RAI SUSHMA v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 726/2026

[2026] HKCFI 5312

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 726 OF 2026

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D E C I S I O N

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A. Introduction

1.  By Form 86 dated 13 April 2026, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review, so as to challenge the decision or decisions made by the Putative Respondent Director of Immigration (“Director”), refusing the Applicant’s application for extension of stay in Hong Kong.

2.  Together with the Form 86, the Applicant has filed an affirmation, and two letters from the Immigration Department dated 20 August 2025 and 18 March 2026 respectively.

3.  I gave directions permitting the Director to file an Initial Response, and for the Applicant to file a Reply.  The Initial Response was filed by Ms Crystal Wong, Government Counsel, of the Department of Justice, on 21 July 2026, following an extension of time.  Acting in person, the Applicant filed her Reply on 14 September 2026.

4.  Having considered the materials provided, I am satisfied that this application can appropriately be dealt with on paper.

5.  This is my Decision.

B.   Background

6.  The Applicant is an Indian national.  She first entered Hong Kong as a foreign domestic helper, and was last permitted to remain in Hong Kong until 4 May 2025.

7.  During her stay, she met her husband, a Hong Kong Permanent Resident.  After the establishment of a relationship, their marriage was solemnised on 22 April 2024.  The Applicant consequently applied to the Immigration Department (“ImmD”) for an application for extension of stay, and for a change of status to that as a dependant of her husband (“Sponsor”) on 10 May 2024.  This application (“Initial Application”) was approved on 16 July 2024.

8.  However, it was expressly noted by the Director in the 16 July 2024 approval that the Applicant’s next application for extension of stay would involve a reassessment of the Sponsor’s financial capability to continue sponsoring the Applicant.

9.  On 30 June 2025, the Applicant applied for an extension of stay as dependant of the Sponsor (“Extension Application”).  The Director’s relevant internal minute identifies that the Director found several issues with regards to the Sponsor’s financial situation.  This included, amongst other things, that:

(1)  The Sponsor’s IR56B was not signed by the employer and there was no receiving stamp from the IRD.

(2)  The Sponsor’s IR56B only exhibited a period of employment between 1 April and 30 June 2024, and therefore there was no information provided on the Sponsor’s employment situation after June 2024.

(3)  There was no receiving stamp from the IRD on the Sponsor’s IR56E, and the date of commencement of employment was identified as 1 April 2025.

(4)  Both the IR56B and IR56E indicated that the Sponsor was employed as a ‘Waiter’, instead of ‘Public Relation Manager’ as provided in the Sponsor’s employment contract.

(5)  The attendance record submitted by the Sponsor only covered employment after April 2025.

10.  The Director also found that the Sponsor had altered – without the authentication of the Housing Department – the tenant list in relation to the public rental unit occupied by the Applicant, the Sponsor and the Sponsor’s son.

11.  As a result, the Director concluded that the application for extension of stay should be refused, as he was not satisfied that the Sponsor was continually able to support the Applicant’s living at a standard well above the subsistence level in Hong Kong and to provide her with suitable accommodation.  He also found no extenuating circumstances which justified exceptional consideration.

12.  By letter dated 20 August 2025, the Applicant was informed of the Director’s decision (“Refusal Decision”), and she was required to leave Hong Kong on or before 3 September 2025.

13.  However, the Applicant did not leave Hong Kong.  Instead, on 11 September 2025, the Applicant wrote to ImmD, requesting a reconsideration of the Refusal Decision (“1^st Reconsideration Request”).  On the same day, the Applicant also submitted a Data Access Request in relation to the minutes and all submitted documents under the Initial Application.  These documents were provided to the Applicant on 20 October 2025.

14.  The Director’s internal minute identifies that under the 1^st Reconsideration Request, the Sponsor failed to provide any supporting document to clarify his employment relationship with his employer, and failed to provide any information in relation to his then employment and income situation.  However, the Applicant was able to provide fresh and credible information in relation to her accommodation.

15.  The Director concluded that as the Sponsor had failed to provide fresh and credible information in relation to his employment and income, he was not satisfied that the Sponsor had the financial means to provide for the Applicant’s living.  Consequently, the 1^st Reconsideration Request was refused, and the Applicant was notified of this by letter dated 7 November 2025.

16.  On 2 February 2026, a further reconsideration request was made by the Applicant (“2^nd Reconsideration Request”).  With this request, the Sponsor provided information regarding new employment that had commenced on 26 November 2025.  He also provided the salary payment records for September and October 2025 from his previous employment, alongside a bank statement showing an updated savings balance.

17.  However, as noted in the Director’s internal minute, the new information provided by the Applicant did not assist in dismissing the Director’s concerns regarding the Sponsor’s overall financial capability and stability.  After consideration of all available information and circumstances, the Director maintained the view that there were no fresh grounds justifying reversion of the Refusal Decision.  Thus, the 2^nd Reconsideration Request was refused, and the Applicant was notified of this by letter dated 18 March 2026.

18.  The Applicant then brought these proceedings seeking to challenge the decision made on the 2^nd Reconsideration Request (“Impugned Decision”).

C.  Grounds of Review

19.  In her Affirmation, the Applicant raised two intended grounds of review, being:

(1)  Ground 1: The Impugned Decision was wrong in principle, unreasonable and procedurally unfair.

(2)  Ground 2: The Applicant’s previous application for extension of stay and change of status was approved with similar background (i.e. legitimate expectation).

D.  Ground 1

20.  The Applicant’s first intended ground of review is that the Impugned Decision was wrong in principle, unreasonable and procedurally unfair, because:

(1)  the Sponsor was a full-time salesman with a basic monthly salary of HK$18,000 since November 2025, and savings of approximately HK$63,000, which showed that the Sponsor was of sound financial standing in Hong Kong;

(2)  the Sponsor was able to provide the Applicant accommodation in the form of a Public Housing Unit; and

(3)  the Director failed to consider basic documents and information submitted as part of the Reconsideration Requests.

21.  The Applicant further contends in her Reply that the requirements for an application for a dependent visa do not apply to an application for an extension of stay for someone already on a dependant visa, and that the criteria for extension of stay should be different.  She alleges that the reassessment of the Sponsor’s finances in the Initial Application, and thereafter, was the result of discrimination by the Director on the age gap between the Sponsor and herself, and that it was seemingly clear (in the Applicant’s view) that the Director was trying to find reasons to refuse her extension of stay, particularly given that there were no guidelines regarding reassessment in extension of stay applications.

22.  I shall deal with these points in order.  It may be useful, however, first to refer to the existing policy in relation to dependant visas, before analysing the merits of the Applicant’s arguments.

23.  Under the existing dependant visa policy, a person may be granted permission to remain in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“HKSAR”) as a dependant, if he or she can identify an eligible sponsor.  Eligible sponsors include, amongst others, Hong Kong permanent residents and residents who are not subject to a limit of stay.  But, importantly, an applicant (and their sponsor) should also provide reasonable proof of a genuine relationship between them, proof that there is no known record to the detriment of the applicant, and proof that the sponsor is capable of supporting the applicant’s living well above the subsistence level and of providing them with suitable accommodation.

24.  It is a basic requirement for an application for extension of stay that the applicant continues to meet the above-mentioned eligibility criteria (applicable to a dependant visa application), and the burden to demonstrate this remains on the applicant.  Meeting those requirements, however, does not automatically mean that the extension is granted.  It is still for the Director to determine whether, in his view of the materials, there is any change of circumstances that would have resulted in loss of sponsorship for the applicant.

25.  It is also trite that immigration decisions are a matter for the Director, and the Court will only intervene where there is sufficient argument on public law grounds.  The strengths and weaknesses of each application (i.e. its underlying merits) are for the Director to weigh and decide in the exercise of his discretion, and this includes consideration of any points founded on compassionate or humanitarian factors.

26.  It is also trite that where an applicant asserts Wednesbury unreasonableness in a decision involving immigration, he or she faces an onerous threshold to overcome.  This is because the Director’s views are given a wide margin of appreciation due to the Court’s lack of relevant expertise and relevant information necessary for making an immigration decision.

27.  In this case, the Applicant has not shown how the Director’s decision is one that is arguably unreasonable, let alone one that is so outrageous in its defiance of logic that no reasonable decision-maker could have reached.

28.  It is not reasonably arguable that the Decision was wrong in principle, unreasonable or procedurally unfair.  The first two points advanced by the Applicant in her Affirmation (i.e. on salary, savings and accommodation) are essentially a repeat of the merits advanced by her in her Initial Application.  But an arguable ground of judicial review does not simply arise by virtue of the Director reaching a decision unfavourable to the Applicant.  In exercising its judicial review jurisdiction, the Court does not reconsider whether the Sponsor’s financial situation should lead to a grant of a visa extension to the Applicant.

29.  The Applicant’s point that the Director failed to consider basic documents and information submitted during the reconsideration requests is also unfounded.  Upon a reading of the Director’s internal minutes, it is clear that the Director clearly considered all the documents that were submitted during the reconsideration requests.

30.  For instance, at §8 of the Internal Minute relating to the 2^nd Reconsideration Request, the Director clearly acknowledged the newly-submitted documents, stating:

Regarding the original employment, [the Sponsor] only provided the salary records for 09/2025 and 10/2025.  This limited documentation is not considered a solid proof of a genuine employment relationship.  Furthermore, given the multiple irregularities identified in the initial assessment, this information fails to clarify the doubts cast on the genuineness of this employment.  Although a new employment was subsequently reported, [the Sponsor]’s financial capability and stability remained questionable.

31.  Hence, after proper consideration of the documents that were submitted, the Director still came to the conclusion that the Sponsor had failed to show sufficient financial capability to support the Applicant’s living above the subsistence level.  I see no reasonably arguable merit in the Applicant’s argument in this respect.

32.  Likewise, it can be said that the Applicant’s contentions in her Reply are factually incorrect and unsubstantiated.  Firstly, as explained above, the dependant visa policy explicitly states that the eligibility criteria for a dependant visa application applies to an application for an extension of stay.  Secondly, there is no reasonable argument that the eligibility criteria for an application for an extension of stay should be different from on the original application, and should include the household status of the whole family and not just the sponsor (i.e. that it should include the Applicant’s own earnings and savings).  Moreover, the dependant visa policy exists for the grant of a visa to a person who is dependent on a sponsor for (amongst other aspects) financial support, housing and basic needs.  On the financial side, the focus is obviously upon the sponsor’s financial capability (and not that of the applicant who is said to be dependent on the sponsor).

33.  It is also unclear why the Applicant contends that the age gap between the Sponsor and herself would be a ground for discrimination by the Director.  There seems to be no evidence to suggest that any discrimination took place.  On the contrary, a reading of the Director’s internal minutes would show that the decision was made with proper consideration to the appropriate factors (i.e. the financial capability and stability of the Sponsor).

34.  It appears to me that the Applicant was given sufficient opportunities to provide further information and evidence under multiple occasions to support her application for extension of stay.  In the end, the Director concluded (as was open to him) that the financial circumstances of the Sponsor, as exhibited by the submitted documents, did not reach the required level of financial stability.  As the Director was not satisfied that the Sponsor had stable income and employment, it was well within his powers under the policy to conclude that an extension of stay should not be granted.

35.  There was no error of principle or procedural unfairness, or arguable unreasonableness in the public law sense.  Ground 1 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

E.  Ground 2

36.  The Applicant’s second ground is in essence one of legitimate expectation.  It is her case that because the Director did not take issue with the Sponsor’s financial standing or accommodation arrangements during the Initial Application, that reasonably gave rise to a legitimate expectation that her future applications for extension of stay would be approved, especially given that the Sponsor’s financial circumstances had not substantially changed since then.

37.  However, as I have addressed above, the Director is to determine each application in view of the facts and materials before him at the time, and therefore, it cannot be reasonably argued that the Applicant could have the legitimate expectation that her extension of stay application would be automatically granted.  It is wrong to assume that the previous grant of a visa creates a precedent binding on the Director in relation to a subsequent application: see, for example, my decision in Gurung Ram Bahadur v Director of Immigration [2025] HKCFI 2367 at §38.

38.  Further, as pointed out by Ms Wong, the Director has given the Applicant no express or implied assurance that any future application for extension of stay would be approved.  In fact, the evidence suggests the contrary.  The letter dated 13 July 2024 granting approval of the Initial Application explicitly stated that her next application for extension of stay would involve a review of the Sponsor’s financial standing.

39.  Ms Wong also submitted that the factual circumstances between the Initial Application and the subsequent applications were different, as seen by the documents submitted by the Applicant (and Sponsor).  She said that for the Initial Application, the Sponsor provided genuine proof of employment from his previous employer, whereas for the later applications, they did not provide sufficient information to demonstrate overall financial capability and stability.

40.  I accept this submission.  Indeed, at §4 of the Internal Minute relating to the Refusal Decision, the Director noted that:

[the Sponsor] failed to provide sufficient and credible information/documents to prove his employment/income situation in the past 12 months. It is suspected that [the Sponsor] did not work for the company after being granted approval to the last C/S application.

41.  The Applicant’s submissions in relation to this ground are essentially premised on misinterpretations of law and fact.  Ground 2 is also not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

F.  Result

42.  Because the Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable grounds of review with any realistic prospect of success, the application for leave to apply for judicial review falls to be dismissed.  I so order.

43.  However, I make no order as to costs.