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CACV 640/2026, [2026] HKCA 1417
On appeal from [2026] HKCFI 3131
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO 640 OF 2026
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 158/2023)
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| RE: |
RUBIO EVELYN DELA TIERRA |
Applicant |
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| Before: |
Hon Barma JA and Leung J in Court |
| Date of Hearing: |
6 August 2026 |
| Date of Judgment: |
27 August 2026 |
___________________
J U D G M E N T
___________________
Hon Leung J (giving the Judgment of the Court):
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court
Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Martin Wong (“the Judge”) dated 8 June 2026[1] (“the Leave Decision”) refusing to grant leave for the applicant to apply for
judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 1 February 2023 (“the
Board’s Decision”) whereby the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 26
October 2021 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim was dismissed.
2. The applicant is a national of the Philippines. Her
background, basis of claim and the Board’s reasons were set out in the Board’s Decision[2] as well as the Leave Decision at [6]. They will not be
repeated.
3. The applicant was absent from the hearing for the leave
application. After considering the documents filed by the applicant, the Judge dismissed the
application for the reasons stated at [7]-[13] of the Leave Decision.
Appeal to this court
4. In her Notice of Appeal dated 15 June 2026, the applicant
stated:
“I am pleading to the Court of Appeal to review my application. The Judgment reached
unreasonable.”
5. In her written submissions dated 22 July 2026, the applicant
complained that the determinations of the Director of Immigration and
the Board were unfair. She raised several complaints against the Judge, including that he had
failed to appreciate the significance of her claim, and that he aimed at quick disposal of her case without
adhering to “a high standard of fairness”. She also argued that she was prejudiced in the proceedings below due
to the lack of legal and language assistance.
6. We heard the appeal on 6 August 2026, at which the applicant
appeared in person. At the hearing, the applicant had nothing further to add to the matters already set
out in the documents lodged with the Court.
Discussion
7. The principles governing appeals in non‑refoulement cases are
set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]. In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to
apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the
judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no
viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed.
Assertions by the applicant of fear, if refouled, do not constitute proper grounds of appeal:
Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].
8. The Court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s
decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review. Nor is an appeal the occasion for
regurgitating arguments advanced and rejected by the judge or for running arguments which could and should have
been raised but were not raised before the judge. In the determination of an appeal, the Court of Appeal
focuses on the decision of the judge, and the Court will only reverse that decision if an appellant could
demonstrate that the judge made errors of law or failed to take
account of relevant matters already placed before the judge or was otherwise plainly wrong: Re
Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022 at [13].
9. The applicant has failed to identify any error on the part of
the Judge and thus failed to raise any viable ground of appeal. The points advanced by the applicant were bare
assertions unsupported by particulars or evidence.
10. In the present case, the Board found that the applicant’s
alleged past domestic abuse suffered at the hands of her husband (by reason of, among other things, dispute on
his extra-marital affairs and monetary dispute) did not on the evidence meet the required threshold of a real
and substantial risk of harm. The Board took the view that in any event suitable options of internal
relocation were available to the applicant in order to minimise any risk of harm. These were factual
findings open to the Board on the evidence, and were sufficiently canvassed and considered by the Judge in the
Leave Decision at [7]-[13]. We see no basis to interfere.
11. The applicant has failed to demonstrate how the Board had
acted unlawfully or procedurally unfairly in reaching its decision, or how such decision could be said to be
Wednesbury unreasonable.
12. In particular, we are not persuaded by the applicant’s
complaint about prejudice caused by her lack of legal representation. As this Court has repeatedly held,
it does not follow that the high standards of fairness applicable require that a non-refoulement protection
claimant would be absolutely entitled to legal representation at all stages of the screening process or the
legal proceedings ensuing therefrom: see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14; Re Zahid Abbas [2018] HKCA 15; Re Tariq Farhan [2018] HKCA 17; Re Lopchan Subash [2018] HKCA 37; and Re Ahmed Syed Rafiq [2018] HKCA 178.
13. We are equally not persuaded by the applicant’s complaint
about the lack of language assistance. Whether by herself or with the assistance of others, she was
clearly able to lodge comprehensible English documents and submissions with the Court as well as in the
processing of her claim below.
14. As the applicant advanced no viable grounds of appeal
against the Judge’s decision, and there is no merit in the appeal, we dismiss the appeal accordingly.
(Aarif Barma)
Justice of Appeal |
(Simon Leung)
Judge of the Court of
First Instance |
The applicant, unrepresented, appearing in person
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