RE KINZIE

HCB 4163/2025

[2026] HKCFI 4658

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO 4163 OF 2025

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J U D G M E N T

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I.  INTRODUCTION

1.  On 15 September 2025, I pronounced a usual bankruptcy order (the “Bankruptcy Order”) against the Debtor (see Reasons for Judgment [2025] HKCFI 4822) upon the petition herein filed on 28 May 2025 (the “Petition”).  By Summons filed on 30 September 2025 (the “Debtor’s Summons”), the Debtor seeks the following relief:-

(1)  The Bankruptcy Order be annulled pursuant to section 33 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6) (the “BO”);

(2)  The Debtor be excused from her duty to present a statement of financial affairs or other documents to the Receiver’s Office; and

(3)  Alternatively, if the Bankruptcy Order is not annulled, there shall be leave under section 480(1) of the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622) (the “CO”) to the Debtor to act (a) as a sole director and shareholder of Connections Un Limited and (b) as a director and a 50% owner of Robocoin Limited jointly with the Petitioner.

2.  In her written submissions (including her submissions made in the Third Affidavit of Kinzie (Supplementary) dated 19 August 2026 (the “Third Affidavit”) after the hearing), the Debtor also seeks further and better particulars of the petitioning debt (the “Petitioning Debt”), namely the costs summarily assessed by Master Thomas Kwong under his costs order (the “Costs Order”) in HCA 1681 of 2023 (the “HC Action”) on 9 September 2024, being the underlying debt of the statutory demand (the “Statutory Demand”) for the Petition.

3.  The Debtor acts in person.  The Debtor frankly tells the Court that she has been advised to seek legal advice and to apply for legal aid, but that she thinks the time she would take to explain the matter to the Legal Aid Department would be more than the time she herself could learn the law to argue the matter for herself.  This is the Debtor’s own choice.  However, the Courts have time and again reminded litigants that a litigant-in-person should also be bound by the law and the rules just like litigants legally represented. 

II.  INSOLVENCY AS AT THE TIME OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE PETITION

4.  As an overview, as at the time of the pronouncement of the Bankruptcy Order, the Petitioning Debt was not the only debt due and owing from the Debtor.  According to the Report of the Official Receiver and Provisional Trustee dated 1 December 2025, the Debtor herself admitted that she owed to the Creditor and other creditors in the sum of HK$285,575 (inclusive of the Petitioning Debt).  During the hearing, the Debtor also frankly admits to me that she was a “walking bankrupt” at that time, though she says that she was not insolvent but only “close to insolvency”.  In fact, as I recorded it in §7 of the Reasons for Judgment, after I pronounced the Bankruptcy Order, the Debtor in an attempt to say that she was able to pay, sent a purported printout of her bank account statement showing a balance of HK$19,484.26 only, an amount less than one-tenth of the aforesaid admitted debts.  In my view, the Debtor was clearly insolvent at the time of the pronouncement of the Bankruptcy Order, if not at the time of the presentation of the Petition.

III.  ANALYSIS GROUNS IN SUPPORT OF THE DEBTOR’S SUMMONS

5.  Against the above, the Debtor’s first ground in support of the Debtor’s Summons is that she was kept from money by the Creditor who should have paid her more than HK$3,000,000 in the HC Action commenced against the Creditor, which she cannot pursue anymore as a result of the bankruptcy proceedings and the Bankruptcy Order.  She submits that the Petition was tactics deployed by the Creditor, pursued for an improper purpose of delaying the Debtor’s claim in the HC Action and eventually stifling the claim at all, because once the Bankruptcy Order was made, she “lost legal interest” in the case and cannot pursue the claim on her own anymore, but the Official Receiver and the Trustee has taken over the matter.  In §109 of her Affidavit, the Debtor refers to Re China People Creative Ape Services Limited [2023] HKCFI 2671, where DHCJ Le Pichon at §11 quoted Re Asia View Enterprises Limited [2020] HKCFI 2812:-

“(1) A petitioner who is owed an undisputed or indisputable debt is entitled to a winding up order ex debito justitiae.

(2) In order to successfully oppose a petition on the basis of a bona fide dispute to the debt on substantial grounds, the debtor has to adduce sufficiently precise evidence which is believable, and must establish that it has a defence of substance, not just a fair probability of one.

(3) Winding-up proceedings are summary in nature and are not meant to be used for the purpose of debt collection. If the court is satisfied that there is a bona fide dispute on the debt, it will not usurp the function of a civil court and decide the disputes between the parties.

(4) The burden is on the company to establish that there is a genuine dispute of the debt on substantial grounds. In this context, “substantial” means having substance and not frivolous.

(5) The court should look at the company’s evidence against so much of the background and evidence that is not disputed or not capable of being disputed in good faith; in other words, the evidence is not to be approached with a wholly uncritical eye.

(6) The court should caution itself against unsubstantiated and unparticularized assertions. It is incumbent on the company to put forward sufficiently precise factual evidence to substantiate his allegations.

(7) The court does not try the dispute on affidavit but is to determine whether a substantial dispute exists. In so doing, the court necessarily has to take a view on the evidence, to see if the company is merely “raising a cloud of objections on affidavits” or whether there really is substance in the dispute raised by the company.”

6.  With respect, I am not satisfied that the Petition was such tactics for improper purpose:-

(1)  A judgment debtor is entitled to seek immediate payment of the judgment sum and is perfectly entitled to present an insolvency petition on a statutory demand based on such judgment sum: see Re Wintac (Hong Kong) Limited [2023] HKCFI 2323 at §15(3) and Shandong Chenming Paper Holdings Limited v Arjowiggins HKK 2 Limited (2022) 25 HKCFAR 98 at §34 per Fok and Lam PJJ (delivering the unanimous judgment of the Court of Final Appeal).

(2)  In principle, the debtor may still be able to prove that the petition based on a statutory demand served in respect of a judgment debt is presented with improper purpose.  However, an allegation of improper motive is a serious allegation and motive has in generally to be sufficiently particularised .  A fortiori, against the legal principle in §6(1) above.

(3)  In the present context, a consideration is the merit of the HC Action.  For example, if the HC Action is so strong that the Creditor is bound to lose, this may be an indicia of improper motive when the Creditor uses the insolvency proceedings to stifle her claim for a sum over HK$3,000,000 for a petitioning debt of HK$20,000 only.  That said, one would also have to consider why if the HC Action is really so strong, there has been no application for interim payment at least for a small fraction of the HK$3,000,000 claim.  For example, in the present case, 10% of the HK$3,000,000 claim would be HK$300,000, more than sufficient to cover the debts admitted by the Debtor herself.

(4)  The absence of such an application for interim payment might or might not be due to lack of legal representative of the Debtor.  However, as explained above, it was the Debtor’s own choice.  The burden lies upon the Debtor to convince me that the Petition was presented for improper motive as she alleges.  Lack of legal representative in the present case does not appear to me as any reason related to the merits of the HC Action at all.

(5)  In any event, the Bankruptcy Order would not stifle the Debtor’s claim.  If the Official Receiver and Provisional Trustee, upon proper assessment, thinks that her claim is meritorious and worth pursuing, the Official Receiver and Provisional Trustee could carry on the claim.  However, if a contrary view is taken, I see no reason why the Debtor should still pursue the claim.

(6)  The Debtor also raises that there was a discrepancy between the assessed costs of HK$19,475 in the Costs Order mentioned in §2 of the Petition, and the “justly and truly indebted” debt of HK$19,615.86 mentioned in §3 of the Petition, and submits that despite her repeated requests and demands, the Creditor failed and/or refused to explain the discrepancy.  With respect, this discrepancy was clearly explained in the Statutory Demand already received by the Debtor when the Petition was presented – the explanation being, unsurprisingly, the judgment interest having accrued on the assessed costs.  That the Debtor was not legally represented and thus might not understand this at the first sight would be understandable.  But the Debtor, having received the Statutory Demand (containing a warning of serious consequence), should have ascertained the reason for the discrepancy, and the Creditor or the Creditor’s legal representatives were not her legal advisers.  As mentioned above, it was the Debtor’s own decision whether to seek legal advice or not.  But she has to bear the consequence of her own decision.  In any event, even assuming the Debtor genuinely believed that there was no good reason for the discrepancy, she should have no doubt of the assessed costs in the sum of HK$19,475.  In the circumstances, I do not see how the discrepancy support any improper motive.

(7)  This ties in with the Debtor’s another argument that she was prepared to pay the debt, but the Creditor deliberately refused to explain the discrepancy and thus not knowing what that amount was, she could not pay something she had no knowledge of.  Essentially, she is saying that the Creditor was creating difficulty for her to pay.  This argument is, with respect, disingenuous.  As said, she should at least know that the assessed costs was in the sum of HK$19,475.  She was liable to pay it, and if she really intended to pay it, she could do so, leaving the HK$140.86 difference to be resolved.  That HK$140.86 would be far from enough to sustain the Petition.  I should add that after the pronouncement of the Bankruptcy Order, upon the Debtor’s indication in writing she was prepared to pay, taking an exceptional course, I ordered withholding the sealing of the Bankruptcy Order for 14 days to allow parties to sort out the matter.  However, not a single penny was paid.  The Debtor’s explanation remained that she did not know what to pay.  This explanation is unacceptable given that there should be no dispute at least over the sum of the assessed costs excluding interest.  In the circumstances, again, I do not see how the Creditor deliberately created difficulty for the Debtor to pay .

(8)  The Debtor also mentions how the Statutory Demand and/or the Petition was served on her, how she was intimidated by six solicitors for the Creditor attending the bankruptcy hearing, the timing of the Petition to stifle her claim.  I fail to see these as any basis for saying that the Petition was presented with improper motive.

7.  The second ground raised by the Debtor in support of the Debtor’s Summons is that she lacked the information about the underlying information of the assessed costs of the Costs Order, and this ground is also related to her application or request in her written submissions for particulars like “identify the sealed judicial record recording the costs assessment of HK$19,475”.  However, she has not lodged any appeal against the Costs Order, and I see no ground for appealing against the Costs Order.  The summary assessment of the costs in any proceedings is broad-brush and meant to be not detailed.  I fail to see any merit in this ground.

8.  The third ground raised by the Debtor is that prior to the presentation of the Petition and throughout, she had offered to pay the Petitioning Debt by instalment but her offer was not accepted.  In my view, given that a judgment creditor is entitled to immediate payment of the judgment sum, the judgment creditor is of course entitled also to refuse to accept payment by instalment.  There is no merit in this third ground.

9.  In her evidence and submissions, the Debtor mentions quite a lot about service of the Statutory Demand and service of the Petition.  She specifically mentions that the Petition was served on her personally at Pacific Place when the Creditor knew that she would appear in the vicinity.  It is not entirely clear whether the Debtor is trying to argue that the services were irregular.  Insofar as she is, I would reject such argument.  I see nothing irregular in the services.  Further, the Debtor did attend the hearing in September 2025 without any complaint about the services. 

10.  Lastly, in the Third Affidavit, the Debtor expressed her view that the Creditor had adopted a delaying tactics in the HC Action.  I cannot see how this, even if true, would  help the Debtor in the present application.

11.  In the circumstances, having considered other creditors’ interest and having considered the Debtor’s grounds, I am not satisfied that the Bankrupt has made out any ground in section 33(1)(a) or (b) of the BO, and I refuse to annul the Bankruptcy Order. 

12.  In the circumstances, I fail to see any reason why the Debtor should be excused from her duty to present a statement of financial affairs.

13.  The application under section 480 of the CO should be made separately by way of Originating Summons: see rule 2(1) of Order 102 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A).  This is sufficient for me to dismiss the Debtor’s application thereunder.  In any event, I fail to see any grounds in the evidence in support of the application.  Therefore, putting aside the defective procedure, I would still dismiss the Debtor’s application thereunder.

IV.  THE DEBTOR’S REQUESTS FOR FURTHER AND BETTER PARTICULARS

14.  In her submissions, the Debtor requests further and better particulars like “state the exact date the petition was filed at the Court”, “state the exact date of the hearing and the name of the judicial officer who made the bankruptcy order” and so on.  It is not necessary to set of all the 16 requests.  Suffice to say that the “further and better particulars” are irrelevant to the Debtor’s Summons, and that at least some of the requests are an abuse – for example, the Debtor, attending the hearing where the Bankruptcy Order was made, obviously knew the date and who made the Bankruptcy Order.  In fact, in §66 of her Affidavit, she herself stated, “[a]t the 15 September 2025 hearing in front of Honourable Gary CC Lam, I stated my ability to pay the debt in full forthwith…”.  It was at that hearing I pronounced the Bankruptcy Order in front of her.

15.  In any event, I see no proper legal basis for making such requests in the first place.

16.  Therefore, putting aside that the procedural defect that the application for “further and better particulars” is not properly made by way of Summons, I dismiss such application.

V.  CONCLUSION

17.  To conclude, I dismiss the Debtor’s Summons.

18.  I order the Debtor to pay the Creditor costs of the Debtor’s Summons summarily assessed at HK$48,000, and to pay the Official Receiver and Provisional Trustee costs of HK$5,000.