AHMED NAVEED v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 193/2020

[2025] HKCFI 1838

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 193 of 2020

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;            or
	consideration of the documents and the Applicant being absent in open court;

(1)  Form 86 be amended, removing the Director of Immigration as a Putative Respondent and adding it as a Putative Interested Party.

(2)  The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

1.  By Form 86 (“Form 86”) dated 17 January 2020, the Applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 13 January 2020 (“the Board’s Decision”) confirming the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 17 May 2018, which rejected his non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (USM) (“the Director’s Decision”).

2.  I have amended Form 86 on my own motion to correctly name only the Board as the proposed respondent and add the Director as the proposed interested party.

3.  The Applicant’s personal background, the incidents alleged to show that he would be harmed or killed by his girlfriend’s father in Pakistan, and the procedural and immigration history, etc. have been set out comprehensively in the Board’s Decision. It is not necessary for me to restate them here. For completeness’ sake, reference can be made to the Board’s Decision, the hyperlink to which is included below[1]. The Board’s abbreviations and descriptions are adopted herein unless otherwise specified.

4.  The Applicant is absent from the oral hearing. I have proceeded to consider the merits of the present leave application (see Re Abdus Salam [2019] HKCA 1091). I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended challenge of the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success (see Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung & Another (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676). I note that the Applicant has not identified his grounds for judicial review as required (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015 (dated 22 December 2016) at §142), nor has he fulfilled his duty to make full and frank disclosure in an ex parte application (see Re Leung Kwok Hung, HCAL 83/2012 (28 September 2012) at §35). Apart from exhibiting a copy of the Board’s Decision, the supporting affirmation contains no other materials of substance. In the premises, the Applicant has completely failed to demonstrate that the Board had committed any errors of law, or there was any procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision that would warrant the Court’s intervention by way of judicial review. In view of the seriousness of the issues in question, I have reminded myself to apply an enhanced standard and to consider the Board’s Decision with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny.

5.  For these reasons, I make an order that the application herein for leave be dismissed.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1