VU VAN HOANG v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD
[2026] HKCFI 5571 · HCAL 1770/2025
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1770/2025
[2026] HKCFI 5571
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST
NO 1770 OF 2025
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BETWEEN
| | | |
| | Vu Van Hoang | Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
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Before: Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 18 September 2026
Date of Handing Down of Decision: 30 September 2026
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D E C I S I O N
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Background
By way of summons filed on 28 July 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant
applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 17 June
2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for
judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board dated 19 May 2025.
Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that
“Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may
appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days
after such order”.
In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an
appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review
started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date
when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order
was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant
received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA
226).
As my order was made on 17 June 2026, the last day for the applicant to
lodge an appeal was on 1 July 2026. However, 1 July 2026 was a public
holiday. By virtue of section 71(1)(b) of the Interpretation and General
Clauses Ordinance, Cap 1, when the last day of the period in question is a
public holiday, the period shall include the next following day, not being
a public holiday or a gale warning day or black rainstorm warning day. The
next following day was 2 July 2026. Thus, the time for appealing against
my order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to
appeal out of time.
The applicable law
In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing
leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1)
the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the
intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of
time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another
[2020] HKCA 844).
However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the
applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the
intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court
will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re
Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).
Discussion
In his supporting affirmation dated 28 July 2026, the applicant explained
his delay in lodging the appeal by saying that he did not speak English or
Chinese, he had to seek help from his friends to help him to submit his
appeal to this court and it was inconvenient for him to file the appeal in
the appeal period.
However, at the hearing of the Summons on 18 September 2026, the applicant
gave another explanation by saying that after he had received this court’s
decision, he asked his lawyer to handle the appeal, but he did not know why
it was late.
The applicant’s explanation in his supporting affirmation is inconsistent
with the explanation given at the hearing. In any event, there was no
reason given as to why he could not have sought help from his friends
within the appeal period. Just by saying that it was inconvenient for him
to do so is insufficient. There was also no reason given for his lawyer’s
delay in lodging the appeal for him.
Moreover, the applicant did not give any valid ground for his intended
appeal in the Summons or his supporting affirmation. The applicant only
explained why he withdrew his application for judicial review and then
cancelled the repatriation request in his affirmation. At the oral hearing
of the Summons, the applicant also explained the same matters.
However, the applicant’s withdrawal of his leave application was refused by
me on 17 June 2026. His leave application was dismissed by me because he
confirmed at that time that his debt problem in Vietnam had been resolved
and it was safe for him to return to Vietnam. If there was any change for
his situation after my decision was made, the applicant still could not use
it to challenge my decision. Thus, there was simply no valid ground of
appeal for the intended appeal.
For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that
this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant
matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong
(see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524). The applicant
has failed to demonstrate any of the above.
As there is no satisfactory explanation for the applicant’s delay in
lodging the intended appeal, and there is no reasonable prospect of success
in the intended appeal, I am not prepared to grant any extension of time
for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.
Conclusion
For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.
(Michael WONG)
Deputy High Court Judge
The applicant appearing in person
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