HKSAR v. SUEN KIN WING

CACC 147/2024

[2026] HKCA 310

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 147 OF 2024

(ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO 77 OF 2021)

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REASONS FOR DECISION

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1.  This is an application for bail pending appeal. The test to be applied is whether the applicant’s appeal has a strong likelihood of success (the merits ground), or whether there is a real likelihood that all or a substantial part of the sentence will be served before the disposal of the appeal (the time-served ground), as explained in HKSAR v Poon Chi Keung[1].

2.  On 30 January 2024, the applicant was convicted on his own plea of two counts of money laundering involving a total amount of Hong Kong currency in the sum of HK$134,992,204.98. On 21 June 2024, he was sentenced to a total term of 10 years’ imprisonment. The applicant’s earliest discharge date, taking into account remission of one third for good conduct, is 27 July 2029.

3.  On 15 January 2026, I granted the applicant leave to appeal against his sentence on two grounds, namely that the judge erred in sentencing him on an erroneous factual basis as to the quantum of the proceeds of the predicate offence, and that the sentence is manifestly excessive.[2]

4.  As this application relates to a sentence appeal, the issue for me to decide is whether the applicant’s appeal has a strong likelihood of success such that it would significantly reduce his sentence, with the result that all or a substantial part of the reduced sentence would be served before the disposal of the appeal. 

5.  Mr Simon Young, for the applicant, submits that this is a case where the applicant would have served a substantial part of his sentence before the disposal of his appeal.  He notes that, based on the applicant’s sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment (i.e. 120 months), the applicant would need to serve 80 months before the sentence is completed, taking into account full remission.  So far, the applicant has served 43 months.  Mr Young argues that the correct starting point should have been 7 years’ imprisonment, and that, after applying the same 25% discount for the applicant’s guilty plea as applied by the judge, the applicant’s sentence would be 5 years and 3 months’ imprisonment (i.e. 42 months to serve after full remission).  This would result in the applicant having already served his sentence.  He further argues that even if the starting point adopted were higher than 7 years, a substantial part of the applicant’s likely new sentence would have been served before the disposal of his appeal.  In support of his submissions, Mr Young refers to several cases in which, having regard to the amount of money laundered, a sentence in the region of 7 years’ imprisonment was imposed.  However, during oral submissions, it was noted that the applicant received 6 months’ imprisonment for contempt of court in respect of an injunctive order, for which he received one third remission (the contempt sentence was served from 20 December 2023 to 19 April 2024).  The contempt sentence was served separately from his present sentence, so that the period so far served by the applicant is around 38 months.

6.  Mr Jason Lau, for the respondent, refers to the relevant sentencing considerations for money laundering offences set out in HKSAR v Boma[3].  He argues that the sentence was not manifestly excessive when having regard to the seriousness of this money laundering offence and the role and culpability of the applicant in carrying it out.  He submits that whilst the amount of money laundered “is not the be-all and end-all of a case”[4], it was a significant feature in this case as substantial amounts of money were involved spanning a period of over two years.  He argues that the applicant’s offending was seriously aggravated because of the following factors.  First, the predicate offence in this case involved the applicant practising a fraud or theft on a client to whom he was a professional investment adviser.  This constituted a serious breach of trust.  Secondly, the case involved cross-border and international elements, in that the money originated from mainland China and the applicant used the proceeds to purchase properties in the United Kingdom and mainland China.  Thirdly, the applicant benefited financially from the laundered money, living a lavish lifestyle as evidenced by the purchase of luxury motor vehicles and numerous properties.

7.  Whilst there are arguments on both sides as to the appropriate sentence that the applicant should receive for the two offences, I am not persuaded, on the submissions before me, that even if the applicant were successful in his appeal against sentence, any reduction in sentence would be such as to warrant bail on the time-served ground. 

8.  Mr Young argues that another factor that should be taken into account when considering this application is the likely hearing date of the applicant’s sentence appeal.  I have therefore considered it appropriate to order an expedited hearing of the sentence appeal. 

9.  For the foregoing reasons, bail pending appeal is refused.

[1] HKSAR v Poon Chi Keung [2025] 5 HKLRD 976, at [9].

[2] See HKSAR v Suen Kin Wing [2026] HKCA 27, at [40] and [44].

[3] HKSAR v Boma [2012] 2 HKLRD 33, at [35]-[40]. 

[4] Boma, at [38].