CHAN SUN JUDY v. QIN XIAOJIAN, the sole administrator of the estate of CHAN WAI HING ALEXANDER, deceased

HCMP 2396/2024

[2026] HKCFI 66

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 2396 OF 2024

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HCMP 142/2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 142 OF 2025

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DECISION

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INTRODUCTION

1.  Unless otherwise stated, I shall adopt the definitions used in the Judgment dated 4 November 2025 (“the Judgment”).

2.  By the Judgment, this Court, among other things, removed the Widow as the administratrix of the Estate, and appointed an independent administrator in her place.  This Court also made a costs order nisi that:

“(1)  Judy shall bear the following costs:

(a)  The filing fee of the Originating Summons in the 142 Proceedings;

(b)  Taocheng’s costs of correspondences between Judy’s solicitors and his solicitors.

(2)  Subject to paragraph (1)  above, Qin Xiao Jian shall bear Judy’s costs of the 2396 Proceedings personally, to be taxed on party and party basis if not agreed.

(3)  Subject to paragraph (1)  above, Qin Xiao Jian and Chan Kwun Shing shall bear Judy’s costs of the 142 Proceedings personally, to be taxed on party and party basis if not agreed.

(4)  Subject to paragraph (1) above, Qin Xiao Jian and Chan Kwun Shing shall bear Taocheng’s costs of the 142 Proceedings personally, to be taxed on party and party basis if not agreed.”

  (“the Order Nisi”).

3.  By summons filed on 18 November 2025 (“the Variation Summons”), Judy applied to vary paragraphs (2)  and (3)  of the Order Nisi, such that her costs to be borne by the Widow shall be taxed on indemnity basis.

THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

4.  The relevant principles have been summarised in Chan Chung Sing v Qupital Limited [2024] HKCFI 74 at [6] – [10] and I do not think it is necessary to repeat the same herein, save to emphasize that:

(1)  Costs are in the discretion of the court;

(2)  Generally speaking, there must be some special and unusual features in the case in order to justify an order for indemnity costs;

(3)  It is also well recognised that a party’s conduct which is “unreasonable to a high degree” may also justify an indemnity costs order;

(4)  The circumstances under which an indemnity costs order may be made is not closed.  Ultimately, it is a question of whether such an order is appropriate.  For example, it has been held in China Shanshui Cement Group Limited & Others v Tianrui (International)  Holding Company Limited & Others [2021] HKCFI 2745 that the pursuit of unarguable, weak or thin points, or points which are plainly wrong in law, can result in such an order.

WHY AN INDEMNITY COSTS ORDER IS APPROPRIATE

5.  I am of the view that an indemnity costs order against the Widow is justified in the present case, for the following reasons:

(1)  While the Widow has sought to rely on the Loan Agreement and the Settlement Agreement in the Widow’s 1^st Affirmation in her explanation of the sale of 4 out of 5 properties owned by the HK Company, she has sought to “withdraw” the said 1^st Affirmation in her 2^nd Affirmation, and treated as if those properties had never been sold, such that they are still available for distribution among the beneficiaries of the Estate.  The inference that can be drawn is that the Loan Agreement and the Settlement Agreement are not genuine transactions but were attempts to transfer properties away from the Estate so that they would be out of reach of the other beneficiaries.  Such kind of conduct should be seriously reproached, and it is no doubt appropriate for an indemnity costs order to be made so as to express the Court’s strong sense of indignation at the Widow’s conduct;

(2)  Separately, given the fact that the Widow must have known what she had done to the properties of the HK Company, once her suitability as administratrix of the Estate was challenged by Judy upon the commencement of the 2396 Proceedings, the Widow should not have resisted Judy’s application.  Her change of stance as reflected in the Widow’s 2^nd Affirmation only served to show that her case is hopeless, and that the persist opposition on her part is unreasonable to a high degree.  Yet, the Widow fought the action till the end, and that as a result had caused Judy to incur costs which could have been avoided if the Widow had been sensible in her conduct in these proceedings.  In such circumstances, there is no reason why Judy should be deprived of her costs, save that those costs had been unreasonably incurred;

(3)  I do not accept the Widow’s argument that Judy had commenced the 2396 Proceedings “with undue haste”.  The development of these proceedings show that, but for these actions, it would have been likely, to say the least, that the Widow would have relied on the Loan Agreement and the Settlement Agreement and maintained that a substantial part of the Estate’s assets had been used to repay the alleged creditor of the Deceased such that they are no longer available for distribution;

(4)  Although this Court takes the view that Judy should have agreed to join Taocheng as a party to the 2396 Proceedings, I do not think the level of culpability of such failure is high enough to tilt the balance;

(5)  It was not unreasonable for Judy not to accept the Widow’s settlement offers (in respect of which the Widow submitted that the Court should take into account):

(1)  The Widow’s calderbank offer made on 20 March 2025, which did not touch on the Widow’s status as administratrix of the Estate, is unrealistic given the alleged sale of the properties of the HK Company which apparently required further investigation;

(2)  The Widow’s calderbank offer made on 17 September 2025 does not assist her either because she did not agree to bear any part of Judy’s costs of the proceedings.

DISPOSITION

6.  For reasons of the aforesaid, paragraphs 2 and (3)  of the Order Nisi are hereby varied to the followings:

“(2)  Subject to paragraph (1)  above, Qin Xiao Jian shall bear Judy’s costs of the 2396 Proceedings personally, to be taxed on indemnity basis if not agreed.

(3)  Subject to paragraph (1) above, Qin Xiao Jian shall bear Judy’s costs of the 142 Proceedings personally, to be taxed on indemnity basis if not agreed, and Chan Kwun Shing shall bear Judy’s costs of the 142 Proceedings personally, to be taxed on party and party basis if not agreed.”

COSTS OF THIS APPLICATION

7.  Costs of this application should follow the event. 

8.  I see no reason why such costs should not be assessed on indemnity basis. 

9.  As the costs matter of the application is straight forward and simple, I also take the view that summary assessment of the same is appropriate.

10.  I therefore make a costs order nisi that the Widow shall bear Judy’s costs of the Variation Summons, and such costs shall be summarily assessed in lieu of taxation. 

11.  The above order nisi shall become absolute in the absence of application to vary (which, if any, will be disposed of on paper)  within 14 days hereof.

12.  Unless any application for variation of the aforesaid costs order nisi is made within time, Judy shall lodge and serve her statement of costs within 7 days after the expiry of the said 14-day period.  The Widow shall lodge and serve her statement of objection within 7 days thereafter.  Summary assessment of the costs of the Variation Summons will be conducted on paper (no matter whether any statement of objection is lodged by the Widow within time)  thereafter.  The costs assessed shall be paid by the Widow within 14 days after assessment.