

[2024] HKDC 292

香港特別行政區

區域法院

刑事案件2023年第699號

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判刑理由書

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1.  被告人承認兩項控罪：

(a)  危險駕駛引致他人身體受嚴重傷害，違反香港法例第374章《道路交通條例》第36A條（控罪1）；及

(b)  使用汽車而所裝配充氣輪胎的簾布線結構有部份暴露出來，違反香港法例第374A章《道路交通（車輛構造及保養）規例》第22(1)(e)及121(1)條（控罪2）。

案情撮要

2.  被告人承認的案情撮要如下：

(a)  2022年12月27日下午約3時16分，香港九龍旺角界限街大坑東遊樂場外發生交通意外。界限街（東行）的相關路段有五條行車線組成，最左線供左轉入大坑東道，第二至第五線供直駛。

(b)  案發時，天氣晴朗，路面乾爽且維修妥善。由於是白天，能見度佳。交通流量中等，車速限制每小時50公里。

(c)  2022年12月27日下午約3時16分，被告人沿界限街第四線駕駛登記號碼KT1206輕型貨車（KT1206）。緊接 KT1206 前方及後方均無其他車輛。KT1206 突然急扭入第五線並繼續扭右，直接撞到行人路鐵欄，最後才停下來。

(d)  當時，區詩雅女士（控方第一證人）站在行人路上，面向長凳，一歲兒子則坐在長凳上。她的母親及妹妹站在她右邊。控方第一證人突然聽到身後傳來巨響，回頭看見KT1206 撞到行人路鐵欄，而KT1206車頭撞到她右腿。控方第一證人無法移動右腿；她的母親及妹妹避過KT1206撞擊，兒子沒有受傷。

(e)  與此同時，呂明漢先生（控方第二證人）與妻子李可均女士（控方第三證人）沿界限街行向旺角大球場。控方第二證人在左邊，在控方第三證人稍前方。控方第二及第三證人突然聽到身後傳來巨響。第二證人回頭，一個鐵欄飛向他，落在他左腳背上。同一時間，控方第三證人亦聽到響聲，但來不及回頭便已失去平衡，向後跌倒地上。控方第三證人感到左肩疼痛。案件由路人報警處理。

傷勢

(f)  控方第一證人送往伊利沙伯醫院。醫療檢驗顯示控方第一證人右膝挫傷，前膝至內膝有4x3厘米擦傷、膝關節積水、內側膝關節間線痛楚，右膝活動範圍局限於0至60度。控方第一證人2022年12月29日出院，獲處方止痛劑，並獲轉介接受門診物理治療。控方第一證人獲發病假，日期由2022年12月27日至2023年4月1日為止（包括首尾兩日）。

(g)  控方第二證人送往廣華醫院。醫療檢驗顯示控方第二證人左腳被金屬挫傷、左腳背腫脹及觸痛。他接受治療，同日出院。

(h)  控方第三證人送往廣華醫院。醫療檢驗顯示控方第三證人左肩胛骨觸痛，左肩主動性活動範圍受痛楚局限，右肘有一處2厘米淺橫裂傷。控方第三證人的左肩胛骨電腦斷層掃描檢查顯示，左肩胛骨粉碎性骨折，沒有關節突出。控方第三證人2022年12月28日出院。

調查

(i)  行人路上長約10米的鐵欄損毁。

(j)  警方在現場找到被告人。經現場查問，被告人向警員22378表示沿界限街天橋左邊第二線行駛，駛入第四線下天橋，兩部的士突然從第三線切入他的行車線，所以他切入第五線，之後未能及時剎車，無可避免地撞到鐵欄。

(k)  被告人被拘捕，罪名是「危險駕駛引致他人身體受嚴重傷害」。被告人在警誡下表示沿界限街東行第四單駕駛KT1206，兩部的士突然從第三線切入他的行車線，所以他立即向右急扭閃避。

行車紀錄儀片段

(l)  KT1206的行車紀錄儀拍攝到意外經過。撞擊約10秒前，KT1206沿界限街天橋（東行）第二線行駛，之後駛入界限街左邊第四線。約4秒後，兩部的士出現在界限街左邊第二線，切入左邊第三線，在KT1206前方。KT1206繼續直行，兩部的士在左邊第三線內。KT1206超越兩部的士，急扭向右，橫越第五線再撞到行人路鐵欄。控方第一證人與家人站在長凳附近，控方第二及第三證人沿行人路更遠處行走。KT1206撞到鐵欄，一個欄杆飛向控方第二及第三證人，最終砸到控方第二及第三證人的腳，導致控方第三證人失去平衡，向後跌倒。

(m)  經翻看行車紀錄儀片段，政府化驗師蘇文浩博士計算出KT1206在撞擊前約4秒及2秒的平均車速分別為每小時91+/- 9公里及每小時86+/-9公里。

汽車檢驗

(n)  2022年12月28日，汽車檢驗主任檢驗KT1206，發現有機械故障，即左前車輪胎的內部簾布線結構暴露。

(o)  汽車檢驗主任亦發現意外造成KT1206以下損壞故障：

(a)  車頭防撞槓損毁及登記號碼牌不見了；

(b)  車頭蓋、車頭加固裝置及右邊車頭防撞架變形；

(c)  右邊車頭組合式頭燈鏡片損毁；

(d)  左後車門損毁；

(e)  右邊車頭轉向連杆及防傾桿線系變形；及

(f)  右邊車頭制動軟管斷裂，制動液滲漏。

控罪1的基礎

(p)  案發期間，被告人在道路上危險駕駛KT1206，即被告人超速駕駛一部有機械故障的汽車及突然扭右，引致控方第三證人身體受嚴重傷害。被告人當時的駕駛方式遠遜於一個合格而謹慎的駕駛人士會被期望達到的水平，且對該合格而謹慎的駕駛人而言，在本案全部事實及情況下以該方式駕駛屬危險，會是顯然易見。

控罪2的基礎

(q)  案發時，被告人在道路上使用KT1206，而KT1206的左前輪胎的內部簾布線結構暴露。

法例

控罪1

3.  香港法例第36A條訂明：

⌠(1)  任何人在道路上危險駕駛汽車，引致他人身體受嚴重傷害，即屬犯法 –

(a)  一經循公訴程序定罪，可處第5級罰款及監禁7年……

(2)  如法庭或裁判官裁定任何人犯第(1)款所訂罪行，則法庭或裁判官除非基於特別理由，命令取消該人的駕駛資格為期一段較短期間，或命令不取消個人的駕駛資格，否則須命令按照第(3)或(4)款取消該人的駕駛資格。

(3)  在不抵觸第(4)款的條文下，上述的人的駕駛資格須取消的期間為 –

(a)  （如屬首次被定罪）至少2年；

(b)  （如屬再次被定罪）至少5年。

(4)  如法庭或裁判官已根據第72A(1A)條，命令上述的人修習和完成駕駛改進課程，個人的駕駛資格須取消的期間為 –

(a)  （如屬首次被定罪）至少2年，或直至該人已自費修習和完成該課程為止，兩者以較後者為準；

(b)  （如屬再次被定罪）至少 5 年，或直至該人已自費修習和完成該課程為止，兩者以較後者為準。……

(11)  如對一個合格而謹慎的駕駛人而言，駕駛處於當時狀況的有關汽車會屬危險，會是顯然意見的，則該人亦須視為屬第(1)款所指的危險駕駛。

(12)  就第(10)及(11)  款而言，危險指對任何人造成損傷或對財產造成嚴重損壞的危險。……

(14)  在為第(11)款的目的而斷定有關汽車的狀況時，可顧及附着於該汽車的任何東西，或該汽車上或該汽車內所裝載的任何東西，並可顧及該等東西的附着方式或裝載方式。

4.  「同一法例第 72A 條訂明：

(1)  法庭或裁判官如裁定某人犯附表 11 指名的罪行，可採取以下所有或其中一項行動 –

(a)  判處可就該罪行判處的懲罰；

(b)  命令該人修習和完成一項駕駛改進課程。

(1A)  除第 (1B)  款另有規定外，凡法庭或裁判官裁定任何人犯了第 ...36A…條所訂的罪行，……則法庭或裁判官除非基於特別理由，決定不作出該人須修習和完成駕駛改進課程的命令，否則須作出此命令。

控罪 2

5.  香港法例第 374A 章《道路交通（車輛構造及保養）規例》第22(1)條訂明：

「除(2)及(7)  款另有規定外，任何汽車或拖車的車輪不得裝配有下列情況的充氣輪胎—

(e)該充氣輪胎的簾布層或簾布線結構有任何部份暴露出來……」

6.  同一法例第 121(1)  條訂明：

「除本規例的條文另有規定外，任何人在任何道路上使用，或致使或允許他人使用並沒有在所有方面均符合本規例的任何車輛，即屬犯罪，可處第三級罰款及監禁6個月。」

判刑原則

控罪 1

7.  這類案件的案情千變萬化，因此沒有量刑指引。可是，所有案例均指出，這類控罪判刑的要旨是懲罰、譴責及阻嚇。一般而言，若然控罪涉及一時欠缺專注或判斷錯誤（momentary lapse of attention or error in judgement），可被視為罪責較輕的個案；若然有關的駕駛方式是明顯或故意罔顧其他道路使用者的安危，則會被視為較嚴重的類別。

8.  於 Secretary for Justice v Poon Wing Kay & Anor [2007] 1 HKC 289，上訴法院訂定「危險駕駛引致他人死亡」的判刑原則：

“[10] In sentencing the Defendants, the Judge adopted a starting point of 2½ years for the dangerous driving charges for both Defendants. He found, as we have, great assistance in the English case of R v Cooksley [2003] 3 All ER 40. There, the Court of Appeal laid down sentencing guidelines for the offences of dangerous driving and careless driving causing death when under the influence of drink or drugs. While admittedly the sentencing guidelines for the offence of dangerous driving causing death in that case cannot be used in Hong Kong, not least because the maximum sentence in the United Kingdom for the offence was at the time of that case 10 years (now 14 years)  rather than 5, a number of general principles found in the judgment of Lord Woolf CJ can be stated as being equally applicable in Hong Kong (we also add some observations of our own)  : -

(1)  In most cases of dangerous driving, it will be obvious to the offender that his driving was dangerous and he therefore deserves to be punished accordingly : - at page 45j (paragraph 11). This is important to bear in mind because, while it may be true in some instances not to treat violators of traffic laws as true criminals, nevertheless for offences such as dangerous driving causing death, the offender may not necessarily be seen in quite such a benevolent light.

(2)  Where death results from dangerous driving, it is obvious that grave distress will be caused to the family of the deceased……The impact on people’s lives ought to be taken into account when sentencing.

(3)  It is important for courts to drive home the message that there may sometimes be extremely grave consequences flowing from acts of dangerous driving and it is therefore necessary to have in mind a deterrent effect when sentencing in many cases involving dangerous driving……A motor vehicle, many may often forget, when not driven to requisite standards, can kill or maim. The standards required by the law for motorists found in the road traffic legislation and elsewhere are there to ensure that all who can come into contact with motor vehicles (whether fellow motorists, passengers or pedestrians)  are safe and that their lives are not endangered.

(4)  While a list can be drawn up of aggravating and mitigating factors, a sentencing court must however look at the overall circumstances and the overall culpability of the offender. In assessing the overall seriousness of a crime, culpability is often the dominant factor……It is not a case of counting the number of aggravating or mitigating factors and then arriving by mechanical means at the relevant sentence. Sentencing is not quite that exact an exercise and courts must be sufficiently nimble to take into account the overall picture in order to arrive at an appropriate sentence. In some cases, the fact that only some aggravating factors exist, but not others (such as in the present case), may still bring the case into a very serious category.

(5)  One major factor to be considered as an aggravating factor justifying a heavy sentence is where a person has driven with selfish disregard for the safety of other road users or of his passengers (or, we would add, of pedestrians)  or with a degree of recklessness.

9.  分別於 Secretary for Justice v Lam Siu Tong [2009] 5 HKLRD 601 及 Secretary for Justice v Wong Wai Hung [2011] 2 HKC 224, 上訴法庭強調，法庭就「危險駕駛」判刑時必須謹記刑期須具阻嚇性。

10.  於 HKSAR v Lee Yau Wing [2013] 1 HKC 572, CACC 282/2012, 13 December 2012），上訴法庭指出立法機關修訂道路交通條例及加重3 類「危險駕駛」的刑罰，明顯的目的是要對該類控罪予以嚴懲，法庭亦須反映立法原意。法庭亦指出 Poon Wing Kay一案內的原則適用於「危險駕駛引致他人身體受嚴重傷害」。上訴庭述明量刑原則：

“The relevant sentencing principles

26. How a person attracts criminal liability for dangerous driving is determined by application of the provisions of sections 37(4)  – (8), 36A(10)  – (14)  and 36 (4)  – (8). All of these provisions are identical. The important point to note from these provisions is that they do not require proof of any specific intent to drive dangerously or to cause grievous bodily harm or death. Whether a driver’s driving was dangerous is a matter to be decided objectively.

27. It is this lack of an intent that prompted the English Sentencing Panel to conclude that when sentencing for the offence of dangerous driving causing death greater prominence should be given to the culpability of the driving. This approach was discussed by the English Court of Appeal in R v Cooksley ……:

“[13]……culpability must be the dominant factor when the offence involves no intention to kill or injure……”

28. This approach was endorsed by this Court in Secretary for Justice v Poon Wing Kay [2007] 1 HKLRD 660 at 668D and has been applied by this Court in many other decisions since. This seems to us to be an equally appropriate approach to the offence of causing grievous bodily harm by dangerous driving. For this offence the range of harm is considerable from the situation of the victim in the present case, who only suffered a fractured knee to the victim who may be rendered paraplegic. Furthermore the harmful consequences of a driving accident may be disproportionate to the level of culpability of the defendant’s driving. A car accident caused by appalling driving may present as an horrific scene to onlookers but the occupants of the car or cars may walk away with comparatively less serious injuries. But an accident caused by a low level of culpability may nevertheless result in death or terrible injuries. There can be an element of randomness in the outcome of an accident and the present case is a prime example.

29. Here the applicant drove slowly onto a pedestrian crossing against a red light not knowing what he might encounter because his vision was obstructed by a mini-bus which had stopped waiting for the lights to turn green. What he did encounter, emerging from the front of the mini‑bus, was an elderly person who, quite fortuitously for the applicant, ultimately recovered quite uneventfully from her injuries. But what if the person crossing in front of the mini-bus had been a woman in an advanced state of pregnancy or a child rushing ahead of its parent or a baby in a stroller – in any of these cases the consequences could have been much more disastrous.

30. Consequently even though the harm caused by the driving misconduct is an important matter for the sentencing judge to take into account, it is not given the same prominence as the culpability of the driving misconduct.

31. In determining the culpability of a defendant’s dangerous driving we see no reason to treat the section 36A offence any differently from the other dangerous driving offences in the Road Traffic Ordinance. A substantial body of case law has developed since this court’s decision in Secretary for Justice v Poon Wing Kay and even though most of it relates to the offence of causing death by dangerous driving there is no reason why it should not apply to causing grievous bodily harm by dangerous driving, after making whatever allowance may be necessary for the fact that in the latter offence no death flows from the dangerous driving.

32. This focus on the culpability of the driving has been adopted by the courts notwithstanding that it is a sad feature of this offence that the offender is usually not a person of a criminal background but is a law abiding citizen of good character performing an action, namely driving a motor vehicle, that is so common and widespread in our society there is a tendency to take it for granted, no longer recognizing that it is a privilege attendant with responsibilities. Consequently the person appearing before the courts is usually an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, for only this one occasion in his life, finds himself being prosecuted for having breached the criminal law. Yet, because of the nature of the offence he has committed, he further finds that he does not receive the usual advantages of being a first offender and a person of good character and that the court is less concerned with imposing upon him a sentence that is rehabilitative in nature but a sentence that seeks to accommodate other sentencing principles.

33. Consequently, rather than trying to discern from other cases, all of which turn on their own particular facts, what sentence should be imposed on this applicant, we think it is more helpful to identify the sentencing principles that must be accommodated when sentencing for an offence of this nature and level of seriousness. In our view they are the principles of retribution, deterrence and denunciation.

34. The first principle, retribution, simply means the punishment of the offender…

35. However the dominant sentencing principle for this offence is general deterrence but the severe sentences that are imposed in order to deter also have a secondary purpose of educating the public as to the potential dangers to others involved in driving a motor vehicle and the social responsibility that rests on the shoulders of all drivers to drive safely and with due regard to others. This was made clear by the Court of Appeal in Poon Wing Kay when, in referring to this role of the courts, it said at page 668A to B:

“It is important for courts to drive home the message that there may sometimes be extremely grave consequences flowing from acts of dangerous driving and it is therefore necessary to have in mind a deterrent effect when sentencing in many cases involving dangerous driving.”

36. This, of course, is where the principle of denunciation plays its role for the courts to achieve the goal of educating the public not just through the principle of deterrence and the imposition of severe sentences but also by denouncing the breach of society’s values as reflected in the driving misconduct……

37. In communicating society’s condemnation of a particular offender’s conduct, the sentencing principle of denunciation brings home to the offender, those affected by his conduct and the public generally that the punishment that is meted out to drivers who drive dangerously is because by their conduct they have fallen below the values that society has imposed on them.

38. It is noteworthy that liability for the offence of dangerous driving is in fact drafted in terms of standards, namely driving that “falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful driver”. This standard required by the law exists, as this court made clear in Poon Wing Kay, “to ensure that all who can come into contact with motor vehicles (whether fellow motorists, passengers or pedestrians)  are safe and that their lives are not endangered.

39. If the judge bears the principles of retribution, deterrence and denunciation in mind when considering the appropriate level of punishment for the offender then the sentence that he imposes should be a balanced, proportionate and just one. In this way the courts will contribute to the important objective of “maintaining public confidence in the sentencing system.”

11.  於HKSAR v Chan Chi Chiu Louis （陳志超）[2013] 5 HKC 162 一案中，上訴法院重申，雖然意外的結果亦是重要因素，判刑的主要考慮是被告人的罪責。法庭亦指，判刑時，法庭有權考慮車速；如考慮到案發情況，被告人超速駕駛是極危險的話，超速可構成加刑因素。

12.  於 Secretary for Justice v Chu Wing Yin Christine （朱詠妍）[2020] 1 HKLRD 771，上訴法院指一般情況下，「危險駕駛引致他人身體受嚴重傷害」應以即時監禁為量刑起點。法庭認為適當的判刑考慮是先要衡量被告人的罪責，以釐定涉案行為的客觀危險程度及被告人的道德罪責。此外，法庭也要考慮受害人受到的傷害及影響，之後再考慮有否加刑因素，包括:

(1)  受害人受傷的程度及性質；

(2)  受害人數目；

(3)  車速；

(4)  受酒精或藥物影響的程度；

(5)  是否有不穩定或攻擊性駕駛；

(6)  是否與他人競賽或賣弄駕駛技術；

(7)  危險駕駛所佔時間的長短

(8)  司機是否忽視相關的警告；

(9)  司機是否正逃離警方的追捕；

(10)  司機是否缺乏睡眠；

(11)  司機是否沒有及時將車輛停下；

(12)  案發是否在行人過路線；

(13)  被告人是否駕駛公共車輛等等。

13.  法庭亦會衡量案中有否求情或減刑因素，而對判刑作出適當調整。

控罪 2

14.  如上文所述，這項控罪最高刑罰為第三級罰款及監禁6個月。這類控罪沒有量刑指引。

被告人的背景

15.  被告人現年34歲，未婚，但有一位穩定女友，兩人本計劃今年結婚。被告人與61歲的母親同住。其63歲的父親因心臟手術意外，自2023年8月起一直在瑪麗醫院留醫。被告人有一名29歲的妹妹，任職空中服務員。

16.  被告人父母於2007年離異。當時被告人母親為家庭的經濟支柱，被告人作為長子於18歲時便開始工作，減輕母親的負擔，供養妹妹讀書，至她完成大學學位。被告人母親患有癌症，經數次切除手術後身體狀況欠佳，不能繼續工作，倚賴被告人供養。由於其妹妹工作時間不穩定，經常不在港，其母的日常起居生活亦須依賴被告人照顧。

17.  被告人接受教育至文憑程度。他原先從事酒店餐飲業，但受到疫情影響，開工不足，因此轉行為三間洋酒公司送貨，當時月入約$42,000。案發時，被告人全職工作了半年。

18.  大律師指，2022 年被告人的朋友以被告人的名義借貸，但自2022年11月始，該名朋友得知被告人牽涉本案後便斷絕聯絡，以致被告人需要承擔39萬元的還款。被告人一直以來辛勞工作，如期償還欠款。直至本年一月，只有兩期便能完全清還債項。

19.  大律師續指，案發後被告人已再沒駕駛。至2023年4月10日他轉往馬可孛羅酒店工作，現職餐廳副經理，月入約$29,000。

20.  被告人於2008年考獲車牌。他有兩項不小心駕駛的刑事定罪記錄，分別為2014年及2015年。2016年8月有一項刑事定罪紀錄，涉及兩項控罪，分別為「酒後駕駛」及「使用沒有第三者保險的汽車」，分別被罰款$5000、停牌6個月、及自費修習及完成駕駛改進課程，以及罰款$2000及停牌12個月。被告人沒有按法庭命令修習及完成駕駛改進課程，於2017年被定罪及被判處罰款。2020 年至2022年間，被告人有九項交通定額罰款紀錄，當中大部份為超速駕駛。

辯方的「案例」

21.  辯方援引的案例包括 HKSAR v Chan Chi Chiu Louis 、HKSAR v Lee Yau Wing及 Secretary for Justice v Chu Wing Yin Christine。本席已引述有關的段落，現不再重複。另外，大律師提供一系列的區域法院判刑理由書，要求法庭與本案作比較。上訴法院已多次強調這些判刑沒有經過上訴而被肯定，也沒有什麼量刑原則可言，對量刑既沒有約束力也沒有參考價值，根本起不了任何指導作用，根本不應稱之為『案例』（見 香港特別行政區 對 唐健帮及另二人CAAR 13/2022 [2023] HKCA 896第35段及香港特別行政區 對 劉晉旭及另三人 CACC 243/2021 [2023] HKCA1098第51段）。

量刑

控罪 1

22.  大律師指案發當日，被告人於約早上10時開始工作，開工前檢查好輕型貨車，發現一切機件及操作正常。案發前被告人沿長沙灣道打算前往九龍城吃午飯，駕駛輕型貨車至界限街天橋，開始上橋時加速，於界限街天橋下斜時，沒有謹慎留意及提早控制落橋的車速。當被告人接近橋底時，他看見其左方的行車線上有兩輛的士，一前一後從左二線切入左三線；進入左三線後，後面的士的右指揮燈一直亮着。當時被告人誤以為該輛的士準備連續切入他所在的左四線，於是即時剎車，但當時其車速太快，他亦感到剎車掣沉了下去，即使腳踏了剎車掣仍無法有效剎車。為免直接撞向其他車輛，被告人出於一時的本能反應，將其輕型貨車扭向右方，結果撞毁鐵欄，不幸地傷及行人。

23.  大律師的陳述與被告人的行車紀錄儀片段不脗合。從片段可見，其中一輛的士正打着向右的指揮燈，但被告人從後而來，一直向前駛，超越兩輛的士後才向右扭。另外，片段顯示被告人前方有大量車輛停在路上。明顯地，以被告人當時的車速，他根本無法及時停車，如非向右扭，也會與前面的車輛發生嚴重碰撞，引致連環撞車。

24.  大律師續指被告人一時疏忽，沒有留意到案發路段的時速限制。案發現場是市中心，一般路段的時速限制為每小時50公里；除非是高速公路，一般路段的最高時速限制為每小時70公里。可是，案發前被告人的時速為91+/-9公里及86+/-9公里。換言之，被告人明顯知悉他是超速。

25.  大律師力陳，被告人曾嘗試剎車，但感到剎車掣沉了下去；即使腳踏剎車掣，仍無法有效剎車。這說法與專家的報告不脗合。大律師亦承認專家發現被告人的輕型貨車的剎車掣運作正常。

26.  大律師指本案中沒有某些加刑因素，例如涉及駕駛公共交通工具、多人身體受嚴重傷害、違反交通燈號等。因此，大律師指法庭有空間可酌情考慮索取社會服務令報告。

27.  大律師援引 Secretary for Justice v Chu Wing Yin Christine（同上）。該案中，涉案司機在紅色交通燈號下駛進行人過路線，未能及時剎車，撞到三名行人及導致他們重傷，其中兩人一人永久的殘缺，一人於判刑時，仍處於一種癱瘓狀態。區域法院判處被告人200小時社會服務令。上訴庭認為該案合適的判刑起點為18個月監禁。

28.  大律師指雖然被告人超速，但也曾因應路面狀況嘗試剎車，並非完全沒有作出任何反應，或放任地不控制車輛。本案不涉及競賽或炫耀，亦不涉及醉酒或濫用藥物。被告人是誤判路面情況才向右扭，只是出於本能反應，絕非故意、蓄意、甚至惡意衝向行人路及傷害行人。

29.  本席不敢苟同。一個輪胎的結構，最外面是一層塑膠。該面層的胎面設有花紋；花紋影響輪胎的「抓著力」，而「抓著力」直接影響車輛的剎車功效。輪胎面層下面是兩層緩衝層；緩衝層下面才是簾布層。案發時，被告人輕型貨車的左前輪胎簾布線外露。這顯示左輪胎嚴重磨損（外層及兩層緩衝層均已完全損耗），狀況極度危險。

30.  輪胎的磨損並非一朝一夕做成的。大律師指案發當日早上被告人曾檢查其輕型貨車的機件及操作。如這說法屬實，被告人必然會知悉左輪胎的惡劣狀況，可是他仍駕駛該輛輕型貨車，並非一時疏忽或欠缺專注力。根據《道路交通條例》第36A(11)-(14)條，單單駕駛上述狀況的車輛已構成「危險駕駛」。如上文所述，輪胎的狀況直接影響車輛的剎車功能；輪胎的花紋嚴重損耗的話，汽車根本無法正常剎車。被告人不但駕駛該輕型貨車，還嚴重超速，簡直是完全罔顧其他道路使用者的安全。以被告人的車速，突然煞掣或扭軚都會令車輛失控。此乃加刑因素。

31.  被告人的紀錄顯示其駕駛態度極度惡劣。2014年至2016年間有3次與駕駛有關的刑事定罪紀錄。2017年更沒有按法庭命令修習及完成駕駛改進課程。雖然他分別四次修習及完成駕駛改進課程，但其駕駛態度不但沒有改善，還似乎每況愈下。單是2021年2月至11月（即10個月內），已有5次超速、1次不遵守交通標誌及1次不遵守道路交通標誌的定額罰款。

32.  本案案情十分嚴重，即時監禁是唯一適當的選項。

33.  這類控罪的案情千變萬化。有時被告人的駕駛可能極度危險，但僥倖地結果並不嚴重；有時，被告人可能是一時疏忽，但後果卻十分嚴重。因此，上訴法院多次強調，雖然意外造成的結果是考慮因素之一，但主要考量是被告人的罪責。綜觀本案案情，被告人的駕駛行為極度危險，但僥倖地結果並非最嚴重。

34.  考慮到整體案情，被告人的罪責遠超 HKSAR v Chan Chi Chiu Louis、HKSAR v Lee Yau Wing及Secretary for Justice v Chu Wing Yin Christine。本席認為適當的量刑基準為3年半監禁（即42個月監禁）。

控罪 2

35.  輪胎的狀況極度危險。被告人不但仍使用涉案輕型貨車，還嚴重超速。適當的量刑基準為4½月監禁。

減刑因素

36.  被告人適時認罪，可獲三份一的扣減。控罪1的刑期減為 28 個月監禁；控罪 2 的刑期則減為3個月監禁。眾所周知，就這類控罪判刑時，被告人的個人背景、家庭狀況及判刑引致的經濟困難均非減刑因素。認罪後所獲的扣減已涵蓋悔意。除了適時認罪外，本案並無其他減刑因素。

總刑期

37.  本席必須考慮總刑期的原則。衡量控罪 1 量刑基準時，本席已考慮涉案輪胎的狀況。因此，本席下令控罪 2 的刑期與控罪1同期執行，即總刑期為28個月監禁。

38.  另外，本席看不到任何原因不頒發停牌令。因此，就控罪1下令取消被告人駕駛任何類別車輛的資格，為期24個月。如被告人於停牌期間駕駛任何車輛即屬犯法（無牌駕駛），一般會判處即時監禁。

39.  被告人之前已分別4次修習及完成駕駛改進課程，但其駕駛態度仍然惡劣。駕駛改進課程明顯對被告人全無效益。本席現根據法例第70條，下令停牌令由即日開始計算直至該命令日期後，被告人自費重新獲得駕駛測驗及格及向署長出示法例訂明格式的證據，說明被取消駕駛資格的人在有關命令作出後上述測驗合格，才可復牌。