HONG KONG SHANGHAI (SHIPPING) LTD v. THE OWNERS OF THE SHIP OF VESSEL "EVERGRAND" (Panamanian Flag) AND ANOTHER

1986, No. 108 - 111

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HOEG KONG

HIGH COURT

Admiralty Jurisdiction

____________

Admiralty Action in rem against:
the ship or vessel "CAVALRY" (Panamanian Flag)

___________

JUDGMENT

___________

1. In form I have before me four Admiralty actions in rem brought by the Plaintiffs, Hongkong Shanghai (Shipping) Limited (HSS) and four identical summons arising in each action. The actions concern the following four ships and owners. -

2. The identical summonses taken out in each action are:

3. Underlying all these applications is a much more basic question to which most of the argument has been directed. It is the legality of a loan agreement dated 7th October 1980 made between HSS and the defendants. Both sides for different reasons, asked me to rule upon it. Mr. Waung for the defendants submitted that any order for sale would involve the Court in giving assistance to the enforcement of an illegal contract. He likened the position to that arising on a striking out application. The Court, he argued, could not order any sale without first concluding that the defendants' allegations of illegality were unarguable and must fail. Mr. Sussex for HSS disputed this premise in relation to sale, but he adopted the same approach in his opposition to joinder. His first ground of opposition here was that in law, and upon the undisputed and indisputable facts, the proposed new parties must fail.

4. The matter turns upon the true construction of the Money Lenders Ordinances 1911 and 1980. I have listened to a most careful and detailed argument from counsel to whom I am very much indebted. It raises some interesting and important points of law but as the argument developed, the areas of difference between counsel became comparatively narrow. Elaborate litigation is in train both here and in England, and this is nothing to what could follow. I can see no difference, other than form, between this and the many other reported interlocutory situations where Court had ruled upon complex points of law capable of riving rise to prolonged argument if a sufficient factual foundation existed to enable them to do so. Tho striking out cases such as Rondel v. Worsley⁽¹⁾ and Arenson v. Arenson⁽²⁾ are some examples. Others are Tiverton Ltd. v. Wearwell Ltd.⁽³⁾ per lord Denning, M.R. at p.156 Carl - Zeiss - Stiftung . Rayner(3) ⁽⁴⁾ per Buckley, J. at 908 : Forster v. Outred & Co.⁽⁵⁾ per Dunn, L.J. at p.98 : and European Asian Bank v. Punjab & Sind Bank⁽⁶⁾. I can see no justification or merit in postponement. I accept the parties' invitation, and approach the problem with a view to seeing if the material before me suffices to enable a ruling to be given.

5. Before reciting the circumstances in which the agreement of 7th October came to be made in the form that it was, it is necessary to describe the parties to it. They were :-

6. The persons behind these ocrporations who in fact authorised the making of the agreement were on the one side senior officials of the Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (the Bank) and on the other Messrs. Kwon. The Messrs. Kwon were running a shipping business through single ship Liberian and Panamanian companies and the management company. Prior to 7th October 1980, the Bank had given financial support to their group and certain of the corporate guarantors to enable ships to be built. Such support had been given either in Hong Kong or in Nassau through the Bank's Nassau Branch. In 1980, the Bank decided for fiscal purposes, to move part of its ship finance business off-shore. One of the ironies of this case is that the move came just too early. Had the Bank waited until after 12th December 1980, when the 1980 Money Lending Ordinance came into force, this dispute would have been avoided.

7. The Bank took the following steps: -

The agreement of 7th October 1980

8. The terms of this agreement material for present purposes are: -

9. The agreement also provided for the execution of mortgages by each of the ship owing corporate guarantors for the total of the "outstanding indebtedness” under the agreement. These mortgages contained their own applicable law clauses. In the case of the Panamanian owners, they took the following form: -

The Liberian form contained the equivalent only of (B).

10. The loans provided for by the agreement were duly made. Owing largely to difficulties in the shipping market, the venture did not prosper; and the defendants were soon in financial difficulty. Two further agreements were made namely: -

11. Thereafter the defendants' financial position continued to deteriorate. There were abortive discussions about sales of ships, which produced no agreement on a continuously falling market. The defendants are admittedly in default under the agreement. The present and seemingly indisputable indebtedness exceeds US$100. A chilling schedule of values has been put before me by the defendants, showing the present total value of the fleet to be less than US$32m. On any view tie shortfall is massive. Faced with this as personal guarantors, the Messrs. Kwan have advanced an argument calculated to destroy their commercial credit and reputation for all time. It is that the agreements are all illegal or tainted with illegality by reason of the Hong Kong Money Lenders Ordinances, and further that such repayments as have been made in the past by the defendants are recoverable from HSS.

12. This suggestion sparked proceedings both here and in England. In April the defendants as plaintiffs launched proceedings A1988 of 1986 against HSS; purported to serve HSS in Hong Kong at the office of WSS; and by leave served HSS in the Bahamas. A Statement of Claim was served which conveniently details the defendants'  proposed case on money lending. On 30th May 1980, Mayo J. set aside service in both jurisdictions and dismissed the action. In respect of service out of the jurisdiction, he found that the present defendants did not have a "good and arguable case" within Vitkovice Horni v. Korner⁽⁷⁾. Although he went on to observe that they also had "no prospect of success", this was obiter and not necessary to his decision. In consequence of this ruling on the day following, 31st May, the present Admiralty actions were commenced. This decision is now under appeal.

13. Also in April, HSS, the present plaintiff instituted proceedings before the High Court of Justice in England to enforce the loan agreement, and on 18th April obtained leave from Bingham J. to serve concurrent writs out of the jurisdiction upon all the defendants. The defendants are seeking to set aside this order, but owing to the length of time estimated for that hearing and to the congested state of the lists in London, such application is unlikely to be heard until early next year. The commercial court in London will be invited at the same time to deal with an application for summary judgment by HSS.

14. To complete my narrative of the facts and also in April:-

Money leading

15. On 7th October 1980 the Money renders Ordinance 1911 was in force. This was substantially a reenactment of the English Act of 1900. It was repealed on 12th December 1980 by section 35 of the 1980 Money Lenders Ordinance. Parts II and III of the 1980 Ordinance are the material parts for present purposes. From the operation of these parts certain persons were made exempt by section 3 and schedule 1. They include: "A bank licenced under the Banking Ordinance or any subsidiary thereof". The Bank is so licenced and HSS is a subsidiary. This exemption covers the conduct of HSS after 12th December, but not expressly its conduct when the principal agreement was made. The defendants argued that this was rendered illegal and void by the 1911 Ordinance and this tainted all the later dealings and agreements. This contention stands or fails upon the true construction and ambit of the 1911 Ordinance to which I now turn.

16. It is convenient to start with clause 17.01 of the agreement whereby English law was expressly chosen as the governing law. I shall pass over the technicalities of formal proof of English law in our courts and vice versa, 17 Halsbury's Laws 4th Edition, paras 92 and 103. Apart from the borrowed statute, we have almost no relevant Hong Kong law. I must apply English law under the application of English law Ordinance, Cap. 88. My conclusion will constitute my view of Hong Kong law. That an English judge might reach the same conclusion by the same route is a matter of conjecture, not expectation. I therefore turn to English law upon the basis that it governs in both jurisdictions but accepting that nothing I say has validity outside Hong Kong.

17. English law goes further than many jurisdictions in allowing contracting parties a free choice of their governing proper law subject only to the three qualifications stated by lord Wright in Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Company⁽⁸⁾. These qualifications are:

 

1)    "Bona fide,

2)    Legal,

          and 3)     No reason for avoiding the clause on the ground of public policy".

Upon analysis in argument, it was accepted by counsel that the only relevant exception here was 2). This raises the question whether the 1911 Ordinance could be categorized as an "overriding statute" in the language of Dicey and Morris Conflict of Laws, 10th edition, page 19. Lack of bona fides was not and could not here be alleged Had it been, I would have been happy to have followed the reasoning of Hoare J. in (S.C.) Golden Acres Limited v. Queensland Estates Pty. Limited⁽⁹⁾ at pps 384,5 who considered in succession the construction of the relevant local statute; the proper law of the contract; and the public policy expressed in that statute, and was then able to draw the inference of lack of bona fides. The defendants in effect invite me to follow the same reasoning and strike down the choice of law directly by reference to the statute without such inference. Equally there is no relevant extranecus public policy consideration beyond the Ordinance itself. Policy may be relevant to its construction but no further. It follows that the challenge to clause 17.01 depends upon the true construction and ambit of the 1911 Ordinance.

18. This Ordinance is plainly directed primarily to domestic transactions. Its apparent social purpose is to prevent the exploitation of Hong Kong citizens by Hong Kong loan sharks. Section 2 imposes no direct obligations on parties. It enables the Court, clearly meaning I think the Hong Kong Court, to reopen transactions in certain circumstances. Section 3 positively shouts domesticicy. The money lender must register his name and address : carry on business only under that name: and carry on that business at that address and at no other address. These provisions, and the references to "business of a money lender" there, and in the definition is section 6, plainly refer to business in Hong Kong conducted at one or more Hong Kong address. Section 3 is the penal section, the breach of which renders the contract illegal and unenforceable : Victorian Daylesford Sydicate v. Dott^(l0) and Bonnard v. Dott⁽¹¹⁾. In Shaik Sahied v. Sockalingam Chettiar⁽¹²⁾, Lord Atkin said that the English. Money Lenders Acts were "intended to regulate the exercise in England only of particular activities by providing for registration, licences, procedure and penalties which can only be carried into effect in England itself. Such law is not capable of extension to the Colony" of Straits Settlements. This reasoning applies equally to our Ordinance. So the first condition for its application to any transaction is that the lender should in fact carry on the business of a money lender in Hong Kong.

19. If such condition is satisfied, I think that the mandatory provisions of section 3 of the 1911 Ordinance and section 1(2) of the 1980 Ordinance could have an overriding effect. I accept that the language is much less precisely directed than that to be found in a number of recent English Statutes adopting international conventions especially in relation to the carriage of persons and goods, e.g. Carriage of Passengers by Road Act 1974 Section 1, and Carriage by Railway Act 1972 Section 1. The language is even further removed from the sophisticated two-way effect of section 27 of the Unfair Contracts Act 1977. But this is 1900 drafting, by someone who is unlikely to have had international financing in mind. I think that these two sections would suffice to override even an apparently bona fide but misguided choice of a foreign proper law, in an otherwise purely domestic Hong Kong money lending transaction.

20. The next question is whether every transaction entered into everywhere by a man who is in fact in business in Hong Kong as a money lender falls within the Ordinance. It may be singularly unlikely that the legislature in 1911 had in mind anything comparable to the present agreement, or indeed anything other than domestic Hong Kong transactions; or intended to include under the protective umbrella of its social legislation, Panamanian or Liberian borrowers or shippers. But by what criteria is the purely Hong Kong transaction falling within the ambit of the Ordinance to be judged.

21. Two views are postulated in the authorities and were canvassed in argument namely, geographical location measured by the legislative limits express or implied of the legislature, and proper law. Location was accepted as decisive, and proper law rejected, by the majority of the High Court of Australia in Kays Leasing Corporation Pty. Limited v. Fletcher⁽¹³⁾. So where a hire-purchase agreement was signed by the hirer in New South Wales and by the owner in Victoria, the agreement was made in Victoria and the New South Wales Act was inapplicable. The express Victorian choice of law clause was held irrelevant. The lex loci contractus and its relationship to the legislative boundaries in question may be highly significant. But I share the views of those critics of this decision who say that it is too rigid and narrow, and that location should not be decisive. I cannot for example accept that a contract signing ceremony in Macau would be effective to exclude the Ordinance in an otherwise wholly domestic situation.

22. A similar problem arises with the decision of the Court of Session in Scotland in English v. Donnelly⁽¹⁴⁾. There the majority was able to conclude that a hire purchase agreement signed in Scotland by the hirer and subsequently by the owner in England was "entered into in Scotland" within the words of the Scottish Act. Counsel felt unable to support this and with the greatest respect to those judges, neither can I. I find myself much more in sympathy with the spirit, albeit not with all the language, of the judgment of Lord Sorn, where he points out that this was clearly a Scottish transaction within the legislative intent of the Scottish Act. This seems to me to be another way of saying that in relation to a truly Scottish transaction, the imperative terms of the Scottish Act overrode the choice of law clause. I would respectfully agree with this approach whether or not such choice can be labelled mala fide. I respectfully conclude that both these courts reached the right conclusion, but that it should properly have been reached by the application of the proper law test to which I now turn.

23. The classic formulation of this test is in the judgment of Dixon J. in the Wanganui-Rangitikei Electric Power Board v. the, Australian Mutual Provident Society⁽¹⁵⁾ at P. 601 :-

"The rule is that an enactment describing acts, matters or things in general words, so that, if restrained by no consideration lying outside its expressed meaning, its intended application would be universal, is to be read as confined to what, according to the rules of international law administered or recognised in our Courts, it is within the province of our law to affect or control. The rule is one of construction only, and it may have little or no place where some other restriction is supplied by context or subject matter. But in the absence of any countervailing consideration, the principle is, I think, that general words should not be understood as extending to cases which, according to the ruler; of private international law administered in our Courts, are governed by foreign law. . . . . . . The circumstances of the present case illustrated the soundness of the presumption by which, unless a contrary intention appears, statutory provisions are understood as having no application to matters governed by foreign law".

24. In applying this principle one has first to look to see if the Ordinance contains evidence of a contrary intention. There is no trace of wider intent in. the 1911 Ordinance. If the contract contains a choice of law clause which is challenged, the next task is to ascertain the proper law of the contract by objective standards, by asking "what is the system of law with which the transaction has its closest and most real connection" in the words of Dicey's rule 145, sub-rule 3, p. 769. If the proper law so ascertained is foreign, then the statute has no application. If on the other hand, it is domestic, then the Court has a base from which it ten judge the impact of any allegedly overriding statute, and the validity of the challenge to the bona fides of any selection. No authority has been found in which this principle has been either accepted or rejected in the English court. But it enjoys wide support from the textbook writers, e.g. Dicey p.792 Chitty on Contracts Vol. 1 para. 2074: Philip Wood Law and Practice of International Finance p. 9. It enables the Court to give full and proper weight to location, but avoids the rigidity of treating this as decisive. It does not in my opinion suffer from the defects of avoidance suggested by Kitto J. in the Kays Leasing case⁽¹³⁾ at p. 143. Rather it seems to me to supply the best test of bona fides and the best answer to the problem of avoidance, see Golden Acres v. Queensland Estate⁽⁹⁾ above. It wholly accords with Dicey's rule 149 that "the material or essential validity of a contract is governed by" its proper law. I was invited by both counsel to adopt it, and I have no hesitation in doing so.

25. It follows in my judgment that the 1911 Ordinance does not affect the contract of 7th October 1980 unless two conditions are satisfied, namely :

I now turn to consider each in turn.

(1) Business in Hong Kong

26. The defendants' underlying contention here is that nothing changed in August 1980. Before that, they say they were dealing with Bank personnel in Hong Kong and Nassau, and borrowing from the Bank in both places. Afterwards in effect, they assert that they continued to deal with the same people in Hong Kong. These people, they say, may have purported to act for WSS, but in reality they were conducting HSS business in Hong Kong. They seek partially to lift the corporate veil, but to penetrate back only as far as HSS and not to the Bank itself. In my judgment, this is untenable. A new corporate structure was deliberately created. None of the documentation is asserted to be or can be dismissed as a sham. This new structure established HSS as the lender in relation to the defendants in substitution for and in discharge of the Bank itself both in Hong Kong and in Nassau. I can sae no basis for ignoring this. Equally if I thought it permissible to lift the corporate veil, I do not see how such exercise could properly stop at HSS, and not continue through to the Bank itself with fatal consequences for the defendants.

27. I was referred to a large number of authorities upon the question as to what constitutes carrying on of a business within a jurisdiction sufficient to create a presence there that can be served. The cases are not a complete analogy as they show that an ancilliary business may suffice for this purpose: South India Shipping Corporation v. Export-Import Bank of Korea⁽¹⁶⁾. But where, as here, the business of the principal HSS is alleged to have been conducted here by the went WSS, the critical criteria identified in these authorities are first whether the agent has power to bind the principal contractually, and second whether the possibility of profit exists; Dicey p.188: The World Harmony⁽¹⁷⁾ and Artemis⁽¹⁸⁾ and the other authorities collected there. Here on the face of the agency agreement neither WSS nor HSS enjoyed any such authority. There is nothing anywhere to suggest otherwise. The reference's back to Senior Management of the Bank in Hong Kong from time to time in later years, upon which most reliance was placed by the defendants, serve to confirm not refute this limitation. Secondly with all the loans being advanced and all repayments being made in New York, I can see no prospect of any possible profit (or loss) from money lending being generated in Hong Kong by WSS or anybody.

28. Further in my judgment, and virtually by definition, the conduct of the business of money lending in Hong Kone postulates both the lending of money and the repayment of money in Hong Kong. Under this contract, both events took place in New York. Nowhere in the extensive documentation before me, and more particularly in the Statement of Claim before Mayo, J. and in the notice of appeal from his decision, have the defendants asserted any such behaviour in Hong Kong either by HSS or WSS. The Bank was no doubt well capable of dealing with Hong Kong needs direct. The burden of the defendants' submission was that the negotiation of contracts within the jurisdiction was sufficient to constitute the business of money lending, without lending itself. I do not agree.

29. For these reasons, and judging the matter both upon the indisputable material before me and by the most that is asserted by the defendants, the allegation that HSS was carrying on a money lending business at the material time in Hong Kong in and through WSS has no substance and must fail.

(2) Proper Law

30. On its face, this was a contract by a Baheinian corporation to lend US dollars to a Panamanian corporation in New York, and to be repayable in New York, for onward lending to a group of Panamanian and Liberian corporations. The loan is guaranteed by this group of foreign corporations plus a Hong Kong management company and two individuals who give not a residential but a "c/o" address in Hong Kong. The transaction is almost entirely foreign. Any argument in favour of Hong Kong as the objective proper law has to ignore the offshore move in the summer of 1980 and the deliberate choice of a Bahamian company as lender. The only significant Hong Kong connections are the fact that the terms were negotiated here, and that the documentation was drafted and signed here on behalf of the defendants. But the contract was not made here. It may have bound initially when HSS permitted the first draw-down in New York on 7th October. Ultimately it bound when it was signed by HSS in the Bahamas. In this type of monetary situation two of the factors crucial to any objective determination of the proper law are the place of the lender's business and the place where the money is lent and is repayable: see Re United Railways of Havana⁽¹⁹⁾, eg Per Lord Denning p. 1068 Rossano v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co.⁽²⁰⁾: and the interest cases collected in Dicey rule 166 p. 903. On any view a debt is most closely connected with its location chosen by the parties. Upon no objective consideration in my judgment can the proper law of this contract be said to be the law of Hong Kong. It was that of New York or possibly the Bahamas, it matters not.

31. In my judgment therefore, neither of the pre-conditions necessary to the application of this Ordinance are satisfied. I accordingly rule that the contract of 7th October 1980 was not a money lending contract within the meaning or ambit of the Moneylending Ordinance 1911, which accordingly has no overriding effect to displace the parties express choice of law therein.

32. Since this matter will no doubt be taken further, I should also deal with two additional arguments raised by HSS against the application of the Ordinance.

33. The first is based upon section 6(b) of the Ordinance and the Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Ordinance, Cap. 70. Section 6(b) exempts from the Ordinance "any body corporate ..... empowered by any Ordinance ..... to lend money in accordance with such ordinance". The Bank Ordinance is a public statute, and its affairs are regulated by that and the subsidiary Regulations. The latter constitute its Memorandum of Association. Paragraph 3 defines its objects as including the lending of money (a) and empowers the Bank to pursue such objects through other companies and subsidiaries (d)(e)(u), and "in any part of the world ..... as principal agent ..... contractor ..... or in any other capacity whatever" (v). Section 5 of the Bank Ordinance empowers the Bank :

"To carry on and effect all or any of its objects at any of its establishments, that is to say at its head office and also at its present branches, agencies and sub-agencies, and also at any additional branches, agencies and sub-agencies, whether in the Colony or elsewhere which may hereafter be established".

34. The defendants contend that the banking exception in section 6 is (c) and that (b) was never intended to cover this sort of situation at all. But I cannot speculate as to this. I can only construe and apply the words used. HSS and WSS are corporations. They are in fact respectively the agent and sub-agent of the Bank. In view of the breath of language in which the objects are expressed, I can see no reason to limit “agencies” to businesses conducted only in the Bank's name. Both are participating or assisting in part of the Bank's business, namely, in the phraseology of the agency agreements "ship financing". I would therefore hold that they are both "establishments" within the meaning of section 5. It follows in my judgment that at the material date, HSS was exempt from the provisions of the 1911 Ordinance, and upon this further ground, the defendants' illegality contention is ill-founded.

35. The 2nd argument is based upon section 36 of the 1980 Ordinance. To test it illegality under the 1911 Ordinance must be assumed. This would at least render the agreement unenforceable (I deliberately avoid using the word void) MacKender v. Feldia⁽²¹⁾. The contention is that section 36 operates to restore it. I cannot agree. There is a presumption against giving any retrospective effect to a statute, Lauri v. Renad⁽²²⁾, and Craies Statute Law 7th Edition 387. The presumption is at its strongest and the need for plain and unambiguous language the clearest "when a new enactment is said to convert an act wrongfully done at the time into a legal act, and to deprive the person injured of the remedy which the law then gave him" per Lord Watson in Young v. Adams⁽²³⁾. There are here no express words to that effect at all. The language used can readily be construed as having future effect upon past agreements which in fact subsisted on 12th December 1980. I think I have probably had the benefit of more comprehensive argument upon this problem than Mayo, J. or Jackson-Lipkin, J. may have received, but in any event I must respectfully dissent from their apparent conclusions to the contrary. I therefore reject HSS's argument under this head and return to the subject matter of the particular summons.

Joinder

36. The mortgages permit HSS to pursue its remedies thereunder against the ships by actions in rem wherever they may be found. That is what HSS has done in Hong Kong and Rotterdam. Clause 17.01 of the principal agreement enables HSS to select the English courts as the appropriate forum for the application of the English governing law in any action in personam to determine underlying contractual rights. The Hong Kong proceedings in rem involved in my judgment, no breach of contract such as the defendants alleged. These actions enable each individual defendant prima facie to plead by way of defence the alleged illegality of the "outstanding indebtedness" and to counterclaim. If such a step were taken, it would be clear that the legality of the agreement would be a common question arising between HSS and the defendants within 0.15, r.6(2).

37. It is not in issue that I should apply the same principles that have been applied by courts faced with contractual choice of jurisdiction clauses on applications for a stay of proceedings within the jurisdiction; leave to serve out of the jurisdiction; or more rarely applications to restrain proceedings out of the jurisdiction. A considerable weight of authority has been put before me including The Fehmarn⁽²⁴⁾ : MacKender v. Feldia⁽²¹⁾: The Chapparal⁽²⁵⁾: The Lisboa⁽²⁶⁾ The Eleftheria⁽²⁷⁾: and The E. L. Amria⁽²⁸⁾. I have also considered the forum conveniens cases culminating in The Abidin Daver⁽²⁹⁾.

38. My conclusions are as follows:

The arrests

1. Setting aside

39. A plaintiff making an ex parte application for the arrest of a ship has a duty to make "full disclosure of the material facts to the Court" per Robert Goff, L.J. in The Andria renamed Vasso⁽³⁰⁾. These actions are brought under section 20(2)(c) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 to enforce claims under mortgages. For this purpose, and formalities apart, the substantial matter an applicant has to show is a prima facie valid mortgage and an outstanding indebtedness. This, the applicant plainly did. Indeed it is admitted that subject only to the illegality argument, no possible ground existed for refusing arrest.

40. Notwithstanding this, the matters said to constitute sufficient non-disclosure to justify the setting aside of each arrest are: -

41. In my judgment the defendants are simply grasping at straws and there is no substance in these allegations at all.

2. Release

42. The defendants invite me to release all the ships to enable them to continue trading on credit with HSS money and to the detriment of the security without offering any security at all. The proposition has simply to be stated to be rejected.

Sale Pendente Lite

43. In my judgment the alleged illegality presents no obstacle, and it is unnecessary to consider the technical question of enforcement. On the figures before me, the whole fleet has lost 2/3 rds of its value over three years. It cannot be assumed that the market has bottomed out. The net return from the ships will continue to fall by reason of some further depreciation and the costs of upkeep. This decline can only be arrested by sale. In the light of past disagreements, no sale will occur without an order of the Court. In The Barenbels⁽³¹⁾ at p. 392 Sheen J. said that it was "the hallmark of an action in rem" that the owner had to put up security and obtain the release of the ship: or "take no action and allow the ship to be sold". There must be orders for appraisement and sale in all cases, and I will hear counsel upon the appropriate ancillary relief.

(1) (1969) 1 A.C. 191
(2) (1977) A.C. 405
(3) (1975) C.H. 145
(4) (1969) 3 All E.R. 897
(5) (1982) 1 W.L.R. 86
(6) (1983) 2 All E.R. 508
(7) (1951) A.C. 869
(8) (1939) A.C. 277 at p.290
(9) (1969) Qd. L.R. 378
(10) (1905) 1 Ch 624
(11) (l906) 1 Ch 740.
(12) (1933) A.C. 342, 346
(13) (1964) 116 C.L.R. 124
(14) (1958) S.C. 494
(15) (1934) 50 C.L.R. 581
(13) (1964) 116 C.L.R. 124
(16) (1985) 1 WLR 585
(17) (1967) P. 341
(18) (1983) HKLR 364
(19) (1961) A.C. 1007
(20) (1963) 2 Q.B. 352
(21) (1962) 2 Q.B. 590, 601
(22) (1892) 3 Ch 402 per Lindley M.R. 421
(23) (1898) AC 469, 476 (p.c.)
(24) (1958) 1 All E.R.333
(25) (1868) 2 Lloyds Rep.158
(26) (1980) 2 Lloyds Rep.546.
(27) (1970) P.94
(28) (1981) 2 Lloyds Rep.119
(29) (1984) A.C. 398
(30) (1984) 1 Q.B. 477, 492
(31) (1984) 2 Lloyds Rep. 388