RE HOSSAIN LAL CHAID
[2026] HKCA 1993 · CACV 208/2026
Court of Appeal
CACV 208/2026, [2026] HKCA 1993 On appeal from [2023] HKCFI 1191 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 208 OF 2026 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 766 of 2021) ________________________ Before: Hon Chu VP and Cheng J in Court Date of Judgment: 30 October 2026 ________________ JUDGMENT ________________ Hon Chu VP giving the Judgment of the Court: On 19 May 2026, this Court handed down a judgment ([2026] HKCA 961) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan given on 27 February 2026 which refused to grant him leave to apply for judicial review. On 23 June 2026, the applicant filed a notice of motion together with an affirmation to apply for leave to appeal against our judgment to the Court of Final Appeal. He has also lodged a written submission to support his application. We see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing, and have proceeded to determine this application on the basis of the papers before the court. The background to this case and the applicant’s claim have been set out in our judgment. We will not repeat them. Section 24(2) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484 provides that application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal shall be filed within 28 days from the date of the judgment to be appealed from. Section 24(5) further provides that the Court of Appeal may extend the time for the filing of the notice of motion. In considering whether to extend time, the court will have regard to (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the merits of the intended application; and (4) the prejudice that may occasion to the respondent if time extension is granted. The applicant’s present application is late by one week, which is not an insignificant delay. In his supporting affirmation, the applicant explained that when he received the judgment the time to appeal had expired. He, however, has not explained the reasons for the delay in receiving the judgment or the exact date when he received the judgment. We are not persuaded that he has satisfactorily explained his delay. We will next consider the merits of the application which is a more important consideration. On the merits of the application, section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance provides that leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision. The Notice of Motion states that the decisions of the Torture Claims Appeal Board and the Court were made without proper scrutiny of the applicant’s claim, the problem faced by the applicant in his home country is very severe, and he will be killed on his return. In gist, the applicant’s written submission states that: The Judges were wrong as a matter of law for not having applied the principle of irrationality to the decisions made by the Director of Immigration and the Board, which have the effect of finally disposing of the applicant’s claim. The Judges were wrong as a matter of law for not having applied the principle of procedural unfairness to the decisions of the Director and the Board, who were required to give reasons justifying the decisions. High standards of fairness are required in the determination of torture claims, but the Board did not properly scrutinize the applicant’s claim and the Judge reviewed the matter lightly. The Board made a number of errors, including failing to give the applicant sufficient opportunity to arrange relevant evidence, relying on news that were unofficial and hearsay, failing to evaluate and find there was a consistent pattern of gross and mass violation of human rights in the applicant’s home country, and also failing to assess and make a finding on whether state protection existed in the applicant’s home country. The applicant will be in grave danger if he returns to his home country. His enemies are now the controlling power in the country. They are still looking for the applicant, and will kill the applicant if he were to return to his home country. The government and the police will not protect him. We are of the view that the matters put forward in the notice of motion and the written submission do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. Critically, no question of great general or public importance has been identified, as required by section 22(1)(b). Secondly, many of the matters now put forward by the applicant were not raised as a ground for judicial review before the Judge or as a ground of appeal before this Court. It is not the practice of the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal on new points that were not canvassed in the appeal before it. Nor is it the practice of the Court of Final Appeal to grant leave on new fact-sensitive points not argued in the Court of Appeal. Thirdly, the grounds put forward by the applicant were general assertions without particulars. Fourthly, these grounds do not engage with the reasons we gave for dismissing the appeal. We also do not see any basis for the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1) (b). In conclusion, having regard to the delay and the lack of merits of the present application, there is no basis for us to extend the time for the filing of the notice of motion. Accordingly, we dismiss the Notice of Motion. The applicant, unrepresented, acted in person.
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RE HOSSAIN LAL CHAID
CA · [2026] HKCA 1993
This judgment