WILFRED WAI FU HSU v. MICHAEL HAK MAN YUEN

HCA 1801/2019

[2023] HKCFI 1778

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1801 OF 2019

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J U D G M E N T

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1.  In this case, the plaintiff (“P”) claims against the defendant (“D”) for the repayment of the outstanding principal and interest pursuant to a Promissory Note and Loan Agreement dated 14 January 2018 signed by D (“the Loan Agreement”). P is legally represented at all times. D was legally represented until 1 June 2023, and has been acting in person thereafter.

2.  In the trial, P is represented by Ms Angela Mui of counsel, and D is acting in person.

The parties’ respective cases

3.  P and D have known each other and have been friends for many years.  The matters concerning this case began in 2017.

4.  P’s case is as follows:

(1)  In early 2017, D told P that he and his wife had started a business concerning electronic wearables by using a company called M&G Enterprises (“M&G”).  D requested P to provide him a loan of RMB 6.8 million.  After some discussion, P agreed and provided the loan to D (“the Original Loan”).  At that time, the parties had discussed that there would be interest on the loan at not less than 12% per annum, but there was no agreement on the exact interest rate.  P requested that D’s wife should be a guarantor of the loan.

(2)  Sometime thereafter, P knew that D’s wife had refused to guarantee the loan.  D invited P to consider to treat the RMB 6.8 million as an investment in M&G.  After some consideration, P declined to accept the invitation and demanded D to repay the Original Loan, and D agreed to do so by instalments.  Subsequently, D repaid USD 510,000 and USD 50,000 to P.

(3)  In January 2018, P met D at an exhibition in Las Vegas.  After some discussion, P and D reached an agreement.  Pursuant to the agreement, the outstanding principal of the Original Loan and the interests were all converted to a lump sum of USD 600,000 (“the New Loan”).  The agreement was reduced into writing.  On 14 January 2018, D signed the Loan Agreement.

(4)  The Loan Agreement contains the following terms:

(a)  The New Loan is subject to an interest at 15% per annum and shall accrue and be paid on the principal amount of the New Loan outstanding at the end of every month (Clause 2).

(b)  The New Loan is for a period of 1 year and 16 days and D shall repay the aggregate outstanding New Loan in full on 31 January 2019 (Clause 3).

(c)  Any interest payment overdue for a period of more than three calendar days shall incur a late fee of 10% (Clause 6).

(5)  After the signing of the Loan Agreement, D has made the following repayments:

(a)  a repayment of HKD 25,013 in June 2018

(b)  a repayment of HKD 17,550 on 30 January 2019; and

(c)  a repayment of HKD 58,500 on 1 April 2019.

(6)  Save and except the aforesaid, no other repayment has been made by D.

(7)  P claims against D for the outstanding principal sum of the New Loan, interests and late fees pursuant to the Loan Agreement.

5.  D’s case is as follows:

(1)  P and D came to know each other while they were studying in the same university.

(2)  In early 2017, D has some discussion with P regarding a business project in electronic wearables (“the QRS Project”) being developed by D at that time.  The QRS Project was a project run by M&G.  P was interested in investing into the QRS Project, but he did not have sufficient cash at that time.  P and D agreed that D would assist P in selling some of his real properties in Mainland China, and P would use the proceeds obtained from the sale to invest into the QRS Project. Thereafter, with D’s assistance, P successfully sold some real properties in Mainland China.  In around April 2017, P transferred RMB 6.8 million to D as P’s investment into the QRS Project.

(3)  However, shortly thereafter, P told D that he wanted to withdraw from the investment and asked D to return the investment sum to him.  D agreed.  P and D agreed that the investment sum should be converted to USD 970,000.

(4)  On 28 April 2017, D returned USD 510,000 to P.

(5)  Sometime thereafter, P and D agreed that the remaining USD 460,000 would be treated as a convertible loan from P to D in support of D’s business.

(6)  On 17 May 2017, D repaid a further USD 50,000 to P.

(7)  In January 2018, in an exhibition is Las Vegas, P told D that he wanted to have a written record of the loan due from D to P.  P produced the Loan Agreement to D.  Before signing the same, P told D that the total amount owed by D to P was USD 600,000.  P also told D that the Loan Agreement was only a formality and P would not enforce the same against D.  D did not have sufficient time to calculate the amount due to P.  D believed what P had said, and signed the Loan Agreement.

(8)  The Loan Agreement did not reflect the truth and the actual dealings between the parties.  D signed the Loan Agreement out of his friendly intention to maintain good business relationship with P.  P has not provided consideration to D in return for the execution of the Loan Agreement by D.  Further, the parties have never intended the Loan Agreement to be treated as a legally binding agreement.

(9)  After the signing of the Loan Agreement, D made 4 repayments to P.  Details of the repayments are as follows:

Date	Payment method	Amount (HKD)
June 2018	Cheque (925190)	25,013.00
7 June 2018	Cheque (925191) (“the 300k Cheque”)	300,562.76
30 January 2019	Cheque (131914)	17,550.00
1 April 2019	Cheque (131937)	58,500.00

(10)  In consideration of the repayments made by D, P has orally agreed with D, to further extend the repayment deadline of the outstanding loan, to a date to be further agreed by the parties (“the Extension Agreement”). However, while the parties were still in the course of negotiation, P has prematurely commenced his claim herein.

(11)  While D was giving evidence in the trial, D said that he refused to honour the 300k Cheque, for P had overstated the indebtedness owed by D to P in the Loan Agreement.  D said that as at 14 January 2018, the indebtedness owed by him to P was only about USD 410,000.

6.  P and D are the only witnesses giving evidence in the trial.  They have given evidence in the trial in support of their respective cases.

7.  Based upon the pleadings and the evidence, the following matters are not in dispute:

(1)  In around April 2017, D owed the Original Loan to P.  The principal amount of the Original Loan was RMB 6.8 million.

(2)  In late April 2017 and May 2017, D repaid USD 510,000 and USD 50,000 respectively to P.

(3)  On or about 14 January 2018, D signed the Loan Agreement.

(4)  After the signing of the Loan Agreement, D repaid to P HKD 25,013 in June 2018, HKD 17,550 on 30 January 2019, and HKD 58,500 on 1 April 2019.

8.  In my view, the issues to be determined in the trial are as follows:

(1)  whether the Loan Agreement is unenforceable as contended by D by reason of:

(a)  there is no consideration from P in support of the Loan Agreement; and/or

(b)  the parties did not intend the Loan Agreement to be a legally binding agreement.

(2)  whether the Extension Agreement is true; and

(3)  If the answers to (1) and (2) are “No”, the amounts owed by D to P under the Loan Agreement.

The principles

9.  It is well established that the issues in a trial are defined by pleadings, not by evidence.  One cannot slip in an unpleaded issue by saying that there is evidence on the issue.  As said by Ma CJ in Kwok Chin Wing v 21 Holdings Ltd^[1]:-

“21. It should by now really be quite unnecessary to issue yet another reminder on the rationale behind pleadings. The basic objective is fairly and precisely to inform the other party or parties in the litigation of the stance of the pleading party (in other words, that party’s case) so that proper preparation is made possible, and to ensure that time and effort are not expended unnecessarily on other issues:- Wing Hang Bank Limited v Crystal Jet International Limited [2005] 2 HKLRD 795, 799 [6(1)]. It is the pleadings that will define the issues in a trial and dictate the course of proceedings both before and at trial. Where witnesses are involved, it will be the pleaded issues that define the scope of the evidence, and not the other way round. In other words, it will not be acceptable for unpleaded issues to be raised out of the evidence which is to be or has been adduced. As the Court of Appeal remarked in Wing Hang Bank Limited v Crystal Jet International Limited:-

‘(2) In a trial, particularly where evidence is given by witnesses, it becomes extremely important that each side knows exactly what are the live issues. Where issues are sought to be introduced that have not been adequately or properly pleaded, amendments must be sought unless the consent of the other party or parties has been obtained. It will simply not do for unpleaded issues to be “slipped in” when evidence is being given in the hope that the other side is not sufficiently alert to object.’

22. …… one does not sift through the evidence adduced in a trial in the hope that something was said that can conceivably found a cause of action. Issues, I would reiterate, must be properly pleaded unless for some reason the pleadings have assumed a less significant role in the proceedings.” (Emphasis added)

10.  As said by the Court of Final Appeal in Ming Shiu Chung & Others v Ming Shiu Sum & Others^[2], a person of full age and understanding is bound by the document signed by him, unless a recognized legal basis for concluding that his apparent consent has been in some way vitiated or that reliance on the document by some other person falls into some category of unconscionable conduct justifying relief in equity.  Choosing to sign a document without knowing its contents cannot be a sufficient reason for not being bound by the document.  In Ming Shiu Chung, Ribeiro PJ said:

“84. … Reliance is universally placed on signatures appended to documents by persons of full age and understanding as signifying the signatory’s assent or adherence to what that document states. Where such a person has signed a document which purports to have legal effect, the law has never regardedit as enough to show that he signed without knowing its contentsfor the document to be disavowed. It is an everyday occurrence that people sign documents without reading the small (or even the large) print and therefore sign without actually knowing the terms (or all the terms) of the document signed. But they are held to the documents which they have chosen to sign unless there is shown to be a recognized legal basis for concluding that their apparent consent has been in some way vitiated or that reliance on that document by some other person falls into some category of unconscionable conduct justifying relief in equity.

85. Thus, in Saunders v Anglia Building Society [1971] AC 1004 at 1016, Lord Reid warned against an approach, like that of the Court of Appeal, which inverts the general rule:

‘We find in many of the authorities statements that a man’s deed is not his deed if his mind does not go with his pen. But that is far too wide. It would cover cases where the manhad taken no precautions at all, and there was no ground forhis belief that he was signing something different from thatwhich in fact he signed. I think that it is the wrong approach to start from that wide statement and then whittle it down by excluding cases where the remedy will not be granted. It is for the person who seeks the remedy to show that he should have it.’

86. And in Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd v Fung Chin Kan & Another (2002) 5 HKCFAR 515 at p.533, Litton NPJ acknowledged:

‘… the fundamental principle that, generally speaking, when a person signs a legal document, he or she is bound by the act of signature: As a matter of general law, it is no defence to say that he or she did not understand the contents of a legal document; that person takes the chance of being bound by its terms, as he or she can take the simple precaution of not signing until its contents have been fully explained and understood.’ ” (Emphasis added)

11.  Parties reaching an express agreement of a commercial character are presumed to intend it to have legal effect unless the contrary is shown.  The burden of showing the contrary is on the party alleging that the agreement has no binding effect, and the burden is a heavy one.  In deciding whether the burden has been discharged, the court would be influenced by the importance of the agreement to the parties, and by the fact that one of them acted in reliance on it.[3]

12.  In respect of evaluating the evidence given by witnesses, a valuable guidance can be found in Lee Fu Wing v Yan Po Ting Paul^[4], in which DHCJ Au (as he then was) said:

“53. In assessing the credibility of a party’s case on a particular issue, I accept the submissions of [counsel] that the Court should take into considerations the following: -

(1) Whether the party’s case is inherently plausible or implausible.

(2) Whether the party’s case is, in a material way, contradicted by other evidence (documentary or otherwise) which is undisputed or indisputable.

(3) Where it is shown that a witness has been discredited over one or more matters to which he has given evidence using the above tests. This is relevant to the assessment of his overall credibility.

(4)    The demeanour of the witnesses.”

Discussion

13.  Having seen and heard the evidence from P and the evidence from D, I accept P’s evidence, and refuse to accept D’s evidence.  In respect of the matters on which P and D have given different evidence, I prefer P’s evidence to D’s evidence.

14.  P’s evidence is cogent and consistent with the documents.  I am of the view that his evidence is truthful and reliable.  I will explain why I refuse to accept D’s evidence in the paragraphs below.

15.  The starting point is that the Loan Agreement is a document signed by D.  Accordingly, unless it can be shown that D’s apparent consent to the document has been vitiated or that the reliance on that document by P falls into some category of unconscionable conduct justifying relief in equity, D shall be held to the Loan Agreement.  The burden of showing a factor vitiating the Loan Agreement is on D.  D can only rely upon the matters pleaded in his pleading as vitiating factors, not any unpleaded issue.

16.  In my view, at the time of the execution of the Loan Agreement by D, both P and D intended that the contents of the Loan Agreement constituted a legally binding agreement between them.

(1)  It is common ground that before the execution of the Loan Agreement, D owed P the outstanding balance of the Original Loan and interest thereon.  It is natural that the parties would have some discussion to deal with these outstanding sums.

(2)  The Loan Agreement, on the face of it, is a formal commercial document with legal effect.

(3)  The Loan Agreement does not only cover the loan and the repayment of the same, but also covers the following matters:

(a)  The loan provided by P to D has been and shall be used towards funding “[D]’s product development project under [M&G] related to ECG and blood pressure measurement consumer wearable” (Clause 1(b)).

(b)  P is given an option to convert the loan into 15% of the shares of M&G (Clause 4).

(4)  By the agreement as recorded in the Loan Agreement, D has been given slightly more than 1 year to use the principal owed to P to develop the project as stated in the Loan Agreement without the necessity of repaying the same within that period, provided that D would repay the agreed interest each month.  In other words, P has provided some liquidity to D.

(5)  Obviously, the deal as recorded in the Loan Agreement is the outcome of some commercial discussion.  Both P and D have some give and take in the course of the discussion.

(6)  The following clauses of the Loan Agreement should also be considered:

“6. Default

This Note shall be in default if any payment is not paid when due. Borrower is hereby informed that no invoice shall be necessary or forthcoming and all interest payments are due on the last day of each calendar month and due and payable on or before the first day of the following month, or it shall become overdue. Any interest payment overdue for a period of more than three calendar days shall incur a late fee of 10%. Any deviation or exception must be done in writing. Upon the event of any default, all outstanding principal, interest and fees shall be accelerated and due at once at the sole discretion of Lender. Borrower agrees to bear all fees of collection upon default including but not limited to all legal fees, attorneys’ fees (for solicitors and barristers), court costs, and any other related fees and expenses.

7. Governing law

This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of Hong Kong and/or the laws of China. Holder (Lender) of this Note shall have a choice of the venue of jurisdiction on the collection and enforcement of this Note upon any event of default.

……” (Emphasis added)

(7) The highlighted parts in clauses 6 and 7 of the Loan Agreement obviously show that the parties to the Loan Agreement are treating the loan agreement as a serious legal document which can only be deviated or varied by another agreement in writing. Further, there has also been an agreement on matters relating to the enforcement of the Loan Agreement. All these clearly show that the parties intended the Loan Agreement to be a legally binding agreement.

(8) With all these in mind, there is overwhelming evidence showing that the Loan Agreement was intended to be a legally binding agreement when P gave this to D for signing, and when D signed the same. I do not accept that at the time of the execution of the Loan Agreement, P told D that he would not enforce the Loan Agreement.

17.  Whether the Loan Agreement was intended to be legally binding at the time of execution is an important issue in this case.  Since D’s evidence on this issue is rejected, I do not regard D as a reliable witness.

18.  The unreliability of D’s evidence is also shown by the fact that while D was giving evidence in the trial, out of his own motion, D said that he deliberately caused the 300k Cheque to be dishonoured, for P had overstated the indebtedness owed by D in the Loan Agreement.  In my view, this is a recent invention made up by D in the witness box.

(1)  In [6] of the Defence dated 17 January 2020 (which was prepared by the solicitors representing him at that time and verified by a statement of truth signed by D), it is expressly stated that the 300k Cheque had been used to repay the actual indebtedness owed by D to P.

(2)  The point pleaded by D is contradicted by the documents produced by P, which show that the 300k Cheque was dishonored after being presented by P to the bank.

(3)  In [10] of his witness statement dated 27 July 2021 (which was prepared by the solicitors representing him at that time, signed by D, and confirmed by D in his evidence in chief), D said:

“Since [the signing of the Loan Agreement], I have been making payments to [P] in relation to the Loan, details of which are as particularized in paragraph 6 of the Defence and I do not intend to repeat the here. I am unaware that [the 300k Cheque] was dishonoured and [P] have never informed me the same.” (Emphasis added)

(4)  D’s evidence in the witness box is directly contradicted by his own witness statement.  His evidence cannot be accepted.

19.  In his oral evidence, D said that he had sent an email to P on 8 May 2017 (“the Alleged Email”), in which he had explained the dealings between P and him in detail.  D said that the Alleged Email would prove that his case is in fact true.  However, D has not disclosed the Alleged Email in this case, and that email is not in the evidence before me.  The existence of the Alleged Email is disputed by P.  In my view, if D’s evidence is true, there is no reason why he has never disclosed the Alleged Email.  The absence of the Alleged Email in the evidence casts doubt on the veracity of D’s evidence.

20.  In the trial, D disclosed for the first time two excel tables (“the Two Excel Tables”).  D claimed that the Two Excel Tables contain evidence in support of his case.  Ms Mui objected to the late discovery of these documents.  After hearing submissions from the parties, I refused to allow D to rely upon the Two Excel Tables as evidence in the trial.  My reasons are as follows: 

(1)  There is no satisfactory explanation from D as to why the Two Excel Tables have not been disclosed at an earlier time.

(2)  The items in the Two Excel Tables are some accounting matters, including some expenses.  These matters would have some underlying supporting documents.  Without seeing the underlying supporting documents, one cannot know whether the entries in the Two Excel Tables are correct or not.  In the circumstances, it would not be safe, and it would not be fair to P, if D is allowed to rely upon the Two Excel Tables in the trial.

(3)  The matters in the Two Excel Tables are not self-explanatory.  In order to understand the Two Excel Tables, the court would need to hear evidence concerning the matters in the tables.  D has not prepared a witness statement to explain the matters in the tables.  P is completely taken by surprise and has no opportunity to adduce evidence in relation to the matters in the two tables.  In the circumstances, the court would not be able to know whether the matters in the Two Excel Tables are relevant to the issues in this case or not.  The court would also not be able to assess whether these matters are true or not.

(4)  As said in the above, P has been completely taken by surprise by this late discovery.  P has no opportunity to conduct any investigation in relation to the matters in the Two Excel Tables, and has no time to prepare evidence to respond to those matters.  In the circumstances, allowing D to rely upon the Two Excel Tables in the trial would not be fair to P.

(5)  With the aforesaid in mind, in the exercise of my case management power, D’s request must be refused.

21.  Save and except the matters which are not disputed by P, I refuse to attach weight to D’s evidence.

22.  As a result of accepting P’s evidence and rejecting D’s evidence, it is also my finding that P has never said to D that as to the indebtedness under the Loan Agreement, D can repay the outstanding indebtedness at a later time to be agreed by the parties.  I would also say that this allegation is against common and commercial sense.  The allegation would mean that D may postpone the repayment indefinitely by withholding his consent to a new repayment date.  With respect, this is absurd.   In my judgment, the Extension Agreement as alleged by D is untrue.

23.  Finally, regarding consideration, by giving more time to D (ie 1 year and 16 days from the date of the Loan Agreement) to repay the principal owed by D, P has provided liquidity to D and has given consideration in support of the Loan Agreement.

24.  In my judgment, the Loan Agreement is supported by consideration from P.  Both P and D intended the Loan Agreement to be a legally binding agreement at the time of the execution of the same by D.  No other vitiating factor has been pleaded or proved by D.

25.  As to the quantum of the indebtedness owed by D to P under the Loan Agreement, the parties have agreed that on the basis that P’s case is accepted by this court, up to 7 July 2023 (ie the date of this judgment), the sums owed by D to P under the Loan Agreement are as follows:

(1)  the principal sum: USD 600,000

(2)  interest: USD 493,397

(3)  late fees on overdue interest: USD 49,340

26.  Since I have accepted P’s case and rejected D’s case, D shall repay the aforesaid sums to P forthwith.

27.  The above would be sufficient for the disposal of this case.  For the sake of completeness, I would briefly address some other arguments put forward by the parties.

(1)  Parol evidence rule

(a)  Ms Mui submits that the Loan Agreement is a promissory note, and by the operation of the parol evidence rule, any oral evidence introduced by D for the purpose of contradicting the terms of the Loan Agreement is inadmissible.  Ms Mui relies upon the following in support of her submission:

(i)  Bills of Exchange Ordinance, s.89(1) states that:

“a promissory note is an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another signed by the maker, engaging to pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to, or to the order of, a specified person or to bearer.”

In accordance with this definition, the Loan Agreement is a promissory note.  This point is further supported by the fact that the full name of the Loan Agreement is “Promissory Note and Loan Agreement”, which shows the parties’ intention that the Loan Agreement shall be treated as a promissory note.

(ii)  In Chitty on Contracts (34^th Edition), at §15-028, it is stated:

“Certain contracts are required by law in writing. The effect of this requirement will be to exclude oral evidence which is offered for no other purpose than to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the contract as contained in writing. In particular, the contracts of the various parties to a bill of exchange or promissory note must be in writing. It is well established that, even as between immediate parties to a bill or note, evidence will not be admitted to prove an oral agreement to quantify the absolute undertaking or a party on the instrument, for example, to show that their liability is to be enforceable against them only in certain contingencies or that it is to be postponed to a time later than that expressed on the face of the instrument.” (Ms Mui’s emphasis)

(b)  I agree with Ms Mui and accept her submission.  Insofar as may be necessary, the parol evidence rule is a further point which P may rely upon in support of his case.

(c)  In my analysis, I have proceeded on the basis that even if D’s evidence is admissible, on the matters in respect of which P and D differ, D’s evidence is incredible and unreliable, and cannot be accepted.  Even without the parol evidence rule, D’s case must be rejected.

(2)  Ftlife Insurance Co Ltd v Choy Hoi Yan, Jacqueline[5]

(a)  D relies upon Ftlife in support of his contention that the Loan Agreement is not a legally binding agreement.

(b)  I refuse to accept this submission.  Each case depends upon its own facts.  As submitted by Ms Mui, in Ftlife, DHCJ Field ruled that the loan agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant in that case was not a legally binding agreement based upon the factual findings made by the court in that case.  After considering all the evidence, the learned judge found that the loan agreement and two other agreements in question were “mere window dressing”, allowing the plaintiff appeared to have satisfied all regulatory and internal requirements. The real parties that entered into legal relations were not the plaintiff and the defendant, but the plaintiff and the defendant’s mother.  The defendant was a mere puppet acting in the position of her mother.[6] The conclusion that the loan agreement was not a legally binding agreement is based upon these factual findings.

(c)  In my judgment, D cannot derive any assistance from Ftlife.  The facts in this case are entirely different from the facts in Ftlife.

(3)  Overstating the indebtedness in the Loan Agreement

(a)  D contended that at the time of the Loan Agreement
(ie 14 January 2018), he owed P only about USD 410,000.  P has overstated the indebtedness in the Loan Agreement.

(b)  There is no merit in this argument.  Based upon the evidence accepted by this court, there should be interest on the Original Loan at the rate of not less than 12% per annum.[7] Further, under the Loan Agreement, P has provided liquidity to D for a period of 1 year and 16 days.  The liquidity provided is valuable.  With all these in mind, after having some commercial discussion, P and D deemed the loan provided by P to D to be USD 600,000 in the Loan Agreement.  There is nothing unusual in this commercial deal.

(4)  Loan Agreement not signed by D’s wife

(a)  D also contended that the Loan Agreement should also be signed by his wife.  However, his wife did not sign the same.  Accordingly, the Loan Agreement cannot be a legally binding agreement.

(b)  By looking at the Loan Agreement, it is true that D’s wife is expected to be a guarantor guaranteeing the loan to D under the Loan Agreement, and D’s wife is expected to sign the Loan Agreement in this capacity.  It is also true that D’s wife has not signed the Loan Agreement.  However, that would only mean that D’s wife is not a guarantor of D’s liabilities under the Loan Agreement.  It is an indisputable fact that D has signed the Loan Agreement as the borrower, and D must perform the borrower’s obligations as stated in the Loan Agreement.

Disposition

28.  I enter judgment for P.  There be an order that D do repay the sums as set out in [25] forthwith.  I agree with Ms Mui that in respect of the principal sum of USD 600,000, in accordance with Clause 2 of the Loan Agreement, P is entitled to have interest at the rate of 15% per annum thereon from the date of this judgment until full payment.  In respect of the other sums as stipulated in [25], there be interest at the judgment rate from the date of this judgment until full payment of the same.

29.  I have heard submissions on costs.  In my view, there is no reason to depart from the general rule of costs following the event.  I order that costs of these proceedings be to P, to be taxed if not agreed.  Ms Mui accepts that costs be taxed on a party and party basis.  I so order.

30.  Lastly, it remains for me to thank the parties for the assistance provided to the court.