香港特別行政區 訴 陳偉強

CACC 160/2021，[2026] HKCA 1409

原案件：[2021] HKDC 824

香港特別行政區

高等法院上訴法庭

刑事司法管轄權

申請終審法院上訴許可證明書

刑事上訴案件2021年第160號

(原區域法院刑事案件2020年第295號)

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判決書

高等法院上訴法庭法官彭偉昌頒發上訴法庭判決書：

事緣

1.  本案原審時有兩名被告，申請人是D1，他在審訊後被裁定兩項‘意圖妨礙司法公正’罪成立[1]，區域法院原審法官把他判囚共2年8個月。申請人不服，就定罪提出上訴許可申請。

2.  2026年3月4日，本庭拒絕申請人的上訴許可申請，並駁回相關的上訴。案件的背景和爭議點詳見本庭於同日頒發的《判案書》（[2026] HKCA 367）。

3.  2026年3月30日，申請人存檔《動議通知書》，要求本庭頒令證明上述的判決涉及重大廣泛重要性的法律論點，以便申請人向終審法院申請上訴許可。

4.  《實務指引》4.3訂明，以判決涉及重大廣泛重要性法律論點為由要求上訴法庭發出證明書，須於《判案書》頒發後7天內提出申請，而按照這個指引，本申請實逾期19天而申請人亦無提出任何延誤的理由。

5.  無論如何，答辯方沒有因為申請人延誤而反對本申請。答辯方的主張是申請人理據不足，所以申請應予駁回。

6.  在沒有口頭聆訊的申請下，本庭決定以書面方式處理本申請。

法律論點

7.  申請人列出據稱涉及重大廣泛重要性的法律論點如下：

「 (一) 在刑事上訴案中，上訴人以大律師嚴重不稱職為訴狀，從綜合所有證據而言，門檻應該以“被告人受了不公平審訊”還是以“審判結果不公平”為限：Chong Ching Yuen v HKSAR (2004) 7 HKCFAR 126，根據Bokhary PJ的[10]的[13]？

  (二)  因負責辯護的大律師不稱職，沒有公平地把事實提交負責尋找事實的法院，上訴法院可否援引《刑事訴訟（程序）條例》（第221章）第83條的但書：Sankar v Trinidad & Tobago [1995] 1 WLR 194?」

核心陳詞

8.  以下是申請人的核心陳詞，其他散見於申請人《論點綱要》的都只是枝節。

9.  包致金法官（Bokhary PJ）在 Chong Ching Yuen and HKSAR (2004) 7 HKCFAR 126（第13段）表示：

“ 13. Delivering the advice of the Privy Council in Sankar v Trinidad and Tobago [1995] 1 WLR 194, Lord Woolf said this at p.198B–C:

In an extreme situation where the defendant is deprived of the necessities of a fair trial then even though it is his own advocate who is responsible for what has happened, an appellate court may have to quash the conviction and will do so if it appears there has been a miscarriage of justice.

As I understand that, the question of a miscarriage of justice comes in by reason of the proviso. I would not rule out the possibility of circumstances in which an appellate court can be satisfied that the result of a trial is just even though the trial itself was unfair. But I find such circumstances difficult to envisage. If an accused has been deprived of something that he would have received if his trial had been fair, what the outcome of the trial might have been if he had not been deprived of that thing would naturally tend to be in the impermissible realm of speculation. This (as one sees at pp.200H–201B of the report in Sankar v Trinidad and Tobago [1995] 1 WLR 194) is precisely why the Privy Council declined to apply the proviso in that case.”

10.  在本案，上訴法庭認定，原審辯方大律師沒有把辯方案情完整展現（《判案書》第29段），其實就是以「隱晦」的形式認定他嚴重不稱職；上訴法庭繼而以「結果無異之測驗標準」，「認為定罪妥當」（《判案書》第35和39段），就變成了「援引但書」，墮進了包法官辨識的謬誤[2]。判定大律師嚴重不稱職的準測，是「（被告）是否得到不公正的審判」而非「審判結果是否確實不公正」。上訴法庭是把兩者混淆了[3]。

11.  本案的情況，必須和 HKSAR v Leung Shing Chi (2014) 17 HKCFAR 889等有關辯方大律師是否應建議被告作供的案例有所區分。那些案例涉及辯方大律師的策略選擇，大律師有一定的裁量空間。但在本案，上訴法庭是明確裁定大律師肆意裁剪，令辯方的案論無法完整呈現，這是前所未見的。無論如何，辯方既被剝奪完整案論，上訴法庭便不應該對假設案論有被完整呈現下的審判結果進行揣測（見包法官最後幾句觀察）[4]。

12.  以上的情況，均與申請人提出的兩個法律論點有關，而「對於在香港的憲法框架下，如果被告因律師不勝任不提出訴訟而被剝奪了公平審判，是否可以援引但書，也沒有具有約束力的終審法院的裁決，如果可以，則該例外必須有多窄」[5]，所以須要終審法院在本案澄清[6]。

答辯方立場

13.  答辯方的書面回應，跟申請人一樣詳細，幾乎是逐點反駁。取其核心，答辯方的立場是：就法律論點（一），他們接受有兩度「門檻」，而且應該以第二度「門檻」為準，但根據上訴法庭的裁決，本案是連第一度「門檻」都尚未達到，所以根本不會引發論點（一）的討論；就法律論點（二），由於上訴法庭從未裁定辯方大律師嚴重不稱職，所以無需也沒有適用但書，亦即同樣沒有引發論點（二）的討論。總括而言就是本案實無關兩個法律論點提出的問題。

討論

14.  Chong Ching Yuen 是有關大律師嚴重不稱職的權威案例，當中的主判詞由艾俊彬法官（Sir Thomas Eichelbaum NPJ）撰寫。以下是主判詞裡最經典的兩段，這兩段清楚解釋了何謂足以推翻定罪的嚴重不稱職（第48至49段）：

“ 48. It follows, almost inevitably, that ordinarily, a tactical decision by counsel which, in hindsight, ought to have been made differently, will not provide any ground for appeal, any more than if such decision had been made by the defendant personally. Nor will other forms of mere error of judgment.

49. Nevertheless, the courts have recognized that in some exceptional instances, an error of sufficient proportion and consequence will enable the court to intervene and avert a miscarriage of justice. To describe this ground, the expression “flagrant incompetence” has generally been used, see for example R v Mo Lee Kuen [1993] 1 HKCLR 78; HKSAR v Wong Chi Keung & Others (unrep., Crim App No 585 of 1996, [1998] HKLRD (Yrbk) 157); R v Lau Sui Fu [1997] HKLRD 323; HKSAR v Au Yeung Long & Another (unrep., CACC No 522 of 1998, [1999] HKEC 1099). While the term is firmly embedded in case law in Hong Kong, and in some jurisdictions overseas as well, it is more a convenient form of shorthand than anything like a comprehensive description of the foundation for a successful appeal. Indeed, at least at first impression, the reference to incompetence may suggest an issue about the general competence of counsel, which usually is not in issue at all, and was not in issue here. Occasionally, in extreme cases, an appeal may turn on counsel’s conduct of the trial as a whole, for example a failure to conduct the case in accordance with any theory of a defence case where a clear line of defence is available. More often, however, assertions of “incompetence” will relate to the manner in which counsel dealt with a specific issue during trial, involving a matter of judgment or decision, or advice given to the defendant. The expression “flagrant incompetence” rightly underlines an appellant’s need to show much more than a mistake, an error of judgment, or a decision to follow one course when in hindsight another would have been preferable. But it should not deflect attention from the most critical point, namely given that there was a significant error of some kind, what will be decisive is the effect of the error on the trial. As Lord Steyn said, in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Boodram v Trinidad and Tobago [2002] 1 Cr App R 103:

… the general principle requires the court to focus on the impact of the faulty conduct. (at p.118)

The bottom line is that to succeed, an appellant must be able to show he or she received less than a fair trial. As the Appeal Committee said in Mak Kam Chuen v HKSAR (unrep., FAMC No 35 of 2001, [2002] HKLRD (Yrbk) 276, [2001] HKEC 1521):

… the ultimate question for the court is whether the conduct complained of has resulted in the accused not getting a fair trial so that the conviction is unsafe or there is a miscarriage of justice. (at p.4)

  ….”

15.  艾俊彬法官的分析和結論，包致金法官是明確表示贊同的（該案判詞第2段）。至於包法官本人的觀察（判詞第13段），那最少要從判詞第5段讀起才能準確抓住當中的整套思路如下：根據《刑事訴訟程序條例》第83(1)條，上訴法庭只能基於三個理由推翻某項定罪；因為大律師嚴重不稱職而推翻定罪的個案，一般都能夠以當中的「定罪並不穩妥或並不令人滿意」（conviction unsafe and unsatisfactory）去理解；至於第83(1)條下的「但書」，「審訊不公平」（deprived of a fair trial）（嚴重不稱職的準測）和「司法並無不公」（no miscarriage of justice）（適用但書的準測）既屬兩個不同概念，就不是完全沒有可能同時發生，但實際上會是什麼情況則很難想像；它甚至會牽涉到上訴法院對假設條件下的審訊結果進行臆測，是不應該的，例子見 Sankar v Trinidad and Tobago[7]。

16.  包法官這些觀察，同樣得到艾俊彬和其他所有同案法官的認可。這些觀察旨在指出「司法並無不公」和「審訊不公平」之間的實際而非概念上的難以同步。說白了就是很難在現實中發生。這個進路既保護了第83(1)條的有效完好（integrity），同時又不會減損以大律師嚴重不稱職為由的上訴機會，所以是兩全其美地理順了兩者之間的邏輯關係，就是這麼簡單。由始至終，大律師嚴重不稱職的準測都只有一個，即「審訊不公平」，反之「但書」就是第83(1)條下一個一般適用的保留條款。人們無需也沒有理由把它們視作測試大律師嚴重不稱職的「兩度門檻」。無論如何，包法官已經把兩者的關係解釋得非常清楚，所以根本沒有什麼法律論點要由終審法院來澄清。

17.  為求完備，本庭會進一步指出，本庭從未裁定本案辯方大律師（黃大律師）嚴重不稱職；無論是直接、間接，甚或「隱晦地」裁定都沒有。如果申請人有細讀本庭的判詞，他便應該知道，基於雙方存檔的誓章、夾附文件，以及證物P8A（監控錄音）的內容，本庭的結論是[8]：申請人和黃大律師都清楚知道證物P8A的無可辯駁，堅持不認罪只是二人各取所需；沒有依足指示盤問PW1，的確有損辯方案論的完整，而且也暴露了黃大律師的處事輕慢，但這些指示本身卻漏洞百出，用於直接面對證物P8A更是毫無用處；申請人不上證人台，是申請人經過思考和權衡的個人選擇；他投訴黃大律師嚴重不稱職，只是因為最初五項上訴理由被處理保釋的法官全面否定。本庭是基於以上的綜合情況才裁定申請人的上訴失敗，是一個縱觀全局的結論。黃大律師的缺失本身並未顛覆原審的公平公正。

處置

18.  本庭拒絕發出有關的證明書。