YUEN OI YEE LISA v. CHAROEN SIRIVADHANABHAKDI AND OTHERS

DCCJ 1914/2015

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 1914 OF 2015

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DECISION

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1. Ms Yuen is subject to the restrictive proceedings order made in the course of these proceedings on 16 November 2015 (“the RPO”).

2. In compliance with the RPO, Ms Yuen filed an application (by means of the draft summons dated 19 August 2016) for RPO leave to commence fresh proceedings against D1, D3, D4 and D6 of this action (“the four intended defendants”).  The application was supported by two affirmations, dated 19 August 2016 and 22 August 2016 respectively.

3. On 5 September 2016, I dismissed her application as I took the view that her intended proceedings would be a repeat of DCCJ 1914/2015 which had been struck out.

4. This is Ms Yuen’s application for leave to appeal against my refusal to grant her RPO leave.  The application is supported by her affirmation dated 12 September 2016.

5. Paragraph 22 of Practice Direction 11.3 provides that on the first occasion that an RPO litigant makes an application to the District Court for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against a refusal of an RPO leave application, such an application for leave to appeal shall be heard by the District Court inter partes.

6. Since Ms Yuen did not have leave to serve the inter partes summons out of the jurisdiction on the four intended defendants, the four intended defendants are absent today.  Having regard to the nature of today’s hearing, I shall proceed in their absence.

Discussion

7. According to the indorsement on the draft writ annexed to Ms Yuen’s affirmation dated 19 August 2016, her intended claim against the four intended defendants is for “HK$16,000,000.00 under s 66 of Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap 486).”  This is the same as her indorsement in DCCJ 1914/2015, which was for “HK$16,000,000.00 under Section 66 of Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap 486) which is a precedent case in HKSAR.”

8. Ms Yuen has in fact named a total of 11 intended defendants on the draft writ (although she only applied for RPO leave in respect of four of them).  These intended defendants were all defendants or intended defendants in DCCJ 1914/2015.

9. Although Ms Yuen did not annex any draft statement of claim to her RPO leave application, it is clear from the above and her supporting affirmations that the intended proceedings would be a re-run of DCCJ 1914/2015.

10. DCCJ 1914/2015 had been struck out by me on the ground that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action, was frivolous and vexatious and constituted an abuse of process.[1] The Court of Appeal subsequently affirmed my decision, commenting that:

“After carefully going through the evidence before him, the Judge concluded that the action was a re-litigation of LBTC 588/2011 and HCA 2045/2012. Those actions were commenced by the applicant’s husband but had already been dismissed. The Judge found that the applicant had a direct interest in the outcome of her husband’s claim in those actions and was therefore privy. She cannot re-litigate those matters by virtue of the action below. In our view, the Judge was entirely correct in his analysis and reasoning.”[2]

11. Under sections 63 and 63A of the District Court Ordinance (Cap 336), an appeal to the Court of Appeal may only be made with leave and no leave should be granted unless the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard. 

12. In her latest affirmation filed in support of her application for leave to appeal, Ms Yuen complains that: “It was a serious mistake of His Honour Judge Ko to have jumped into a conclusion / decision / judgment that my proceedings in DCCJ 1914/2015 was a repetition of my husband’s proceedings in LBTC 588/2011.”  This confirms that she is unable to accept defeat and intends to re-litigate DCCJ 1914/2015, which was itself a re-litigation of LBTC 588/2011 and HCA 2045/2012.  Her intended appeal has no prospect of success.

13. Li CJ has said in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Ltd [2005] 1 HKLRD 473 at para 2 that attempts to re-litigate the same matters that have already been determined are one of the hallmark activities of vexatious litigants.  There is simply no reason why her appeal should be heard.

14. Ms Yuen’s summons is therefore dismissed with no order as to costs. 

Postscript

15. On 19 September 2016, Ms Yuen took out an interlocutory application (by means of inter partes summons) to seek an order: “To pass my complaint made to the ICAC in respect of my husband’s lost witness statement filed and served by me in LBTC588/2011 on 25^th May 2011 to the Secretary for Justice’s consideration and Police’s investigation with immediate effect which had led to my husband’s Bankruptcy Petition in HCB1128/2015 on 9^th February 2015 and further led to my / this proceedings under no choice despite Justice Queeny Au Yeung had already granted me leave to RPO against Best Spirits Company Limited on 4^th February 2014.”

16. As this action had already been dismissed, there is no basis for Ms Yuen to make any interlocutory application.  Her summons is also dismissed with no order as to costs.