SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE v. POON CHUK HUNG

HCMP 2386/2024

[2026] HKCFI 1986

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 2386 OF 2024

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J U D G M E N T

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A.  INTRODUCTION

1.  The Secretary of Justice (“SJ”) filed an Originating Summons on 20 November 2024 (“OS”) for an order of committal against Mr Poon Chuk Hang (“Mr Poon”) for:

(1)  criminal contempt in making insulting, abusive, offensive, scurrilous, ridiculing and/or harassing remarks against the judicial officers of the Labour Tribunal in LBTC 3098/2021 (“Criminal Contempt”); and

(2)  civil contempt in aiding and abetting the breach of the undertaking given to the Labour Tribunal that the hearing transcripts would be used only for matters in connection with the underlying proceedings and would not be reproduced or released to others or used for any other purposes (“Civil Contempt”).

2.  Mr Poon did not contest liability. This is the hearing for his mitigation and sentencing.

B.  AGREED FACTS

3.  On 26 August 2021, Poon Ki Chi (“Claimant”) brought a claim against Lockill Biochemical Limited (“Company”) for unpaid wages in LBTC 3098/2021 (“the Underlying Proceedings”).

4.  Mr Poon was the sole director of the Company at the material time, and he represented the Company at the trial.

5.  On 29 December 2022, the Labour Tribunal made an award in favour of the Claimant. On 12 January 2023, the Company applied for leave to appeal in HCLA 2/2023 (“the Leave Application”).

6.  Mr Poon, on behalf of the Company, applied for the transcript of the trial in the Underlying Proceedings (“Transcript”). He signed and returned an undertaking to the Labour Tribunal to only use the transcript for purposes in connection with those proceedings and not for any other purpose; and not to reproduce or disseminate the transcript to any other person or body (the “Undertaking”). He later obtained the Transcript.

7.  In breach of the Undertaking, Mr Poon uploaded screenshots of parts of the Transcript in two public posts on his Facebook page. The first post attracted 235 “likes” and “wow” reactions, 89 responses and 10 shares with others. The second post attracted 581 “likes”, “wow” and “haha” reactions, 112 comments and 43 shares with others.

8.  Mr Poon also uploaded two videos to his Youtube channel making the following remarks:

“Okay，勞審咁嗰啲咁嘅咩官呀？喂，跌到最底層嗰啲，即係全部XXX啦直頭，直頭嗰個呀直頭XX嚟㗎。我直頭講個官係XX，個XX，X你… 你判到咁？… …”

9.  In the second video, Mr Poon was shown reciting the contents of the Transcript and attacking the Claimant. Mr Poon was shown holding a document which resembled the Transcript, saying that it was the transcript of the proceedings obtained from the Court which constituted “evidence pointing to the [Claimant’s] guilt” and he would recite the same. He was also shown to be inviting his viewers to visit his Facebook page for the Transcript.

10.  As at 22 and 26 March 2024 and 22 April 2024, both videos were available for viewing. As at 20 August 2024, the first video was set to private, whilst the second video was still publicly accessible (§22).

11.  As of 9 October 2024, Mr Poon’s YouTube Channel had 77,600 subscribers. The second video was viewed 38,001 times and had attracted about 2,000 likes and 311 comments. His Facebook page had about 53,000 followers. As of 10 October 2024, 1,771 videos were uploaded onto his YouTube Channel, which had attracted 20,337,625 views in total.

C.  LIABILITY FOR CONTEMPT

12.  The remarks in the video (§8 above) were abusive attacks on the judicial officer at the Labour Tribunal rather than pointing out his errors in handling Mr Poon’s case: Secretary for Justice v The Oriental Press Group Ltd [1998] 2 HKLRD 123, at 148 I-J. The remarks scandalized the Labour Tribunal, constituting criminal contempt of court because of the negative effect those remarks may have on public confidence in the due administration of justice. The conduct was neither causal, accidental or unintentional. I find the Criminal Contempt to be proved beyond reasonable doubt against Mr Poon.

13.  The Undertaking was as good as a court order: Au Tze Pui v Chow Wing Man [2025] HKCFI 2995 at §2. Mr Poon who signed the Undertaking must have been aware of its contents. The Undertaking was indisputably breached as the Transcript was publicized and not for the purpose of the Underlying Proceedings or the Leave Application; and the public was invited to inspect the Transcript. The breach was not casual, accidental or unintentional. I find the Civil Contempt to be proved beyond reasonable doubt as against Mr Poon.

D.  LEGAL PRINCIPLES ON SENTENCING

14.  The legal principles on sentencing for contempt of court are not controversial. Chu J (as she then was) in Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa [2011] 1 HKC 346 at §§9-12 held as follows:

(1)  The court has a wide discretion as to the sanction to be imposed for contempt of court. Sanction for contempt ranges from a fine to a term of imprisonment.

(2)  In civil contempt, which covers breach of court order and undertaking to court, the primary concern in sentencing is to demonstrate to litigants that orders of the court are to be obeyed. In modern times, imprisonment is regarded as a sanction of last resort. However, where there has been deliberate and repeated breach of court orders and undertaking, a term of imprisonment is appropriate. Further in cases of deliberate breaches of orders, the court has to take into account public interest in the administration of justice.

(3)  In criminal contempt, which involves interference with the administration of justice, a term of imprisonment is generally called for. This is particularly the case where the interferences are grave and contumelious and contumacious.

15.  In Au Tze Pui v Chow Wing Man [2025] HKCFI 2995 at §§2-4, Au-Yeung J held as follows:

(1)  Breach of an undertaking is like a breach of a court order. Where there is no evidence to suggest that compliance was in any way difficult or impossible, a sentence of imprisonment would not be inappropriate. This would be particularly so in a case where the sentence was designed to enforce compliance.

(2)  The starting point is to acknowledge that contempt of civil court orders is a serious matter and that court orders are made to be obeyed. A prime consideration of the court in sentencing contempt is to signal importance of demonstrating to litigants that the orders of these courts are to be obeyed. By “litigants”, it is clearly referring to litigants in general and not just the contemnor himself.

(3)  The object of the sentence is both to punish conduct in defiance of the court's order and to serve a coercive function by holding out the threat of future punishment as a means of securing the protection which the order was primarily there to do. The court has to balance the 2 objects.

(4)  The sentence for contempt may range from a fine to a term of imprisonment. Imprisonment should be regarded as a sanction of the last resort. Any custodial sentence should be as short as possible consistent with the circumstances of the case.

(5)  The court may suspend a term of imprisonment for such period or on such terms as the court deems fit. This is an “absolute discretion” but it would be difficult to think of circumstances where a suspended order should be made when nothing further remains to be done to comply with the order.

(6)  The court will consider if there are (i) aggravating factors, (ii) mitigating factors and (iii) acts to purge the contempt.

(7)  Relevant factors (which are not exhaustive) include (i) the nature of the order and breach in question, and the extent of the breach; (ii) whether the contempt was contumacious or unintentional, the reasons, motives and state of mind; (iii) whether the claimant has been prejudiced by virtue of the contempt and whether the prejudice is capable of remedy; (iv) whether the contemnor appreciates the seriousness of the deliberate breach; and (v) whether the contemnor has cooperated.

16.  Where the contemnor is being sentenced on more than one count of contempt, the court must have regard to the principle of totality of sentence: Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, §§30-31.

17.  In Secretary for Justice v Choy Bing Wing (unrep., HCMP 4694/2003, 7 December 2005), the respondent’s affirmation and his “tirade of abuse” heaped upon the judge and during the course of the hearing were the most serious scandalizing of the court. It was an attempt to remove the judge from the hearing of his appeal. The court found that the respondent was not exercising in good faith any right of ordinary criticism, even if misguided (§12). His conduct was intended to undermine the administration of justice (§26), and his purported apology (§25) was insincere (§19). He was given a sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment.

18.  In Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa [2011] HKC 346, the respondent (i) sent abusive letters to judges and officers in large quantity, (ii) made insulting or harassing telephone calls to judge's clerk, (iii) employed deceptive means in seeking to commence proceedings in court, (iv) abuse the process of the court by using court proceedings for an improper, malicious and ulterior motive, and (v) using abusive language against a judge in court document (§1). The judge found that the respondent’s conduct was to scandalize and victimize judges who had made decisions against her and to improperly influence the judges in their conduct of matters relating to her. It was not a case of a litigant, being overborne by the stress and burden of litigation, exhibited an outburst of emotion or had a moment of exasperation (§23). There was no remorse or sincere attempt to purge her contempt (§24). Two months’ imprisonment were imposed for each of the 3 offences of interference with the administration of justice that involved the use of insulting, abusive and offensive language against judges (§26). There were terms of imprisonment for other offences. Taking into account the totality of the sentence, the judge ordered that the sentences be served concurrently such that the total sentence was 2 months’ imprisonment (§§30-31).

19.  In Secretary for Justice v The Oriental Press Group Ltd [1998] 2 HKLRD 123, the respondents mounted a “vitriolic campaign” to vilify the judiciary by publishing degrading articles with “extremely degrading and insulting expressions” and to intimidate members of the judiciary by having a paparazzi type pursuit on a judge. The vitriolic campaign was without parallel in modern times. They contained no reasoned argument and the allegations made were without foundation. The intention was to incite their readers to despise members of the judiciary and not to trust them (pp. 156-158). The court sentenced the former chief editor of a newspaper to 4 months’ imprisonment, reduced from 8 to reflect mitigation (p.175). The newspaper company was fined HK$5 million (p.176).

20.  In Wong Yeung Ng v Secretary for Justice [1999] 3 HKC 143, the editors of the Oriental Daily News were convicted of two counts of contempt of court by conducting a series of campaign of vilification and intimidation which were aimed at members of the Obscene Articles Tribunal and the judiciary. The Court of Appeal found that the features of the campaign which made it so unique included “the venom of the language used, the outrageousness of the motives ascribed to the targets and the impact the campaign had on confidence in the ability of the judges to dispense justice conscientiously and impartially (146 F-G). The campaign was also found to threaten, harass and intimidate Godfrey JA, by having him pursued night and day by employees of the Oriental Daily News (146 H-I). The editors’ appeal against the sentence of four months’ imprisonment was dismissed.

E.  MITIGATION

21.  Mr Poon has expressed unreserved remorse for his actions in an affirmation filed on 23 June 2025. He explained that the outcome of the Underlying Proceedings was deeply disappointing to him as he believed that the Claimant’s claim was inaccurate and misleading. The Claimant’s witness in the Underlying Proceedings was unreliable and full of self-contradiction, but the judgment was “upset and unjust”. He claimed that the bankruptcy of the Company “caused significant financial and emotional strain”. With the unfavourable judgment, Mr Poon was left “in a state of distress, which clouded [his] judgment at the time of the actions in question.” He further explained that the remarks in his posts/videos “were made impulsively during a moment of exhaustion and frustration” and his intention “was not to undermine the authority or integrity of the Labour Tribunal or its officers but to express personal disappointment in a misguided and regrettable manner”.

22.  In respect of the civil contempt, Mr Poon admitted that he posted the Transcript in the video “with the intention of inviting public input to corroborate [his] belief that [the Claimant] had provided inaccurate testimony … [His] aim was to gather evidence to support [his] perspective on the underlying dispute, which [he] felt had not been adequately addressed in the Tribunal’s award.” He claimed that he “did not fully comprehend that these actions constituted a breach of the undertaking, as [he] mistakenly believed they were related to the broader context of seeking justice”.

23.  Upon being served with the OS, he removed the subject videos from the YouTube Channel and refrained from making any further public statements about the Underlying Proceedings or the Judiciary. He also reviewed his social media activity to ensure no other content could be perceived as disrespectful to the Court. He had taken steps to secure the Transcript to prevent misuse.

F.  SENTENCE FOR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

24.  Mr Poon had been committed once for (civil) contempt of court for breach of an injunction in a case involving the Claimant but that breach actually took place after the offending posts/videos in this case. However, I place no weight on a “clear record” as it would be misleading to suggest that each person has one opportunity to commit contempt.

25.  Mr Poon has admitted liability. He has purged his contempt as stated in paragraph 23 above. Post-hearing, on 31 March 2026, he had published a statement on his Facebook page and YouTube channel. In it, he gave an unreserved apology to the court and the judicial officers and expressed regret for his inappropriate remarks and conduct. He also stated that he understood that he should behave properly in public and could not make inappropriate remarks against the court and judges and cannot breach an undertaking to the court. He also expressed hope that the public would understand these from this case. All of these go towards mitigation.

26.  The Leave Application has been withdrawn, but this is not a mitigating factor. It is never the intention of contempt proceedings to deter a litigant from pursuing a rightful appeal. What’s more, it was the provisional liquidator of the Company who withdrew the Leave Application, not Mr Poon.

27.  On the other hand, Mr Poon’s conduct was intentional, even if it had been motivated by frustration. There were aggravating factors.

28.  Firstly, although the post/videos were published after the Underlying Proceedings had concluded, there was a pending Leave Application. The fact that he had only published a few out of 512 pages of the Transcript was irrelevant. As revealed from paragraph 22 above, he plainly intended to involve other people to affect the outcome of the Leave Application or appeal, if leave is granted. That was interference with the proper administration of justice.

29.  Secondly, whilst I accept that the Labour Tribunal award and the Company’s bankruptcy left Mr Poon “in a vulnerable emotional and financial state”, I do not accept that his publications were made “impulsively during a moment of exhaustion and frustration”:

(1)  There was not only a one-off post. The Facebook post and the two Youtube videos were published on 3 days, 13 March 2024, 16 March 2024, and 19 March 2024 respectively.

(2)  There was a cooling off period from the Labour Tribunal’s award delivered on 29 December 2022 to 13 March 2024 and in between the 3 publications. The time intervals indicated that his action was pre-conceived, made after the Transcript was obtained and designed to vent his anger on the judicial officer personally instead of making comments on the judgment.

(3)  The post and videos remained in the public domain for at least 5 months from 13 March 2024 to 20 August 2024 when Video 1 was set to private. Video 2 was removed after service of the OS.

30.  Thirdly, Mr Poon is a public figure who called himself a “social activist”. He has a large group of public followers. He misused his public platform for a private dispute that his Company had with his ex-employee at the Labour Tribunal, rather than any social justice issue. Quite unlike Yuen Oi Yee Lisa whose abusive remarks were addressed to a limited group of persons within the judiciary (who, one could expect, would uphold the interests of justice and not be deterred by the respondent’s abusive conduct), Mr Poon’s publication of the scandalizing post/videos was to a wider, public audience. It was serious and it is in the public interest to punish and deter such behaviour.

31.  The flipside of Mr Poon having a Facebook and YouTube channel is that he can influence the public on what not to do about vilifying the court. Give the large number of followers, his written apology can achieve the effect of educating the public just that, to deter similar conduct in future. This is a very important mitigating factor.

32.  Taking all circumstances into account, I consider it appropriate to impose 2 months’ imprisonment for the criminal contempt but reduce it to one month for the mitigating circumstances.

G.  CIVIL CONTEMPT

33.  Mr Poon signed the Undertaking with full knowledge of its meaning, and yet he breached it, not once but thrice. The instigating and aggravating factors apply equally. The gravest aggravating factor is paragraph 28 above.

34.  Many litigants apply for transcripts. The Court should uphold strict compliance with the undertaking to deter misuse of transcripts by litigants.

35.  A deterrent sentence is called for. A term of imprisonment for 6 weeks reduced to one month for the Civil Contempt is appropriate.

36.  The Criminal and Civil Contempt were related to the same Underlying Proceedings. It is appropriate to order the sentences to run concurrently so that the overall term of imprisonment is one month. I see no reason for suspending the sentence when nothing else is to be done by Mr Poon.

37.  On costs, Mr Poon shall pay the SJ’s costs on an indemnity basis, summarily assessed in the sum of HK$262,655.

38.  I thank Mr. Lam and Mr. Chung for their assistance.