LEE CHEE HON v. SONG LIHUA

HCMP 314/2024

[2025] HKCFI 5895

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 314 OF 2024

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  This is an application for specific discovery made by summons issued by the Plaintiff (“Lee”) on 22 April 2025. The application was made in relation to the contempt proceedings which were commenced by Lee against the Defendant, Song Lihua (“Song”), by Originating Summons dated 23 February 2024 (“OS”).

2.  The background facts to the OS and the present application are not controversial. The parties have submitted an agreed chronology setting out the events below.

3.  The OS arose out of the matters in HCCT 111/2022 (“Enforcement Proceedings”), whereby Song sought to enforce an arbitral award (“Award”) in Hong Kong against Lee. By an ex parte Originating Summons dated 9 December 2022, Song sought leave to enforce the Award.

4.  On 12 December 2022, Song applied for and obtained an ex parte Mareva injunction against Lee, restraining him from dealing with his assets in Hong Kong up to $38,400,000. The Mareva injunction was continued by the Order of DHCJ Winnie Tsui (as she then was) dated 16 December 2022, which expressly provided that if Lee paid into Court $38,400,000 (“Sum”), the injunction would be discharged.

5.  On 23 December 2022, Lee paid the Sum into Court and the injunction was discharged.

6.  By my order in the Enforcement Proceedings dated 24 August 2023, I set aside the enforcement order and refused enforcement of the Award (“Set Aside Order”), for reasons given in my decision handed down on 5 October 2023. The procedural history of the Enforcement Proceedings is summarised in my decision, which I will not repeat here.

7.  On 6 September 2023, Song applied by summons for leave to appeal the Set Aside Order.

8.  Following the Set Aside Order, Lee applied to dismiss the Originating Summons in the Enforcement Proceedings and for the payment out of the Sum (“Payment Out Summons”). On 6 October 2023, I dismissed the Originating Summons in the Enforcement Proceedings and ordered the Sum to be paid out to Lee through his solicitors (“Payment Out Order”).

9.  On 9 October 2023, Grandall Zimmern Law firm (“Grandall HK”), Song’s former solicitors in the Enforcement Proceedings, sent a letter to this Court seeking “directions” for Song to issue an application to stay the Set Aside Order and, pending the determination of that application, a stay of the Payment Out Order. By letter dated 11 October 2023, this Court stated that “[a]ny application should be made by summons”.

10.  On 12 October 2023, Song applied by summons to stay the execution of the Payment Out Order (“Stay Application”). On the same day, Grandall HK sent a letter requesting the Court to “urgently deal with [Song’s] Stay Application for, among others, an interim interim stay of the Payment Out Order”. On 13 October 2023, Grandall HK sent a letter to Lee’s solicitors, DS Cheung & Co (“DSC”) inviting Lee to undertake not to effect any payment out of the Sum.

11.  On 16 October 2023, this Court sent a letter to Grandall HK stating that the Stay Application was fixed for 7 November 2023 and could only be dealt with then. DSC sent a letter to Grandall HK refusing to provide the requested undertaking.

12.  On 20 October 2023, Grandall HK sent a letter (“1^st Letter”) to the Accounts Office of the High Court (“Accounts Office”), referring to the Stay Application and stating:

“3. Thus, in order to avoid the situation where administrative arrangements pre-empt the Court’s substantive determination of relevant matters, we would be very grateful if you could withhold any payment out request in relation to the Sum until determination of the Stay Application.”

13.  DSC immediately wrote to Grandall HK on the same day stating that the 1^st Letter was “an abuse of process and constitutes contempt of court by interfering with the due administration of justice”, and demanding Grandall HK to “unreservedly withdraw the Letter”.

14.  On 24 October 2023, Grandall HK sent a letter to the Accounts Office (“2^nd Letter”) “to withdraw our earlier letter”, and stated that “[w]e leave it entirely to your Office to decide what is the most appropriate action to take if and when your Office does receive a request for payment out from [DSC]”.

15.  On 25 October 2023, DSC sent a letter to Grandall HK stating that the 2^nd Letter was not an “unreserved withdrawal” since it “implicitly suggested that there is another “appropriate” course of action to take other than to comply with a request for payment out, pursuant to Her Ladyship’s Order”. On the same day, Grandall HK sent a letter to the Accounts Office stating that they “unreservedly withdraw Our Two Letters” (“3^rd Letter”).

16.  On 26 October 2023, Song applied for and obtained an interim stay of execution of the Payment Out Order until 7 November 2023 (ie the date of the first hearing of the Stay Application), by Order of DHCJ MK Liu dated 26 October 2023 (“Interim-Interim Stay Order”). On 2 November 2023, Song applied by summons to extend the Interim-Interim Stay Order (“Extension Summons”).

17.  On 7 November 2023, I adjourned the Extension Summons for argument. Given that the Interim-Interim Stay Order lapsed and no further interim stay was granted, the Payment Out Order took effect again.

18.  On 14 November 2023, I handed down my decision dismissing Song’s application for leave to appeal the Set Aside Order. On 20 November 2023, the Sum was released to Lee.

19.  On 8 February 2024, Lee applied ex parte for leave to commence the present contempt proceedings against Song, on the basis that the issuance of the 1^st and 2^nd Letters constituted criminal contempt. Following this Court’s grant of leave on 19 February 2024, Lee issued the OS on 23 February 2024.

20.  In the present discovery application, Lee seeks specific discovery of the following documents (“Requested Documents”):

“All communications and correspondence (including but not limited to letters, emails, text and electronic messages) between (1) the Defendant and Grandall Zimmern Law Firm (“Grandall HK”) and (2) the Defendant and Grandall Law Firm (“Grandall BJ”) over the period 30 August 2023 to 25 October 2023 (both inclusive) in relation to the following matters within HCCT 111/2022:

(a) The Plaintiff’s application by summons dated 30 August 2023 (for payment out of HK$38,400,000, among others);

(b) The Order made by the Honourable Madam Justice Mimmie Chan on 6 October 2023 (directing the payment out of HK$38,400,000, among others); and

(c) The Defendant’s application by summons dated 12 October 2023 (for stay of execution);

including in particular communications and correspondence in relation to or discussing (i) Grandall HK’s letter dated 20 October 2023 to the High Court Accounts Office (“Accounts Office”), (ii) Grandall HK’s letter dated 24 October 2023 to the Accounts Office, and (iii) Grandall HK’s letter dated 25 October 2023 to the Accounts Office.”

21.  On 27 October 2025, Lee sought leave to amend the specific discovery summons to include relief under RHC Order 24 rule 3 that Song be ordered to make and serve on Lee a list of documents of the Requested Documents which are or have been in her possession, custody or power, and to file an affidavit to verify such list and to serve a copy thereof on Lee. At the hearing, Song’s counsel indicated that she did not oppose the amendment application, and I allowed the amendment, with costs be paid by Lee to Song.

Legal principles

22.  The legal principles on specific discovery applications under RHC Order 24 rule 7 are well established and not disputed.

23.  The burden is on the applicant to demonstrate a prima facie case that (1) the documents or classes of documents exist, (2) the documents relate to a matter in issue in the action (in the Peruvian Guano sense), and (3) the documents are in the possession, custody or power of the other party: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2025 at §24/7/2; Jade’s Realm Ltd v Director of Lands (HCA 1509/2012, 10 June 2014) at §20 (per Ng J).

24.  However, proving the above matters does not necessarily entitle the applicant to specific discovery. The Court has a discretion whether or not to order discovery. The Court will not make an order unless the discovery sought is necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs: RHC Order 24 rules 8, 13; Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2025 at §24/7/2.

25.  Under RHC Order 24 rule 13, it is for the party applying for specific discovery to satisfy the Court that the order for production and inspection is necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter, or for saving costs. Order 24 rule 13 confers a broad discretion rather than a narrow or fettered discretion. The Court will use the issues as identified by the parties in the pleadings and other related documents to determine whether production is necessary either to dispose fairly of the cause or matter or to save costs: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2025 at §24/13/1.

Existence, relevance, and possession

26.  I am satisfied that Lee has proved a prima facie case on the existence, relevance, and Song’s possession of category (c) of the Requested Documents. Song did not seriously dispute these matters.

27.  However, there is plainly no reason for Lee to seek specific discovery for categories (a) and (b) of the Requested Documents. It is undisputedly the case that the contempt proceedings, as particularized in the OS and Lee’s Statement pursuant to RHC Order 52 rule 2(2) (“O.52 Statement”), that the alleged act constituted criminal contempt was Song’s alleged conduct in relation to the issuance of the 1^st and 2^nd Letters, of 20 October and 24 October 2023 respectively. There was no complaint about the propriety of Song’s conduct concerning Lee’s Payment Out Summons (of 30 August 2023) or the Payment Out Order (of 6 October 2023) generally. I accept Song’s submissions that the application seeking discovery of categories (a) and (b) of the Requested Documents is unduly wide and plainly unrelated (in the Peruvian Guano sense) to the pleaded/relevant issue of alleged criminal contempt. It is also not necessary to require discovery of these documents to dispose fairly of the cause or matter or to save costs (see below concerning this Court’s discretion). I accordingly refuse discovery of categories (a) and (b) of the Requested Documents.

Legal Profession Privilege

28.  The real crux of the dispute is whether, as Song submitted, the category (c) Requested Documents are protected by LPP and hence not subject to discovery.

29.  The general principles on LPP are not in dispute.

30.  LPP is a fundamental right which the courts will jealously protect. In Hong Kong, LPP is constitutionally guaranteed under Article 35 of the Basic Law. LPP is also a fundamental human right in the common law: Akai Holding Ltd v Ernst & Young (a Hong Kong firm) [2009] 12 HKCFAR 649 at §67 (per Bokhary PJ).

31.  LPP does not involve any balancing of interests. It is absolute and is based not merely upon the general right to privacy but also upon the right of access to justice: SJ v Florence Tsang (2014) 17 HKCFAR 739 at §§27-29 (per Ribeiro PJ).

32.  LPP encompasses legal advice privilege and litigation privilege. As Popplewell LJ explained in Al Sadeq v Dechert LLP [2024] KB 1038 at §52:

“Broadly speaking, legal advice privilege applies to communications between a lawyer and its client for the sole or dominant purpose of giving or receiving legal advice, and documents which would reveal the contents of such communications; litigation privilege attaches to communications between a lawyer and its client or third parties which are brought into existence for the sole or dominant purpose of use in the conduct of existing or contemplated adversarial litigation […] Where legal professional privilege exists, it is inviolate: there is no balancing exercise to be undertaken between the interest in maintaining privilege and competing interests in disclosure of the communications” (emphases added).

33.  The parties are divided on the following four issues:

33.1 First, whether Song has discharged the onus of proving that the Requested Documents are covered by LPP;

33.2 Second, whether Song had deployed materials subject to LPP such that LPP is waived;

33.3 Third, whether the “iniquity exception” applies because the Requested Documents were brought into existence as part of or in furtherance of Song’s alleged criminal contempt of court, such that the Requested Documents were not covered by LPP; and

33.4 Fourth, whether the LPP is spent.

The onus issue

34.  The principles are not in dispute. As held by Ng J in Alireza v Fleet Overseas (New Zealand) Ltd [2020] HKCFI 2802 at §§27-28:

“27. The party claiming privilege carries the onus of proving that the communication was undertaken, or the document was brought into existence, for the dominant purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice. The onus might be discharged by evidence as to the circumstances and context in which the communications occurred or the documents were brought into existence, or by evidence as to the purposes of the person who made the communication, or authored the document, or procured its creation: AWB Ltd v Cole & Another (No 5) supra at [44(1)].

28. The affidavits claiming privilege should be specific enough to show something of the deponent’s analysis of the documents. They should be as specific as possible without disclosing the very matters that the claim for privilege is designed to protect: West London Pipeline and Storage Ltd & Anor v Total UK Ltd & Ors [2008] 2 CLC 258 at [53] and [86(1)]. The person claiming privilege should support the claim by an affirmation setting out the special basis and the full factual context upon which privilege is claimed: Citic Pacific Ltd supra at [76(1)(c)].”

35.  I do not think the onus of proving that certain documents are protected by LPP is an onerous burden. As held in AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30 at §44(4), the Court explained:

“Where communications take place between a client and his or her independent legal advisers, or between a client’s in-house lawyers and those legal advisers, it may be appropriate to assume that legitimate legal advice was being sought, absent any contrary indications: Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 208 ALR 424 at 442 [65] per Gyles J; affirmed on appeal, Kennedy v Wallace at 191-192 [23]-[27] per Black CJ and Emmett J. In Kennedy v Wallace, Black CJ and Emmett J inclined to the view that in the ordinary case of a client consulting a lawyer about a legal problem in uncontroversial circumstances, proof of those facts alone will provide a sufficient basis for a conclusion that legitimate legal advice is being sought or given.” (emphasis added)

36.  Lee’s submission focuses on the use of “specific” in §28 of Ng J’s judgment in Alireza, and complained that Song did not explain, inter alia, the full circumstances and factual context in which the communications occurred or the documents were brought into existence. I do not agree. It is clear, from Song’s affirmation and the undisputed background to this application, that the Requested Documents are the relevant communications between Song and Grandall HK and/or Grandall BJ, her legal representatives. The Requested Documents are clearly connected to the Enforcement Proceedings and the present contempt proceedings. I accept Song’s submissions that the obvious inference is that the Requested Documents formed part of the necessary exchange of information of which the object is the giving of legal advice.

Deployment and waiver

37.  It is the parties’ consensus that the relevant principles on waiver by deployment of privileged materials can be found in Woo VP’s judgment in Goldlion Properties Ltd v Regent National Enterprises Ltd [2006] 1 HKLRD 793 at §21 (citing the judgment below):

“12. Privilege however can, in certain circumstances, be waived. A collateral waiver may occur when material which would otherwise be privileged is deployed in court. The classic statement on collateral waiver appears in the judgment of Mustill J in Nea Karteria Maritime Co. v Atlantic & Great Lakes Steamship Co [1981] Com LR 138, in the following terms:

‘When a party is deploying in court material which would otherwise be privileged the opposite party and the Court must have an opportunity of satisfying themselves what the party has chosen to release from that privilege represents the whole of the material relevant to the issue in question. To allow an individual item to be plucked out of context would be to risk injustice through its real weight or meaning being misunderstood.’

…

14. The dictum of Mustill J in Nea Karteria was referred to by Mathews & Malek on Disclosure 2000, at para 10.17 in the following terms:

‘The key word here is ‘deploying’. A mere reference to a privileged document in an affidavit does not of itself amount to a waiver of privilege, and this is so even if the document referred to is being relied on for some purpose, for reliance in itself is said not to be the test. Instead, the test is whether the contents of the document are being relied on, rather than its effect. The problem is acute in cases where the maker of an affidavit or witness statement has to give details of the source of his information and belief, in order to comply with the rules of admissibility of such affidavit or witness statement. Provided that the maker does not quote the contents, or summarise them, but simply refers to the document’s effect, there is apparently no waiver of privilege.’”

38.  Woo VP further held at §§43-44 of Goldlion:

“43. In Bourns Inc. v Raychem Corporation [1999] FSR 641, after referring to Marubeni, Tate & Lyle and other authorities, Aldous LJ summed up at p 676:

“As stated in Marubeni, mere reference to a document does not waive privilege in that document: there must at least be reference to the contents and reliance.”

44. The test whether there is waiver in its practical application can be found in Hollander’s Documentary Evidence, 8^th Ed, para 17-14, which reads:

“There is a distinction to be drawn between a reference to the fact of legal advice and to its contents. Referring to the fact that legal advice has been taken will not normally give rise to a waiver of privilege. Similarly, reference to the existence of a privileged document will not be sufficient: there must be reference to or reliance on its contents. Thus to state that before attending interview with the police I had taken legal advice is not a waiver of privilege. But to say that I did not tell the police where I was on Tuesday because my solicitor advised me not to, does rely on the contents of the legal advice: here the point of the reliance on the privileged advice is to provide an explanation or justification for the failure to provide an answer to the police. What is important here is not whether legal advice was taken, but what was the content.””

39.  Counsel for Song also referred to Mid-East Sales Ltd v United Engineering & Trading Co Ltd [2014] EWHC 892 (Comm) at §15, where the Court held:

“That distinction reflects a policy not to hold that there has been a waiver without good reason and to confine cases of waiver to cases where the party said to have waived is relying on the content of the legal advice for some purpose. Sometimes the distinction is drawn between reference to legal advice and deployment of it. The overriding principle is one of fairness, that if the content of legal advice is deployed or relied upon in order to advance a party’s case, then fairness may require that disclosure of that advice be made available so that the court can properly assess that assertion.”

40.  It is Lee’s submission that Song had deployed privileged material at paragraph 17 of her affirmation, which provides:

“17. I was told by Grandall BJ that Grandall HK considered it appropriate and advisable to issue a letter to the Accounts Office to: (i) inform the said office of the existence of the pending Stay of Execution Summons; and to (ii) request the office to consider whether it would be willing to suspend the payment out of the Sum pending the Stay of Execution Summons. Grandall HK sent such a letter on 20 October 2023 (i.e. 1^st letter to AO). Although I knew that Grandall HK had issued a letter along those lines, I did not read the letter itself or approve the precise contents of the same.”

41.  Counsel for Lee submitted that Song went beyond just stating that she had taken legal advice from Grandall HK and Grandall BJ, or had been advised by them to send a letter to the Accounts Office (which would have been a mere reference to the “effect” of the legal advice, and hence no waiver). However, Song had referred to the content of legal advice, namely that the letter should inform the Accounts Office of the Stay Application and to request the Accounts Office to consider suspending the payment out of the Sum pending determination of the Stay Application. Lee submitted that Song had relied on the content of the legal advice to explain why the 1^st Letter was issued in order to shift responsibility to Grandall HK.

42.  As Counsel for Song has emphasized, any waiver of LPP must be unequivocal and any doubt should be resolved in favour of upholding privilege (Goldlion at §31).

43.  At the hearing, Counsel for Lee submitted that the entirety of paragraph 17 of Song’s affirmation demonstrated deployment.

44.  In reply, Counsel for Song submitted that all that Song had said at paragraph 17 was that she was advised that it was appropriate to send the 1^st Letter, and the content thereof, which can be seen in the letter itself (and its content is undisputed). Paragraph 17 only recorded the content of the 1^st Letter. What paragraph 17 did not say is why the solicitors considered it appropriate and advisable to send the letter, which would be protected by LPP.

45.  I am inclined to agree with Song that there had not been deployment. Paragraph 17 of Song’s affirmation only referred to the existence and general effect of the advice she received from Grandall HK (through Grandall BJ). The distinction between a mere reference to the effect of legal advice and its content is no doubt blurred at times. However, I am of the view that this is closer to a case of a mere reference to the effect of the legal advice. There was no reliance on the content of the legal advice itself, which would shed light on why (on Song’s assertion) Grandall HK considered it appropriate and advisable to issue the 1^st Letter. The substance of the first sentence of paragraph 17 is referring to the content of the 1^st Letter, which is not itself the legal advice. Counsel for Lee, in his oral reply, submitted that what the client (Song) was advised to do or not to do plainly forms legal advice. Even if this is true, such reference would only be to the “effect” or “conclusion” of the legal advice, and not its content. In any event, I am not satisfied that there is an unequivocal reliance on the content of any legal advice (if at all) that would amount to waiver. Any doubt should be resolved in favour of upholding LPP.

46.  More pertinently, even if there was deployment, and wavier of privilege, I am not satisfied at all that discovery as sought is necessary, either to dispose fairly of the cause or matter, or to save costs, in the subject contempt proceedings.

47.  According to the OS (at paragraphs 17 and 18), the allegation of criminal contempt is based on “Song’s procurement of and/or instructions to [Grandall HK] to send the 1^st Letter … and the 2^nd Letter to Accounts Office”, and that “Song intended: (1) to send the 1^st Letter… and the 2^nd Letter to Accounts Office…; and (2) to interfere with the administration of justice…”. There is no dispute (and can be no dispute) that Grandall HK was properly retained by Song. It must be the case that Grandall HK was acting on Song’s instructions at all material times, and on Song’s behalf as agent with Song being the principal. Even in Song’s affirmation in opposition to the present application, she stated (at paragraph 17 of her affirmation) that she “knew that Grandall HK had issued a letter along those lines”, referring to the 1^st Letter, but only stated that she “did not read the letter itself or approve the precise contents of the same”. Whilst Song did affirm that she did not know that Grandall HK had issued the 2^nd Letter and only found out about its (and the 3^rd Letter’s) existence and content in around mid-March 2024, she never denied that Grandall HK was acting outside their instructions, nor did she state that she did not agree with the issuance of the 1^st and 2^nd Letters. She already admitted that she knew and agreed to the issue of the two pertinent letters. As principal, Song must be bound by the acts of Grandall HK done in accordance with her instructions.

48.  The issue of criminal contempt, specifically the question of whether the 1^st and 2^nd Letters constitute criminal contempt, turns on the proper construction and effect of the letters. This is a matter to be resolved at the substantive hearing for the OS. The letters are in the evidence, the contents are clear and their dispatch on Song’s instructions are not disputed. The Court can decide on whether they constitute contempt of Court, on such evidence. I am unable to see how the discovery of category (c) of the Requested Documents add anything to the key question, which turns on the construction of the 1^st and 2^nd Letters.

49.  Counsel for Lee accepted that category (c) of the Requested Documents might not affect the determination of liability, but may have bearing on sentencing, depending on the extent of Song’s knowledge of the content of the 1^st and 2^nd Letters. Neither party has submitted authority in support of this proposition, but even if I should assume this to be correct, I am not satisfied that this Court should exercise its discretion to allow discovery, based only on the limited relevance on the question of sentencing.

50.  In any event, I do not consider the relevance as alleged has any huge impact, given the admissions already contained in para 17 of Song’s affirmation, as to what she was told of the contents, and what she had agreed, and that she agreed to the issue of the letters.

The “iniquity exception”

51.  Given my above conclusion on waiver and necessity, I do not think it is necessary for me to deal with, firstly, Song’s fallback position that the reference to privileged communications in Song’s affirmation (if any) was only an attempt to negative Lee’s allegations, which did not amount to a waiver; and secondly, on the iniquity exception, and whether the documents in question had been brought into existence as part of or in furtherance of the iniquity of contempt of Court.

52.  For the purpose of this application, I do not wish to say more on the merits of the substantive contempt proceedings, and whether there is a prima facie case of iniquity for the purpose of the “iniquity exception”. Suffices it to say that even if there was a prima facie case of iniquity, and even if the subject documents were brought into existence as part of or in furtherance of the iniquity, I am not satisfied for the reasons stated above that discovery of the documents sought by Song are necessary to dispose fairly of the contempt proceedings, or to save costs, and would not exercise my discretion to order discovery.

Whether LPP is spent

53.  Counsel for Lee made the further contention that since the Enforcement Proceedings were dismissed on 6 October 2023 and Song’s leave to appeal was dismissed on 14 November 2023, there is no reason why the communications between Song and her lawyers should remain confidential.

54.  Counsel for Lee derived support for his submissions mainly from R v Derby Magistrates’ Court, Ex parte B [1996] 1 AC 487 where Lord Nicholls observed at 512F:

“There remains the case where the client no longer has any interest in maintaining his privilege. In many cases, once the transaction or proceedings have been concluded there is no conceivable reason why the lawyer-client communications should remain confidential”

and at 513B:

“Non-availability of the privilege where the client no longer has an interest to protect would not depend upon carrying out any form of balancing exercise, weighing one interest against another. It would depend on proof that no rational person would regard himself as having any continuing interest in protecting the privilege of confidentiality in the originally privileged material. In other words, the privilege has become spent”.

55.  I am not satisfied that LPP is spent in the present case. The threshold is necessarily very high, such that the applicant must prove that the “no rational person would regard himself as having any continuing interest in protecting the privilege of confidentiality in the originally privileged material”. Merely because the Enforcement Proceedings are now closed does not mean Song lost all interest in maintaining confidentiality of privileged documents in those proceedings. Otherwise, this would mean that LPP would automatically expire upon the closure of legal proceedings. This cannot be right. The very fact that the present contempt proceedings is on foot would suggest that there are strong reasons for Song to maintain an interest in keeping confidentiality of privileged documents.

Disposition

56.  For reasons given above, I dismiss Lee’s specific discovery application.

57.  Costs should follow the event. Given the conclusion above, there is no need for apportionment. The order nisi made is for costs of the specific discovery application (including the costs reserved) to be paid by Lee to Song forthwith, with certificate for one counsel, to be summarily assessed. Lee may file statement of objections to Song’s statement of costs within 14 days.