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TIARA WIDIAS TUTIK v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION[Decision on Leave Application]
TIARA WIDIAS TUTIK v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5071 · HCAL 1707/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1707/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5071
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1707 of 2023
BETWEEN
| |Tiara Widias Tutik |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
|(|consideration of the documents only; or |
| |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
Background
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in
the prescribed Form 86 filed on 25 September 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”).
The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
(“Board”) dated 31 August 2023 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the
applicant’s appeal against a decision of the Director of Immigration
(“Director”) dated 3 April 2023 rejecting the applicant’s non-
refoulement claim based on all applicable grounds[1] after the
applicant having been allowed to make a subsequent claim. The Board’s
Decision is set out in the following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL001707_
2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Indonesia,
she would be harmed or killed by the loan shark for an unpaid loan.
The reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s
Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless
otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and
descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
3. The applicant has requested for an oral hearing. On 29 June 2026, the
applicant filed an affirmation for the withdrawal of the Leave
Application as she wanted to go home. On 14 August 2026, the Removal
Assessment and Litigation (Removal and Deportation) Section (1) of the
Immigration Department separately faxed a letter to the court,
informing the court that the applicant would like to withdraw her
judicial review application. Enclosed with the said letter was the
applicant’s signed memo in her native language together with an
English translation dated 3 August 2026. In the memo, the applicant
stated that she would like to withdraw the Leave Application as her
issues in her home country had been resolved. In the circumstances,
this court will dispose of the Leave Application on paper.
Discussion
4. The leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there
is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my
decision[2]. It is therefore sufficient to state my observations
after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials
adduced.
5. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds
of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full
and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an
affidavit. The Form 86 provided no such grounds. In the supporting
affirmation, the applicant made allegations about translation as well
as the interpreter.
6. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively
within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will
not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law,
procedural unfairness, or irrationality.[4] In the present case, the
Board found that the applicant was not a credible witness and rejected
her claim. This, together with her unexplained delay in the lodging of
her non-refoulement claim, the Board found that the applicant would
not be subjected to risk of harm if refouled. It further found that
state protection and internal relocation would both be reasonably
available. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial
review will not interfere with subject to there being any public law
errors.
7. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the decision of the Board, this court is satisfied that
the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and
observed a very high standard of fairness. The allegations the
applicant made in her supporting affirmation were general and did not
condescend to particulars. Hence, the applicant has not shown any
errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s
Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision
is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success
such that would enable this court to grant leave[5].
Withdrawal application
8. Apart from the application to withdraw the Leave Application referred
to above, there is nothing outstanding in this action. In the
circumstances, I make an order to dismiss the Leave Application, and
hereby order the dismissal of the Leave Application: see Re Manik Md
Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471; Ngo Xuan Tuyen v Torture Claims Appeal
Board [2024] HKCA 1140.
Order
9. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
Dated the 18th day of September 2026.
| |(Alfred Chan) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the Applicant|Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such | |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 18/9/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting|Tiara Widias Tutik |Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions| |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days |Applicant’s ref. no: |directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was |Nil. |the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); | |18/9/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating| |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave| |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: |
|53, rule 5; and | |USM 21660 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every other| |Director of Immigration |
|party copies of every | |Putative Interested |
|affidavit which the | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|Applicant proposes to | |193/23 (Formerly RBCZ |
|use at the hearing, | |5000174/23) |
|including the affidavit | | |
|in support of | |Department of Justice, |
|the application for | |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong
Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers
to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the
risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under
Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s
Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to
process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description
of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor
[2015] 3 HKC 293.
[2] Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23.
[3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL
21/2015, 22 December 2016 at §142.
[4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328;
Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v
Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.