LI XIAO YI v. TANG CHUNG WAH (also known as ALAN CHUNG WAH TANG)

HCMP 406/2025

[2026] HKCFI 4283

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 406 OF 2025

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J U D G M E N T

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Introduction

1.  On 17 October 2024 I dismissed NHD Systems (Asia)  Limited’s (“Company”)  claim against the defendant in HCA 1492/2018 (“Action”)  (Dr Li Xiao Yi (“Dr Li”)  who is now the Plaintiff in these proceedings)  (“Judgment”)  with Reasons for Judgment delivered on 21 January 2025 (“Reasons”).  Having given my reasons for so doing in [1]–[14], I continued in [15]–[37] to address the evidence of Mr Alan Tang (“Mr Tang”).  Mr Tang was one of the two joint liquidators (the other being Mr Terry Kan)  (“Liquidators”)  of the Company, which was put into compulsory liquidation on 9 May 2000.  For the reasons explained in [15]–[37] I concluded that the evidence of Mr Tang given in support of the Company’s claim in the respects explained in the Reasons was dishonest.

2.  On 24 February 2025 the Plaintiff filed a statement in support of an application for leave to apply for an order of committal against Mr Tang pursuant to Order 52, rule 2(2) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A (“RHC”).  I granted leave on 3 March 2025. On 14 March 2025 the Plaintiff issued an Originating Summons commencing these proceedings in which he seeks an order that Mr Tang be committed to prison or fined for contempt in deliberately giving false evidence on affirmation and in court.  The grounds on which the order is sought were set out in the schedule annexed to the Originating Summons (“Schedule”). The Schedule refers to the Reasons and my findings in [25]–[31].

Leave Summons

3.  On 13 April 2026 Mr Tang issued a summons to adjourn the present proceedings (“Adjournment Summons”), which I dismissed on 30 April 2026 with Reasons for Decision delivered on 6 May 2026. On 5 May 2026 Mr Tang applied for leave to appeal against my dismissal of the Adjournment Summons and an interim stay of the present proceedings (“Leave Summons”).

4.  Before leave to appeal can be granted, the court must be satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success[1] or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why it should be heard.  As to adjournment, whether or not to allow an adjournment is a matter within this Court’s discretion with which the appellate court will not intervene unless it can be shown that the exercise of that discretion was plainly wrong[2].

5.  In support of the Leave Summons, Mr Tang repeats his submissions made in the Adjournment Summons, namely, that the present proceedings should be adjourned pending the determination by the Court of Appeal of his renewed application for an extension of time to appeal against my Judgment (“Time Extension Appeal”)[3]. Mr Tang submits that the Time Extension Appeal will have an impact on the present proceedings because “the Appeal was filed against not just the Order, but also against the Main Reasons”[4]. This is wrong.  Appeals are against judgments, not reasons[5]. As I have noted in [1] above, my Reasons are divided into two distinct parts. The first deals with Dr Li’s no case submission and ends with me dismissing the Action; the second deals with Mr Tang’s evidence.  It seems clear to me that the outcome of the Time Extension Appeal is irrelevant to the determination of the present proceedings.  It also seems clear to me that the Time Extension Appeal has not been progressed diligently[6]. I, therefore, dismissed Mr Tang’s Leave Summons and will now turn to consider Dr Li’s Originating Summons.

Background

6.  On 19 September 2024 Dr Li’s solicitors wrote to the Company’s solicitors, Damien Shea & Co, asking for, amongst other things, a confirmation whether the following documents were in the Company’s power, possession or custody, namely, the Company’s (1)  bank statement(s)  from 15 September 1992 to 30 September 1992, (2)  audited financial statement(s)  for the financial years from 1992 to 1999, and (3)  management account(s)  for the financial years from 1992 to 1999 (“Accounts”). The letter refers to a confirmation from Damien Shea on 29 November 2021 that neither the solicitors nor the Company had in their power, possession, or custody the above Accounts.  Dr Li’s solicitors queried the accuracy of what they had been told because Damien Shea had, by a letter dated 20 August 2024, disclosed the Company’s bank statements in or around September 1992, which they previously said they did not have in their power, possession, or custody and hence had not been disclosed.  Dr Li’s solicitors sought either disclosure of the Accounts or an affirmation verifying that the Company did not have the Accounts in its power, possession or custody.

7.  In [26] of the Reasons I referred to Mr Tang’s filing of his 6^th affirmation dated 20 September 2024 (“Tang 6^th”)  in which he deposed in [8] that “to the best of [his] knowledge, information and belief, the [Company] may have had in [its] possession, custody and power the [Accounts], when they were first prepared or issued, but has subsequently lost possession, custody and power of the same, following the collapse and liquidation of the Siu Fung Group of Companies [(‘Siu Fung Group’)] in 2000.  Despite repeated efforts in searching again the same recently, the [Company] cannot locate them now”.  As I explained later in [26], this was untrue as Mr Tang and his team had not searched for the Accounts.  In [26]–[31], which are quoted in the Schedule, I went on to refer to a number of other untruthful statements in Mr Tang’s evidence.  It is convenient to quote them.

“26. I find that Mr Tang has lied on affirmation in respect of the following matters. First, Mr Tang affirmed in Tang 6^th that the Company may have had in its custody possession and power its financial statements and management accounts in 1992 to 1999, but had ‘subsequently lost possession of the same, following the collapse and liquidation of the Siu Fung Group of Companies in 2000’. He repeated this assertion in cross-examination. This cannot be the case. Mr Tang simply could not have known whether, if the documents were once in the Company’s power, possession or custody, they were subsequently lost, given that neither he nor his staff had ever gone through the 350 boxes of files. Also, it was impossible for him to believe that the accounts were lost ‘following the collapse and liquidation of the Siu Fung Group of Companies in 2000’. There is simply no reason to believe that the KPMG liquidators (or Mr Tang himself)  would have lost these accounts after they were appointed.

27. Second, Mr Tang gave evidence that he had read the accounts and general ledgers of the Listco, but not the Company, regarding his letter to Dr Li of 29 November 2000. It is highly improbable that Mr Tang would have studied the accounts and ledgers of the Listco (a holding company of the Group)  and not the Company (a key operating subsidiary of the Group).

28. Third, when asked about whether he had gone through the 350 boxes of documents stored in the Godown (and the reason for not doing so), Mr Tang answered that he may have ‘misunderstood’ his duties and cast the blame onto his legal team (‘[t]o a large extent I have been relying on to seek my legal team and legal advice on these matters’). In my view this plainly a fabrication. It is inconceivable that a highly experienced liquidator like Mr Tang (and who all along had been legally advised)  could have misunderstood the scope of the Liquidators’ discovery obligations. He could not have honestly believed that as a litigant, all he had to disclose were documents which were referred to in his pleadings and witness statements. This is inconsistent with Mr Tang having prepared or seen many lists of documents in cases, which would include documents not referred to in witness statements or pleadings.

29. Fourth, when asked about the non-disclosure in the Prospectus of the alleged loan, Mr Tang suddenly made the assertion (for the first time in the entire proceedings)  that the Company was not part of the Siu Fung Group as at the date of the Prospectus. This is inconsistent with the Company’s pleaded case: see ‘[the Plaintiff] is a major operating subsidiary company within the Siu Fong Group of companies, led by the then listed Siu Fung Ceramics Holdings Limited’[7]).

30. This is also wholly unbelievable. Mr Tang accepted that a list of previous names of the Company would have been obtained from a companies search, and would be an easily accessible document in his files. I do not believe that Mr Tang was mistaken as to the name of the Company. When pressed further as to why he had not made this point earlier, Mr Tang claimed that he was busy and had not read either the Company’s or Dr Li’s written opening submissions, or listened carefully to Dr Li’s oral opening submissions (he was in Court)  and so never realised that all parties were proceeding on the factual premise that the Company was part of the Siu Fung Group as at the listing of Listco in 1993.

31.  Fifth, when it was suggested to Mr Tang that he could not have been unaware of the fact that the Company was part of the Siu Fung Group given that its name, Siu Fung Strategy, was listed in the Prospectus as one of the Listco’s subsidiaries, Mr Tang said that ‘maybe what my staff produced to me was the 1992 return showing the names of the 3 individuals as we saw this morning’.  This is not credible.  It is highly unlikely that when Mr Tang instructed his staff to tell him whether the Company formed part of the Siu Fung Group in 1993, they would have brought him the Company’s Annual Return for 1992 and that no one would appreciate the error.”

8.  I will next address the relevant legal principles and then the two complaints advanced by Mr Tang in his written opening submissions[8], followed by a more detailed explanation of the claim advanced in the Action in order that the grounds relied on by Dr Li as constituting contempt are better understood.

Legal Principles

9.  This is a case of criminal[9] contempt at common law by way of false evidence.  Whilst this case was commenced under Order 52 of RHC, I accept the submission made by Mr Bernard Man SC[10] that the principles laid down in cases commenced under Order 41A, rule 9 of RHC and its English equivalent (rule 32.14 of Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”))  are equally applicable.  In particular, notwithstanding that Order 41A, rule 9 of RHC expressly provides for contempt proceedings commenced in respect of a false statement of truth (rather than false evidence), the substantive elements for contempt under Order 41A, rule 9 of RHC, rule 32.14 of CPR and the common law are the same[11].  In the following paragraphs I will proceed on this basis.

10.  In citing a person for contempt for making a false statement of truth under Order 41A, rule 9 of RHC, the plaintiff must prove each of the following elements beyond reasonable doubt[12]:

(1)  the falsity of the statement in question;

(2)  the statement has or would have interfered with the course of justice in some material respect; and

(3)  at the time it was made the maker of the statement had no honest belief in the truth of the relevant statement and knew of its likelihood to interfere with the course of justice.

Interference with the Course of Justice

11.  Interference with the course of justice connotes “a risk to the system of justice generally, rather than a potential interference with the outcome of an individual trial”[13]. Such interference with the course of justice as a continuing process “may take many forms which include diminishing the authority of the court, bringing the court into disrepute, and reducing public confidence in the system”[14].

12.  It is not necessary that there is an actual interference with the course of justice; it suffices that the making of the false statement is likely to cause such interference[15].

Likelihood of Interference with the Course of Justice

13.  In terms of the likelihood of interference with the course of justice, a number of legal principles can be identified from Neil v Henderson[16]:

(1)  both actual and attempted interference with the administration of justice may constitute an act of contempt ([73]);

(2)  a contempt may be committed whether the attempt is successful or not ([74]);

(3)  an act of contempt can be completed without the evidence being actually deployed in court; in other words, it is not necessary to show that either the court or another party was actually misled by the deployment of false or forged evidence; nor is it necessary to show that either the court or another party took action in reliance on the false or forged evidence; it is sufficient to show that the deployment of the false or forged evidence was likely to have one, other or both of these effects ([75]);

(4)  the nature of the interference with the administration of justice must be material, as opposed to trivial; beyond that, there is no further requirement that there must have been an actual, as opposed to potential, risk of interference with the course of justice before an act of contempt is made out ([77]); in other words, it is not necessary to show that the conduct must have had an impact in the sense of causing a court to do something it otherwise would not have done ([246]); neither is it necessary to show that the deployment of the false evidence caused the court to act in any particular way ([260])[17]; and

(5)  even exhibiting documents to a witness statement, when those documents had already been exhibited by the other side, would be sufficient as “the purpose and inevitable effect of exhibiting [those documents to a witness statement] was to indicate to the recipient that they were being put forward as genuine” ([246]).

14.  The above analysis may differ depending on whether the maker of the false statement knew the statement to be untrue or was reckless as to whether or not the statement was true when he made it.  “If the statements were deliberately false, it [would be] obvious that they were likely to interfere with the course of justice [and] if the statements were deliberately untrue, it would be fair to say that their purpose was to interfere with the course of justice.”[18]

15.  In both the civil and the criminal context, the court has emphasised time after time that “an obligation to give truthful evidence is a matter of paramount importance to the administration of justice”[19]. As observed in Liverpool Victoria Insurance our system of justice will be undermined “even if the falsity of the relevant statement is identified at an early stage and does not in the end affect the outcome of the litigation”[20]. Indeed, the making of a false statement verified by a statement of truth (or, in this case, the giving of false evidence)  undermines “the whole process of our system of justice and the court will not tolerate such an act”[21].

Intent to Interfere with the Course of Justice

16.  Insofar as criminal contempt at common law is concerned, whether a specific intent (to interfere with the administration of justice)  or a basic intent (to perform the acts which constituted the actus reus of the contempt)  is required depends on the actual form of contempt before the court and the public policy considerations involved[22]. For criminal contempt by way of false evidence, no specific intent is necessary[23]. The requisite mens rea is proven if the maker of the statement (1)  had no honest belief in the truth of the relevant statement and (2)  knew of its likelihood to interfere with the administration of justice.

17.  Whilst no specific intent is necessary, an intention to interfere with the administration of justice can be readily inferred from (1)  the deliberate or reckless making of a false statement (or, in this case, the giving of false evidence)  with (2)  the knowledge that it was likely to interfere with the administration of justice. Plainly, “where the court is sure … that the person putting forward the [false evidence] knew them to be [false], then it is difficult to see what other intention she had”[24].

Lack of Honest Belief

18.  Insofar as the common law in Hong Kong is concerned, Coleman J held in Hwang Joon Sang v Golden Electronics Inc (No 3)[25]that the maker of the false statement will be guilty of contempt if he knew it to be untrue or was reckless as to whether or not it was true when he made it.

19.  In England, the courts have occasionally[26] adopted a higher threshold.  For example, the English Court of Appeal found in Norman v Adler that recklessness simpliciter (in the sense that the contemnor did not care whether or not what he said was true)  is insufficient to prove a lack of honest belief.  Instead, the plaintiff must prove to the requisite standard that “[the contemnor] knew that he did not know whether what he said was true or not”[27].  The distinction between these two types of recklessness, is subtle and I do not think it is likely to make much, if any, a difference in practice in the large majority of cases.  As I observed at the trial of these proceedings, “if somebody understands what it is they are being asked to confirm and they do not bother to check whether that is right or wrong, they must know that they are not in a position to confirm the truth of it”.

20.  In any case, the current position in Hong Kong is that recklessness simpliciter is sufficient mens rea. This Court is not bound by the English Court of Appeal’s finding in Norman v Adler, which is itself per incuriam[28], and I see no reason to depart from the position expounded by Coleman J in Hwang Joon Sang.  Indeed, it seems to me that the natural meaning of the phrase “no honest belief in its truth” in the test as set out in [10] above and Order 41A, rule 9(1) of RHC would necessarily imply recklessness simpliciter. After all, the reckless making of a false statement verified by a statement of truth (or, in this case, the giving of false evidence)  is inherently inimical to the administration of justice[29] such that recklessness simpliciter should suffice as a matter of principle.

Burden and Standard of Proof

21.  The plaintiff must prove beyond reasonable doubt that (1)  the act amounts to the actus reus of contempt and (2)  the defendant’s requisite mens rea.  Any genuine doubt is to be resolved in the defendant’s favour.[30]

22.  It is relevant that the criminal standard of proof does not require the court to be satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that all the evidence relied on has been proved.  In Neil v Henderson[31], Zacaroli J explains in [84] that:

“… the prosecution bears the burden of proving all the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. That means that the essential ingredients of each element must be so proved. It does not mean that every fact – every piece of evidence – relied upon to prove an element by inference must itself be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Intent, for example, is, save for statutory exceptions, an element of every crime. It is something which, apart from admissions, must be proved by inference. But the jury may quite properly draw the necessary inference having regard to the whole of the evidence, whether or not each individual piece of evidence relied upon is proved beyond reasonable doubt, provided they reach their conclusion upon the criminal standard of proof. Indeed, the probative force of a mass of evidence may be cumulative, making it pointless to consider the degree of probability of each item of evidence separately.”

23.  Whilst it is necessary to prove the facts from which an inference is to be drawn, such facts or some of them may be proved on the balance of probabilities as opposed to beyond reasonable doubt[32]. In short, it suffices if the body of evidence relied on, viewed as a whole, satisfies the criminal standard[33].

24.  In criminal cases, a defendant does not bear any burden to prove that he is not guilty of an offence.  In line with the presumption of innocence provided by Article 11(1) of the Bills of Rights (which is entrenched in Article 39 of the Basic Law), both the persuasive and the evidential burden rest on the prosecution (or, in this case, the party who is pressing for committal)  throughout the trial.  There is one exception.  Where the defendant wishes to put in issue some matter which is potentially exculpatory, he bears an evidential burden (which is required to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities)  to adduce evidence supporting the exculpatory matter which is sufficiently substantial that it raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt[34]. The prosecution will fail to prove its case unless the exculpatory matter is answered, in other words the reasonable doubt is removed and ceases to be an obstacle to the prosecution proving its case beyond reasonable doubt[35].

Material Non-Disclosure

25.  I now turn to address Mr Tang’s complaint in his written opening submissions that the Plaintiff is guilty of material non-disclosure because he had failed to bring to my attention the following in his application for leave:

(1)  The Plaintiff had filed a set of “Supplemental Submissions on Court’s Power to Initiate Contempt Proceedings” on 24 October 2024 (“Supplemental Submissions”); and

(2)  In the Company’s revised closing submissions in the Action filed on 27 December 2024, the Company had reserved the right to respond to such submissions.

26.  This allegation is hopelessly misconceived.  The Plaintiff’s Supplemental Submissions dealt with the court’s power to initiate contempt proceedings of its own motion.  This is by definition irrelevant to the Plaintiff’s application for leave to commence the present proceedings, which was an application for contempt proceedings to be initiated by the Plaintiff with the leave of the court rather than by the court of its own motion.

Perjury

27.  In his written opening submissions, Mr Tang claims that the offence of perjury under section 31 of the Crimes Ordinance and, therefore, the requirement of corroboration under section 43 of the Crimes Ordinance are relevant to the present proceedings.  On this basis, Mr Tang complains that the Plaintiff has failed to fulfil the requirement of corroboration, rendering a conviction of perjury legally impossible.

28.  This allegation is also hopelessly misconceived.  In these proceedings, this Court is concerned with an application brought pursuant to Order 52 of RHC, which is criminal contempt at common law.  It is not concerned with perjury which, being a criminal offence and barring private prosecution, can only be charged and pursued by a prosecuting authority as opposed to a private party like Dr Li.  Analytically, perjury and criminal contempt are distinct legal concepts[36]. In any event, even if corroboration is required before criminal contempt can be proved, I agree with the observation made in Super Max[37] that documentary evidence would suffice.  As I will explain later, the evidence against Mr Tang is overwhelming.

The Claim in the Action

29.  The general background to the Action is explained in the Reasons.  Mr Tang following his reappointment as a Liquidator in June 2016 became aware of a document headed “Loan Agreement”, dated 1 July 1992 and signed by Dr Li’s brother, Siegfried, in which Dr Li is named as the borrower of a loan of US$1 million (“Loan” or “Loan Agreement”).  The Loan Agreement was not signed by Dr Li.  There is no dispute that various other documents were produced at this time authorising the Loan and these are referred to in [3] of the Reasons.  In 2017, Mr Tang asked Dr Li for an explanation in respect of the transaction he assumed was recorded in these documents.  This was some 25 years after the date of the Loan Agreement.  Dr Li said he could not recall how the matter developed, but he did not think he had received the Loan.  The documents then available to Mr Tang did not include any banking documents showing a transfer to an account in the name of Dr Li or a company known to be owned by Dr Li. Neither did Mr Tang produce any accounts or ledgers of the Company recording a loan to Dr Li.  There were available to the Liquidators about 350 box files of the Company’s documents (“Documents”).  It is not in dispute that Mr Tang did not at that time check or instruct his staff to check those box files to see if any documents (such as accounts, ledgers or bank records)  existed, which either supported US$1 million being advanced to Dr Li, or tended to suggest that although such a loan had been discussed, the arrangement was never implemented and the money was never advanced to him.

30.  At trial, the Company relied on the documents referred to in the Reasons and Mr Tang’s own evidence.  Mr Tang was the only witness called by the Company.  I found that the Company’s evidence clearly failed to prove that a loan had been concluded and that US$1 million was advanced to Dr Li by way of a loan.  I dismissed the claim.

31.  Much of Mr Man’s cross-examination of Mr Tang focused on the absence of documents that it might have been expected to exist, which would cast light on whether the Loan had been concluded.  The case theory that was being advanced was that the Loan had been something that one would expect to be recorded in the Company’s accounts and ledgers.  Conversely, if the Company’s accounts and ledgers made no reference to a Loan to Dr Li and, particularly, if they recorded a US$1 million loan to somebody else during the material period, this would suggest that whatever discussions might have taken place in July 1992, those discussions did not result in a Loan being advanced to Dr Li.  It will be recalled that Ground 1 relied on by Dr Li in these proceedings as proving contempt refers to Tang 6^th, where Mr Tang deposed that the Company might have had the Accounts in its power, possession and custody, but had “subsequently lost possession of the same, following the collapse and liquidation of the Siu Fung Group of Companies in 2000”.

32.  The Plaintiff’s evidence in these proceedings consists of:

(1)  Dr Li’s 6^th affirmation in the Action dated 24 February 2025 (“Li 6^th”);

(2)  Dr Li’s 2^nd affirmation in these proceedings dated 13 October 2025; and

(3)  the underlying court documents in the Action including Tang 6^th and the transcript of the trial of the Action.

33.  I accept the Plaintiff is entitled to rely on the underlying court documents in the Action as part of the documentary record[38]. They need not be exhibited to the Plaintiff’s affidavit evidence[39]. I also note that although the Reasons are referred to in the Plaintiff’s written submissions to narrate the indisputable factual background, the Plaintiff highlights that he does not rely on the findings in the Reasons in these proceedings to prove the five counts of Mr Tang’s false evidence as set out in the Schedule.

34.  Mr Tang has elected to give evidence in these proceedings.  His evidence in chief consists of:

(1)  Mr Tang’s 1^st affirmation dated 28 August 2025 (“Tang 1^st”);

(2)  Mr Tang’s 2^nd affirmation dated 29 September 2025 (“Tang 2^nd”); and

(3)  Mr Tang’s 1^st affirmation in CACV 80/2025 dated 9 January 2026 (“Tang 1^st in CACV 80/2025”).

35.  The latter two affirmations were not filed as evidence in opposition to the Originating Summons[40]. Nevertheless, by agreement, Mr Tang was given leave to rely on them as long as the Plaintiff was given leave to cross-examine Mr Tang on their contents.  This is in line with the position in respect of Tang 1^st for which an order for cross-examination had previously been granted in [2025] HKCFI 5754.

36.  I would note that Mr Tang did not call any of his staff to substantiate his case or produce any new documents.  It does not appear, for example, that Mr Tang, who clearly appreciated the seriousness of the proceedings against him[41], took steps to check the Documents to see if he could find anything amongst them to support any element of what he had said at trial.  If he did, it would appear that he had found nothing helpful otherwise one would have expected him to exhibit it to one of his affirmations.  I would also note that although Mr Tang represented himself at the hearings before me from 1 December 2025 (in respect of applications mainly seeking leave to appeal decisions to the Court of Appeal or to adjourn the present proceedings), he had lawyers on the record until 30 November 2025.

Ground 1—Tang 6^th on the loss of the Accounts

37.  As is apparent from [6] above, Dr Li’s solicitors had first sought in late 2021 from the Company discovery of the Accounts and banking documents, and had been told that the Liquidators did not have them.  Following the PTR at which I suggested to Mr George Chu, who appeared for the Company at that hearing and also at the trial, that the Company should look for the banking documents (as this was the obvious way of proving that the Loan had been advanced to Dr Li), it appeared that the Liquidators had looked at the documents in their possession, or at least that is what Mr Tang says in Tang 6^th, to see if they could find them.  As I have explained, Mr Tang expressly says in Tang 6^th in [8] that:

“… I hereby confirm that, to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, the [Company] may have had in their possession, custody and power the Financial Statements and Management Accounts in 1992 to 1999, when they were first prepared or issued, but has subsequently lost possession, custody and power of the same, following the collapse and liquidation of the Siu Fung Group of Companies in 2000. Despite repeated efforts in searching again the same recently, the [Company] cannot locate them now. I appreciate the valiant efforts spent by my insolvency team over the years. We have done this on good faith and for the best interest of the unsecured creditors of the [Company].” (emphasis supplied)

38.  Dr Li suggests that this was a false statement, because Mr Tang and his staff had never checked the documents in the Liquidators’ possession to see if they contained the Accounts.  Consequently, Mr Tang could never have believed that they were lost.  It was a lie and Mr Tang must have known this.

39.  It is difficult to understand Mr Tang’s answers to Dr Li’s suggestion.  Initially, in Tang 6^th (where he was clearly dealing with a request by Dr Li’s solicitors in respect of the Accounts)  he says in [8] that the Accounts were “lost […] following the collapse and liquidation of the Siu Fung Group”.  Later, in [49] of Tang 1^st, he says that “[I] had not personally checked each of the 300-odd boxes of documents in the godown.  Instead of asking [my] staff to go through each and every one of all these 300-odd boxes, [I] gave instructions to try find the bank statements needed”.  He also refers to various answers he gave in his evidence at the trial of the Action which, as I understand it, are meant to show that what he said in Tang 6^th was not a lie.  At the trial of the Action, in answer to the question from the Court, “So you’re saying somebody from your team went through all 350 boxes, are you?”, Mr Tang replied “No, that’s why I say in the subsequent affirmation after that hearing we, at the suggestion of my legal team, try to—thought to write to the bank to make inquiries despite 20-odd years late”; and in answer to the question from Mr Man, “… how can you [say] that to the best of your belief?”, Mr Tang replied “when the Siu Fung Group collapsed, when the papers were handed over to KPMG, we do not have any evidence that these accounts have existed among them”.  A couple of minutes later, however, Mr Tang agreed with Mr Man that “[he] can’t say one way or another whether the accounts of ’92 to ’99 are among the boxes of documents that [he hasn’t] looked at” such that “the fairer way of saying [what his] belief is that the accounts are among the documents [he hasn’t] looked at, the fair answer is that [he doesn’t] know”.

40.  As it transpired, Mr Tang’s position changed during the present proceedings.  He states at the end of Tang 1^st in [49] that “The simple point is: there is no objective evidence before the Court that the financial statements of NHDA from 1992–1999 existed in 2000.  Despite searches, they could not be found in 2024.  There is thus nothing improper for Tang to say on oath in 2024 effectively that, had these financial statements existed in 2000, they ‘could have’ been lost since then.  Here, ‘lost’ means ‘cannot be retrieved or located’; not necessarily literally ‘do not exist’!”.  This is, however, not the issue.  Mr Tang’s evidence which is intended to demonstrate what he said in [8] of Tang 6^th was not false, is internally inconsistent and, as I will explain later, inherently incredible at times.  Tang 6^th, Tang 1^st and his evidence at the trial of the Action cannot simultaneously be true.

(1)  In [8] of Tang 6^th, Mr Tang is clearly stating that he had caused searches to find the Accounts to be undertaken.  He is also clearly saying that he believed that the Accounts had been lost.  At the trial, it was Mr Tang’s evidence that he had not searched through the Documents and “[he] cannot say [his staff] went through all the 300-odd boxes”.  Later, in [49] of Tang 1^st, Mr Tang flipflops back to his evidence in Tang 6^th and says “Despite searches, they could not be found”.  At the trial, it was also Mr Tang’s evidence that the Accounts “could have” been lost.  But that is not what he says in [8] of Tang 6^th, namely, that the Accounts have been lost.

(2)  Throughout the trial and the present proceedings, Mr Tang testified “to the best of [his] knowledge, information and belief”, and affirmed, it was “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth” that the Accounts “have” been lost (as per Tang 6^th and Tang 1^st)  or “could have” been lost (as per Mr Tang’s oral evidence).  But there is no basis for either of these beliefs.  I note Mr Tang in cross-examination admitted (A)  “[it was] a part of the standard operating procedure that if you are appointed liquidator over a company, you’ll have a look and see whether you have the audited accounts.  If not, you can ask the auditors”, (B)  such standard operating procedure is “likely” to be conducted within 13 months of a liquidation, and (C)  he is not sure[42] if the Accounts are amongst the Documents, but that “Everything is possible”[43] echoing his earlier evidence[44] that the Accounts were likely to have been secured by the Liquidators soon after appointment.  Having admitted the above, Mr Tang cannot credibly and honestly say that the Accounts “have” or “could have” been lost, or that “there was no evidence that [the Accounts] ever existed, even amongst the boxes of documents”.  Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.  Plainly, that there is no evidence that the Accounts ever existed does not allow Mr Tang to positively depose that the Accounts “have” or “could have” been lost, especially when he had never taken the trouble to look for the Accounts amongst the Documents and that the Accounts were likely to have been amongst the Documents.

41.  The following in my view are clearly beyond all reasonable doubt:

(1)  [8] of Tang 6^th contained false evidence, namely, (A)  that Mr Tang believed the Accounts had been lost following the collapse and liquidation of the Siu Fung Group in 2000 and (B)  repeated efforts to search for the Accounts had been undertaken but, despite this, the Company, in the form of the Liquidators and their staff, could not locate them; and

(2)  Mr Tang knew this to be false or was at the very least clearly indifferent and reckless as to whether either (A)  or (B)  was true.

42.  To find criminal contempt in respect of Ground 1, it is also necessary for me to be satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the false statements were made with the intention of interfering with the judicial process.  I am.  Mr Tang accepted in cross-examination during these proceedings that I would rely on his evidence in the Action.  The evidence in Tang 6^th was intended to persuade the Court that (1)  there was an innocent reason as to why the Company did not produce the Accounts to prove the alleged Loan, namely, the Accounts had been lost, and (2)  no adverse inference could be drawn from the absence of the Accounts.  The adverse inference being that the Accounts were withheld because they did not record the Loan, which would be helpful to Dr Li’s defence and which Mr Tang admitted in cross-examination of the trial would be the case.  The only other inference would be that Mr Tang did not want to spend time or money checking the Documents which, when pressed, he said at the trial of the Action was why the Documents had not been checked.  This in my view would not help him.  He would still have been making a false statement, which would interfere with the fair resolution of the proceedings.

Ground 2—Mr Tang’s oral evidence that he did not and/or could not remember whether he had read the Accounts of the Company

43.  During the trial of the Action, Mr Tang said at the beginning of cross-examination that he did not look at the Accounts of the Company “because … at the time the focus was Siu Fung Ceramics Holdings [Limited (“Holdings”)], which is the top listed company … so we were dealing with the affairs and, of course, look at the accounts of the listed company … but not the other subsidiaries because that’s not one of the top priorities at the time”.  Later, Mr Tang claimed that “I cannot recall what I did in 2000 as part of my duties”, although he agreed it is “possible” that “as a liquidator [he] would have caused [his] staff to look at the audited accounts of the [Company] within these 13 months [i.e. his initial appointment]”.

44.  In [27] of the Reasons, I found it highly improbable that Mr Tang would have studied the accounts and accounting ledgers of Holdings, but not those of the Company which is a major operating subsidiary of Holdings.  In these proceedings, Dr Li submits that not only was Mr Tang’s evidence false, but that he could not have held an honest belief in the truth of that evidence.  I agree.  Mr Tang had been a special manager and later a liquidator of the Company for some 18 months prior to his resignation from KPMG in November 2001.  It was his own evidence at the trial of these proceedings that Holdings was a “listed shell” and that the Company was “one of the larger [subsidiaries]” within the Siu Fung Group.  Given the nature of the Company and its role within the Siu Fung Group, it is inconceivable that Mr Tang had not read or studied the Accounts of the Company.  If a liquidator were to study the accounts and accounting ledgers of a holding company, one would have thought that he would also study those of the operating subsidiaries because it would have been in the accounts of the subsidiaries, as opposed to a “listed shell”, where key transactions would be recorded.

45.  I note Mr Tang explained at the trial of the Action and again in these proceedings that “the focus in [his] first year of work is the restructure of the Siu Fung Group, dealing with Mr Li himself and also the defendant in this case, Mr Li Xiao Yi, trying to sell the listed shell to them to rescue the various joint ventures in China … so the focus was not for [him] to look at the accounts of each and every company within the Siu Fung Group”.  If Mr Tang’s explanation was true, it is not credible that Mr Tang had not studied closely the accounts of the major operating subsidiaries of Holdings, such as the Company, in preparation for the proposed restructuring.

46.  In my view it is beyond all reasonable doubt that Mr Tang’s evidence that he did not and/or could not remember whether he had read the Accounts of the Company was false evidence.  Mr Tang knew this to be false or was at the very least reckless as to whether his evidence was true.  I am also satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that such false statement was made with the intention of interfering with the judicial process.  Much like the evidence in respect of Ground 1, Mr Tang’s evidence referred to in Ground 2 was intended to persuade the Court that (1)  there was an innocent reason as to why the Company did not produce the Accounts to prove the alleged Loan, namely, Mr Tang had not even read the Accounts himself, and (2)  no adverse inference could be drawn from the absence of the Accounts against the Company that the contents of the Accounts were helpful to Dr Li’s defence.

Ground 3—Mr Tang’s oral evidence on his discovery obligation

47.  This ground concerns Mr Tang’s oral evidence that he had misunderstood his discovery obligation to extend only to documents referred to in his affirmations and witness statements as opposed to all relevant documents, whether or not they were referred to in his affirmations and witness statements.  During the trial of the Action, Mr Tang gave evidence that his obligation was to make discovery of documents referred to in his affirmations regardless of whether or not they were in the Company’s favour, and that he did not understand that the obligation extended to disclosing all documents in a party’s power, possession or custody regardless of whether or not they are in that party’s favour.

48.  There are several difficulties with this evidence.  First, there is nothing in Tang 6^th to suggest that Mr Tang was proceeding on the assumption that he was disclosing documents referred to in his affirmations only.  On the contrary, he refers in [4] to his team trying to locate “all relevant documents”.  The relevant documents would include the Accounts.  Discovery of the Accounts had not been made, despite having been referred to in one of Mr Tang’s affirmations.  Secondly, as Tang 6^th was directed specifically to the Accounts, it is difficult to see why the fact that he might have thought that he only had to disclose documents referred to in his affirmations was material in his decision (or the lack thereof)  to look for or ask his team to look for the Accounts.  This fact was irrelevant to the task he deposed to have caused to be undertaken.  Thirdly, his evidence that he might have “misunderstood” the scope of his duty of disclosure and that he thought his discovery obligation was limited to disclosing documents referred to in his affirmations came after the following earlier evidence:

“Q: And am I right that — do you understand that the obligation of discovery is that you have to produce — you have to disclose documents in your custody, power and possession even if — well, if they are Peruvian Guano relevant. Do you understand Peruvian Guano relevance? No. If they are relevant either in your favour or against you, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: So you appreciate that, right?

A: Yes.

…

Q: So would you accept that it is a breach of the plaintiff’s discovery obligations under the liquidators’ control — it is a breach of discovery obligations not to look for the documents that are relevant which are likely to be in your possession. This must be right, mustn’t it?

A: I make no comment on this question.

Q: You cannot make no comment on this question because I’m suggesting to you as an officer of the court that you are acting in breach of an obligation owed to the court and to us because, as you appreciate, as you confirmed, you — the plaintiff under your care and control owe an obligation of discovery, you accept that, right?

A: Yes.

Q: And we have accepted that the audited accounts are likely to be in your possession. It is just that you haven’t looked for it for lack of funds, correct?

A: Yes.

Q. And they are relevant because they may show something which operates in our favour, namely the absence of this loan, correct?

A. Yes.

…

Court: Just listen. What Mr Man is clearly concerned to ask you is this: did you appreciate that your obligation was to ensure that the plaintiff checked and disclosed any documents that were arguably relevant to the issues in the case, which would clearly include ledgers.

A: Correct.

Court: You understood that?

A:  Yes.”

49.  I can see no reason for not concluding that the evidence Mr Tang gave first in time during cross-examination at the trial of the Action, namely, that he was aware of the scope of his duty of disclosure, was true.  It is quite well known that in our legal system all relevant documents must be disclosed to the other side regardless of whether the document is helpful or unhelpful in advancing a party’s case.  I accept Mr Tang’s evidence that he has “never been legally trained … even though … many people consider [he is] an experienced insolvency practitioner”.  Nevertheless, precisely because Mr Tang has considerable experience in insolvency litigation, it seems inherently likely that he had been told about this in the Action or in earlier proceedings.  In answer to the Court’s questions, Mr Tang admitted at the trial of the Action that (1)  he had seen lists of documents in these proceedings as well as other proceedings, (2)  he had been told by lawyers why lists of documents had to be prepared, and (3)  he knew what is contained in a list of documents is not limited to references to documents contained in affirmations and witness statements.  Mr Tang further admitted he did appreciate that his obligation “was to ensure that the plaintiff checked and disclosed any documents that were arguably relevant to the issues in the case”.  As noted in [48] above, Mr Tang refers in [4] of Tang 6^th to his team trying to locate “all relevant documents” as opposed to those in his affirmations only.

50.  I can see no plausible reason for thinking that Mr Tang’s state of knowledge of his discovery obligation had changed between the making of Tang 6^th and the giving of oral evidence at the trial of the Action, and he has not suggested that it did.  What seems likely is that as the cross-examination progressed, Mr Tang began to understand that his earlier and honest answer was unhelpful and he changed his evidence.  He knew he was doing this.  What he said subsequently was plainly false and I have no doubt he knew it.  In my view he was giving false evidence to (1)  explain away his or his staff’s failure to search through the Documents and disclose the Accounts accordingly and (2)  avoid the suggestion that disclosure of the Accounts had been withheld and that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Company that the contents of the Accounts were helpful to Dr Li’s defence.

Ground 4—Mr Tang’s oral evidence that the Company was not part of the Siu Fung Group

51.  In its amended Statement of Claim for the Action[45], the Company pleaded, amongst other things, that:

(1)  “[it is] a major operating subsidiary company within the Siu Fung Group of companies, led by the then listed Siu Fung Ceramics Holdings Limited [(i.e. Holdings)] now also in liquidation”; and

(2)  Holdings was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1993.

52.  It was Dr Li’s pleaded case that he was a director of Holdings in 1992.  If the Loan had been advanced in 1992, this should have been disclosed in the prospectus for Holdings’ initial public offering in 1993 or any other announcement issued by Holdings.  During cross-examination at the trial of the Action, Mr Tang agreed that if the Loan had been made to Dr Li by the Company in 1992, it should have been referred to in the prospectus.  This view was supported by the expert report of Mr Fung Chi Keung (“Mr Fung”)  which Dr Li had filed for the purpose of defending an application brought by the Company for summary judgment.  Mr Tang must have been aware at that time that it was Dr Li’s case that the absence of reference to the Loan in the prospectus supported his case that the Loan was never made.  Mr Tang could not have been surprised by the cross-examination on this matter.

53.  When cross-examined on this matter, Mr Tang said initially that:

“Q: Now, Mr Tang … just for a moment remember that we were not born yesterday, okay.

A: We were, what?

Q: We were not born yesterday. One of the major issues in the case in the evidence is what the prospectus said, okay.

A: Yes.

Q: We have actually gone to the lengths of getting an expert to say something which is pretty self-evident.

A: Yes.

Q: To say that … this loan, if it existed, would have been reflected in the prospectus. That is surely because at the time of the listing when the prospectus was prepared, the plaintiff had become a member of the Siu Fung Group. Did you not even know that? You didn’t know that?

…

A: I remember in one of the affirmations I filed I had — I have made some observations. And if I remember — I’ve not checked that affirmation before this morning or even before yesterday or recently. I recall what I said in that affirmation was to the effect that by the time the Siu Fung Ceramics Group was listed, this company was for some reason taken off from the Siu Fung Group at the time of the listing for various reasons I do not know. But as I say, as we saw this morning from the annual return of 1992, December 1992, the listed — or the name registered shareholders were three individuals.

…

Court: … You have accepted that if the company was part of the Siu Fung Group at the time of the listing, then you would have expected the loan which you’re trying to recover on behalf of the plaintiff to have been referred to in the consolidated accounts, you remember giving that evidence?

A: Well, your Lordship, this is exactly what I disagree.

Court: No, that’s exactly what you said.

A:  What I said is by the time of the listing of the Siu Fung Ceramics group in 1993, I don’t remember the month, this group [i.e. referring to the Company] was not at that point of time part of the Siu Fung Group and therefore the listing prospectus would not have included anything, assets and liabilities, loans concerning this company.”

54.  This evidence was false.  The Company, then named Siu Fung Strategy Limited, was listed as a subsidiary in Holdings’ prospectus.  In [70] of his written opening submissions for these proceedings, Mr Tang appears to acknowledge that the Company was a subsidiary of Holdings and was referred to in the prospectus.  At the same time, however, he refers to his evidence at the trial of the Action that he believed the Company was not a subsidiary of Holdings because he was shown by his staff only the Company’s annual return for 1992 (“Annual Return”), not 1993.  This evidence stands in stark contrast to his earlier evidence at trial, which I have quoted in [43] above, that the reason why he did not look at the Company’s accounts in 2000 was that “[they] were dealing with the affairs and, of course, look at the accounts of the listed company [i.e. the Holdings] … but not the other subsidiaries because that’s not one of the top priorities at the time”.  Logically, Mr Tang’s earlier evidence assumes that he knew in 2000 (and consequently in 2024 when the evidence was given)  that the Company was a subsidiary of Holdings.  It is unclear why Mr Tang does not accept in these proceedings that his evidence was wrong.  Despite now accepting that the Company was a subsidiary of Holdings, Mr Tang is adamant that he was not wrong when giving evidence to the contrary at the trial of the Action[46].

55.  There is a further problem with Mr Tang’s evidence.  Dr Li says Mr Tang could not have believed what he said in that part of his cross-examination quoted above was true at the trial of the Action.  Mr Fung’s evidence was necessarily premised on Dr Li’s case that the Company was a subsidiary of Holdings at the material time.  Mr Tang was a liquidator of the Company and Holdings.  It is difficult to believe that he had not established early in the liquidation which companies were subsidiaries and, in particular, major subsidiaries of Holdings and when they became so.  If Mr Tang could not remember whether the Company was a subsidiary, I would have expected him to check.  In fact, as I have found in [30] of the Reasons, Mr Tang accepted under cross-examination that a list of previous names of the Company would have been obtained from a simple company search and this would essentially be “reaching out for a piece of paper that is easily accessible” from his files.

56.  Mr Tang had been alerted well before the trial of the Action to the fact that Dr Li said the Company was a subsidiary of Holdings in 1993, and if the Loan had been made, it should have appeared in the prospectus: see [52] above.  Under cross-examination, Mr Tang said he had read Mr Fung’s report and considered Mr Fung’s conclusion, and was aware of the premise on which his opinion was based.  If Mr Tang had genuinely believed that the answer to Dr Li’s case or Mr Fung’s conclusion was that the Company was not a subsidiary of Holdings, one would have expected him to adduce evidence of this.  He did not.  Instead, in [73] of Tang 1^st, Mr Tang repeats his evidence filed for the Action in which he suggested that one reason for the absence of the Loan in the prospectus might be a breach of the relevant reporting requirements.  This in my view would not help him.  Paragraph 73 necessarily assumes that the Company was a subsidiary of Holdings when it was listed in 1993.

57.  There is no suggestion in [73] that Mr Tang had thought the Company was not a subsidiary and, if so, why he thought not.  He ends the first section of [73] with the following statement: “Even if LSF-Co/SF Strategy were not a part of the Siu Fung Group in 1993, there is nothing to prevent NHDA [(i.e. Company)] becoming a major subsidiary of the Group in subsequent years.  Any alleged ‘inconsistency’ has been ‘manufactured’ by Leading Counsel”.  It is unclear what this means, but I note the following.  It is certainly not an acceptance that the Company was a subsidiary at the time of the listing which, by the time Tang 1^st was made, Mr Tang must have known it was, and Mr Tang had no basis for theorising that the Company became a subsidiary in subsequent years.  As to the suggestion that Mr Man was manufacturing an inconsistency, that is plainly untrue.

58.  In my view the reason why Mr Tang continued to refuse to accept that the Company was a subsidiary of Holdings and that his evidence had been wrong is only explicable by the fact that he is fully aware that the evidence I have quoted in [53] was untrue and he refuses to admit it because it was not an innocent mistake, but a conscious lie said in an attempt to answer Mr Fung’s evidence.  I, therefore, find that Mr Tang knowingly lied, or at the very least was reckless to the truth of what he said with the conscious intention of interfering with the judicial process by influencing this Court’s decision.

Ground 5—Mr Tang’s oral evidence that the Company’s Annual Return was the basis of his erroneous belief that the Company was not a subsidiary of Holdings

59.  This ground arises from Mr Tang’s evidence at the trial of the Action that he was unaware that the Company was a subsidiary of Holdings, even though its former name (i.e. Siu Fung Strategy Limited)  was listed in the prospectus as one of Holdings’ subsidiaries.  At trial, Mr Tang gave the following evidence:

“Q: So can you explain — does it sound like you not to have ascertained the factual position when you thought this was the perfect answer to him? Does this sound like the sort of thing that you would do of … not investigating the question?

A: Well, I should have, to put it this way.

Q: You should have, right. So let’s say if you should have — am I to understand you should have means that you believe you likely had ascertained the position?

A: Yes.

Q: Now, if you had ascertained the position, there could be no room for error because, as I said, this list of names sitting in your file would readily tell you that as of the time of listing plaintiff was called Siu Fung [Strategy].

A: Now, maybe — maybe — because I have the team working for me. Maybe what my staff produce to me was the 1992 return showing the names of the three individuals as we saw this morning.

…

A:  When my staff checked the annual return, they only produce to me the 1992 return because — supposing if the Siu Fung Group was listed in June or July 1993, the latest available annual return at that time would be the ’92 annual return which show the names of the three individuals as shareholders.  And that’s why I form the view that the company was not part of the Siu Fung Group.  And not realising the change of name …”

60.  Dr Li submits that the falsity and the dishonesty of this evidence follow from a finding in his favour in respect of Ground 4, namely, that Mr Tang must have known that the Company was named Siu Fung Strategy Limited and was a subsidiary of Holdings when it was listed in 1993.  If Mr Tang did know this, it follows that his evidence that he might have been misled by the contents of the Annual Return that he was given by a member of his staff must have been a dishonest fabrication.  I agree.  It also seems to me clear that Mr Tang was lying and fabricating an excuse for him not admitting what I had already found he knew by the time he was cross-examined at the trial of the Action, namely, the Company was a subsidiary of Holdings in 1993.

61.  Mr Tang is an experienced[47] liquidator, and it is inherently unlikely that he would not have noticed that he had been given the annual return for the wrong year.  He needed to know who the shareholders of the Company were for 1993.  If his explanation was true, it would follow that he had asked a member of his staff to provide him with an annual return for one or more years.  He might have done this by asking them, emailing them or messaging them.  Similarly, the relevant member of staff would have provided the relevant annual return by handing it to him, emailing it to him or attaching it to a message.  Unlike many of the other events the Action and these proceedings are concerned with, this event occurred recently.  The present application is serious, and Mr Tang knows[48] this.  However, despite having 14 months to do so, he failed to produce any evidence (be it documentary evidence or affirmations from a member of his staff)  to corroborate his story.

62.  In my view, much like Ground 4, the reason why Mr Tang gave evidence that his erroneous belief that the Company was not a subsidiary of Holdings was based on the Annual Return given to him by a member of his staff is only explicable by the fact that he is fully aware that the evidence I have quoted in [53] was untrue.  Having consciously lied about his belief, he was forced to tell yet another lie, namely, that his belief was based on the Annual Return that was erroneously given to him.  Mr Tang has not produced any evidence to corroborate his story, which in my view was fabricated in an attempt to answer Mr Fung’s evidence.  I, therefore, find that Mr Tang knowingly lied, or at the very least was reckless to the truth of what he said with the conscious intention of interfering with the judicial process by influencing this Court’s decision.

63.  Lastly, I note Mr Tang submitted in his written closing submissions that “any alleged inconsistency in D’s testimony is explicable by mistake, misunderstanding, imperfect memory or imprecise wording, and does not support an inference of conscious dishonesty” and that his answers were more likely to be “(a)  a hurried attempt to comply with the difficult questions, (b)  a mistaken or imprecise response, (c)  or a protective answer under stress, than a deliberate, calculated falsehood”.  I am unable to accept this submission.  Giving evidence in court is a stressful experience, but Mr Tang is an officer of the court who has been involved in several proceedings (including contempt proceedings[49])  at the High Court. I find it difficult to believe that his judgment was impaired so that his evidence was continually inaccurate and, of course, it does not answer Ground 1. What is being scrutinised is not only Mr Tang’s oral evidence but also his affirmation evidence which presumably he would have had plenty of time to prepare and, if necessary, amend.  In my view what is more likely is that having consciously lied about one matter, Mr Tang had to lie about other matter(s)  in order to get his story straight.  For the reasons that I have explained above, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff has proven beyond all reasonable doubt that Mr Tang had committed contempt in respect of each of the five counts of false evidence as set out in the Schedule.

Disposition

64.  Having dismissed Mr Tang’s Leave Summons, I will order costs of the Leave Summons be paid by Mr Tang to Dr Li forthwith, with a certificate for one counsel, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.

65.  As to Dr Li’s Originating Summons, I will hear further submissions on the penalty to be imposed.  A hearing has been fixed to deal with the penalty in the event of me finding in Dr Li’s favour, which will take place at 10:00am on 31 August 2026.