SAYA AO REYMOND MABIASAN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5423 · HCAL 1070/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1070/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5423
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1070 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Saya Ao Reymond Mabiasan |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative interested
party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 3 July 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 21 June 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL001070_
2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant’s application for non-refoulement
protection in Hong Kong was not made out on all the applicable grounds
under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Thus, the Board
refused his appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of
Immigration (“the Director”) dated 29 October 2020 and confirmed the
same, which rejected the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement
protection.
Amendment
3. The applicant named the Board as both the putative respondent and the
putative interested party in Form 86.
4. In fact, the Board should only be named as the putative respondent,
and the Director should be named as the putative interested party.
5. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of
the putative interested party to “Director of Immigration”.
The applicant’s case
6. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
7. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to the Philippines, he would be harmed or killed by his ex-
wife, her family, and in particular her brother-in-law, and the New
People’s Army (“the NPA”). The applicant claimed that his ex-wife and
her family wanted him to share the proceeds of the sale of the
matrimonial home but he refused. He further claimed that his ex-
wife’s family had framed him for being a police informant and had
intelligence of the hideouts of the Calabarzon Command Group of the
NPA, and hence he was pursued by the NPA as well.
Oral hearing
8. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application
and his case was heard on 17 September 2026.
9. When this court asked the applicant for the grounds of his intended
judicial review, he merely said that he could not go home because some
people in the Philippines were still hunting for him.
Grounds for judicial review
10. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
11. The applicant did not advance any ground for his intended judicial
review in Form 86, nor in his supporting affidavit dated 3 July 2023.
12. As aforesaid, at the oral hearing, the applicant only mentioned that
some people were hunting for him in the Philippines, which is not a
ground for judicial review at all.
Discussion
13. First of all, the applicant’s danger in his country had been duly
assessed but rejected by the Board. If he intends to challenge the
Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for
judicial review.
14. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
15. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite
the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
16. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 13 October 2022 and the applicant was present. Thus,
the applicant was given the opportunity to present his case to the
Board in person.
17. The Board laid out its assessment of the applicant’s claims in
paragraphs 46 to 65 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary
to repeat the same here.
18. In gist, after considering all the evidence, the Board was of the view
that the applicant had exaggerated and fabricated his evidence to
advance a claim for non-refoulement protection and that his former
wife’s family were not associated with the NPA. Furthermore, the
Board found that the applicant had not been identified by the NPA as
an informant and was not at risk for this reason.
19. The Board further found that in any event, even if it were to accept
that the applicant’s former wife’s family were members of the NPA and
were using their membership to frighten or harm the applicant so he
would give his former wife money from the sale of his house, the Board
was satisfied that state protection would be available to the
applicant.
20. The Board found from country of origin information (“COI”) that the
Philippine government had been active in trying to rid the country of
the CPP-NPA[1] insurgency. The NPA was estimated to have only some
4,000 members or less at the material time of the Board’s Decision.
The Board considered it extremely unlikely that the NPA would expend
meagre resources on locating and harming the applicant.
21. Moreover, the Board found that the Philippine government was willing
and able to act against the NPA and its members. There would appear
to be no reason why the applicant could not obtain assistance from the
police or security authorities if he was threatened by the NPA,
including his former wife’s family members. The Board was therefore
satisfied that in the unlikely event that the applicant was threatened
with harm by the NPA, adequate state protection was available to him.
The Board assessed the applicant’s risk of harm on this basis as being
very low.
22. The Board had also considered whether the applicant had been
threatened by his former wife’s family because they wanted him to
share the proceeds of the sale of his house and whether he would be at
risk for this reason should he return to the Philippines. Although
the Board accepted that his former wife’s family wanted money from
him, there was no evidence that they tried to harm him for this
reason. The Board considered that even if they did want to harm the
applicant, irrespective of whether they were associated with the NPA,
the applicant would be able to seek the police’s assistance.
23. Moreover, the Board found that even if for whatever reason the
applicant could not obtain assistance from the police or other
authorities, he could safely relocate elsewhere in the Philippines.
The Board had given its reasons for such a finding in paragraphs 61 to
63 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary to reiterate the
same here.
24. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant had failed to establish a
case for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the
applicable grounds under the USM.
25. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence, COI and
risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing with
the applicant’s appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to make its
own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the
way the Board reached its conclusion.
26. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
27. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
28. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 23rd day of September 2026
| | |
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or the applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s |the putative |
|may be directed by the|solicitors on: |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order |23/09/2026 |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any| |interested parties as |
|directions given | |may be directed by the |
|within 14 days after |Applicant’s ref. no: |Court / the putative |
|the leave was granted |Nil |interested parties’ |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |23/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | | |
|within 14 days after | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|the grant of leave and| |Board/Non-refoulement |
|serve it in accordance| |Claims Petition Office |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |Putative respondent’s |
|and | |ref. no.: |
| | |USM 17376 |
|c) supply to every | | |
|other party copies of | |Director of Immigration |
|every affidavit which | |Putative interested |
|the applicant proposes| |party’s ref. no.: |
|to use at the hearing,| |QA T/C 541/20 (formerly |
|including the | |RBCZ 54/20) |
|affidavit in support | | |
|of the application for| |Department of Justice, |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Senior Assistant Law |
|6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
| | | |
| | | |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] CPP was used as an abbreviation for the Communist Party of the
Philippines in the Board’s Decision