HO CHIU KING PANSY CATILINA v. CHEN PAN YU STEFFI

HCA 528/2026

[2026] HKCFI 5516

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 528 OF 2026

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BETWEEN

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REASONS FOR DECISION

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Introduction and Background

1.  Two applications were made by the Plaintiff (“P”):

(1) For judgment in default of defence pursuant to O.19, r.7 of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A (“RHC”) by Summons dated 30 June 2026 (“Default Judgment Summons”); and

(2) For an interim injunction pursuant to O.29, r.1 of RHC, s.21L of the High Court Ordinance, Cap. 4 and the court’s inherent jurisdiction by Summons dated 2 April 2026 (“Interim Injunction Summons”).

2.  In P’s Skeleton Submission, it was indicated that if the Default Judgment Summons is allowed, P proposes that the Interim Injunction Summons be adjourned sine die with liberty to restore. However, in oral submissions, it was confirmed that if default judgment is entered and the action thereby comes to an end, there is no longer any need for any interim injunction, P would be prepared to withdraw the Interim Injunction Summons. Leave to withdraw the Interim Injunction Summons has been granted.

3.  By Writ of Summons dated 30 March 2026 (“the Writ”), P commenced the present action against D seeking various injunctive relief and damages to be assessed. In the Statement of Claim dated 26 May 2026 (“SOC”), essentially, it is pleaded that:

(1) P is a high profile and well-renowned businesswoman who holds, amongst others, the positions of Chairperson and Executive Director of MGM China Holdings Limited (“MGM China”) and Group Executive Chairman and Managing Director of Shun Tak Holdings Limited (“Shun Tak”), government and non-governmental positions in Hong Kong, Macau, the Mainland and overseas;

(2) The Defendant (“D”) is a Hong Kong resident. She is the sole director and shareholder of InsightCore Limited (“InsightCore”), a company incorporated in Hong Kong since November 2024;

(3) D is not known to P and to the best of P’s knowledge, has never met D;

(4) Since around March 2025, D has pursued a course of conduct against P which amounts to harassment and/or intimidation including:

(a) Repeatedly emailing senior management from MGM China and its controlling shareholder, MGM Resorts International, in March 2025, falsely alleging that P had since late 2024 offered D a job as Head of Bond Financing of MGM China but that P had informed her that P’s sister, Daisy prevented her from being onboarded at MGM China;

(b) Delivering to MGM China’s Macau office on 8 April 2025 a fabricated invoice issued by InsightCore dated 31 March 2025, addressed to P at Shun Tak’s office, demanding payment of HK$20M for alleged business and consultancy services when in fact D has never been engaged by P, MGM China or Shun Tak;

(c) Sending at least one email to P’s MGM China email on 17 April 2025 forwarding an excerpt from a news article regarding Hong Kong National Security Education Day;

(d) Emailing MGM China’s senior management on 11 April 2025 and 25 April 2025 requesting an in-person meeting with P or her team in Macau and repeating her false allegations that she had been offered employment with MGM China by P;

(e) Causing Messrs P C Woo & Co (“P C Woo”) to send a letter of demand to P’s solicitors on 12 September 2025 (“Demand Letter”) falsely claiming that HK$21.26M is due and payable by P to D in respect of consultancy services performed since 2024 and an offer of employment with MGM China which was withdrawn in April 2025. In the letter, D reserved her rights including to bring legal action against P and make public her false allegations;

(f) Hand delivering to P, at MGM China’s Hong Kong office, on 23 September 2025 a further demand letter along with a draft writ of summons purportedly drafted by Messrs Hill Dickinson (“Draft Writ”);

(g) Hand delivering the Demand Letter and the Draft Writ to the home of P’s late sister (“Maisy”) on around 2 October 2025;

(h) Falsely alleging that P was a client, colleague or business partner of D in the correspondence from Messrs Payne Velasco Solicitors (“Payne Velasco”), hand delivered to P at Shun Tak’s Hong Kong office, on 5 January 2026 which included a statutory declaration of D dated 2 January 2026 which stated that a Mr To Sing, officer of Bank of Communications Co Ltd, had falsely been informing people that he knew D, was a close friend and professional connection to D or her business;

(i) Attending the premises of Shun Tak’s Macau office on 3 March 2026 asking to see P and Maisy, asking whether P had received her statutory declaration and letter, and repeating her false allegation that the purpose of her visit concerned a consulting fee arrangement;

(j) Instructing Payne Velasco to prepare a demand letter to Mr To in March 2026 repeating inter alia the false allegation that D was engaged by P to provide business advisory services for a fee of HK$20M, Mr To had approached P and her family representing himself as D’s business associate, agent or representative and collected yet misappropriated the HK$20M;

(k) Instructing P C Woo to issue a letter on 20 March 2026 falsely alleging inter alia that P and some of her family member had reached an amicable settlement with D by payment of HK$20M and a cheque for this amount would be issued and given to D via a partner at P C Woo;

(5) By reasons of the above conduct, P has suffered loss and damages, including emotional distress and pecuniary loss of no less than US$229,057.46, to be assessed;

(6) P also seeks an injunction restraining D from directly or indirectly carrying out the following acts:

(a) Causing, pursuing or permitting any course of conduct which amounts to or involves, directly or indirectly, harassment of P;

(b) Causing or permitting trespass to the properties owned directly or indirectly by P;

(c) Entering, remaining at or coming within a distance of 30 metres of the Hong Kong offices of MGM China and Shun Tak;

(d) Approaching or contacting P, directly or indirectly, whether by telephone or email or otherwise; and

(e) Causing or permitting the printing, producing, circulating, distributing, sending, emailing, transmitting or otherwise publishing any materials containing false, defamatory or derogatory remarks about P.

4.  Notwithstanding I was satisfied from the various affirmations of service that D was properly served the SOC on 26 May 2026 and other court documents since then, and had notice of the substantive hearing before me: (1) D failed to file any defence by the deadline of 23 June 2026 or at all; and (2) notwithstanding the directions given by DHCJ MK Liu on 17 April 2026, D had not filed any evidence to oppose the Interim Injunction Summons.

5.  Mr Charles Manzoni SC, counsel for P, appeared for P. D appeared, unrepresented, in person.

6.  At the end of the substantive hearing, I granted default judgment and made an order in terms of the Draft Order submitted to me as amended by me. These are my reasons for doing so.

Applicable principles

7.  The applicable principles for default judgment under O.19, r.7 of RHC are well-settled. The power to grant judgment under O.19, r.7 is discretionary. The court is required to scrutinize whether the matters pleaded in the Statement of Claim entitle the plaintiff to the judgment sought. The court’s decision is made on the basis of pleaded facts, rather than on evidence. This is because where no defence is filed, the court will assume that the Statement of Claim has been impliedly admitted. See Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026, Vol.1, §§19/2/1, 19/7/11 and 19/7/14.

8.  It is also well-established that the court has jurisdiction to grant permanent injunctions in an application for default judgment: see Times Square Limited v Lee Kwun Kit trading as JL Music & Ors [2020] HKCFI 438 at §14(5) per DHCJ William Wong SC; Biostime International Investment Ltd v France Heson Paper (Hong Kong) Co Ltd [2015] 2 HKLRD 658, §§12-13 per DHCJ Paul Lam SC and Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026, Vol.1, §19/7/17.

9.  As for the common law tort of harassment, the existence of which has most recently been recognized by the Court of Final Appeal in Sir Elly Kadoorie & Sons Limited v Samantha Jane Bradley [2026] HKCFA 2, the ingredients of the tort which were summarized by Chow JA giving the judgment of the Court in [2024] 4 HKLRD 428 (at §32) was approved (subject to one point) by the Court of Final Appeal at §176:

“In summary, in the present state of the development of the tort of harassment in Hong Kong, in order to make out a cause of action in this tort, the victim of harassment has to show that:

(1) the harasser, directly or through third parties, has, by a course of sufficiently repetitive, unreasonable and oppressive conduct, caused, and which he ought reasonably to know would cause, worry, alarm, emotional distress or annoyance to the victim;

(2) the conduct complained of must, objectively, amount to harassment (in the ordinary sense of that word);

(3) the harasser either intends to cause harm or injury to the victim by his harassing conduct, or is reckless as to whether the victim would suffer harm or injury as a result of the harassing conduct; and

(4) to complete the tort, the victim must have suffered actual damage caused by the harassment. For this purpose, physical harm, including anxiety, distress, (a fortiori) recognised psychiatric illness, and financial loss would suffice.”

10.  At §177, Lam PJ and Lord Neuberger, held that they would characterize the above as a “good working definition” of the ingredients of the tort of harassment as they did not want to close off the possibility of the courts in the future refining or even altering this definition as a result of experience and that the final component requires a little refinement (namely that apart from financial loss, the plaintiff must suffer some distress or worse as a result of the defendant’s actions): see §§185-188.

11.  As for the tort of intimidation, it involves three elements: (1) unlawful threat; (2) intention to cause harm to the claimant with the threat; and (3) damage to the claimant: see Lau Tat Wai v Yip Lai Kuen Joey [2013] 2 HKLRD 1197 at §43 per Anthony Chan J (as he then was).

Discussion and Disposition

12.  Notwithstanding D did not file any skeleton submissions contrary to PD 5.4 and I was entitled not to allow D to pursue any submissions not advanced in a skeleton argument filed at least 48 hours before the hearing, exceptionally, I indulged D and heard her submissions. In gist, the following arguments were made:

(1) She strongly believed that P did not sign the Statement of Truth. Comparing P’s signature with filings with P’s signature in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, the signature seems to be very different. It is suspected someone forged the signature on the Statement of Truth;

(2) There was no attestation and verification of P’s signature by an independent lawyer or third party;

(3) In P’s Affirmation dated 2 April 2026, it was stated that it was affirmed at an address in Hong Kong but she believes that P was not in Hong Kong on that day;

(4) She had sent multiple emails and messages to P’s solicitors to seek that they provide authority to prove that they acted for P but to date she had received no such authority or proof; and

(5) As she did not believe P’s solicitors were authorised by P to bring this action and there was “identity fraud”, she did not file any defence.

13.  Given the very serious allegations made of forgery including also serious allegations against officers of the court (who witnessed P’s signature on P’s Affirmation and who prepared and signed on the SOC and other court documents as representing P) which is unsupported by any evidence besides what is merely asserted from the Bar table, I do not believe that D’s submissions disclose any arguable defence to P’s claims.

14.  Furthermore, there is simply no legal basis or requirement for the complaint that P’s signature on the Statement of Truth has to be witnessed or verified by an independent solicitor. Nor is there any evidentiary basis to cast doubt on P’s solicitors’ and counsel’s authority to act on behalf of P as to require them to provide proof of their authority: see Grant Thornton International Limited & Ors v Tang Chung Wah & Anor (unrep) HCMP 1510/2013, 11 July 2013 at §37.

15.  Having carefully scrutinized the SOC and considered the submissions of Mr Manzoni, I am of the view that the ingredients of the tort of harassment have been properly pleaded and are impliedly admitted in default of defence. See SOC, §47 where it is pleaded that:

(1) D has engaged in repetitive, unreasonable and oppressive conduct against P;

(2) D knew or ought to have known that her conduct would and in fact did cause distress to P;

(3) D intended and did in fact cause such harm and injury to P by D’s harassing conduct; and

(4) By reason of D’s conduct, P has suffered emotional distress, anxiety, worry and/or annoyance and pecuniary loss.

16.  I am also satisfied that P has properly pleaded the elements of the tort of intimidation which are impliedly admitted. See SOC, §48 where it is pleaded that:

(1) D has made unlawful threats against P to bring legal proceedings on the basis of false claims in respect of P and her family and business associates, and to thereby publicize such false claims. D has done so to coerce P to pay D HK$20M or more;

(2) D knew or ought to have known that her conduct would and in fact did cause harm and injury to P when P had informed D multiple times that her claims and allegations were false and requested D to cease her conduct. P also specifically informed through P’s lawyers that D’s conduct was causing P distress; and

(3) P has suffered damage as result of D’s harassing conduct as already mentioned above.

17.  I am further satisfied that based on the matters pleaded, P is entitled to the injunctive relief sought. D has demonstrated a propensity to repeatedly attempt to contact P and her family and business associates to make false allegations against P which is causing ongoing distress and harm to P. Unless being restrained, there is a real prospect of D continuing with the harassing conduct and therefore a permanent injunction should be granted. A prohibitory injunction in the circumstances is an appropriate remedy to prevent the continuation or repetition of the tortious acts in the future and/or where damages are an inadequate remedy: see e.g. Lau Tat Wai at §79; Lin Man Yuan v Kin Ming Holdings International Limited & Anor (unrep) HCA 216/2008, 3 June 2015, per Lok J at §261; and Ho Frederick Kwok Lung & Anor v Lam Ping [2021] HKDC 1431 per DDJ Charles Wong at §39.

18.  I am also satisfied that it has been pleaded in the SOC that P suffered pecuniary loss in the sum of US$229,057.46 by reason of D’s conduct. Mr Manzoni confirmed that P does not pursue special damages over and beyond US$229,057.46 nor aggravated and exemplary damages so there will be no need for an order for assessment of damages.

19.  As for costs, this should follow the event. D should pay the costs of and occasioned by this action including the Default Judgment Summons on a party to party basis to be taxed if not agreed. Whilst it should not be thought that this court condones the breach of PD and the making of serious allegations of forgery or other claims without evidence, I am not satisfied that this case has some “special or unusual feature” justifying an order requiring D to pay for the costs of the entire action including the present application on an indemnity basis.