Case Details
For Applicant(s):
The Mother applied for legal aid
Listing:
MAHMOOD ANAYA DANISH (a minor) by Khosidatun, her next friend v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
MAHMOOD ANAYA DANISH (a minor) by Khosidatun, her next friend v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5159 · HCAL 1321/2021
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1321/2021
[2026] HKCFI 5159
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1321 OF 2021
BETWEEN
| |Mahmood Anaya Danish (a minor) |Applicant |
| |by Khosidatun, her next friend | |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, “Khosidatun” be deleted as the 1st
applicant, the 2nd applicant be changed to be the sole applicant
and her name be amended to “Mahmood Anaya Danish (a minor) by
Khosidatun, her next friend”, the name of the putative respondent
be amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and the name of the
putative interested party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated 20 September 2021 and filed on 21 September
2021, Khosidatun and Mahmood Anaya Danish, applied for leave to apply
for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the
decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 20
September 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”).
2. Khosidatun (“the Mother”) is the mother of Mahmood Anaya Danish, a
minor born in Hong Kong on 25 April 2018. In Form 86, the Mother
named herself as the 1st applicant and Mahmood Anaya Danish as the 2nd
applicant. However, the Mother is in fact the applicant of a separate
leave application together with her two other children in HCAL
2903/2018, which had been dismissed on 8 September 2021. Hence, the
Mother should not be an applicant together with Mahmood Anaya Danish
in the Leave Application. Moreover, the Board’s Decision was only
concerning Mahmood Anaya Danish’s non-refoulement claim and not the
Mother’s. Thus, Mahmood Anaya Danish should be the only applicant in
the Leave Application.
3. The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2021/HCAL00
1321_2021_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
4. The Board found that Mahmood Anaya Danish was not entitled to non-
refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable grounds
under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board
dismissed her appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of
Immigration (“the Director”) dated 31 December 2018 (“the Director’s
Decision”) and confirmed the same, which rejected her non-refoulement
claim.
Amendments
5. As aforesaid, Mahmood Anaya Danish should be the sole applicant in the
Leave Application. Her name should be stated in Form 86 as “Mahmood
Anaya Danish (a minor) by Khosidatun, her next friend”.
6. Thus, on this court’s own motion, “Khosidatun” is deleted as the 1st
applicant, “Mahmood Anaya Danish” is changed to be the sole applicant
and her name is amended to “Mahmood Anaya Danish (a minor) by
Khosidatun, her next friend”.
7. In Form 86, the applicant named the Board and Immigration Department
as both the putative respondents and the putative interested parties.
8. In fact, only the Board should be named as the putative respondent,
and the Director should be named as the putative interested party.
9. Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent
is amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and the name of the
putative interested party is amended to “Director of Immigration”.
Late application
10. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months
when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the
Board’s Decision was made.
11. However, the applicant filed Form 86 on 21 September 2021, which was 2
years after the Board’s Decision (made on 20 September 2019). The
applicant was hence late for 21 months in making the Leave
Application, and this court has to consider whether there is any good
reason to extend the time for the applicant to make the Leave
Application.
12. As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria
for granting an extension of time are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public
administration.
13. The applicant did not make any application for extension of time and
provided no explanation for the delay when she filed the Leave
Application.
14. At the oral hearing before this court on 3 September 2026, the Mother
explained the delay by saying that she did not know how to apply for
judicial review and she only made the Leave Application for the
applicant in 2021 when she was helped by an NGO.
15. However, this could not be true. As aforesaid, the Mother had made
another Leave Application for herself and her two other children in
2018 and hence she must have known how to apply for judicial review.
The Mother then said that she thought that there was no need to make
another application then. When this court raised the query to her
that she must have known the procedures from her experience in the
previous leave application, the Mother merely replied that she did not
know.
16. A delay of 21 months is very substantial, and the Mother’s explanation
for the delay was not plausible. More importantly, there is no merit
in the Leave Application at all.
17. Having considered the above criteria, this court is not prepared to
grant any extension of time to the applicant to file the Leave
Application. The Leave Application can therefore be dismissed on the
ground of being made out of time alone.
18. However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still deal with
the Leave Application as discussed below.
Legal representation of the applicant
19. The applicant is a minor and is represented by the Mother as her next
friend in the Leave Application.
20. The Mother applied for legal aid for the applicant but her application
was refused by the Director of Legal Aid on 29 July 2026.
21. At the hearing before this court on 3 September 2026, the Mother
confirmed that she would not engage a private lawyer to represent the
applicant.
22. As the applicant was legally represented before the Director and no
new evidence would be advanced in the Leave Application, this Court
considered that the lack of legal representation in the Leave
Application was a mere irregularity and it would not prejudice the
applicant. Hence, this court waived the irregularity and proceeded to
deal with the Leave Application.
The applicant’s case
23. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
24. In sum, the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection was based
on the same fears of the Mother as presented in the Mother’s own non-
refoulement claim. The applicant claimed that if refouled to
Indonesia, she would be harmed or killed by her maternal grandmother
(“the Grandmother”) as the Mother refused to marry an old man arranged
by the Grandmother. The Grandmother had threatened to kill the Mother
and the Mother’s children.
25. The applicant also feared harm from the elder brother of the Mother
(“the Uncle”) who had previously harmed the Mother as the Mother
disobeyed him. The Uncle was also furious that the Mother refused to
marry the old man, had given birth to children in Hong Kong and had
betrayed her religion and shamed the family. The Mother claimed that
the Uncle had disowned her, and had threatened to kill her and her
children.
26. Initially, the Mother also claimed that the applicant feared
discrimination as the applicant was an illegitimate child. However,
the Mother confirmed with the Board that the applicant was actually
born after her marriage with the applicant’s Pakistani father, which
was registered in Hong Kong. Thus, the applicant is not a child born
out of wedlock, nor an illegitimate child.
Oral hearing
27. The applicant’s Leave Application was heard on 3 September 2026. When
this court asked the Mother for the applicant’s grounds of the
intended judicial review, the Mother said that the applicant’s claim
arose from family matters, which had all been presented to the Board
for consideration.
28. When this court asked the Mother what was wrong with the Board’s
Decision, she answered that there was nothing wrong, and she made the
Leave Application for the applicant because of the problems in
Indonesia.
29. The Mother then confirmed that the applicant was of mixed-race, whose
father was a Pakistani non-refoulement claimant and had already
returned to Pakistan, and the applicant would not go back to Pakistan.
Grounds for judicial review
30. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
31. The applicant’s Form 86 and the supporting affirmation dated 20
September 2021 were made by the Mother on behalf of the applicant.
The Mother did not advance any specific ground for the applicant’s
intended judicial review in Form 86, nor in her supporting
affirmation. In the said affirmation, the Mother merely stated that
she would like to reject and review the Board’s Decision as they
disregarded their dangerous situation.
32. As aforesaid, at the oral hearing before this court, the Mother
confirmed that there was nothing wrong with the Board’s Decision. She
merely said that the problems still existed in Indonesia. However,
this could not amount to any valid ground for the applicant’s intended
judicial review.
Discussion
33. First of all, the applicant’s fear of returning to Indonesia due to
family matters had been assessed by the Board. If the applicant
intends to challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not
permissible in an application for judicial review, save when the
Board’s findings are erroneous on point of law or irrational.
34. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
35. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite
the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
36. In assessing the applicant’s appeal/petition, the Board held an oral
hearing on 15 July 2019. The applicant was represented by the Mother.
Hence, the applicant did have an opportunity to present her case to
the Board.
37. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board did give due
consideration to all the risks that the applicant might face if she
were refouled to Indonesia. The Board had discussed the credibility
issues of the applicant’s claims in paragraphs 69 to 72 of the Board’s
Decision, and it is not necessary to repeat the same here.
38. In gist, the Board found that the Mother was not a credible witness
and aspects of her claims to fear harm were not credible. On that
basis the Board did not accept that aspects of the applicant’s claims
to fear harm if returned to Indonesia were credible.
39. The Board had laid out its material findings of fact in paragraph 73
of the Board’s Decision. On the issue of nationality, the Board found
that the applicant was entitled to be registered as an Indonesian
citizen. Based on its assessment of the Mother’s credibility, and on
its assessment of the available evidence, the Board did not accept the
applicant’s claims that (1) she was at risk of harm if returned to
Indonesia from the Grandmother or the Uncle; (2) the Mother was
threatened with death by the Grandmother if she did not engage in an
arranged marriage in Indonesia; (3) the Grandmother threatened to kill
and harm the applicant and other members of the applicant’s family if
they returned to Indonesia; (4) the Mother feared harm from the Uncle;
(5) the Mother was physically harmed by the Uncle on numerous
occasions in Indonesia or that the Mother suffered physical harm from
the Uncle in Indonesia; and (6) the applicant feared harm from the
Uncle.
40. Together with the Board’s consideration of country of origin
information (“COI”) materials, the Board did not accept that the
applicant was at risk of harm because of any issues related to the
marriage of her parents and the issuing of a birth certificate for
her. The Board also did not accept any direct or implied claim that
the applicant faced a real risk of serious harm if she returned to
Indonesia because she was born in Hong Kong. The information before
the Board was that her parents were married in Hong Kong in June 2017.
Thus, the applicant was not an illegitimate child.
41. Significantly, this court notes that although the applicant did not
raise any claim of fear due to her mixed-race ethnicity, the Board on
its own initiative discussed in paragraph 73(g) of the Board’s
Decision this aspect of the applicant’s risk as an implied claim. The
Board found from fully-referenced COI that the applicant would not
face a real risk of harm if she returned to Indonesia because of her
mixed-race background.
42. In the Board’s Decision, the Board also referred to its previous
findings in the Mother and her two other children’s case on the issue
of state protection and internal relocation. The Board’s overall
analysis of the COI material was that if the applicant was returned to
Indonesia, there would be a reasonable level of state protection
available to her on the basis of her claims. The Board’s overall
analysis of the COI material in relation to relocation was that
notwithstanding the difficulties for the applicant’s family, it would
be reasonable overall for the applicant and her family to relocate to
other places in Indonesia if she feared harm on the basis of her
claims in the Mother’s home area.
43. After due consideration of the applicant’s claims, the totality of the
evidence, the available and relevant COI, the Mother’s submissions for
the applicant, and the Board’s own assessment of the credibility of
the applicant’s claims, the Board did not find that the applicant
faced any real risk upon refoulement to Indonesia.
44. Thus, the Board found that the applicant was not entitled to non-
refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable grounds
under the USM.
45. Although the applicant was unrepresented when her claim was assessed
by the Board, the Board did on its own initiative assessed the
applicant’s danger including those specific to the applicant, namely
that she was a child of mixed-race, and concluded that the applicant
was not entitled to non-refoulement protection on any of the
applicable grounds under the USM. Thus, the applicant was not
prejudiced despite the absence of legal representation before the
Board.
46. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence, COI and
risks of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing
with the applicant’s appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to come
to its own conclusion. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable
in the way the Board reached its conclusion.
47. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
48. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
49. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed for being
made out of time and also for lack of merits.
Dated the 16th day of September 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s |the putative |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order |on: 16/09/2026 |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any| |interested parties as |
|directions given | |may be directed by the |
|within 14 days after |Applicant’s ref. no: |Court / the putative |
|the leave was granted |Nil |interested parties’ |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |16/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 15295/19/1/168/I1613|
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes| |QA T/C 4612/18 (Formerly|
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ 10834/18) |
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1