YVES CHARLES EDGAR BOUVIER v. PASCAL MARIE MICHAEL DE SARTHE AND OTHERS

HCA 1822/2025

[2026] HKCFI 2721

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1822 OF 2025

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REASONS FOR DECISION

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Introduction and Background

1.  On 12 December 2025 (“the Last Hearing”), a number of Summonses were placed before me as the Summons Judge. Some of the Summonses were disposed of whilst others were adjourned for substantive argument. See my Decision: [2026] HKCFI 1253 (“the Decision”). For consistency and ease of reference, save as otherwise indicated herein, I shall continue to adopt the same definitions and abbreviations as in the Decision.

2.  At the adjourned hearing on 2 March 2026 (“the Adjourned Hearing”), I heard the following applications:

(1)  An application by P for: (a) further disclosure by Ds by affirmation/affidavit; and (b) delivery up and inspection of the Subject Artworks to an independent third party and payment of the Proceeds into court (Inter Parte Summons, §§2-4). This application was adjourned from the Last Hearing to the Adjourned Hearing;

(2)  Ds’ application for: (a) inter pleader relief or alternatively, joinder of Mr Peretti (“Peretti”) (Interpleader/Joinder Summons, §§1-2 and Perretti’s Summons dated 20 February 2026 (“Peretti’s Summons”), §2, also seeking joinder as a Defendant); and (b) release from or stay of the Disclosure (Interpleader/Joinder Summons, §§3a and 4)[1], were adjourned from the Last Hearing but Peretti’s Summons was not issued at that time. By Peretti’s Summons, §1, leave is also sought to adduce Peretti’s Affirmation in support of his joinder application; 

(3)  Ds’ application for an extension of time to file their Defence to 28 days from the date of determination of D’s application for inter pleader relief (Ds’ Summons dated 2 February 2026 (“D’s EOT Summons”)). This application was taken out subsequent to the Last Hearing. An extension of time was granted by Master Thomas Kwong on 10 February 2026 to file and serve their Defence until 2 March 2026 and D’s EOT Summons was adjourned to be heard at the Adjourned Hearing;

(4)  P’s application for extension of time to file his reply evidence (P’s Summons dated 16 February 2026 (“P’s EOT Summons”)). This application was also taken out subsequent to the Last Hearing; and

(5)  P’s application for leave to file a further affirmation (P’s Summons dated 27 February 2026 (“P’s Further Evidence Summons”)). This was also an application taken out subsequent to the Last Hearing.

3.  At the Adjourned Hearing:

(1)  Ms Tong SC leading Ms Au, counsel, appeared for P;

(2)  Ms Cheung and Ms Lau, counsel, appeared for Ds; and

(3)  Mr Li SC leading Mr Sik, counsel, appeared for Peretti.

4.  In this Reasons for Decision, I will set out my brief reasons for the orders that were made, after hearing the submissions of counsel, at the end of the Adjourned Hearing (which surpassed the 3 hours scheduled for the hearing and it was impracticable to give my reasons).

5.  To understand the issues that were decided, it suffices to set out broadly some of the background facts and the parties’ respective case as follows:

(1)  P is engaged in the business of storage of art and since 2000 acted as a private art dealer and investor in art;

(2)  D1 is an art dealer and gallery owner conducting business through D2 and D3, Hong Kong incorporated companies, which are owned by D1 and his wife;

(3)  Peretti introduced D1 to P to each other in around 2010;

(4)  P’s case is that following a criminal complaint against him from a former client, Mr Rybolovlev, and other civil proceedings in several jurisdictions that followed (“the Proceedings”) in 2015, he wished to protect and preserve his artwork collection. It was Peretti that proposed that he place his artworks with D1 pending the resolution of the Proceedings. Upon discussion, D1, Peretti and P came to an oral agreement (“the Agreement”) inter alia: (a) the objectives of the Agreement were the custody and care of P’s artwork in Hong Kong (including the Artworks) and the maintenance and enhancement of the value and standing of the same; (b) D1 through himself, his gallery (“the Gallery”) and/or D2 and D3 would showcase the Artworks, conduct their marketing and secure the best sale price on P’s behalf; (c) upon the sale of any artwork, D1 was required to reinvest, with the assistance of Peretti, the proceeds of sale to purchase new pieces of artwork for resale once a favourable opportunity presented itself; (d) D1 was responsible for managing the Artworks, the Reinvested Artworks and their value, maintaining financial records of all transactions, expenses and profit distributions. In particular, profits (if any) should be calculated by reference to the difference between the amount stated in the Proforma Invoice of the artwork entrusted to D1 or the purchase price of the Reinvested Artworks (as the case may be) and sale price, and deducting from it related expenses such as logistics, insurance, administration and legal costs (“Net Profit”); (e) D1 and Peretti were to jointly decide on the sales and purchases to be made. Unless otherwise instructed by P, the two of them shall be entitled to exercise their discretion to make decisions in accordance with the parameters set out above without P’s further participation or approval; (f) D1 was to act as P’s trustee and agent to perform the obligation of managing and selling the Artworks and Reinvested Artworks whereas Peretti was to take a supervisory/advisory role in the process. All transactions would need to be jointly decided and approved by D1 and Peretti; (g) In consideration of their service, D1 and Peretti were to be collectively remunerated with 50% share of the Net Profit. Subject to the distribution of the Net Profit, the principal value of the Artworks and Reinvested Artworks shall belong to P; and (h) the Agreement shall be terminated at P’s election or mutual agreement. Upon termination, D1 shall give a full account of and deliver up the Artworks and the Reinvested Artworks to P and the parties shall settle all outstanding Net Profits;

(5)  According to P between 2015 and 2017, pursuant to the Agreement, P arranged for delivery of the Artworks to D1 who took delivery of them by himself or through D2 and D3;

(6)  After the Proceedings were resolved, P reached out to Peretti in 2024 requesting to meet and to provide him with a comprehensive report on the management of the Artworks, but Peretti ignored his calls or gave evasive response and excuses, and was not contactable after September 2024. In late May 2025, he found out that Peretti had been convicted of and sentenced to imprisonment for various offences in France. He therefore contacted D1 instead. From 30 July 2025, correspondence between P’s solicitors (“TDW”) and Ds’ solicitors (“HW”) ensued and a pre-action letter to Ds was issued on 5 August 2025;

(7)  On the other hand, Ds deny the Agreement. Ds’ case is that in around early 2015, Peretti approached D1 and proposed that the Gallery would be responsible for caring for and promoting Peretti’s artworks and selling them. The sale proceeds were to be in accordance with Peretti’s instructions either to be paid out to Peretti or reinvested in other artworks. D1 agreed. Even prior to the drawing up of any written consignment agreement, Peretti arranged shipment of part of the consigned Subject Artworks to the Gallery and subsequently, 4 written consignment agreements were executed by D3 with companies associated with Peretti. At all material times, prior to 30 July 2025, D1 believed that the Gallery was acting as the agent of Peretti and his companies in managing and selling the consigned artworks which were owned by him. It was only in late July 2025, in anticipation of a deadline for the Gallery to submit a purchase invoice for Item 16 to the Picasso Committee, D1 asked Peretti for the said purchase invoice but Peretti informed D1 that he had acquired Item 16 through P’s company and instructed D1 to ask P. On 29 July 2025, D1 called P for the purchase invoice. On 30 July 2025, D1 received an email from P’s assistant which stated that Item 16 was purchased on behalf of P and has been a part of P’s private collection; 

(8)  P’s case is that he had genuine doubts as to the authenticity of the Consignment Agreements and further, they were created for a specific extraneous purpose (i.e. to protect his assets from Mr Rybolovlev) and not intended to be enforced;

(9)  According to Ds, Items 7 and 11 belong to D3. They were owned by Peretti but sent to D1 under a separate arrangement between Peretti and D1, initially to act as security for a loan D1 extended to Peretti but later Peretti and D1 agreed there be an exchange of artworks (560 pieces of T’ang Haywen’s (“T’ang”) artwork (“T’ang Paintings”) to Peretti) for Items 7 and 11 (“the Exchange Agreement”); and

(10)  P’s case is that the Exchange Agreement was a sham and not intended to take legal effect. According to P, in 2013, P had purchased 9,693 paintings by T’ang (“the Collection”) and it was agreed that each of P, Peretti and D1 owned one-third of the Collection. To shield Items 7 and 11 (which were very valuable) from Mr Rybolovlev, D1 agreed to enter into the Exchange Agreement to create the impression P’s company had agreed to exchange them for the T’ang Paintings. Given the Collection was partially owned by P and the discrepancy in value between the T’ang Paintings and Items 7 and 11, P says that it was a sham agreement only to protect Items 7 and 11 from Mr Rybolovlev.

Discussion

6.  At the Adjourned Hearing, I first heard submissions on the applications that I did not believe were very controversial and at least not strenuously opposed.

7.  In respect of P’s EOT Summons, I accepted the submissions of Ms Tong, given that P filed his reply evidence only one working day after the deadline imposed by the Order made at the Last Hearing, no real prejudice should have been caused to Ds (even though Ms Cheung did complain about the lack of explanation for the delay when seeking indulgence from the court). I therefore granted retrospective leave to P to file his reply evidence with costs (at fixed costs) to Ds.

8.  In respect of P’s Further Evidence Summons, given that Bouvier 4^th is to rectify an error in Bouvier 3^rd, by an addition of one line to a paragraph of Bouvier 3^rd, whilst Ms Cheung did say there was a change of evidence by P, nonetheless I allowed the application with costs (at fixed costs) to Ds.

9.  I then heard submissions on the more controversial applications.

10.  In particular, in relation to Peretti’s application for joinder as a defendant and evidence to be filed in support, Ms Tong had indicated that if leave was granted for Peretti to file his affirmation (28 pages with over 170 pages of exhibits), P would wish to file evidence in response and both Peretti’s application for joinder and Ds’ application for interpleader relief/joinder application which are inter-linked should be adjourned.

11.  Ms Tong complained that Peretti’s Summons was filed inexcusably late. There was some justification for this complaint since there is some evidence that Peretti’s brother and son had knowledge of P’s claim since early 2025. Besides, on Ds’ case, as agent of Peretti, no doubt they would have informed Peretti of P’s claims when these proceedings were commenced against them at the end of September 2025. Furthermore, former solicitors of Peretti had in November 2025 indicated that Peretti intended to intervene in these proceedings. They were informed of the Last Hearing but did not attend nor applied for intervention until Peretti’s Summons was filed.

12.  On the other hand, from the correspondence between the parties’ solicitors shown to me by Mr Li, I also accepted that in early December 2025, there had been agreement between parties for Peretti to be joined as a defendant subject to the formulation of the issues concerning ownership of the artworks to be tried. However, P’s stance changed by 8 December 2025, taking the view that until Ds fully complied with the Disclosure Undertaking, Ds’ interpleader/joinder application should be adjourned sine die.

13.  At the outset of the Adjourned Hearing, I directly asked Mr Li to clarify his position. In his Skeleton Submissions, on the one hand, he submitted that the joinder of Peretti does not depend on Peretti’s own application or evidence (as it was part of the Interpleader/Joinder Summons, §2) such that P’s suggestion that further time is needed to deal with his application is disingenuous and Peretti’s Summons was filed “out of caution”, but on the other hand, he submitted that it would be a waste of time for the parties to engage on the merits at the joinder stage. It seemed to me that Peretti’s Summons was wholly unnecessary given there is already an application for joinder before the court although made by Ds and the fact that Ds have filed evidence to say the true owner of the claimed Artworks (save for Items 7 and 11) was Peretti. To allow Peretti’s Affirmation would only cause further delay to the determination of the joinder issue if further evidence in reply was to be allowed to be filed by P. Mr Li then confirmed that he would not be relying on Peretti’s Affirmation. Given that indication, considering the lateness and lack of utility of Peretti’s joinder application, and to avoid further delays to the determination of the application for joinder that has been made since the application was made by Ds in November 2025, I dismissed Peretti’s Summons.

14.  Costs should normally follow the event but bearing in mind from the parties’ correspondence shown to me that to some extent Peretti’s application was said to be taken out because of the change of stance by P, the joinder application by Ds was before the court and had to be addressed by P regardless and Ms Tong’s belated revelation at the end of the Adjourned Hearing that she did not oppose the joinder application by Ds[2], and as ultimately, I allowed Peretti to be joined as a defendant, I took the view that the just order should be no order as to costs. I disagreed with the submissions of Mr Li and Ms Tong both seeking to be awarded costs of Peretti’s Summons.

15.  I also considered whether to entertain an application (apparent only from Ms Cheung’s Skeleton Submissions) in respect of the Preservation Undertaking given by Ds to exclude Items 7 and 11. Paragraph 1 of the Inter Parte Summons pertaining to the preservation of the Subject Artworks and Proceeds had already been disposed of by the Preservation Undertaking given to DHCJ Kent Yee on the first call-over hearing to preserve the items save for Items 7 and 11. At the Last Hearing, Ds gave a further undertaking to this court that pending trial and determination of this action or further order not to inter alia transfer, sell, dispose of, etc Items 7 and 11 including subsequent artwork purchased using their proceeds of sale.  Ms Cheung did not agree that was what was agreed. She submitted that the undertaking was only given until the Adjourned Hearing but not until trial. I disagreed as it is plainly contrary to the court’s understanding as recorded in the Decision (see §§6 and 13) and the Order made following the Last Hearing[3].

16.  Given that the Preservation Undertaking covered Items 7 and 11 and was given until trial or further order, as submitted by Ms Tong, the undertaking will be binding until trial unless there are good grounds for discharging or varying it such as significant change of circumstances: see Gee: Commercial Injunctions, 7^th Edn, §§24-015 and 24-016. There was never any express reservation of rights to take out a discharge or modification applications and Ds should not now be allowed to apply to discharge or vary the undertaking.  

17.  In any event, I had considered Ms Cheung’s submissions including how the suggestion that the Exchange Agreement was a sham was raised belatedly and it was illogical and incredible (i.e. the Exchange Agreement was signed by P, there is no mention of remuneration to D1, there is no reason why only D1 but not Peretti would agree to shield Items 7 and 11, the need for physical delivery of the T’ang Paintings to P’s company if it was a sham). I respectfully disagreed with her that P has failed to show a serious issue to be tried when P has also adduced some contemporaneous records to support his case that he had purchased the Collections, had invoiced the Gallery for participation for the purchase and the apparent discrepancy in the value of Items 7 and 11 with the T’ang Paintings allegedly exchanged.  Given the threshold for serious issue to be tried is not a very high one, and I was not prepared to resolve highly contentious matters and parties’ intention on affidavit evidence, I was not satisfied that there was no serious issue to be tried in respect of P’s claim to ownership of Items 7 and 11.

18.  In respect of the interpleader application, Ms Tong had submitted that there were several reasons why Ds’ interpleader relief should be rejected as a matter of principle. Firstly, she submitted that whilst Peretti has asserted ownership over the Subject Artworks, there is a lack of prima facie case by Peretti against Ds. The test is whether each of the rival claimants has a prima facie case against the interpleading party, but not whether the adverse claimant has a claim against each other (see DLA Piper Hong Kong v China Property Development (Holdings) Ltd [2009] 4 HKLRD 333 at §§20(1) and 22 per Fung J. Secondly, she submitted that given Ds deny the existence of the Agreement and the trustee/agent relationship between P and D1, Ds must remain as defendants and cannot drop out of the picture as a “neutral party”.  Thirdly, it was submitted that Ds are not in a real position of impartiality between the parties (see DLA Piper Hong Kong, §23) where Ds have positively claimed they are agents for Peretti who is the true owner of the Subject Artworks (save Items 7 and 11). Fourthly, in the present case, Ds do claim to have an interest in some of the Subject Artworks (Items 7, 11 and any artworks subsequently purchased using proceeds of the Artworks plus any personal financial resources from Ds). Fifthly, although Ds assert that they do not object to dispose of the Subject Artworks as the court directs, they submit positively seek to keep the Subject Artworks in their possession (see Interpleader/Joinder Summons, §3(b)).

19.  Whilst Ms Cheung submitted that Ds expect to be sued in respect of the Subject Artworks, Peretti has only objected to disclosure by Ds in its objection letters and sought to be joined as a party. I did not agree that somehow being an agent of Peretti, who on their case was the true owner of the Subject Artworks, it suffice to show Peretti has a prima facie claim against Ds. Save that I agreed with Ms Cheung that the fact that Ds claim ownership of parts of the Subject Artworks does not bar Ds from seeking interpleader relief as Ds may interplead as much of a debt as Ds admit (see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026, Vol.1, §17/1/13), I agreed with all of Ms Tong’s other submissions.

20.  However, as already mentioned, I allowed the joinder application.

21.  O. 15, r. 6(2)(b) of RHC provides the court may order the joinder of the following person as a party:

“(i) any person who ought to have been joined as a party or whose presence before the Court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon, or

(ii) any person between whom and any party to the cause or matter there may exist a question or issue arising out of or relating to or connected with any relief or remedy claimed in the cause or matter which in the opinion of the Court it would be just and convenient to determine as between him and that party as well as between the parties to the cause or matter.”

22.  The applicable principles on joinder under O. 15, r. 6(2)(b) of RHC were summarised by K Yeung J in Chen Hongqing v Liu Yiu Keung Stephen & Ors [2021] HKCFI 440 at §26 (set out in footnote 1 of the Decision).

23.  However, the existence of legitimate interest in the outcome of the proceedings is only the minimum requirement that has to be shown before a court can be required to make an order. The court still retains a discretion and the exercise of the court’s discretion in any given case depends on a number of factors which may include: (1) the individual prejudice to the parties in the event an order is or is not made; (2) the stage that the action has reached when the application is made; and (3) any delay in making the application and any delay that may be caused should an order be made. Ultimately, the discretion is exercised bearing in mind the object of O.15, r.6(2)(b) and orders should only be made where necessary, just and convenient. See China Medical Technologies, Inc (in Liquidation) & Ors v Wu Xiaodong & Ors [2023] HKCFI 2350 at §11 per Ng J.

24.  I also remind myself as held in Advanced Connection Limited v Able Technology (Hong Kong) Limited [2019] HKCA 1092 §§20-21, the test is whether there is a bona fide claim and a proper question to be tried between the plaintiff and the intended defendant that is necessary or just and convenient for the resolution between them as well as between the plaintiff and the defendant. At the joinder stage, the court will not engage itself in the scrutiny of the applicant’s case or an adjudication of disputed facts.

25.  In the present case, adopting a liberal approach, and applying the above applicable principles, I cannot see how P can dispute that Peretti is a necessary party to this action to ensure all disputes between the parties are determined without multiplicity of proceedings. On P’s case, the Agreement was a tripartite agreement between P, Peretti and D1 so Peretti must necessarily be a party. According to P, D1 and Peretti were to jointly decide on the sales and purchases to be made and P agreed to share the Net Profits with both D1 and Peretti. It is also telling that P first reached out to Peretti to enquire about the Artworks before reaching out to D1. D1 has said on oath that he is not aware of the transactions for the Artworks allegedly between P and D1 as D1 dealt only with Peretti believing P’s involvement was arranged pursuant to Peretti’s instructions to P. Peretti has made a claim for ownership of 89 of the 92 the Subject Artworks. Furthermore, even though as Ms Tong submitted, P has currently made no claims against Peretti, the existence of a cause of action by one of the parties against the intervening party is not a prerequisite for joinder. I am satisfied that the question of the ownership of the Subject Artworks plainly is a bona fide claim which should be tried between P, Peretti and D1, and Peretti’s interest is directly related to the subject matter of these proceedings. I was of the clear view that Peretti should be joined as the 4^th Defendant in the exercise of my discretion in the circumstances of this case.

26.  However, I took the view that whether there should be a trial of a preliminary issue and the formulation of that issue was premature at this early stage when parties have yet all filed their pleadings and the issues have not been crystalized. I therefore ordered: (a) the joinder of Peretti as the 4^th Defendant (i.e. Interpleader/Joinder Summons, §2a), (b) Peretti to file his Defence within 28 days; and (c) the application for preliminary issue (i.e. Interpleader/Joinder Summons, §2b) be adjourned sine die with liberty to restore. As already mentioned, Ds had stated that they no longer pursued the application for a stay and/or leave to be discharged from the Disclosure Undertaking. As Ms Cheung had explained that the stay sought as well as the extension of time to file Ds’ Defence was based on the interpleader relief which has now been refused, §§3a and 4 ought to be dismissed.

27.  As for the costs of the Interpleader/Joinder Summons, given the mixed successes of the parties and bearing in mind the conduct of P which necessitated the application for joinder, I considered that a fair order would be no order as to costs.

28.  Given P had also sought an indulgence to file his SOC from the court after Ds agreed to an extension, and since this is only Ds’ second application for extension of time and given the distraction of the numerous applications made by the parties and Peretti, I allowed D’s EOT Summons with costs to P (at fixed costs) and not on an unless basis as sought by Ms Tong.

29.  What remained was P’s application for further disclosure, delivery up and payment into Court.

30.  As I disagreed with Ms Cheung that no serious issue to be tried has been demonstrated by P in relation to Items 7 and 11, as I explained in the Decision §13, without the disclosure the Preservation Undertaking cannot be properly enforced, it follows that disclosure in relation to Items 7 and 11 should be given. Furthermore, I respectfully disagreed with Ms Cheung’s submissions that the disclosure order sought amounts to a mandatory injunction for which the court had to satisfied to a high degree of assurance that after trial it will be found that the injunction was correctly granted. Ms Cheung referred me to the decision of Au Yeung J in Jessop & Baird (Hong Kong) Limited v Neo Hwee Khim (unrep) HCA 2572/2016, 14 October 2016 but that case concerned an application for delivery up of properties to the plaintiff by the third and fifth defendant rather than a preservation order requiring delivery up of property to an independent third party in order to preserve property which is the subject matter of this action. Rather, the applicable principles for an order for detention, custody or preservation of property under O. 29, r. 2(1) of RHC are as summarised by K Yeung J in Gentle Soar Limited v CMBC Capital Finance Limited & Ors [2021] HKCFI 3450 at §36(b) and the threshold is that of serious issue to be tried:

(1)  There is property which is bona fide the subject matter of the cause or matter, or as to which any question may arise;

(2)  Something ought to be done for the security of that property, because for example damages may not be an adequate remedy;

(3)  Unlike application for a Mareva injunction, no risk of dissipation needs to be demonstrated;

(4)  Even if there has been delay in making an application which may lead to refusal of a freezing injunction, a proprietary injunction may nonetheless be granted;

(5)  An enquiry into the relative merits of rival claims is not necessary. In respect of the merits of the claim, the party seeking the preservation order only needs to show that there is a serious issue to be tried on the merits on the normal American Cyanamid principles;

(6)  If the opposing party seeks to show that there is no serious issue to be tried, the threshold is high, as it would be necessary to demonstrate that the claim should be struck out;

(7)  There is no strict requirement for an undertaking as to damages where the Court grants a proprietary injunction or a preservation order, albeit that the Court may require such an undertaking “where the circumstances warrant”;

(8)  There is no need for P to show that damages would not be an adequate remedy.

31.  I also agreed with Ms Tong’s submissions, notwithstanding my previous order requiring Ds to fully comply with the Disclosure Undertaking, disclosure to date had been inadequate in a number of respects. Ms Tong submitted that: (1) there were significant redactions to the identities of buyers and seller but confidentiality is not a bar to disclosure unless the information is privileged; (2) there was no disclosure for Items 18, 27, 36, 46, 51, 53, 54, 65 and 89; (3) 12 of the Reinvested Artworks were the Artworks originally entrusted by P to D1 but there is no explanation for them; (4) the apparent erroneous interpretation of Reinvested Artworks to not include those artworks purchased with mixed funds i.e. those other than from the Proceeds. At the very least, Ms Cheung admitted that there was no disclosure in relation to eight Items. In Ds’ Skeleton Submissions (footnote 16), it was stated that Items 18, 36, 46, 51, 53, 54, 65 and 89 were omitted from disclosure which was inadvertent and due to Ds’ oversight. Ds agreed to the filing and serving of a further affirmation if leave is granted to do so. Ms Cheung also indicated that her clients would file an affirmation about 12 of the Reinvested Artwork and the fact that one of the Reinvestment Artwork (Item 6) is no longer in Ds’ sole possession, custody or power and to explain the error including it as one of the Reinvested Artwork.

32.  Ms Tong submitted and I was ultimately persuaded that even though I had previously ordered disclosure and whilst an application for contempt is available to P in so far it is alleged Ds had breached any previous court orders, as I take the view that the Disclosure Undertaking goes hand in hand with the Preservation Undertaking, without which the Preservation Undertaking could not be properly enforced, I ordered the further disclosure as sought by Ms Tong. Ms Tong referred me to China Metal Recycling (Holdings) Limited & Anor v Chun Chi Wai & Ors (unrep) HCA 1412/2013, 9 April 2014 (see §§10-17 per L Chan J).

33.  As for the application for delivery up, given that Ds cannot be treated as wholly neutral and P has undertaken to pay the costs upfront incurred in connection with the delivery up and inspection as well as the costs of insurance (and if reputable and professionals are engaged in the transport and storage, there is no real risk of damage)[4], there should be an order for delivery up of the Subject Artworks to a reputable, independent third party willing to accept custodianship. Inspection should be allowed for all parties.  

34.  However, the latest choice of the third party storage company (Eric Art Services) was identified only in P’s reply evidence on 20 February 2025. As according to Mr Li, his client strongly objected to Eric Art Services being the company selected and also wished to put forward other reputable companies, and taking on board that in the grand scheme of things where the Subject Artworks had remained in Ds’ possession for 10 years and the Subject Artworks are no doubt very valuable should not be moved hastily, I therefore allowed parties further time to see if there could be agreement on the choice of the storage company and the logistics. Failing agreement, parties were directed to write to this Court with their choice of third party storage company and submissions.

35.  As for payment of the proceeds received or to be received by Ds into court, I saw no reason why it should not be ordered when it could not possibly occasion any prejudice to Ds as even on their own case apart from Items 7 and 11 they do not claim any entitlement to the Proceeds.

36.  For completeness, I should record that notwithstanding the joinder of Peretti, I did not see how he was entitled to make submissions and in any event could it affect the interlocutory reliefs granted by me. Regardless of who is ultimately determined as the true owner(s) of the Subject Artworks and the Proceeds, there could be no prejudice to any party if they are preserved by the Preservation Undertaking, for which the Disclosure Undertaking was necessary for its proper enforcement, and orders for delivery up to an independent third party and payment of the Proceeds into court are made.

37.  Given that P more or less succeeded in obtaining all the reliefs sought in the Inter Partes Summons, costs should follow the event. Ds should pay to P the costs of the Inter Parte Summons (including all reserved costs), with certificate for two counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.