RE RIZWAN RAJA

CACV 268/2018

[2019] HKCA 283

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 268 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 557/2017)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 20 December 2018, this court (Barma JA and Yau J) handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Woodcock (“the judge”) on 14 June 2018 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing his appeal from the decisions of the Director of Immigration rejecting his non‑refoulement claim.

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1]  We will not repeat them here.

3.  The applicant subsequently applied, by a Notice of Motion dated 27 December 2018, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant stated in his Notice of Motion that:

“I would like to inform Court of Appeal there is some error in law decision. Decision maker just relied COI Information and my previous facts which were fear on reject my claim actual life occur different situation than mentioned COI Information. The decision is betray a bias and formula approach unlikely fair access the danger of my life and clearly calculate to reject my claim my concern in the attached. Please look into my matter thank you very much for your understanding about my case and about my situation. Bundle of thanks.”

4.  In compliance with the directions of the court, the applicant lodged a written submission in support of his application on 10 January 2019.  In his written submission, the applicant stated the incidents giving rise to his claim.  He also provided three “Grounds for Review”:

“1. Against the decision of the Director of Immigration and the Torture Claims Appeal Board. Their decision lacks fairness and without proper and thorough investigation and questions raised are of discriminatory nature and unrelated to my verbal explanations and answers.

2. Against the High Court for refusing the leave for judicial review based on the incomplete observations and unreasonable grounds. The material, claims and evidence were not analysed fairly and carefully. The oral hearing’s judgment lacks the true picture of the claim of the applicant.

3. I want oral hearings to be interpreted in my native language which is Punjabi instead of Urdu.”

5.  Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion and written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on the papers.  We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of his Notice of Motion and written submission.

6.  The matters stated by the applicant in his Notice of Motion and written submission do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484.  Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters he has raised in his Notice of Motion and his written submission. 

7.  We have held at [14] of our judgment that judicial review proceedings are not avenues of further appeal from the Board’s decision.  The applicant’s complaints against the Board and the Director of Immigration do not give rise to reasonably arguable grounds of appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

8.  As for the contention that the refusal of leave for judicial review was based on incomplete observation and unreasonable grounds, this contention is very vague and lacks particulars.  This ground is also not reasonably arguable before the Court of Final Appeal.

9.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

10.  For these reasons, the Notice of Motion dated 27 December 2018 is dismissed.