POOSAALA RAM PRASAD v. THE HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LTD

HCA 279/2021

[2026] HKCFI 229

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 279 OF 2021

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BETWEEN

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DECISION

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I. INTRODUCTION

1.  On 17 October 2025, I handed down the decision (the “Decision”) ([2025] HKCFI 4818) dismissing the Plaintiff’s appeal against the Master’s order dismissing the Defendant’s Summons filed on 9 January 2025 for leave to file expert evidence. By Summons filed on 30 October 2025 (the “Summons”), the Plaintiff now applies for leave to appeal against the Decision. I gave directions for filing written submissions and paper disposal. Despite my directions that the Plaintiff could file written submissions in reply within 14 days after the Defendant’s written submissions in opposition, the Plaintiff has as at today not filed any reply submissions.

2.  I shall deal with the Grounds of Appeal in the draft Grounds of Appeal attached to the Summons one by one.

II. GROUND 1

3.  In Ground 1, the Plaintiff complains that I erred in framing “the issue as requiring validation of a purchase agreement under Indian Law” and “overlooking the Plaintiff’s Submissions on the preliminary nature of the transaction”. In particular, he points out that his “pleaded case has at all times been that no concluded agreement existed”

4.  First, it has not been the Plaintiff’s pleaded case. On the contrary, when the Defendant pleads at §8(6) of the Re-Amended Defence that there was no binding agreement in India, the Plaintiff simply joined issue in his Reply. In other words, the Plaintiff is taken to not admit the Defendant’s plea that there was no binding agreement. Such non-admission is contrary to the Plaintiff’s submissions that his pleaded case has always been no concluded agreement.

5.  Second, even assuming that the Plaintiff’s case is that no concluded agreement existed, as explained in §7 of the Decision, in issue was also “whether the Plaintiff’s conduct was consistent with the Indian law and practice in relation to a genuine sale and purchase of Indian landed property”. Therefore, the Indian law and practice would still be relevant.

6.  Third, it remains for me to say that the Plaintiff’s own reference to Indian law in his submissions only shows that expert opinion on Indian law and practice is necessary for the fair disposal of the matter.

7.  In conclusion, there are no reasonable prospects of success in Ground 1.

III. GROUND 2

8.  In Ground 2, the Plaintiff complains that I failed to address the inadmissibility of unauthenticated documents and the preliminary nature of conveyancing. In particular, the Plaintiff complains that I erred in treating the Plaintiff’s Documents, disclosed by himself, as evidence of a binding transaction. As mentioned in §6 of the Decision, the Defendant does not admit the authenticity.

9.  Strangely, in support of Ground 2, the Plaintiff submits that these documents, disclosed by himself, were “unauthenticated photocopies, inadmissible as primary evidence of title under Indian Evidence Act 1872”.

10.  The Plaintiff seems, in this Ground, to say that because the Plaintiff’s Documents were not authentic and so should not be admitted, there was no evidence of any binding transaction. If this is indeed what the Plaintiff would like to say, I repeat my reasons for rejecting Ground 1. Further and in any event, at this interlocutory stage, I have not, and do not, make any findings on the Plaintiff’s Documents, but should proceed on the basis that the Plaintiff’s Documents may or may not be accepted at trial to support the Plaintiff’s pleaded case or the Defendant’s pleaded case.

11.  In conclusion, there are no reasonable prospects of success in Ground 2.

IV. GROUND 3

12.  In Ground 3, the Plaintiff complains that I erred in overlooking the irrelevance of the Indian Law to his negligence claim in Hong Kong. He repeats his submissions made during the hearing before me that the Indian law was irrelevant to causation of loss, because his claim was that the causation and quantum of damages fall to be assessed under Hong Kong law. Further, referring to several Indian statutory provisions, the Plaintiff submits again that there was no legally binding agreement.

13.  As pointed out in §6 of the Decision, one of the defences is that the Plaintiff’s conduct was inconsistent with there being any genuine transaction when assessed against the Indian law and practice, and therefore, there was no loss. Therefore, the Indian law and practice clearly is relevant to the causation of loss.

14.  Insofar as the Plaintiff’s repeated submissions in reliance on the Indian statutory provisions that there was no legally binding agreement, I repeat my analysis in Ground 1 above.

15.  In conclusion, there are no reasonable prospects of success in Ground 3.

V. GROUND 4

16.  In Ground 4, the Plaintiff’s first complaint is that I erred in rejecting any presumption of similarity between Hong Kong conveyancing law and Indian conveyancing law. As I explained in §17 of the Decision, the presumption is an evidential tool when there is no evidence on the foreign law. I do not see any error in disapplying the presumption when determining whether to admit expert evidence.

17.  The second complaint is that the expert evidence was speculative, disproportionate and not necessary. However, the expert evidence goes direct to the main issues in the dispute. Whether or not the expert evidence is speculative or reliable was not an issue I could determine at this stage (see §23 of the Decision). In short, I cannot see any merit in this complaint.

18.  Therefore, Ground 4 fails.

VI. GROUND 5

19.  In Ground 5, the Plaintiff complains that I failed to resolve whether the telegraphic transfer was rejected, refused, or simply not sent. The Plaintiffs refer to the Court of Appeal judgment in CACV 466/2021 [2022] HKCA 1876 at §9, and said that the Court of Appeal left this question open.

20.  The Court of Appeal’s judgment was in relation to the Defendant’s application to strike out the Plaintiff’s claim, and therefore, all the facts were assumed in favour of the Plaintiff. So, even if the Court of Appeal expressly left the question open, this question would be a question of fact to be determined at trial, but not to be determined at this stage when I was considering whether to grant leave for expert evidence.

21.  So, Ground 5 fails.

VII. GROUND 6

22.  Ground 6 is similar to Ground 4. The essence of Ground 6 is that I overlooked the inherently unreliability of the Defendant’s expert evidence. As I explained above and §23 of the Decision, the reliability of the expert evidence is to be determined at trial.

23.  Insofar as the Plaintiff repeats his submissions that the expert would usurp the Court’s role, such submissions were dealt with in §22 of the Decision. I do not see any error in it.

24.  Finally, as regards costs and proportionality, I repeat §17 above.

25.  Therefore, Ground 6 fails.

VIII. CONCLUSION

26.  In the premises, I dismiss the Plaintiff’s Summons for leave to appeal, and order the Plaintiff to pay the Defendant costs of the Summons summarily assessed at HK$70,000.