HOLINAIL H.K. LTD v. MATTHIAS POU AND OTHERS

HCA 2397/2024

[2025] HKCFI 2511

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2397 OF 2024

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D E C I S I O N

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Introduction

1.  By summonses dated 3 December 2024 and 25 February 2025[1], the Plaintiff seeks (i) a local and worldwide Mareva injunction against the 1^st Defendant; and (ii) a local Mareva injunction against the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants.

2.  The matter came before Tam J on 6 December 2024 and Herbert Au-Yeung J on 28 February 2025. The Defendants agreed to provide an “interim-interim” undertaking to the extent of HK$13,698,712.29 while the Plaintiff’s summonses were pending resolution.

3.  This is the substantive hearing of the Plaintiff’s summonses.

Material Background

4.  The Plaintiff has been carrying on a business of developing, manufacturing and supplying figurines, collectibles, models built up, die-cast and craft. It is a part of a group of companies (the “Holinail Group”) founded by Mr Massol back in 1985. Through a subsidiary, the Plaintiff owns a factory in the Mainland.

5.  The 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants are the Plaintiff’s former employees.

6.  Insofar as the 1^st Defendant is concerned:-

(1)  He started working for the Holinail Group in 2001.

(2)  From 2013 to 2016, he was the Plaintiff’s international business manager.

(3)  From 2016 to June 2024, he was the Plaintiff’s international business director.

(4)  He was the most senior employee in the Plaintiff.

(5)  By a power of attorney dated 6 January 2014 (the “Power of Attorney”), the 1^st Defendant was authorized to enter into any agreement with the Plaintiff’s clients and to negotiate the main terms and conditions of the transactions with the Plaintiff’s suppliers and financial partners.

(6)  In February 2024, the 1^st Defendant tendered resignation for personal reasons. His last day of employment was on 28 June 2024.

7.  Insofar as the 3^rd Defendant is concerned:-

(1)  She started working for the Plaintiff as a manager in 2014.

(2)  She was the second most senior employee in the Plaintiff.

(3)  She was responsible for managing the Plaintiff’s factory in the Mainland, monitoring the progress of the orders allocated to her account and supporting managerial decisions.

(4)  She tendered resignation in April 2024. Her last day of employment was 10 June 2024.

8.  Insofar as the 4^th Defendant is concerned:-

(1)  She started working for the Plaintiff as an administration officer in April 2021.

(2)  She tendered resignation in January 2024. Her last day of employment was 14 March 2024.

9.  When the 1^st Defendant was still employed by the Plaintiff, he set up the 2^nd Defendant on 22 April 2020. As a matter of public records, the 1^st Defendant was the sole director and sole shareholder of the 2^nd Defendant. The evidence shows that the 1^st Defendant also held out himself as the 2^nd Defendant’s chief executive officer.

10.  It is not in dispute that the 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants are now working for the 2^nd Defendant.

11.  In October 2024, a former customer of the Plaintiff (mistakenly) sent an email to a former employee of the Plaintiff at his former email address. This caused the Plaintiff to feel suspicious.

12.  In the circumstances, the Plaintiff engaged a technology consultant, namely Alternative Enterprises (HK) Ltd (“Alternative Enterprises”) to carry out an investigation. Alternative Enterprises then unearthed and reviewed the electronic records in the computers used by the 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants.

13.  The findings discovered by Alternative Enterprises are set out in annexure 1 of the Plaintiff’s statement of claim. In short, it was discovered that:-

(1)  The 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants discussed how to “shift”, “transfer” and/or “switch” the Plaintiff’s customers and new business opportunities to the 2^nd Defendant.

(2)  The targeted customers included Mighty Jaxx, Leblon Delienne SAS, Juce Gace, Ankama, DeAgostini Japan, NED Trading, Faller GmbH, Jee, Frank Chess, LBD, Nemesis Now, etc.

(3)  The 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants discussed how to use the Plaintiff’s resources to develop the 2^nd Defendant’s business. For instance, they discussed (a) using the Plaintiff’s figurines and office premises to prepare the pitch deck or promotional materials for the 2^nd Defendant; and (b) attending a fair in the United States under the Plaintiff’s name but distributing the name cards of the 2^nd Defendant.

(4)  The 2^nd Defendant did issue invoices to some of the Plaintiff’s customers.

(5)  During the discussion, the 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants indicated that they had to remain “low key”.

14.  In the premises, it is the Plaintiff’s case that:-

(1)  The 1^st Defendant flagrantly breached his fiduciary duties owed to the Plaintiff.

(2)  The 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants flagrantly breached their duties of fidelity owed to the Plaintiff.

(3)  The 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants dishonestly assisted the 1^st Defendant to breach his fiduciary duties owed to the Plaintiff.

(4)  The 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants conspired together to injure the Plaintiff by unlawful means.

Legal Principles

15.  The legal principles relating to Mareva injunctions are well-established. The applicant has to show: (i) he has a good arguable case; (ii) there are assets within the jurisdiction; (iii) the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting a Mareva injunction; and (iv) there is a real risk of dissipation. The court may grant a worldwide Mareva injunction where some of the assets are within the jurisdiction and some are abroad. See Hong Kong Civil Procedure (Vol.1) at paras 29/1/65 and 29/1/83.

16.  The question of whether there is a real risk of dissipation involves evaluative and predictive judgment. It is trite that the risk can be inferred from the defendant’s low commercial morality or dishonesty: see Convoy Collateral Ltd v Cho Kwai Chee [2020] 6 HKC 81 at paras 40 and 53 (per Lam VP, as Lam PJ then was).

Good Arguable Case on Liability

17.  Mr Byron Chiu (for the Plaintiff) submitted there is overwhelming evidence showing that the Defendants committed serious wrongdoings against the Plaintiff.

18.  I agree with Mr Chiu’s submissions.

19.  The evidence shows that:-

(1)  When the 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants were still employed by the Plaintiff, they had extensive discussion as to (i) how to divert the Plaintiff’s business, orders and corporate opportunities to the 2^nd Defendant; and (ii) how to exploit the Plaintiff’s resources for supporting the 2^nd Defendant’s operation.

(2)  In light of the 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants’ collaborative efforts, some of the Plaintiff’s customers stopped doing business with the Plaintiff and they started placing orders with the 2^nd Defendant.

(3)  The 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants were closely involved in the business dealings between the 2^nd Defendant and the Plaintiff’s customers.

20.  In Leader Screws Manufacturing Co Ltd v Huang Shunkui [2021] HKCFI 141 at paras 47-48, Queeny Au-Yeung J stated:-

“47. The concept of fiduciary duty encaptures a situation where one person is in a relationship with another which gives rise to a legitimate expectation, which equity will recognize, that the fiduciary will not utilize his or her personal position in such a way which is adverse to the interests of the principle. That expectation is assessed objectively, so it is not necessary for the principal subjectively to harbour the expectation, nor for the person alleged to be a fiduciary to subjectively consider himself to be undertaking fiduciary duties. See Snell’s Equity, 34th ed, §7-005.

48.  Therefore, much depends on the employee’s role and functions. A senior employee/manager has been held to owe fiduciary duties to his employer in carrying out the specific duties to which he was assigned: TBC International (HK) Ltd v Chan Kwok Sum, HCA 10671/1995, 24 March 1997, at §§6 and 7, Waung J.”

21.  In the present case, the 1^st Defendant was the most senior employee in the Plaintiff. The Power of Attorney effectively empowered him to carry out the operation of the Plaintiff.

22.  In this connection, I do not accept the 1^st Defendant’s suggestion that the Power of Attorney was created for the limited purpose of authorising him to sign unimportant documents on behalf of Mr Massol. This suggestion is flatly contradicted by the terms of the Power of Attorney.

23.  I am of the view it is, to say the least, highly arguable that (i) the 1^st Defendant did owe fiduciary duties to the Plaintiff; and (ii) he did breach the fiduciary duties owed to the Plaintiff.

24.  On the evidence, it is also, to say the least, highly arguable that the 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants breached the aforesaid duties by (i) conspiring to procure the Plaintiff’s customers to do business and place orders with the 2^nd Defendant instead of the Plaintiff; (ii) participating in the competing business operated by the 2^nd Defendant; and (iii) disrupting the Plaintiff’s business.

25.  As pointed out by the learned authors of Employment Law and Practice in Hong Kong (2^nd Ed) at paras 3.028 to 3.029 and 3.032, an employee owes a “duty to serve his or her employer with fidelity and good faith”, and such duties include: (i) an obligation not to persuade customers to shift away from the employer; (ii) an obligation not to take part in a business in competition with the employer’s business; and (iii) an obligation not to disrupt the business of the employer.

26.  For completeness, I also reject the following assertions made by the Defendants

27.  The Defendants allege that the Plaintiff and the 2^nd Defendant pursue different lines of business, in that whilst the Plaintiff focuses on “partwork” projects, the 2^nd Defendant focuses on “premium” projects.

28.  However:-

(1)  As evidenced by the Plaintiff’s promotional materials and contemporaneous exchange with its customers (such as Mighty Jaxx and Attakus), the Plaintiff did manufacture, supply and trade “premium” products.

(2)  As evidenced by the materials unearthed by Alternative Enterprises, the 2^nd Defendant did supply “partwork” or “non-premium” products to the Plaintiff’s customers (such as DeAgostini Japan, which specialises in “partwork” products).

29.  In light of the evidence, it is, to say the least, highly arguable (i) that the 2^nd Defendant has been competing with the Plaintiff; (ii) that the 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants have been diverting the Plaintiff’s businesses and orders to the 2^nd Defendant; and (iii) that the 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants had participated in the competing business of the 2^nd Defendant.

30.  The 1^st Defendant also alleges that he developed the 2^nd Defendant’s business during his spare time.

31.  This allegation is contradicted by the materials unearthed by Alternative Enterprises, which show that:-

(1)  The 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants discussed how to divert the Plaintiff’s businesses and orders to the 2^nd Defendant during office hours.

(2)  The 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants even used the Plaintiff’s resources to develop the 2^nd Defendant’s business. Whilst they used the figurines and office premises to prepare promotional materials for the 2^nd Defendant, they caused the Plaintiff to be responsible for the fees of the photographer who was engaged to take pictures of the figurines.

32.  Lastly, Mr Kevin Lau (for the Defendants) submitted that as the products and services of the Plaintiff were of bad quality, the customers “voted with their feet” and chose to do business with the 2^nd Defendant instead of the Plaintiff.

33.  On the evidence, I do not accept this submission. The 1^st and 3^rd Defendants were the ones who were responsible for operating the Plaintiff’s business. They were the ones who liaised with the Plaintiff’s customers. If the Plaintiff’s products and services were of bad quality, it is most unlikely that the customers, who had dealings with the 1^st and 3^rd Defendants, would wish to do business with the 2^nd Defendant (which has been operated by the 1^st and 3^rd Defendants). I do not believe that the customers would, on their own volition, choose to do business with the 2^nd Defendant in the absence of any solicitation by the 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants.

34.  For all the above reasons, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff has made out a good arguable case against the Defendants on the question of liability.

Good Arguable Case on Quantum

35.  Bearing in mind that the evidence at the interlocutory stage may be “inchoate”, the question of whether there is a good arguable case as to quantum is to be determined qualitatively, not quantitatively: see  Agritrade Resources Ltd v Ashok Kumar Sahoo [2022] HKCA 280 at para 37 (per Cheung JA).

36.  Instead of embarking on some forensic analysis as if a mini trial is taking place, the court should adopt a broad-brush approach to determine the appropriate figure that merits the protection by way of a Mareva injunction: see  Lam Suk Ying v Lam Sik Shi (HCA 4713/2011, 14 January 2011) at para 20 (per Recorder Benjamin Yu SC).

37.  The Plaintiff contends it is entitled to a quantum of HK$13,698,712.29.  In this connection, the Plaintiff relies on:-

(1)  The Defendants’ admission that the 2^nd Defendant’s net profits in 2022 were HK$2,968,199.

(2)  The estimate provided by Mr Massol in regard to the net profits arising from the business that was diverted from the Plaintiff to the 2^nd Defendant in 2023 and 2024.

38.  I am of the view that the estimate provided by Mr Massol makes sense. He is able to explain why the profit margins in respect of the business with different customers varied. Based on the evidence available to the court, I am unable to conclude that Mr Massol’s estimate is arbitrary.

39.  Meanwhile, the position of the Defendants has been opaque.

40.  They only produced the 2^nd Defendant’s tax returns to contend that the 2^nd Defendant has merely earned net profits of around HK$2.4 million odd since April 2020.

41.  For reasons best known to themselves, the Defendants chose not to produce the 2^nd Defendant’s audited financial statements, management account, books and records as well as the underlying documents relating to the transactions with the Plaintiff’s former customers.

42.  Without these documents, neither the court nor the Plaintiff can meaningfully assess the net profits that were actually earned by the 2^nd Defendant.

43.  Be that as it may, Mr Lau contended that the Plaintiff has failed to show causation. He suggested that as the products and services provided by the Plaintiff were bad, the customers would have ceased doing business with the Plaintiff anyhow. He cited the business dealings with Mighty Jaxx and Juce Gace as examples.

44.  In this connection:-

(1)  For the reasons set out in paragraph 33 above, I do not accept Mr Lau’s submission. Bearing in mind that both the Plaintiff and the 2^nd Defendant were operated by the 1^st and 3^rd Defendants, it is doubtful as to whether the services and products offered by the 2^nd Defendant would be superior to those offered by the Plaintiff. In fact, the contemporaneous exchange shows that there were issues regarding the quality of the 2^nd Defendant’s products.

(2)  As to the business dealing with Mighty Jaxx, Mr Lau pointed out that according to a piece of internal document of the Plaintiff[2], the Plaintiff had ceased doing business with Mighty Jaxx from 9  April 2021. However, as pointed out by Mr Chiu, the said internal document was put forward for the purpose of demonstrating that Mighty Jaxx acquired “premium” products from the Plaintiff. In any event, it is Mr Massol’s evidence that the last invoice that the Plaintiff issued to Mighty Jaxx was dated 20 April 2022. This coincided with the materials unearthed by Alternative Enterprises, which show that the 2^nd Defendant provided an offer to Mighty Jaxx on 11 April 2022 in respect of a project named “The Wanderer 2^nd & 3^rd CW”.  In my view, the question whether the Defendants solicited Mighty Jaxx is plainly a matter for trial, and the Plaintiff does have a good arguable case.

(3)  As regards the business dealings with Juce Gace, Mr Lau referred me to a recent email showing that a representative of Juce Gace was allegedly dissatisfied with the Plaintiff’s products. However, as pointed out by Mr Chiu, in the contemporaneous email exchange back in 2021, Juce Gace’s representatives indicated that they were content with the Plaintiff’s efforts and that they intended to place orders with the Plaintiff in 2022. In my view, the question whether the Defendants procured Juce Gace to place orders with the 2^nd Defendant instead of the Plaintiff  is plainly a matter for trial, and on the evidence, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff does have a good arguable case.

45.  Mr Lau also submitted that some customers (such as DeAgostini Japan) were loyal to the 1^st and 3^rd Defendants, and this was the reason why they chose to do business with the 2^nd Defendant rather than the Plaintiff. In this connection, Mr Lau referred me to a recent email from a representative of DeAgostini Japan. There, he indicated his support for the 1^st Defendant.

46.  However, Mr Chiu pointed out that the 1^st Defendant worked for the Plaintiff until 28 June 2024. As such, before his departure, the 1^st Defendant should not have (i) operated a competing business under the 2^nd Defendant; and (ii) diverted the Plaintiff’s customers (such as DeAgostini Japan) to the 2^nd Defendant. In this connection, the Defendants have not adduced evidence to show that DeAgostini Japan only placed orders with the 2^nd Defendant in the 2^nd half of 2024 after the 1^st Defendant left the Plaintiff. On the evidence, I do not believe that DeAgostini Japan only started doing business with the 2^nd Defendant after 28 June 2024. In light of the massive scheme of diversion that has been perpetrated since April 2022, there is every reason to believe that the Defendants had started taking steps to divert the business with DeAgostini Japan before 28 June 2024.

47.  Lastly, as to the business with Ankama in 2023, Mr Lau took issue with the phrase “gross profits” that was used in the contemporaneous exchange amongst the Defendants (which form the basis of the Plaintiff’s claim for HK$780,000 under this head[3]). Having considered the contemporaneous exchange holistically, I am of the view that it is, to say the least, highly arguable that despite the phrase “gross profits” was used, the Defendants intended to refer to the notion of “net profits”. Bearing in mind the context of the discussion, there was no reason to suppose that the Defendants intended to take into account overhead costs and expenses. For completeness, it does not appear to me that the figure of HK$780,000 (or US$100,000) referred to the business revenue arising from the business dealings.

48.  For all the above reasons, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff has made out a good arguable case against the Defendants on quantum to the extent of HK$13,698,075[4].

Balance of Convenience and Risk of Dissipation

49.  Mr Lau submits that the Plaintiff has failed to prove that there is a real risk of dissipation.

50.  In light of the overwhelming evidence against the Defendants, I cannot accept Mr Lau’s submissions.

51.  As mentioned, the evidence shows that:-

(1)  When the 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants were still employed by the Plaintiff, they devised and implemented a scheme that aimed at diverting the Plaintiff’s business and orders to the 2^nd Defendant. They sought to benefit the 2^nd Defendant and/or themselves at the expense of the Plaintiff. They paid no regard to the fiduciary duties and/or duties of fidelity owed to the Plaintiff.

(2)  During their discussion, the 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants mentioned that they had to be insidious. It is apparent they appreciated that their conduct was wrongful. Nonetheless, they continued with their wrongdoings.

(3)  The 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants even used the Plaintiff’s figurines and office premises to prepare the 2^nd Defendant’s pitch deck or promotional materials. They pretended as if the products belonged to the 2^nd Defendant. What was even more shocking was that they caused the invoice in respect of the services provided by the photographer to be issued to the Plaintiff.

52.  The conduct of the Defendants was outrageous.

53.  On the evidence (which is overwhelming), I am satisfied that the Defendants are dishonest and of low commercial morality. They calculatedly concealed their wrongdoings. This was done to ensure that they could continuously take advantage of the Plaintiff. In light of their conduct, I am not of the view that the 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants are the kind of persons who would graciously face the consequences of their wrongdoings. I am satisfied it can be inferred that the Defendants might dissipate their assets with a view to evading judgment: see Convoy Collateral Ltd v Cho Kwai Chee (supra) at para 53.

54.  However, Mr Lau sought to persuade me that the position of the 4^th Defendant is different from the position of the 1^st and 3^rd Defendants.  He drew my attention to the following matters:-

(1)  The 4^th Defendant was young and she was a junior employee.

(2)  She merely earned a humble salary of HK$18,000.

(3)  She did not make strategic decisions. She only provided administrative support and assistance.

55.  Despite Mr Lau’s efforts, I am of the view that the Plaintiff has made out an overwhelming case against the 4^th Defendant based on breach of duties of fidelity, dishonest assistance and conspiracy to injure by unlawful means.

56.  As pointed out by Mr Chiu, the 4^th Defendant knew and should have known that:-

(1)  she was the Plaintiff’s employee;

(2)  the 1^st and 3^rd Defendants were the Plaintiff’s employees; and

(3)  the 1^st and 3^rd Defendants as well as herself should not commit acts that harm the Plaintiff’s interest.

57.  Notwithstanding so, the 4^th Defendant knowingly participated in the scheme that diverted the Plaintiff’s business, orders and corporate opportunities to the 2^nd Defendant. Indeed, the materials discovered by Alternative Enterprises show, among other things, that:-

(1)  The 4^th Defendant was involved in the discussion about attending the fair in the United States in the Plaintiff’s name but distributing the name card of the 2^nd Defendant.

(2)  The 4^th Defendant participated in, amongst other things, (i) the business dealing between the 2^nd Defendant and Juce Gace in August 2022 concerning a project named “I am Wood Namo Edit”; (ii) the business dealing between the 2^nd Defendant and Leblon Delienne SAS in November 2022; and (iii) the business dealing between the 2^nd Defendant and Ankama in February 2024.

58.  In the premises, I accept Mr Chiu’s submissions that the 4^th Defendant was anything but innocent.

Delay and Tipping Off 

59.  Mr Lau sensibly accepted that the Plaintiff could not have pursued the present application before October 2024. However, he contended that (i) there had been delay since October 2024; and (ii) by issuing a complaint letter dated 18 October 2024, the Plaintiff had “tipped off” the Defendants.

60.  First of all, I am not of the view that there has been any inordinate delay in pursuing the present application since October 2024.  It took time for the Plaintiff to investigate the matters relating to the claims in these proceedings.  As soon as its suspicion was aroused, the Plaintiff immediately engaged Alternative Enterprises to review the electronic records in the computers used by the 1^st, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants.

61.  More fundamentally, as a matter of law, it is not sufficient for the defendant to show that the applicant has delayed unreasonably.  It is also necessary to show that “because of the delay in bringing [the] application it would be unreasonable or unjust to grant the order sought by the [applicant]”: see Re Wako Giken (HK) Co Ltd [2010] 4 HKLRD 121 at paras 24 to 25 (per Harris J).

62.  Whilst I accept that equity would not act in vain, I am not of the view that the court should be lenient towards unscrupulous litigants who may, in bad faith, dissipate assets, thereby rendering themselves “judgment-proof”. There is no reason why unscrupulous litigants should be allowed to benefit from their unconscionability.

63.  After all, the question is whether the Mareva injunction sought will be of practical value. Depending on the circumstances, if it can be shown that the Mareva injunction sought is of no practical value at all, this may be a reason why the court may exercise its discretion against granting the proposed Mareva injunction.

64.  In the present case, there is no evidence showing that the Defendants have already dissipated all their assets, such that the Mareva injunction granted by the court would be completely futile.

65.  In this connection, it is not in dispute that the 2^nd Defendant has still been carrying on business. As such, there are good reasons to believe that the Mareva injunction sought will be able to freeze some meaningful assets.

66.  In the premises, I am not of the view that relief should be refused on the ground of alleged delay or on the ground that the Plaintiff issued a complaint letter on 18 October 2024.

Worldwide Mareva Injunction

67.  The 1^st Defendant is now residing in Canada.  It is apparent that he has assets there.

68.  If the Defendants have sufficient assets in Hong Kong, it would be unnecessary to grant a worldwide Mareva injunction against the 1^st Defendant.

69.  In this connection, Mr Lau submits that the Plaintiff has failed to show that the assets in Hong Kong are not sufficient to cover the Plaintiff’s claims.

70.  However, there is simply no evidence showing that the Defendants have HK$13,698,075 in Hong Kong to satisfy the Plaintiff’s claims.

71.  Had such evidence existed, the Defendants would have adduced the same for opposing the Plaintiff’s application for a worldwide Mareva injunction against the 1^st Defendant. This did not happen.

72.  I am not of the view that the Plaintiff can be criticized for not adducing precise evidence on the 1^st Defendant’s assets. It is unrealistic to expect the Plaintiff to have precise information relating to the 1^st Defendant’s financial position.

73.  For completeness, I do not accept that the Plaintiff was guilty of inordinate delay in pursuing a worldwide Mareva against the 1^st Defendant. Understandably:-

(1)  The Plaintiff would wish to focus on building up its case regarding the diversion scheme at the initial stage of the proceedings.

(2)  It took time for the Plaintiff to investigate the assets of the 1^st Defendant and the Plaintiff would not wish to pursue a worldwide Mareva injunction against the 1^st Defendant when the picture was not yet clear. Bearing in mind the draconian nature of the relief sought, there was every reason why the Plaintiff should conduct these proceedings in a cautious and responsible manner.

Conclusion and Disposition

74.  For all the above reasons, I grant (i) a local and worldwide Mareva injunction against the 1^st Defendant; and (ii) a local Mareva injunction against the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th Defendants in terms of the Plaintiff’s summonses dated 3 December 2024 and 25 February 2025, save that:-

(1)  the amount covered should be HK$13,698,075; and

(2)  the Defendants do have 14 days to comply with the ancillary disclosure order.

75.  The Mareva injunctions order does not prohibit:-

(1)  the 1^st Defendant from spending HK$100,000 per month towards his ordinary living expenses.

(2)  the 1^st Defendant from making payment of income tax in Canada in 2025 and spending HK$54,000 for the purpose of a family trip in France in the summer of 2025.

(3)  the 2^nd defendant from spending HK$400,000 per month towards its ordinary and proper business expenses.

(4)  the 3^rd Defendant from spending HK$10,000 per week towards her ordinary living expenses.

(5)  the 4^th Defendant from spending HK$6,000 per week towards her ordinary living expenses.

(6)  the Defendants from collectively spending HK$1.7 million on legal advice and legal expenses in these proceedings up to and including the stage of exchanging witness statements.

76.  I order that there be liberty to apply.

77.  As to costs, I order that:-

(1)  The costs in respect of the Plaintiff’s application for the Mareva injunction against the Defendants be to the Plaintiff in the cause.

(2)  The costs arising from the Defendants’ opposition to the Plaintiff’s application (including the costs in respect of the present hearing, the affirmations in opposition filed by the Defendants and the affirmation in reply filed by the Plaintiff) be paid by the Defendants to the Plaintiff to be taxed forthwith on a party-to-party basis if not agreed (with certificate for counsel).

78.  I express my gratitude to Mr Byron Chiu and Mr Kevin Lau for their very helpful assistance.