PARVEZ MD ANWER v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 2395/2019

[2024] HKCFI 2063

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2395 OF 2019

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;            or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court / the Applicant being absent in open court;

The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

1.  The Applicant is a 37-year-old national of Bangladesh who entered Hong Kong illegally on 18 May 2014 and was arrested by police on the same day. After he was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, he raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that if he returned to Bangladesh he would be harmed or killed by the local Muslim community in his home district for converting his religion from Islam to Christianity. He was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim.

2.  The Applicant was born and raised as a Muslim in Kaliduspur, Alamdanga, Chuadanga, Bangladesh. After leaving the university with a diploma he worked as a technician in his home district to make his living.

3.  One day in October 2013 he took a leaflet in the street about Christianity and became interested in that religion, and started to attend a local Christian church regularly for prayers, and on 8 December 2013 he converted into a Christian by being baptized at the church.

4.  Later some local members of the political party Jamaat-e-Islami (“JeI”) who were Muslims came to the Applicant’s home to demand that he should re-convert his religion back to Islam or else he would be killed.

5.  Several days later the Applicant was confronted by the same group of JeI members on the street who attacked him with a machete that he was injured in his stomach and was subsequently taken to the hospital for medical treatments.

6.  After the last attack the Applicant fled from his home to hide in a friend’s place before moving on to his aunt’s place in Aruapara, Kushtia, but later when he was confronted by some unknown men with knives in the streets of Aruapara but managed to flee from the scene unharmed, and when he continued to receive threats from those Muslim members of JeI, the Applicant felt it was no longer safe to remain in Bangladesh, and so on 4 May 2014 he departed for China, and from there he later sneaked into Hong Kong, and upon his arrest by the police he then raised his non-refoulement claim for protection, for which he completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 15 August 2017 with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”) but failed to attend the scheduled screening interview before an immigration officer due to claimed medical reason.

7.  By a Notice of Decision dated 7 November 2017 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

8.  In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from those JeI members or the Muslim community upon his return to Bangladesh as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that in any event in the absence of any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that freedom of religions are allowed by law in Bangladesh with both Christians and Buddhists amongst the population living their lives without fear or risk of religious persecution from the Muslim community, and that if necessary reasonable internal relocation alternatives are also available in Bangladesh with a large population of 157 million people spread across a vast territory that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other areas of the country away from his home district in large cities such as Dhaka or Comilla where it would be difficult if not impossible for anyone to locate him.

9.  On 21 November 2017 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which he attended an oral hearing on 7 May 2019 before the Board during which he gave evidence and answered questions raised of his claim by the Adjudicator for the Board. On 24 July 2019 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision.

10.  In its decision the Board found material inconsistencies discrepancies and implausibility in the Applicant’s evidence and in particularly his inability to name the church where he claimed to have attended or was baptized or to have any basic knowledge about the Bible or the Christian religion that the Board was unable to attach any credence at all to his claim to have converted as a Christian, and rejected all his account of having been attacked which he claimed to have faced on account of his religion as not credible that it concluded that the Applicant failed to establish any well-founded fear of any risk of the proscribed harms that his claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.

11.  On 19 August 2019 the Applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, and put forward the following grounds for his intended challenge:

(1)  That the Board reached the decision wrongly in assessing his non-refoulement claim as the decision was not fair or reasonable as required by the Wednesbury test in failing to recognize that his life must be protected by the criminal law from extra-judicial killings that he may face if deported back to his home country;

(2)  That the Board failed to appreciate or place proper or sufficient weight or importance to the presence of State Acquiescence in his case which led to an unfair outcome of rejecting his claim without realizing that he was tortured at the behest of the state law enforcement agencies and politicians that the state would be rendered liable to the Applicant by cause of the state and its public officials failing to provide reasonable protection for its citizens under the duty of due diligence;

(3)  That the Adjudicator acted unreasonable and was procedurally unfair by placing too much reliance on COI but failed to take into account the Applicant’s personal background and experience in assessing his claim;

(4)  That the Board had listed relevant COI which supported the Applicant’s aversions that the police in his country would not be able to protect but failed to consider or give sufficient weight to such evidence and instead ruled otherwise against the Applicant’s case which was a clear case of unfair attitude shown by the Board which in itself is enough to render its decision void;

(5)  That the Board failed to attain the high standard of fairness required by the Wednesbury test in failing to take into account the Applicant’s argument that corruption and incompetency of the administration in the Applicant’s country is still a very serious problem as various human rights organizations had compiled reports that stated testament to the Applicant’s assertions;

(6)  That the Adjudicator was procedurally improper and unfair when assessing whether or not to accept the Applicant’s explanations and unreasonably required him to respond to questions that he was not in a position to offer any response;

(7)  That the Adjudicator failed to take into account the nexus of political parties and official corruption which exist in the Applicant’s country making the persecution of the Applicant effectively persecution by the State; and

(8)  That the Adjudicator made a ruling to dismiss the Applicant’s appeal based on findings which the Adjudicator ought to allow and thus the decision was irrational.

12.  These are however all just some bare and vague assertions of the Applicant containing a few key words or phrases but without any necessary or relevant particulars or specifics or elaborations as to how they apply to his case or how the Board or the Adjudicator had erred in the decision, or in what way was the decision unfair or unreasonable or that the Adjudicator had acted procedurally unfair or irrational, or how did the Adjudicator fail to take into account of relevant COI or being selective or improperly rely on irrelevant COI, or what relevancy were state acquiescence or extra-judicial killings to the Applicant’s case or what evidence is there to suggest that the Applicant has ever been tortured by law enforcement agencies or politicians when on the factual basis of even his own case that his claimed risk arose from his religious conversion without any official involvement or political elements at all. As such, and as none of these assertions were properly elaborated or presented with any relevant particulars or specifics by the Applicant, I do not find any of them reasonably arguable for his intended challenge.

13.  As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.

14.  In the Applicant’s case, the Board rejected his claim essentially on its adverse finding on his credibility for the thorough and detailed analysis and reasoning set out in paragraphs 19 – 38 of its decision with the benefit of hearing him in his oral evidence and his answers to questions raised of his claim, and in the absence of any error of law or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in its decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not find any reasonably arguable basis to challenge the finding of the Board.

15.  Furthermore, the fact is that it has also been established by the Director in his decision that the risk of harm in the Applicant’s claim even if real is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for him to relocate to other part of Bangladesh, a decision also agreed and confirmed by the Board, there is simply no justification to afford him with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.

16.  Having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.

17.  Moreover, the Applicant recently on 17 July 2024 filed an affirmation requesting to withdraw his application as the problem which he had in his home country has been solved that he now wants to return to Bangladesh.

18.  In the premises, as I am for the given reasons not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, and in view of his latest confirmation of no more problem for him to return to his home country, I accordingly dismiss his leave application.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1