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CAMP 92/2018
[2019] HKCA 67
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 92 OF 2018
(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 492/2017)
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| RE: |
SARDAR MD MANIR |
Applicant |
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| Before: Hon Chu JA, Barma JA and Poon JA in Court |
| Date of Handing Down Judgment: 18 January 2019 |
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J U D G M E N T
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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):
1. On 28 September 2018, this court (Chu and Barma JJA) handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Woodcock (“the judge”) on 7 June 2018 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing his appeal from the decisions of the Director of Immigration rejecting his non‑refoulement claim.
2. The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1] We will not repeat them here.
3. The applicant subsequently applied, by a notice of motion dated 29 October 2018, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant stated in his notice of motion that:
“the claims that the judgment has made stated is no substance in the grounds of the application is not true.
on the strength of the grounds not made a complain about the poor performance of his duty lawyer is due of fearing he will be picked out for misappropriating by the adjudicator
the applicant gently did not have enough time to address the bundle rest of the grounds I will submit as soon as possible”
4. Because the applicant failed to comply with the unless order made by the Registrar of Civil Appeals on 31 October 2018, the applicant was debarred from lodging any written submissions and the application was dealt with on paper on the basis of the materials already filed before the court.
5. Having considered the applicant’s notice of motion, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on the papers. We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of his notice of motion.
6. The matters stated by the applicant in his notice of motion do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484. Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters he has raised in his notice of motion. The first paragraph of the notice of motion is vague and lacks particulars. The matter raised in the second paragraph was not relied by the applicant in his notice of appeal. As we have explained before, it is not the practice of the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal on new points that were not canvassed in the hearing before it;[2] nor generally is it the practice of the Court of Final Appeal to grant leave on new fact-sensitive points not argued in the Court of Appeal.[3] The applicant never provided any subsequent document to supplement his notice of motion.
7. We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).
8. For these reasons, the notice of motion dated 29 October 2018 is dismissed.
| (Carlye Chu) |
(Aarif Barma) |
(Jeremy Poon) |
| Justice of Appeal |
Justice of Appeal |
Justice of Appeal |
The applicant acting in person
[1] See [2018] HKCA 648
[2] See Ageas Insurance Co (Asia) Ltd v Lam Hau Wah Inneo, CACV 65/2014, unreported, 19 May 2015, at [7] to [9]; and The Law Society of Hong Kong v A Solicitor, CACV 78/2014, unreported, 10 July 2015, at [4] to [7].
[3] See Flywin Co Ltd v Strong & Associates Ltd (2002) 5 HKCFAR 356 at [39].
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