LI XIAO YI v. TANG CHUNG WAH (also known as ALAN CHUNG WAH TANG)

CAMP 35/2026, [2026] HKCA 912

On An Intended Appeal From [2025] HKCFI 5754 &

[2026] HKCFI 381

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 35 OF 2026

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCMP NO 406 OF 2025)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Chow JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

INTRODUCTION

1.  This is the Defendant’s renewed application by summons dated 29 January 2026 (“Leave Summons”) for leave to appeal against the order of Harris J dated 3 November 2025 (“Order”), by which the Judge dismissed the Defendant’s application for him to recuse himself from the substantive hearing of the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons (“the Originating Summons”) seeking an order that the Defendant be committed for contempt of court.

2.  The Judge gave his reasons for making the Order in a written decision dated 25 November 2025 (“Decision”), and refused the Defendant’s application for leave to appeal by a further written decision dated 22 January 2026 (“Leave Decision”).

3.  Having considered the papers before the Court, we take the view that it is appropriate to determine the present application on the basis of written submissions of the parties only and without an oral hearing, pursuant to Order 59, rule 2A(5)(a) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A.

BACKGROUND FACTS

4.  The basic facts of this matter have been set out by the Judge at §§4-11 of the Decision. For the purpose of disposing of the present application, the following brief summary should suffice.

5.  The Defendant is one of the joint and several liquidators of NHD Systems (Asia) Limited, formerly known as Lee Siu-Fung & Co Limited (“Company”), which was placed into compulsory liquidation by an order of the court dated 9 May 2000.

6.  On 27 June 2018, the Company commenced an action in the High Court in HCA 1492/2018 (“Action”) against the Plaintiff for the recovery of an alleged loan of US$1 million. The Defendant had the conduct of the Action and gave evidence on behalf of the Company at the trial, which took place before the Judge on 14, 15, and 17 October 2024.

7.  During the course of the trial, the Judge expressed concerns that the Defendant was prevaricating and giving dishonest evidence. The Judge formally warned the Defendant on at least two occasions of his concerns. Following the close of the Company’s case against the Plaintiff and after hearing the parties, the Judge accepted the Plaintiff’s submission of “No Case to Answer” and dismissed the Company’s action against the Plaintiff on 17 October 2024 (“Judgment”). The Judge gave reasons for the Judgment on 21 January 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 408, “Reasons for Judgment”). Before handing down the Reasons for Judgment, the Judge had called for the transcript of the Defendant’s evidence at the trial, and invited submissions from the parties to ensure that his assessment of the Defendant’s evidence was based on an accurate record.

8.  In the Reasons for Judgment, the Judge, in addition to explaining why he dismissed the Company’s action against the Plaintiff, made observations concerning the conduct of the proceedings by the Defendant as a liquidator of the Company and an officer of the Court. Amongst other things, the Judge expressed the view that (i) the Company (in practice the Defendant) breached its disclosure obligations[1], (ii) the Defendant failed to advance the Company’s claim fairly[2], and (iii) the Defendant gave dishonest evidence to the Court under oath on numerous occasions[3]. The Judge pointed out that, on the Defendant’s own admissions, the liquidators of the Company had breached their discovery obligations in fundamental ways[4]. At §35 of the Reasons for Judgment, the Judge made the following observations:

“Mr Tang is no stranger to controversy. He has been the subject of a disqualification application made by the Official Receiver and also a finding of contempt for failing to comply with his discovery obligations. Although he was not disqualified his conduct has been subject to serious criticism by a number of judges. That he should be subject to yet another judgment in which the court has found he has fallen materially short of his duties to the Court demonstrates a belligerent indifference to the standards required of him. His conduct in the present case is all the more objectionable because he has shown a shocking indifference to his affirmation to tell the truth. I have referred to the affirmation that he filed purporting to describe the disclosure undertaken by the Company. It was plainly a lie as I have no doubt was much of his evidence before me. It is totally unacceptable for an officer of the court to show such contempt for the integrity of the trial process.”

9.  For the above reasons, the Judge referred the matter to the Official Receiver for consideration as to whether disqualification proceedings should be commenced against the Defendant, and directed that, if issued, the matter should be listed before him in the first instance.

10.  The Company’s application for an extension of time to appeal against the Judgment was refused by the Judge on 10 February 2026. The Defendant had erroneously applied to the Court of Appeal for an extension of time to appeal without first seeking leave from the Judge. Kwan VP ordered on 16 April 2025 that the proceedings commenced by his notice of appeal in CACV 80/2025 be stayed pending the Judge’s determination of his application for leave to appeal out of time.[5]  Following the refusal of leave to appeal out of time by the Judge on 10 February 2026, the Defendant issued a summons on 16 February 2026 in the Court of Appeal in CAMP 56/2026 seeking an extension of time to appeal.

11.  In the meantime, on 26 February 2025, the Plaintiff sought leave to apply for an order of committal against the Defendant in light of his alleged dishonest conduct in the Action. Leave was granted by the Judge on 3 March 2025. On 14 March 2025, the Plaintiff issued the Originating Summons for an order of committal against the Defendant. The contempt proceedings have been adjourned a number of times, and are presently fixed to be heard substantively from 18 to 20 May 2026.

12.  On 19 September 2025, the Defendant issued a summons (“Recusal Summons”) seeking an order that the Judge recused himself from the substantive hearing of the Originating Summons.

THE JUDGE’S DECISION

13.  The Defendant’s recusal application was advanced on the basis of alleged apparent bias on the part of the Judge[6]. The Defendant relied upon three principal grounds in support of the allegation of apparent bias: (1) prejudging, (2) substantial similarity between the Reasons for Judgment and the Plaintiff’s Revised No Case Submissions, and (3) a significant portion of the Reasons for Judgment was dedicated to criticising him and his conduct during the trial of the Action.

14.  All three grounds were rejected by the Judge.

15.  As regards ground (1):

(1)  The Judge rejected the Defendant’s contention that he would, in the contempt proceedings, be required to determine essentially what he had already decided in the Action. The Judge considered that what he would be required to determine in the contempt proceedings would be distinct from his finding in the Action that the Defendant was a dishonest witness. In particular, to prove that the Defendant had committed the criminal contempt of perjury, the Plaintiff would be required to prove beyond reasonable doubt (i) the falsity of the relevant statement, (ii) that the statement had, or if persisted in would be likely to have, interfered with the course of justice in some material respects, and (iii) that at the time it was made, the maker of the statement had no honest belief in the truth of the statement and knew of its likelihood to interfere with the course of justice. The Judge took the view that his finding in the Action that the Defendant was a dishonest witness was relevant only to establishing the first and the third elements of the criminal contempt of perjury. For the purposes of the contempt proceedings, he would have to consider separately whether the false statement made by the Defendant had or would be likely to have interfered with the course of justice in some material respects.

(2)  The Judge also rejected the Defendant’s complaint that apparent bias on his part was demonstrated or evidenced by (i) his suggestion that the Plaintiff could make a submission of no case to answer, and (ii) his enquiry with Mr Bernard Man, SC (senior counsel for the Plaintiff) as to whether the court could, on its own motion, initiate contempt proceedings against the Defendant. In respect of (i), the Judge pointed out that the Defendant’s former counsel’s understanding that he made the suggestion that the Plaintiff could make a submission of no case to answer “at the very early stage of the proceeding” was incorrect, in that the suggestion was in fact made at the end of the Defendant’s evidence, which was the only oral evidence relied on by the Company. Further, the Defendant’s former counsel had retracted the complaint that the Judge had, of his own volition, suggested to the Plaintiff that he could make a submission of no case to answer, and accepted that the court was entitled to make comments throughout the trial in order to facilitate the trial process and direct the parties to focus only on the disputed issues. In respect of (ii), the Judge pointed out that -

“… the subject of contempt proceeding was raised because the Plaintiff asked me ‘to lay bare for posterity the conduct of Mr Tang’ by reciting, inter alia, a miscellany of lies that he submitted the Defendant (Mr Tang) had allegedly told on affirmation and in Court. Accordingly, Mr Man and I had an exchange to explore the possible actions that could be taken against the Defendant. When Mr Man submitted that the Plaintiff potentially had standing to bring a contempt proceeding against the Defendant, I indicated that I had not given any thought to the idea of committing the Defendant for contempt. As such, I invited submissions from Mr Man as to whether the Court could, of its own volition, commence contempt proceedings on the basis that it is appalled by a witness’ lack of veracity. In fairness to the Defendant, I invited [the Defendant’s former counsel] to make further submissions. However, [the Defendant’s former counsel] stated that he did not wish to supplement his written submissions save to submit that there was no destruction of evidence which, as I then indicated, was entirely different to my earlier exchange with Mr Man.”[7]

16.  As regards ground (2), the Defendant complained that §§25 to 31 of the Reasons for Judgment, which concerned the Judge’s view that the Defendant had clearly given dishonest evidence to the court under oath on numerous occasions, were substantially similar to §§30 to 32 of the Plaintiff’s Revised No Case Submissions at the trial of the Action, thus giving rise to an appearance of bias. This complaint was rejected by the Judge:

(1)  While the Judge accepted that §§25 to 31 of the Reasons for Judgment were based on the Plaintiff’s written submissions, as explained by the Judge, those were matters which the Defendant “chose not to take detailed issue with”. The Judge pointed out that the submissions of the Defendant’s former counsel dealt very sketchily with the complaints made by Mr Man about the Defendant’s evidence, and referred to the following chronology and matters to show that the Defendant did not seriously dispute the complaints made about his conduct –

“(1) In his 1^st round of submissions dated 16 October 2024, the Plaintiff explained in some detail the ways in which the Defendant was said to have lied on affirmation. The Company did not respond to any of the Plaintiff’s accusations in its 1^st round of reply submissions dated 17 October 2024.

(2) Once the Transcripts became available on 13 November 2024, I caused copies of the Transcripts to be sent to the Parties so that they could, where appropriate, amend their previous submissions. The Plaintiff submitted his 2^nd round of submissions on 29 November 2024. The Company had 28 days to respond and revise its 2^nd round of reply submissions by 27 December 2024. Still, the Company did not respond to any of the Plaintiff’s accusations other than for the submission that ‘[t]he insufficient discovery on the case does not automatically go to dishonesty or contempt sought to be advanced by D’s Contempt Submissions’.

(3) Accordingly, by the time I was writing the Reasons to be handed down on 21 January 2025, I had before me only the Plaintiff’s submissions on the Defendant’s alleged dishonesty, which were supported by references to the then available Transcripts. The Defendant had the opportunity to address the submissions in as much detail as he thought necessary if he considered them wrong. He chose not to do so.”[8]

(2) The Judge rejected the Defendant’s suggestion that he was not willing to bring independent consideration to the issues in the Action, and regarded such suggestion as being “disingenuous”.

(3) The Judge also observed that while he had expressed disapproval of the Defendant’s conduct, “[a]n expression of scepticism is not suggestive of bias unless the judge conveys an unwillingness to be persuaded of a factual proposition whatever the evidence may be”[9], and the Defendant advanced no reason for thinking that a fair-minded and informed observer would think he had a closed mind.

17.  As regards ground (3) concerning that complaint that there had been an excessive focus on the Defendant’s evidence in the Reasons for Judgment which would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that the Judge was apparently biased against the Defendant, the Judge held that:

“As the Company’s claim had clearly not been established, the Action was readily disposed of. Therefore, at the outset of my Reasons, I stated that ‘[m]ost of it concerns the conduct of the case by Mr Tang, his evidence in his affirmations, witness statements and in cross-examination, the duties of a liquidator and more generally the importance of witnesses taking their obligation to give honest evidence seriously and the damage done to the integrity of the trial process if witnesses do not do so’. After giving my Reasons for dismissing the Action in the first 14 paragraphs, I dedicated around 20 paragraphs to discuss the evidence of the Defendant, as a liquidator and an officer of the Court, in order to emphasise the standards of integrity that the Court expects from its officers and the ways in which the Defendant’s conduct had fallen short of those standards. Authority is cited for the Court doing so. [The Defendant’s former counsel] did not submit during the trial or at the Hearing that it was wrong for the Court to express the concerns recorded in the Reasons if the Court considered that it was appropriate. This being the case the criticism is arid.”[10]

18.  Accordingly, the Judge dismissed the Recusal Summons.

THE PRESENT APPLICATION

19.  The Defendant’s application for leave to appeal against the Order was dismissed by the Judge on 22 January 2026.

20.  By the Leave Summons taken out in the Court of Appeal on 29 January 2026, the Defendant renews the application for leave to appeal against the Order.

21.  In the draft Notice of Appeal (“DNOA”) attached to the Leave Summons, the Defendant contends that the Judge erred in the exercise of his discretion in refusing to recuse himself. The Defendant relies mainly on alleged apparent bias on the part of the Judge, while also relying on alleged actual bias[11].

DISCUSSION

Applicable principles

22.  The principles governing applications for leave to appeal are well-established. The applicant needs to show that the intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard: s 14AA(4) of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4. A reasonable prospect of success means an appeal with prospects that are more than fanciful, without having to be probable: SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125, §17.

23.  The Judge’s refusal to recuse himself from hearing the Originating Summons involves an exercise of discretion. The Court of Appeal will only intervene in the Judge’s exercise of discretion if he erred in principle or approach, or his exercise of discretion was plainly wrong: WSSA v SYH [2024] 4 HKLRD 325, at §22.

24.  The applicable principles for “apparent bias” have been set out by the Judge at §§14-21 of the Decision. The Defendant has not taken issue with the principles stated by the Judge. We are satisfied that the Judge correctly stated the relevant principles, and do not propose to repeat them here.

Apparent bias

25.  The Defendant contends that, applying the “reasonable apprehension of bias” test, the Judge ought to have exercised his discretion and recused himself on the ground of apparent bias. Various matters are relied upon by the Defendant in support of the allegation of apparent bias.

26.  First, the Defendant says that the Judge has already formed a “strong negative personal view” of him, and has been particularly critical of him personally, as seen from the Reasons for Judgment (DNOA, §§1 and 3). We do not accept the mere fact that the Judge has expressed strong negative views about the Defendant’s conduct is sufficient to demonstrate apparent bias. While it is clear the Judge was highly critical of the Defendant’s conduct, the Defendant has not contended, whether in the DNOA or in his written statement in support of the present application, that the Judge’s criticisms of his conduct are unjustified or unwarranted. As mentioned by the Judge at §16 of the Decision, “bias” for the present purpose means an attitude of mind that “prevents the judge from making an objective determination of the issues before the Court”. At §20 of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in WSSA v SYH (Application for Recusal) [2024] 4 HKLRD 325, Kwan VP, in the context of her discussion of the “reasonable apprehension” test for apparent bias, said that bias means “a prejudice against one party or his case for reasons unconnected with the merits of the case”. When considering the issue of apparent bias, the fact that the person being observed is a professional judge, who has taken the judicial oath to safeguard the law and administer justice without fear or favour, self-interest or deceit, and whose training and tradition requires him to decide cases without partiality or prejudice, is highly significant: Cosimo Borrelli as Trustee of the SFC Litigation Trust v Allen Tak Yuen Chan and Others [2020] HKCFI 2382, at §14, per Mimmie Chan J. We do not consider the fact that the Judge has expressed strong criticisms of the Defendant’s conduct, including ones going to the Defendant’s honesty or integrity, which have not been challenged or shown to be unjustified or unwarranted, would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to the conclusion that there is real possibility that the Judge may not make, or may be prevented from making, objective determination of the issues in the contempt proceedings, or may decide them for reasons unconnected with the merits of the case.

27.  Second, the Defendant argues that the Judge should not have descended into the arena and taken up the contempt proceedings, and should not have taken part in the present “satellite Recusal litigation”, when he has already handed down the Reasons for Judgment in the Action and where the Judgment in the Action is under appeal, or there is an outstanding application for extension of time to appeal (DNOA, §2). This complaint has no validity whatsoever. The fact that the Judge has given a judgment in the Action, and/or his judgment is or may be under appeal, is no reason why the Judge should not hear the Originating Summons which raises issues concerning the Defendant’s conduct in the Action. The so-called “satellite” litigation was brought by the Defendant himself. It was entirely appropriate that the application should be dealt with the Judge, who is most familiar with the relevant issues in the application, in the first instance.

28.  Third, the Defendant complains that the Judge erroneously found that he had been subject to a disqualification application by the Official Receiver, and further commented that the Defendant was “no stranger to controversy” and “[had] been subject to serious criticism by a number of judges” (DNOA, §3). The Defendant’s complaints have no validity. In respect of the former, as pointed out by the Judge at §7(2) of the Leave Decision, the observation that the Defendant had been subject to a disqualification application by the Official Receiver was strictly correct. In Re Chan John Loong Fai[12], the Official Receiver made an application to the court for directions as to whether the Defendant was a fit person whom the creditors could validly appoint as a trustee, and the purpose of the application was effectively to seek the removal of the Defendant as a trustee in those bankruptcy proceedings. In respect of the latter, it has not been shown that the Judge’s observation is incorrect or unjustified (see further §30 below). When considering the validity of this complaint of the Defendant, it is important to take into account the context in which the Judge made the relevant comments, namely, “the duties of a liquidator and more generally the importance of witnesses taking their obligation to give honest evidence seriously and the damage done to the integrity of the trial process if witnesses do not do so”[13]. As explained by the Judge, his comments were made “in order to emphasise the standards of integrity that the Court expects from its officers and the ways in which the Defendant’s conduct had fallen short of those standards”[14]. The Judge’s comments were not, so to speak, gratuitous statements. We do not see that they can give rise to any justifiable complaint of apparent bias on the part of the Judge.

29.  Fourth, the Defendant complains that the Judge on his own motion invited the Official Officer to consider commencing disqualification proceedings against him, and expressly directed that such proceedings, if any, should be listed before him in the first instance (DNOA, §4). It seems to us that, in light of the Judge’s findings that the Defendant had failed to act fairly in the presentation of the Company’s case against the Plaintiff, blatantly breached his disclosure obligations, and given dishonest evidence to the court on oath on numerous occasions, it was justifiable for the Judge to refer the matter to the Official Receiver for consideration of whether disqualification proceedings should be commenced against him. We agree with the Judge that this was a proportionate response in the circumstances, and does not indicate bias[15]. The further direction that any such disqualification proceedings should be listed before the Judge is not objectionable. The fact that that Judge expressly stated that such proceedings, if any, should be listed before him “in the first instance” shows that the Judge was prepared to keep an open mind on whether he should be hearing the matter substantively.

30.  Fifth, the Defendant states that he was never canvassed/cross-examined during the trial of the Action concerning any action by the Official Receiver, and complained that the Judge made use of his personal knowledge of the Defendant’s involvement in other legal proceedings which was outside the scope of the evidence adduced at the trial (DNOA, §5). There is nothing in these complaints. As mentioned by the Judge at §7(1) of the Leave Decision, neither the Defendant nor his former counsel took issue with his observation during the trial of the Action that –

“And one might think that the Official Receiver who might, already having once had a go at Mr Tang, take the view that, clearly, he … prospective disqualification proceedings against him should be given very serious consideration, will look into the matter”.

As for the complaint that the Judge made use of his personal knowledge of the Defendant’s involvement in other legal proceedings to make adverse comments against him, the fact that the Defendant’s conduct has been subject to serious criticisms by a number of judges is a matter of public record. See the various judgments mentioned at footnote 20 to the Plaintiff’s Revised Statement in Opposition to Leave to Appeal dated 19 March 2026, which we do not find necessary to set out in this judgment.

31.  In the “Defendant’s Short Statement” dated 5 March 2026 lodged in support of the present application, at §11, the Defendant repeats his complaint that §§25 to 31 of the Reasons for Judgment were substantially similar to §§30 to 32 of the Plaintiff’s “No Case to Answer” submissions in the Action. As correctly pointed out by the Plaintiff, this complaint is not included in the DNOA and thus the Defendant is not entitled to rely on it in the present application. In any event, we have considered the Judge’s reasons for rejecting this complaint at §§29 to 31 of the Decision. In the context of a complaint of judicial copying, it bears emphasis that the fundamental issue is whether a judge has brought an independent mind to his judicial function and can be seen to have done so. In respect of matters which are common ground or not in dispute, the fact that a judge substantially adopted the manner in which those matters were expressed by one party would not show that the judge did not, or was not willing to, bring an independent mind to the issues which required his determination.

GROUND 2 – ACTUAL BIAS

32.  At §8 of the DNOA, the Defendant argues that the Judge failed to deal with his complaint of “actual bias”, which he says was made in §§21-26 of his Second Affirmation filed on 30 September 2025, and his Third Affirmation filed on 20 October 2025. On the other hand, the Plaintiff submits that the allegation of actual bias was only raised for the first time before the Judge at the leave stage, and should not be entertained.

33.  We have read the passages in the Defendant’s Second and Third Affirmations relied on by him. At §§21-26 of his Second Affirmation, the Defendant complained that the Judge reached an adverse conclusion on his credibility and considered “practical solution to the problem of remedying [his] perjury” very early in the course of the trial in the Action, made constant interjections of his testimony and explanation, made numerous assumptions and proffered alternative defences for and in favour of the Plaintiff, and made open invitations to leading counsel for the Plaintiff to make a submission of no case to answer at a very early stage of the trial, and that he was being cross-examined by both leading counsel for the Plaintiff and the Judge throughout the trial. The Defendant referred to various parts of the transcript of the proceedings in support of his complaints. However, he never suggested in the Second Affirmation that he was making any allegation of actual bias against the Judge. On the contrary, at §4 of his Second Affirmation, the Defendant expressly stated the following –

“This 2^nd Affirmation is filed in support of the Summons filed on 19 September 2025 by the Defendant seeking recusal of Mr. Justice Harris as presiding judge for the present Committal Proceedings. The application is straightforward in that I seek to establish apparent bias with Mr Justice Harris presiding over these Committal Proceedings, due to his presiding over 1492 Action and his Reasons for Judgment made therein, without going so far as to establishing the existence of actual bias…” [the italicisation of the word “without” was original].

34.  In the Defendant’s Third Affirmation, although he did make an allegation of “positive bias” in favour of the Plaintiff, he concluded at §26 thereof as follows:

“The test of whether the circumstances of this case would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there is a real possibility that Mr. Justice Harris is biased has been satisfied. Mr. Justice Harris should, in my humble and respectful view, excuse himself (or be excused) as the hearing Judge for the present Committal Proceedings”.

35.  In the written skeleton submissions of the Defendant’s former counsel dated 22 October 2025 lodged in support of the recusal application, he made submissions with reference to the “reasonable apprehension of bias” test. There was no submission or allegation of actual bias. Similarly, there was no reliance on actual bias in the Defendant’s Reply Points dated 31 October 2025.

36.  It is, in our view, clear that in the Defendant’s original recusal application before the Judge, he was running a case of apparent bias only, and did not rely on any allegation of actual bias. This was also how the Judge understood the Defendant’s case at that time[16]. The Defendant’s suggestion that he had made a complaint of actual bias at that stage is completely disingenuous. The Judge was correct not to allow the allegation of actual bias to be raised for the first time (in counsel’s submissions[17] but not in the draft notice of appeal[18] attached to the Defendant’s summons dated 17 November 2025) at the leave stage, on the ground that the arguments were fact-sensitive[19].

37.  We likewise do not consider that the Defendant should be permitted to rely on any allegation of actual bias in the present leave application (see Re Lehmanbrown Limited, HCMP 977/2015 (unreported, 17 June 2015), at §§10-11). In any event, for the purpose of “actual bias”, bias means “the decision maker was influenced by either partiality or prejudice and it has been demonstrated that he was actually prejudiced” (see Chau Siu Woon v Cheung Shek Kong [2010] 3 HKLRD 49, at §9). The matters relied upon by the Defendant are nothing more than repetitions of those matters which he relies upon in support of the allegation of apparent bias, and are far from sufficient to raise a reasonably arguable case of actual bias, ie the Judge was influenced by either partiality or prejudice in reaching his decision against the Defendant and was actually prejudiced against him.

38.  At §12 of the DNOA, the Defendant raises various complaints about the Leave Decision. Those complaints are irrelevant for the present purpose, because the Defendant’s application is for leave to appeal against the Judge’s order refusing the recusal application (for the reasons set out in the Decision), not his order refusing to grant leave to appeal (for the reasons set out in the Leave Decision). We would add that none of the matters complained of by the Defendant at §12 of the DNOA takes the Defendant’s case of bias (whether actual or apparent) any further.

39.  For the sake of completeness, we should briefly deal with an allegation by the Defendant at §12(iv) of the DNOA that the Judge, of his own volition, cited the case of Re Chan John Loong Fai (at §7(2) of the Leave Decision), when it was not raised by either party. Such reliance, says the Defendant, demonstrates a serious departure from judicial neutrality and contributes to a perception that the Defendant was personally and unfairly singled out. This allegation of the Defendant is without foundation. The case of Re Chan John Loong Fai was in fact referred to and relied upon by the Plaintiff at §14.2 of the Plaintiff’s Skeleton Submissions dated 16 December 2025, lodged in opposition to the Defendant’s application for leave to appeal below.

40.  In all, none of the Defendant’s intended grounds of appeal has a reasonable prospect of success. We also do not see any other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard. Accordingly, we refuse to grant leave to appeal.

DISPOSITION

41.  The Leave Summons is dismissed. As the Defendant’s application for leave to appeal is totally without merit, we make an Order under Order 59, rule 2A(8) of the Rules of the High Court that no party may request the present determination to be reconsidered at an oral hearing inter partes.

42.  Insofar as costs are concerned, we see no reason why they should not follow the event. We make an order that the Defendant shall pay the Plaintiff’s costs of the Leave Summons. In the Plaintiff’s Amended Statement of Costs dated 19 March 2026, the Plaintiff seeks costs in the total sum of HK$348,525. Taking into account the fact that the grounds of appeal before us are essentially the same as those before the Judge, and the same legal team has acted for the Plaintiff throughout the proceedings here and below, as well as the nature and complexity of the application, we summarily assess the Plaintiff’s costs in the sum of HK$280,000. The above costs order (including the assessment of costs) is an order nisi, which shall become absolute unless an application is made to vary the same within 14 days from the date of this judgment.