POOSAALA RAM PRASAD v. THE HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LTD

HCA 279/2021

[2026] HKCFI 1396

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 279 OF 2021

__________________

BETWEEN

__________________

__________________

DECISION

__________________

I. INTRODUCTION

1.  On 13 January 2026, I handed down Decision ([2026] HKCFI 229) (the “Decision”) dismissing the Plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal. In §1 of the Decision, I mentioned that the Plaintiff did not file any reply submissions. On 13 February 2026, the Plaintiff wrote to the Court saying that he had duly filed reply submissions. Upon search of the court files, it is discovered that the Plaintiff filed an affirmation on 15 December 2025 (the “December Affirmation”) without any margin note mentioning that the affirmation was the reply submissions for paper disposal. The affirmation only states “PLAINTIFF’S REPLY SUBMISSIONS OPPOSING THE DEFENDANT’S SKELETON SUBMISSIONS. See the attachment. Exhibit “A””. It was not mentioned for what application the submissions were. When a party simply files an affirmation but not submissions, chances are that the affirmation would simply stay in the court files without any notice to the Court.

2.  In the letter of 13 February 2026 mentioned above, the Plaintiff complained that the Decision, without considering the reply submissions, caused grave unfairness and injustice to him. He asked me to revoke the Decision.

3.  I have no jurisdiction to revoke the Decision as such. However, since the order for refusing leave has not been sealed, I have jurisdiction to review the order. Having considered that the Plaintiff acts in person, I am prepared to take his letter as an application for review. Further, since the complaint is that I did not consider his reply submissions, I do not find any need to trouble the Defendant to make any further submissions on the matter.

4.  As regards the legal principles, the discretion to review the order should be exercised only in very rare and exceptional circumstances (see Lee Yui Kai v TD Co., Limited and Others [2018] HKDC 978 at §§7-16 per HH Judge KW Wong (as he then was)).

II. GROUND 1

5.  I have read §§4-6 of the submissions exhibited to the December Affirmation concerning Ground 1. In essence, the Plaintiff repeats his submissions previously made. I have considered Ground 1 in the light of these reply submissions, and I am of the view that my reasons for refusing Ground 1 set out in §§3-6 of the Decision remain valid.

III. GROUND 2

6.  I have read §§7-8 of the submissions exhibited to the December Affirmation concerning Ground 2. In essence, the Plaintiff repeats his submissions previously made. The Plaintiff also stresses that his claim is for loss of opportunity under Hong Kong law, not enforcement of any Indian instrument. However, as I explained in §7 of my decision handed down on 17 October 2025:-

“The issue, therefore, is whether the Purchase was legally binding under the Indian law and whether the Plaintiff’s conduct was consistent with the Indian law and practice in relation to a genuine sale and purchase of Indian landed property. If not, then the Plaintiff’s allegation of causation of loss would be defeated or at least significantly undermined, given that the Plaintiff would have much to prove in respect of the alleged loss when the subject Purchase was not legally bound to proceed to completion at any rate, or at least, the chance of completion of the Purchase would be undermined.”

7.  Having considered the reply submissions, I am of the view that my reasons for refusing Ground 2 set out in §§8-10 of the Decision remain valid.

IV. GROUND 3

8.  I have read §§9-10 of the submissions exhibited to the December Affirmation concerning Ground 3. The reply submissions are, again, essentially repetition of his previous submissions. I have considered these reply submissions, and take the view that my reasons for refusing Ground 3 set out in §§12-14 remain valid.

V. GROUND 4

9.  In §§11-12 of the submissions exhibited to the December Affirmation concerning Ground 4, the Plaintiff repeats his point that the presumption that the foreign law is the same as Hong Kong law should apply in the absence of better evidence. However, as I explained in §16 of the Decision, in determining whether to give leave for expert evidence, this presumption should not be applied; otherwise, the Hong Kong Court would essentially not be able to take any expert evidence on foreign law. This clearly is not the objective of the presumption. In general, the presumption applies when there is a foreign law issue, but somehow, both parties are content to deal with the issue without any expert evidence on the foreign law.

10.  Despite the reply submissions, I am of the view that the reasons for refusing Ground 4 set out in §§16-17 remain valid.

VI. GROUND 5

11.  In §13 of the submissions exhibited to the December Affirmation concerning Ground 5, the Plaintiff stresses that the Hong Kong Monetary Authority had guidelines requiring the banks to notify customer promptly of remittance failures, and this would have enabled alternative funding arrangement and preserved the opportunity. Even if this is correct, the Indian law and practice is still relevant to the fundamental question of whether the opportunity said to be preserved existed in the first place.

12.  Having considered the reply submission, I am of the view that the reasons for refusing Ground 5 set out in §§19-20 of the Decision remains valid.

VII. GROUND 6

13.  The reply submissions in §14 of the submissions exhibited to the December Affirmation concerning Ground 6 shows the Plaintiff’s misunderstanding of the role of the experts. The experts are legitimate to give their opinions on certain assumed facts, and their reliability would be determined at trial rather than at this stage.

14.  The reply submissions have not changed my view on Ground 6. My reasons for refusing Ground 6 set out in §§22-23 of the Decision remain valid.

VIII. CONCLUSION

15.  In the premises, I refused the review application, with no order as to costs. I order that the Defendant’s solicitors shall draft, file and serve the order of my refusal of the review application.