CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 2430 of 2020
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BETWEEN
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Waqas |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board/
Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |
Putative Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)
Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Philips Wong:
1. Form 86 be amended as follows:- the Director of Immigration be named as the Putative Interested Party.
2. The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By Form 86 filed on 14 December 2020 (the “Form”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 19 November 2020 (the “Board’s Decision”).
2. In the Form, the Applicant named the Board as both the proposed respondent and the proposed interested party. As it is trite that the Board should be the proposed respondent and the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) should be the proposed interested party in an application of this sort, I make an order to amend the Form on the court’s own motion.
3. The Applicant requested an oral hearing for the application. The hearing took place on 1 September 2025 and the Applicant attended in person. At the hearing, the Applicant however indicated that he had nothing to say in respect of the Leave Application.
Background
4. The Applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and the arguments he advanced had been set out in detail in the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary for me to repeat the same here. The hyperlink to the Board’s Decision is included below[1] for reference.
Discussion
5. The applicable legal principles relating to application of this sort are well established. The role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. Though in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (COI) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. (See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, at §14)
6. In the Form, the Applicant did not provide any grounds in support of the Leave Application. In the supporting Affirmation, the Applicant simply stated that he is not satisfied with the Board’s Decision and that he cannot go back to his country because his life is not safe there.
7. I have considered the Board’s Decision in detail. I do not find any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. Neither has the Applicant been able to demonstrate any of the same. There is nothing to indicate that the Board had failed to take into account any relevant matters. The Board’s Decision was comprehensive with adequate reasons provided. In particular, the Board was entitled to find that the Applicant’s evidence to be incredible and untruthful (§31 of the Board’s Decision). The Board was also entitled to reject the claim based on the reasons provided (§§24-89 of the Board’s Decision). I see no errors in the Board’s analysis and reasoning. The Board’s Decision satisfies the enhanced Wednesbury test and is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.
8. In the premises, I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended challenge of the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success. Accordingly, I refuse to grant leave for judicial review.
9. Leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process and I am not expected to give elaborated reasons for my decision (see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at §23). Suffice for me to state that in reaching the decision, I have considered all the relevant documents before me.
Conclusion
10. In the light of the reasons provided above, I make an order that the Form be amended as described above and the Leave Application be dismissed.
Dated the 24th day of October 2025
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(Allen LEE)
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted
(Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave
(Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant
on 24/10/2025
Waqas
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 24/10/2025
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 16820/20/3/48/P3298
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
RBCZ 10005/20 (T2S1)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1