RE BAL TAMANG CHANDRA BAHADUR
[2026] HKCA 1985 · CACV 855/2026
Court of Appeal
CACV 855/2026, [2026] HKCA 1985 On Appeal From [2026] HKCFI 66 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 855 OF 2026 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1335 OF 2020) _______________ RE: BAL TAMANG CHANDRA BAHADUR Applicant _______________ Before: Hon Au JA and Mimmie Chan J in Court Date of Hearing: 13 October 2026 Date of Judgment: 30 October 2026 _______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): INTRODUCTION By its decision dated 5 September 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”), the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) refused the applicant’s late filing of a notice of appeal and thus refused the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 22 February 2019 (“the Director’s Decision”), refusing the applicant’s non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds. The applicant then took out the following late applications: Over 9 months after the Board’s Decision, the applicant filed his Form 86, seeking leave to apply for judicial review against the Board’s Decision on 29 June 2020. By then he was already late for over 6.5 months out of the statutory 3-month limit to make the leave application. By a decision dated 3 January 2024 (“the Leave Decision”), Deputy High Court Judge To (“the Judge”) refused to grant extension of time for, and dismissed, his application for leave to apply for judicial review. Some 9 months after the Leave Decision, the applicant took out an application for extension of time to appeal against the Leave Decision (“the CFI EOT Application”). By a decision dated 22 November 2024 (“the CFI EOT Decision”), the Judge dismissed his application. 2 months after the CFI EOT Decision, in January 2025 the applicant took out a renewed application in the Court of Appeal for extension of time to effectively appeal against the Leave Decision (“the CA EOT Application”). By a judgment dated 24 July 2026 (“the CA EOT Judgment”), this court (Chu VP and Barma JA) granted extension of time to the applicant to appeal against the Leave Decision. Pursuant to the leave to appeal out of time granted, the applicant filed a Notice of Appeal (“NoA”) together with a supporting affirmation on 13 August 2026 and written submissions on 23 September 2026. This is the applicant’s appeal against the Leave Decision. BRIEF BACKGROUND The applicant is a national of Nepal. The basis of his non-refoulement claim is, if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by members of a Maoist rebellious group known as “Forum” as he was previously kidnapped by the group but he managed to escape, and the group later accused him of leaking information about its location and activities. His background, the basis of his claim and arguments advanced before the Board as well as the Board’s reasons for refusing the late filing of his notice of appeal are all set out at [9] - [15] of the Leave Decision and [4] - [10] of the CA EOT Judgment. We will not repeat the details herein. Suffice to say for present purpose, the Director’s Decision was received by the Duty Lawyer services on behalf of the applicant on 22 February 2019. Contrary to the 14-day time limit stipulated under section 37ZT(1) of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) (“the Ordinance”) applicable in 2019, the applicant filed his notice of appeal before the Board on 12 March 2019, which the Board found to be late for one day. In his said notice of appeal before the Board, the applicant alleged that the Director’s Decision was given to him on “27 April”, and thus he was late. After considering the matter on paper, the Board refused to allow the applicant’s late filing of his notice of appeal, as “there [was] no evidence to support that there was any delay on the part of the Director, the Board [had] no basis on which to exercise any statutory discretion to extend the time limit”. In coming to this decision, the Board did not consider the merits/demerits of the applicant’s underlying non-refoulment claim as it was of the view that this was irrelevant. THE LEAVE DECISION As mentioned above, on 29 June 2020, the applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review against the Board’s Decision. By then, he was over 6.5 months out of the 3-month time limit prescribed under Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A). However, the applicant gave no reason whatsoever in this application to explain for the delay. The applicant did not turn up at the hearing of his application fixed on 4 December 2023. The Judge therefore proceeded to determine his application on paper. The Judge refused to grant extension of time to the applicant and dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review for the following reasons: “The late leave application 5. The leave application was filed more than nine and half months after the date of the Decision sought to be reviewed. Pursuant to section 21K(6) of the High Court Ordinance and Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, it was made more than six and half months out of time. Leave to file the leave application out of time is required. 6. In AW and Director of Immigration and William Lam, the Court of Appeal held that the following factors are relevant in determining whether to grant leave to file an application for leave to apply for judicial review out of time: (1) length of the delay; (2) explanation for the delay; (3) merits of the substantive application; (4) prejudice to the applicant if leave is refused vis-à-vis that to the respondent and public administration if leave is granted; and (5) whether the application raises any questions of general public importance, and whether those questions are likely to have to be resolved by the courts in any event. Usually, the first three factors are most crucial and determinative. If the sum total of these three factors are in favour of grant of extension, the court could be more relaxed in the remaining two. Conversely, if it is against the grant of extension, there is no need to consider the remaining two factors. However, where an applicant is many months out of time, leave may be refused ‘however strong the complaint might otherwise be’, see Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung, per Litton NPJ. 7. The delay in this case is so substantial that leave may be refused on this ground alone, unless the Applicant has a reasonable and credible explanation for the delay. Such substantial delay suggests that the Applicant does not have any genuine intention to prosecute his application and that the application may be an abuse of proceedings. The Applicant gave no explanation for the delay. Nevertheless, out of abundance of caution, the Court proceeds to assess the prospect of success in the proposed judicial review. … 18. The issue raised by this leave application is the propriety of the Board’s Decision refusing the Applicant’s late filing of the NOA, not the merits of his non-refoulement claim. Hence the merits of his non-refoulement claim is [sic] totally irrelevant. 19. For reasons as stated in Paragraphs 14 and 15, the Board found the Applicant had provided no explanation for the delay, albeit of only one day. He has provided no evidence in writing which could satisfy the Board that he had exercised all due diligence to file the NOA within time but failed because of circumstances beyond his control. Though not so expressly mentioned, the Board obviously had no knowledge of any other relevant facts which would support his late filing. The Board had directed its mind to the relevant provisions under the Ordinance relating to late filing of the NOA. It applied the law correctly to the facts it found and came to the inevitable conclusion that the Applicant had failed to satisfy the Board that he had exercised all due diligence to file the NOA within time but failed because of circumstances beyond his control. 20. Having rigorously examined the Decision, the papers and the evidence with anxious scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to late filing of NOA; correctly identified the issues raised by the late filing and observed a very high standard of fairness. The Board made its decision in accordance with Section 37ZT. The Decision is one of finding of fact and applying the law to the facts. The facts found or relied on by the Board are incontrovertible. In any event, such finding is solely within the province of the Board to make which the court in a judicial review will not interfere save for errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality. This Court could not detect any error of law in the Board’s finding of fact or its application of the law to the fact. This Court could find no procedural unfairness at any stage of the proceedings. The Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test. It is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. The Decision is utterly without fault. The proposed judicial review has no realistic prospect of success. For the above reasons, leave to apply for judicial review is refused.” (emphases added) In summary, when the Leave Decision is properly read as whole and objectively, the Judge decided not to extend time to the applicant and dismissed his leave application on two bases: First, he dismissed the applicant’s application on the basis of the applicant’s unexplained and substantial delay in taking out the leave application alone even if the intended judicial had merits (see [5] - [7]). Second, “out of abundance of caution” and thus on obiter, he also went on to further consider and conclude that the Board’s Decision was in any event correct as a matter of law and thus the applicant’s intended judicial review was without any merit (see [18] - [20]). THE APPLICATIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPEAL On 17 October 2024, the applicant filed a summons for extension of time to appeal against the Leave Decision (ie, the CFI EOT Application). By then, he was already 9 months out of time, long beyond the 14-day time limit to appeal as prescribed by the rules. The applicant’s explanation for the delay in appealing was that he had neither received the notice of hearing of his leave application (which resulted in his leave application being determined in his absence), nor the Leave Decision. He asserted that he was only informed of the outcome of his leave application by his case officer when he was transferred from Tai Lam Correctional Institution to Tai Tam Gap Correctional Institution after serving his prison term on 1 August 2024. The Judge rejected those reasons as incredible and unsupported, and dismissed the CFI EOT Application. The Judge explained at [9] - [12] of the CFI EOT Decision as follows: “9. Thus, in respect of the initial delay of six and half months before he became aware of the outcome of his leave application, his explanation is that he had never received the Order and Form CALL-1. He said he had never changed his address since October 2023 as he was residing with his wife and the address he gave to the Immigration Department is the address of his wife. He did not state his wife’s address. Accepting what he said to be true, all correspondences from this Court had been sent to him by post to his correct address as the address was obtained from the Immigration Department. 10. Not only did he claimed [sic] he had not received the Order and Form CALL-1, he also claimed he had not received the notice of hearing. In addition, on 12 December 2023 a notice that the decision will be handed down towards the end of that month had been sent to him by post. All these documents had been sent to him by post to the correct address. The delivery service of Hong Kong Post is usually very reliable. It is very unlikely that two delivery failures could and would have so coincidently occurred to him and in relation to his non-refoulement claim. If these documents had been delivered to his correct address, it is unlikely that he would not have received them. Furthermore, unless he had also not received the notice of handing down of the decision, a reasonable applicant in his position and in the face of imminent refoulement would have made some inquiry with the Court about the outcome of his leave application by January 2024 and would not have waited for nine and half months to appeal until he had served his sentence and was transferred to immigration detention on 1 August 2024. For all three or even two delivery failures to happen to him is too much a coincidence to be true. 11. The Applicant has a record of non-compliance with time limits. He was one day late in filing his notice of appeal against the decision of the Director’s Notice refusing his claim for non-refoulement protection. He was six and half month late in filing his leave application. He was nine month late in filing his appeal against the Order. If he did not deliberately occasion the last two delays for the purpose of delaying his non-refoulement process, he is at least a person with no respect for time limit. I found his explanation for the initial period of delay is incredible. 12. Even ignoring that initial delay of six and half months, it was not until 17 October 2024 that he made the present application for extension of time to appeal. Accepting what he claimed to be true (which I do not), it took him two and half months to make this application. Even allowing for the inconvenience of being in custody and his ignorance about the appeal procedures, the delay since he was informed of the outcome of his leave application is very substantial in the context of a 14 days’ period of appeal and unexplained.” (emphases added) After yet another 2 months, on 23 January 2025, the applicant filed a summons in this court for the CA EOT Application. In support, he advanced three points in his written submissions dated 20 August 2025, as summarised at [18] of the CA EOT Judgment: “(1) His delay in filing the notice of appeal to the Board was in fact due to his drug addiction and because he felt ashamed, he lied and stated in the notice of appeal that he did not receive the decision in time. (2) As the delay in filing the notice of appeal was not serious, the Board should also have regard to the merits of his case as disclosed on the available materials, relying on this Court’s decision in Re Karamjit Singh [2018] HKCA 460 at [14]. (3) A lot of things happened in the period after the Board gave its decision. First, his wife, who is Hong Kong resident, gave birth to their daughter on 16 November 2019. Second, the daughter underwent a surgery at Queen Mary Hospital in mid-December 2019. Due to stress, the applicant had a relapse in his drug addiction. He was arrested for drug related matter on 15 January 2020 and was in jail custody until 21 May 2020 when he was released and transferred to be detained at the Castle Peak Bay Immigration Centre. Eventually, on 29 June 2020, he filed his Form 86.” (emphases added) Pausing here, it is pertinent to note that this is the first time some 5 years after the filing of his Form 86 that the applicant had put forward explanations for his 6.5-month delay in applying for leave to apply for judicial review. By the CA EOT Judgment, this court (Chu VP and Barma JA) considered that his delay of over 9 months to apply for extension of time to appeal the Leave Decision as serious and was not satisfactorily explained. However, the court also considered that the Board had likely erred in law in not taking into account the merits/demerits of the applicant’s underlying non-refoulement claim when refusing his late filing of his notice of appeal, and the Judge in agreeing with the Board had therefore also likely erred in the Leave Decision in dismissing the leave application for judicial review. There was therefore a realistic prospect of success in the applicant’s intended appeal against the Leave Decision. As a result, the court granted the applicant extension of time to appeal against the Leave Decision. THIS APPEAL By the NoA, the applicant stated the following in support of his appeal: “the Court of Appeal on its Judgement from 24th July 2026 regarding CAMP 17/2025, [2026] HKCA 1311 on appeal from [2024] HKCFI 66 has passed a disposition to allow extension of time for late filing by citing the grounds of ‘special circumstances’ under 37ZT(3) of the Ordinance.” (sic) The applicant also lodged written submissions on 23 September 2026 for the purpose of the appeal. In those submissions, the applicant cited various case authorities on high standards of fairness and procedural fairness, but failed to condescend upon particulars as to how those broad principles were applicable to the facts of his individual case. At the hearing of this appeal, the applicant reiterated that the Board’s Decision was unfair and that he had been detained for 25 months. He further asserted that because of his “small mistakes” the decision afterwards was unfair and if he was sent back to his home country it would bring hardship for his family and that he wanted to take care of his family. E1. Applicable legal principles The relevant legal principles governing appeals in non-refoulement cases are set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]. In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed. The court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review. See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(6)]. In respect of the time limit in taking out an application for leave to apply for judicial review, Order 53, rule 4(1) states: “An application for leave to apply for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made.” It is trite that the primary requirement under this rule is one of promptness. What may constitute a good reason for extending time cannot be defined. In most cases, this would be a “multi-faceted question” the answer to which would depend on the circumstances of each case: AW v Director of Immigration (unreported, CACV 63/2015, 3 November 2015) at [27]. Generally, the court will look at (a) the length of delay; (b) explanation for the delay; (c) the merits of the substantive application; (d) prejudice; and (e) whether the application raises questions of general public importance and whether those questions are likely to have to be resolved by the courts in any event: see Re Thomas Lai [2014] 6 HKC 1 at [45]. Although merits of the challenge of the administrative decision are a significant matter to be taken into account, it is by no means the sole criterion: Re Thomas Lai (supra) at [45]. Thus, it has been stated that where an applicant is without good reasons many months out of time, leave may be refused “however strong the complaint might otherwise be”: Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 at p693B – C, per Litton NPJ. As also observed by Hartmann J, an applicant who sleeps upon his rights may be barred from pursuing them in judicial review even though he may have a meritorious case: Law Chun Loy v Secretary for Justice (unreported, HCAL 13/2005, 26 October 2006) at [13]. In the recent case of Re Chantharasiri Singha [2026] HKCA 975, an applicant had incurred an unexplained substantial delay of over 22 months before filing his Form 86 against a Board’s decision. The Board (as in the present case) refused to allow his late filing of a notice of appeal without taking into account the merits/de-merits of his underlying non-refoulment claim. Although accepting that there was merit in the complaint that the Board had erred in its decision, this court (Cheung and Anthony Chan JJA) nevertheless dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the first instance judge’s refusal of his leave to apply for judicial review on the basis of the applicant’s unexplained substantial delay in taking out that leave application. Cheung JA (in giving the judgment of the court) observed and explained as follows: “16. The emphasis is on a multi‑facet approach. What is significant in this case is the substantial delay in the lodging of the leave application and the total lack of explanation for this substantial delay. Whilst the applicant may have a reasonably arguable case on the merits of his application by reference to section 37ZT of the Ordinance, the Court must also consider the other factors as well. We are unable to accept that the mere presence of a reasonably arguable case would trump the other equally significant factors. Indeed, as emphasised by G Lam (as he then was) in Re Thomas Lai, although merits of the challenge of the administrative decision are a significant factor to be taken into account, it is by no means the sole criterion. The rationale being that a disciplined approach is required in an out of time application for judicial review. Late applications bear the risk that they may unduly disrupt public administration and decisions put into uncertainty because of the late challenge. … 19. Mr Ip argued that the Department of Justice who represents the Board and Director has chosen to take a neutral stand in this appeal and has not attended the hearing. He argued that no prejudice is shown if leave is granted. He further urged this Court to consider the danger to the life and limb of the applicant if he is to return to Thailand. We repeat that the merits of a case are not the sole determinative factor. The arguments on danger to life and limb and lack of prejudice must be considered also in the context of the applicant’s own conduct in not pursuing the leave application promptly and in not providing any explanation for the substantial delay. In our view, the applicant has not satisfied the requirement to obtain leave for judicial review.” (emphases added) E2. Discussion Applying the above principles and approach, for the following reasons, we are of the view that this appeal should be dismissed. As mentioned at [11] - [12] above, the Judge’s primary reason for refusing to exercise his discretion to grant extension of time for the applicant to apply for judicial review is the applicant’s unexplained and substantial delay of 6 months even if his intended judicial review had merits. In the premises, the applicant could only succeed in this appeal if he could show that the Judge erred in principle or was plainly wrong in his exercise of discretion against the applicant on this basis. In this respect, there is no question (and thus the Judge was correct) that in the context of public law, a delay of 6 months is a substantial one. Further, the Judge was also plainly correct in holding that the substantial delay was unexplained as the applicant did not provide any explanation for his delay in the Form 86 or supporting affirmation. This then comes down to the applicant’s “explanations” which were proffered only in January 2025 to explain for his 6.5-month delay in seeking leave to apply for judicial review in June 2020. As a recap, it is now his explanations that the delay was caused by a number of matters which happened after the Board’s Decision: (a) his wife, who is Hong Kong resident, gave birth to their daughter on 16 November 2019; (b) the daughter underwent a surgery at Queen Mary Hospital in mid-December 2019; (c) due to stress, the applicant had a relapse in his drug addiction around that time; and (d) he was arrested for a drug related matter on 15 January 2020 and was in jail custody until 21 May 2020 when he was released and transferred to be detained at the Castle Peak Bay Immigration Centre. We have no hesitation in rejecting these explanations being plainly incredible and unsubstantiated: The explanations bear all the hallmarks of an afterthought as they were only provided for the first time some 5 years after the filing of the Form 86, and there are no explanations at all as to why the applicant did not provide them much earlier if they were the true reasons causing his initial delay. In any event, there is also no good reason as to why he would not have provided those explanations, if true, much earlier as: at the time of his application for leave to apply judicial review in June 2020, the applicant should have already known very well that an unexplained delay would result in the dire consequence of the dismissal of his non-refoulment claim (as the Board’s Decision has shown); by way of the Leave Decision, the applicant must also be clearly aware of the fact that his leave application for judicial review was again dismissed on the basis of another unexplained substantial delay. However, he had still not provided such explanations 9 months later when he made the CFI EOT Application in October 2024 seeking leave to appeal the Leave Decision out of time. The explanations that his daughter had to undergo surgery and had stayed in the hospital until December 2019 is not supported by any documentary evidence of the hospitalisation or her alleged underlying urgent medical condition that necessitated the surgery. The explanations in any event do not amount to good reasons for the delay: The expected birth of his daughter and the alleged fact that the daughter had to undergo surgery should have prompted more but not less urgency for him to take out the leave application for judicial review to challenge the Board’s Decision, as given the Board’s dismissal of his appeal against the Director’s Decision, it meant that he would and could no longer continue to stay in Hong Kong unless he could successfully challenge the Board’s Decision. In fact, the applicant was well aware of this consequence. As he stated in his written submissions in support of CA EOT Application, if he was unable to obtain leave to apply for judicial review, he would be “at risk of removal” and he “can’t afford to lose [his] family” and the “consequences will be severe for [him] and [his] family”. As a matter of common sense, the applicant’s alleged imprisonment for drug related offences should not have prevented him from lodging a leave application to apply for judicial review. No explanation has been provided as to why he could not have lodged his leave application for judicial review whilst in prison. For all the above reasons, we do not accept the applicant’s “explanations” as true and/or good reasons for his delay in taking out the leave application to apply for judicial review. In these circumstances, applying the principles set out at [24] - [27] above, it was reasonably open to the Judge to exercise his discretion not to extend time for the applicant to apply for judicial review even if his intended judicial review against the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with a realistic prospect of success. In other words, it cannot be said that the Judge erred in principle or was plainly wrong in exercising his discretion in the way as he did. It is correct that, as observed [22] - [26] of the CA EOT Judgment, the Judge had erred in holding that the applicant’s intended judicial review had no merit as he wrongly held that the Board was correct in law in not considering the merits of the applicant’s underlying non-refoulement claim when refusing to accept his late filing of the notice of appeal. However, we echo the observations made by Cheung JA in Re Chantharasiri Singha that, in adopting a multi-faceted approach, although the merits of the challenge of the administrative decision are a significant factor to be taken into account, it is by no means the sole criterion. The arguments on danger to life and limb must be considered in the context of the applicant’s own conduct in not pursuing the leave application promptly without any good reason, and worse still, his repeated severe delays in pursuing his later applications. As the court has often stressed, the public interest in good administration requires decisiveness and finality, unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary; and that public authorities and third parties should not be kept in suspense as to the legal validity of a decision the authority has reached in purported exercise of decision-making powers for any longer period than is absolutely necessary in fairness to the person affected by the decision: see Re Thomas Lai (supra) at [38] and [44]; Law Chun Loy v Secretary for Justice (supra) at [10] and [11], citing R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex parte Argyll Group Plc [1986] 1 WLR 763 at p774; and O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 at p280. Recurrent late applications not only disrupt public administration but also place decisions into uncertainty because of the late challenges. This is a clear case where the applicant had “slept on his rights”, against a track record of recurrent periods of unexplained, substantial and inordinate delay in prosecuting his applications: (a) his Form 86 was filed 6.5 months late; (b) his CFI EOT Application was taken out 9 months late; (c) and his CA EOT Application was also filed 2 months after the CFI EOT Decision without any explanation. DISPOSITION For all these reasons, the appeal is dismissed. (Thomas Au) (Mimmie Chan) Justice of Appeal Judge of the Court of First Instance The applicant acting in person
Citation
Court
Procedural posture
Issues
Holdings
Legal principles
Disposition
Appeal history
RE BAL TAMANG CHANDRA BAHADUR
CA · [2026] HKCA 1985
This judgment