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HCAL 799/2022
[2026] HKCFI 3898
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 799 of 2022
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BETWEEN
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Ida Royani |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board/ |
Putative |
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Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |
Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Bonnie Cheng:
The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By Form 86 dated 19 August 2022 (“Form 86”), the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”) against the Decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 7 July 2022 (“Board’s Decision”), which affirmed the Decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 21 September 2021.
2. An oral hearing, which was requested by the Applicant, took place before me on 24 February 2026. The Applicant was however absent from the hearing.
Background
3. The Applicant is from Indonesia. Her background and the basis of her application for non-refoulement were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision at this hyperlink.[1] I will not repeat them here. Unless otherwise specified, I adopt the abbreviations in the Board’s Decision.
4. In short, the Applicant claimed to be in fear of being harmed by her husband and her husband’s creditors if she was returned to Indonesia.
Letter to withdraw Leave Application
5. After the hearing, the Court received a letter from the Director dated 19 March 2026, which in turn enclosed a letter from the Applicant dated 16 March 2026 stating that she would like to withdraw her judicial review application as she wanted to return to her home country as soon as possible, and that her issues in her home country had been resolved.
6. Given the Applicant’s application for withdrawal, it is not necessary for the Court to adjudicate on the merits of her Leave Application: Ngo Xuan Tuyen v Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office [2024] HKCA 1140 at §14.
7. In any event, for completeness, I have considered the Leave Application and do not consider the Applicant’s intended challenge against the Board’s Decision to be reasonably arguable, which is the threshold for leave to be granted: Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 at §§14-17.
8. First, the Applicant has not stated any ground of judicial review in her Leave Application, contrary to the requirement in Ho Loy v Director of Environmental Protection (HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016) at §142. She has not identified any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision to demonstrate a reasonably arguable case.
9. Second and in any case, I have reviewed the Board’s Decision and I do not detect any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. In particular:
(1) The Board presumed that the Applicant’s factual assertions could be relied upon and were truthful, and on that basis did not call for an oral hearing. Since there was no question of credibility for the Board to decide, the Court can see why the Board considered an oral hearing unnecessary in the present case: Jagjit Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and Director of Immigration [2025] HKCFI 2856 at §§21-22.
(2) Insofar as the Applicant’s husband was concerned, the Board considered that there was only one threat made to the Applicant over the telephone when she could not help with repayment of his loan. Insofar as the husband’s creditors were concerned, the Board had regard to the fact that the property which was allegedly at risk of repossession had not been foreclosed and there was no actual known violence. The Applicant’s family was living in the property without having been molested. In short, the Board considered the risks of harm to the Applicant to be remote: §§37-39.
(3) The Board also considered as a fall-back that the Applicant would benefit from reasonable state protection in the unlikely event that her husband or his creditors were to harm her: §§40-48.
Conclusion
10. For the above reasons, I make an order that the Leave Application be dismissed.
Dated the 10th day of July 2026
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(Wilinda YIU)
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant
on 10/7/2026
Ida Royani
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 10/7/2026
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 18885/21/10/11/I2257
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 1230/21(formerly RBCZ/67/21) (T1I87)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
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