RE DIANITA ROHMAH

CACV 157/2023, [2025] HKCA 929

On appeal from [2023] HKCFI 1209

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 157 OF 2023

(ON AN APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 793 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Chu VP (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 13 June 2025, this court handed down a judgment ([2025] HKCA 530)  dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Lung given on 16 May 2023 dismissing her application for leave to apply for judicial review.

2.  On the same day, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal this court’s judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.   The applicant has also lodged a written submission to support the application.

3.  Having considered the Notice of Motion and written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing.  We have therefore proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents in the case.

4.  The background to this case and the applicant’s claim have been set out in our judgment.  We will not repeat them.

5.  Section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484 provides that leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

6.  The grounds for the application in the Notice of Motion state that the decision maker just relied on country-of-origin information (“COI”)  and facts that favoured the rejection of her claim; actual life was different from what was mentioned in the COI; the decision makers and the Courts chose to ignore the overwhelming evidence of violence towards the minorities; and the decision betrayed a biased and formulaic approach. 

7.  The written submission quoted extensively from judgments on high standards of fairness and Wednesbury unreasonableness and section 37ZT of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115, and asserted that the high standards of fairness should apply since the decision had the effect of finally dispose of the applicant’s claim and that the Board acted in a procedurally unfair manner and did not properly assess the applicant’s credibility.  

8.  We are of the view that the grounds put forward by the applicant do not constitute viable grounds for granting leave to appeal. Critically, all the grounds of application relate solely to the circumstances and facts of the applicant’s claim.  No question of great general and public importance has been identified, as required by section 22(1)(b)  of the Ordinance, has been identified.  Further, these grounds are vague and general assertions and were not argued in the appeal before us.

9.  We also do not see any basis for the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b). 

10.  As the statutory requirements for giving leave to appeal are not met, the Notice of Motion is dismissed.