RE PHAM THI BAC

CACV 357/2025, [2026] HKCA 223

On Appeal From [2025] HKCFI 1959

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 357 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1451 OF 2023)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is the 1^st applicant’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge To (“the Judge”) dated 19 May 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 1959) (“the Leave Decision”) refusing the 1^st and 2^nd applicants’ (collectively referred to as “the applicants”) application for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) against the decisions of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) respectively dated 11 August 2023 and 12 April 2024 (“the Board’s Decisions”), whereby the Board dismissed the applicants’ respective appeals against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) respectively dated 20 September 2021 and 18 July 2023, refusing their non-refoulement claim.[1]

2.  The applicants’ background, the basis of their claim and arguments advanced before the Board as well as the Board’s reasons for rejecting their appeals are all set out in the Board’s Decisions: see [1] ‑ [14] of the Leave Decision.  The Judge has also set out in detail the grounds advanced by the applicants in support of the Leave Application and his reasons for refusing the Leave Application: see [16] ‑ [20] of the Leave Decision.  We will not repeat those details herein.

3.  In her Notice of Appeal filed on 2 June 2025, the 1^st applicant mainly complained that, if refouled, her life would be seriously threatened by her creditor and local gangsters as it might be possible for them to locate her. She also claimed that internal relocation would be completely unfeasible as she was not an active person and there would be no guarantee that she would be able to adapt to the new place.  She also complained that the Immigration Department failed to consider her human rights under various legislations but failed to particularise her complaint.

4.  In her supporting affirmation filed on 2 June 2025, the 1^st applicant claimed that she understood that there was “a good ground of appeal that was not necessarily considered at the leave stage” and that the Director and the Board did not “see the grounds to reserve their decisions”. However, the 1^st applicant failed to specify what the said ground was.

5.  Pursuant to the directions of the Registrar of Civil Appeals dated 2 June 2025, the 1^st applicant lodged her written submissions on 6 June 2025.  In those submissions, she repeated the factual basis and procedural history of her non-refoulement claim.  She also cited various general propositions and legal authorities on the high standards of fairness and Wednesbury unreasonableness without particularising how those authorities were relevant to her case.

6.  By the written confirmation dated 2 June 2025, the 1^st applicant indicated her consent for this appeal to be disposed of on paper.  Accordingly, we proceed to consider this appeal on paper based on the available materials.

Discussion

7.  The relevant legal principles governing appeals in non‑refoulement cases are set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14].

8.  In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant.  If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed.  The Court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review.  See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(6)].

9.  In light of the above, it is thus incumbent on the 1^st applicant to point out the errors in the Leave Decision with sufficient particulars and specifics.

10.  In our view, the 1^st applicant’s appeal has no substance.  At the outset, her assertions are all general, vague and bare in nature which are not proper grounds of appeal.  General assertions of her fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  More importantly, she has failed to identify any error with specific particulars against the Leave Decision.  Accordingly, her assertions are not valid grounds of appeal.

11.  For the above reasons, we see no basis to interfere with the Leave Decision.  The 1^st applicant’s appeal has no merit and is hereby dismissed.