HKSAR v. WU JING

DCCC 495/2025

[2026] HKDC 247

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CRIMINAL CASE NO 495 OF 2025

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REASONS FOR SENTENCE

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1.  Mr Wu pleaded guilty before me to one charge of Dealing with property known or believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offence, contrary to section 25(1) and (3) of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance, Cap 455. Particulars are that he, between 7 August 2024 and 23 December 2024, both dates inclusive, in Hong Kong, together with other person(s), knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that property, namely a total sum of $250,000 United States currency, and $2,100 Hong Kong currency, in the bank account with Dah Sing Bank Limited held in the name of Pudu Limited, account number 625018230578, in whole or in part directly or indirectly represented any person’s proceeds of an indictable offence, dealt with the said property.

Facts admitted by Mr Wu

2.  On 27 September 2024, a sum of USD250,000 was remitted from overseas to a bank account held in the name of Pudu Limited and numbered 625018230578 with Dah Sing Bank Limited (“the Account”).

3.  The opening mandate and records of the Account showed:

(a) The Account was opened on 6 August 2024 and it was a multi-currency account;

(b) Mr Wu was the sole signatory of the Account;

(c) E-banking service was applied for;

(d) Transactions in USD and HKD were recorded between 7 August 2024 and 27 September 2024 with the following details:

(i) There were no transactions in USD between 7 August and 26 September 2024 and there were no transactions in HKD between 7 August and 22 September 2024;

(ii) A sum of HKD800 and a sum of HKD1,300 were transferred to the Account by way of FPS on 23 and 26 September 2024 respectively; a sum of HKD166 was transferred out through E-banking on 25 September 2024;

(iii) A sum of USD250,000 was remitted into the Account on 27 September 2024 and on the same day a sum of USD249,990 (equivalent to HKD1,941,131.10) was then exchanged to HKD;

(iv) A total sum of HKD1,940,000 was transferred out by E-banking by 4 separate transactions on 27 September 2024;

(v) No other transactions were recorded between 28 September and 23 December 2024; and

(vi) As at the date of closing of the Account, ie 23 December 2024, the balance of the Account remained at USD1 and HKD2,697.10.

4.  On 6 December 2024, Mr Wu was intercepted when he entered Hong Kong through Lowu Control Point.  He was arrested and cautioned.

5.  In the subsequent interview, Mr Wu admitted under caution that:

(a) In around August 2024, his friend told him that he could gain a reward of HKD3,000 for opening a bank account in Hong Kong;

(b) He met an unknown man, whom he did not have any means to contact, in Shenzhen a day before going to Hong Kong; they came to Hong Kong together to open the Account;

(c) He attended a bank to open the Account and he signed all the documents as directed;

(d) All the signatures shown on the account opening mandate were his signatures;

(e) The copy identity documents enclosed with the opening mandate came from his identity documents; and

(f) He did not have control over the Account.

6.  Immigration record showed Mr Wu entered and left Hong Kong respectively at 8:09 am and 4:57 pm on 6 August 2024.

7.  Mr Wu now admits that he together with other person(s) knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that the property specified under the charge, in whole or in part directly or indirectly represented proceeds of an indictable offence, dealt with the said property.

Criminal record

8.  Mr Wu has a clear record in Hong Kong.

Antecedents

9.  Mr Wu is aged 38 (37 at the time of the offence), a Mainlander and a pharmaceutical warehouse worker.  Mr Wu was living in Jiangsu Province.

Mitigation

10.  Mr Robert Chan of counsel assigned by the Director of Legal Aid mitigated on behalf of Mr Wu.  The following is a summary of the mitigation submissions.

11.  Mr Wu had no idea about any of the banking transactions in the account. However, he confirms he knew the account would be receiving monies which he had reason to believe were proceeds of crime.

12.  Mr Wu is educated to college level.  He is divorced, has a son now aged 9.  He had been employed as a warehouse worker in the Mainland, earning about RMB5,000 a month.

13.  Mr Wu has a clear record in Hong Kong.

14.  Money laundering is a serious offence carrying a maximum imprisonment sentence of 14 years.

15.  As said by the Court of Appeal in HKSAR v Boma [2012] 2 HKLRD 33, there is no sentencing guideline for money laundering offences.  However, the Court did provide a list of relevant sentencing factors for consideration, at para 40.

16.  In HKSAR v Hsu Yu Yi [2010] 5 HKLRD 545, the Court of Appeal pointed out at para 13 a number of factors, including that it was the amount of money involved, not the amount of benefit received by a defendant, which is a major sentencing consideration.  Further, a defendant’s level of participation is relevant, as is the length of time the offence lasted.  The Court also set out the amounts of money involved in the sentences imposed in a number of money laundering cases in the past.  A starting point of 3 years or so was taken when the black money involved was between HK$1m and HK$2m.  This range was confirmed by the Court in HKSAR v Wan Kwok Keung [2012] 1 HKLRD 201 at para 15.

17.  In the present case, Mr Wu thought he could make quick money of HK$3,000 by coming to Hong Kong to open the account.  There was no planning on his part. He just did as he had been directed, entering Hong Kong on 6 August 2024, and signing the relevant paperwork at the bank to open the account.  The account was held in the name of Pudu Limited.  From the company’s records, Pudu Limited was incorporated in Hong Kong on 22 July 2024, and Mr Wu was the only director and one of the two founder members (Mr Wu had 99% shareholding).  Before Mr Wu came to Hong Kong to open the account, he provided his personal particulars to somebody for the purpose of opening a company for trading purposes.  Mr Wu did not know the name of Pudu Limited until he reached the bank in Hong Kong to open the account.

18.  Mr Wu did not use the account at all.  It was his friend (or perhaps someone on his behalf, eg the unknown man who accompanied him to open the account) who operated the account.  Mr Wu therefore did not know who had deposited money into the account, or even where any part of the withdrawn money had gone.

19.  There is no evidence of any predicate offence or criminal syndicate. Nor was there any international element (despite much of the tainted money being USD).  Further, it cannot be said that the money laundering involved elaborate steps or (fraudulent) schemes.  There were a relatively small number of transactions.  The total deposits in terms of HKD amount to HK$1,943,308.75.  The actual money laundering occurred over the course of a few days (in September 2024).  Mr Wu’s role was limited to coming to Hong Kong to open the account, which was for someone else to use.  Mr Wu went back home to the Mainland on the same day he opened the account.

20.  Mr Wu did not receive any of the tainted money in the account or any reward/ remuneration for opening the account.

21.  Mr Wu asks for leniency.  He regrets his action, and wishes to rejoin his young son and lead a law-abiding life after serving his sentence.

22.  Mr Chan invited the court to take a starting point no higher than 3 years’ imprisonment and asked for the customary one-third discount for timely guilty plea.

23.  Mr Chan will not oppose the sentence enhancement request of the prosecution.  However, it was submitted that the quantum of enhancement should not be more than 20%, having regard to previous cases involving stooges (ie people who lent or sold their bank accounts to criminals without further involvement).  Mr Chan cited three District Court sentencing cases in support, namely:

(a) HKSAR v Xiang Juan [2024] HKDC 512, paras 13-17, 21-25;

(b) HKSAR v Zhang Hongping [2025] HKDC 603, para 17; and

(c) HKSAR v Chan Ho Yin & Anor [2025] HKDC 1900, paras 19, 20, 23, 24, 27.

24.  On behalf of Mr Wu, Mr Chan submitted a mitigation letter written in Chinese (with English translation) by Mr Wu himself.  The contents are generally that he committed the offence out of greed and ignorance; that he is regretful and remorseful and promises never to re-offend.  Mr Wu asked for a chance for reform and a lenient sentence.

25.  Upon invitation by the court, Mr Chan submitted that coming to Hong Kong specifically to open a bank account for future money laundering activities should not be treated as an aggravating factor because the offence was not yet completed.

Sentence

26.  For the factors which Mr Chan has garnered on behalf of Mr Wu, I am minded to take a lowish starting point in this case.  I am particularly influenced by the fact that the transactions (which were few) took place only on a few days in September 2024.  The initial starting point that I shall adopt in Mr Wu’s case is 2 years 9 months’ imprisonment.

27.  However, I cannot ignore the fact that Mr Wu came to Hong Kong on 6 August 2024 specifically to open the bank account which later became the instrument for money laundering.  For this, I shall add 3 months to reach a final starting point of 3 years’ imprisonment.

28.  Mr Wu pleaded guilty in good time earning for himself the full 1/3 sentencing discount.  There are no other mitigating factors of weight to justify another sentence reduction.

29.  Prosecution applied to furnish information under section 27(2) of OSCO, Cap 455.  Defence has no objection.  I duly received the statement of CIP Li Yiu Nam dated 22 January 2026.

30.  By notice of intention under OSCO, prosecution sought for an enhanced sentence on Mr Wu on two bases, namely:

(a) Prevalence of money laundering offence; and

(b) The nature and extent of any harm, whether direct or indirect, caused to the community by recent occurrences of money laundering offence.

31.  Mr Chan does not oppose enhancement of sentence but submitted that the extent of enhancement should not be over 20%.

32.  On the subject of prevalence, in Table A on page 5 of the statement, it is said that the number of stooges (those who allow others to use their newly-opened or existing accounts for money laundering purpose) arrested in year 2024 stood at 7,883 while the corresponding figure (projected) for year 2025 stood at 5,482.  Whilst this represented a drop of 30%, the absolute figure is still a substantial one when compared with the absolute figures over past few years (rising from 760 in year 2020 steadily to a crest of 7,883 in year 2024).

33.  I am satisfied the use of stooges in money laundering and by implication the offence of money laundering is still prevalent in 2025.

34.  On the subject of harm, in Table B on pages 6-7 of the statement, it is said that the amount of reported losses in local deception cases (detected with arrest) involving subsequent money laundering of crime proceeds came to $2,429.63M (projected) for the whole of year 2025; that in the same year (projected for the full year) the amount of reported losses in both local and overseas deception cases and/or proceeds laundered locally (all types only those cases detected with arrest) involving local stooge accounts came to $2,010.46M.

35.  One can see that the two amounts stated in the foregoing paragraph are huge numbers.

36.  Harm to the community is not restricted to the amount of reported losses in local deception cases.

37.  According to para 18 of the statement, the anti-money laundering regime in Hong Kong is hampered by the Prevalence of Stooge Accounts (“PSA”) for money laundering activities in that:

(a) PSA interferes with the normal operation of the banking system, having a negative effect on the reputation of Hong Kong as a well-known international financial hub;

(b) PSA forms multiple layers of “shields” concealing the identity of the masterminds behind, making it difficult, if not impossible, for police to identify the masterminds behind;

(c) PSA substantially facilitates the commission of crimes and in turn leads to more crimes being committed, as the mastermind[s] could easily get away from their criminal liability;

(d) PSA makes money laundering easier, which allows culprits to make use of their ill-gotten gains to extend their sphere to engage in a wider range of illegal activities;

(e) PSA means that law enforcement agencies have to put in more investigation efforts and resources; and

(f) People with low income or less awareness of the consequences of selling their bank accounts are more likely to be lured by the culprits to take the risks of commission of crimes to surrender their accounts for monetary reward.

38.  Because of the huge amount in the year 2025 of reported losses (overseas and local) and/or proceeds laundered locally involving local stooge accounts, I can readily infer PSA for recent money laundering activities.

39.  It is apparent from para 18 of the statement that PSA is another source of harm to the community.  Together with the amount of reported losses in local deception cases in 2025, it can therefore not be gainsaid that the harm caused to the community by recent occurrences of money laundering offence must be substantial.

40.  I am satisfied that my sentence enhancement power is engaged under section 27(11) of OSCO, Cap 455, under both the prevalence basis and the harm basis.  I am of the view that a 20% enhancement is sufficient to pose as the extra deterrence needed given the state of the statistics.  As an act of mercy, I shall discard the decimal places after calculation of sentence in terms of months.

(Mr Wu, please stand)

41.  The sentence is 28 months’ imprisonment.