IMRAN MUHAMMAD v. HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT AND ANOTHER
[2026] HKCFI 6311 · HCAL 1245/2026
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1245/2026 [2026] HKCFI 6311 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1245 OF 2026 _____________ BETWEEN _____________ Before: Deputy High Court Judge Jonathan Wong in Court Date of Hearing: 13 November 2026 Date of Decision: 13 November 2026 Introduction The Applicant is subject to a Removal Order made on 28 October 2019. He has been held in immigration detention since 9 January 2026 pursuant to section 32(3A) of the Immigration Ordinance Cap 115. As at the hearing before me, he has been detained for 309 days. This is my decision on the Applicant’s application for a writ of habeas corpus filed on 10 July 2026. At the hearing, the Applicant appeared in person, with the benefit of an interpreter. Mr Ray Mok, Government Counsel, appeared for the Director of Immigration (“Director”). Background The Applicant is a Pakistani national. On 31 October 2009, he was arrested by the police for being a suspected illegal immigrant. According to the Applicant, he had entered Hong Kong illegally on the same day. On 11 November 2009, the Applicant was released on recognizance. The Applicant does not have a criminal record. He briefly failed to report recognizance from 18-28 February 2022, allegedly by reason of sickness. His recognizance was resumed on 18 March 2022. The Applicant has no family ties in Hong Kong. Non-refoulement claims (“NRCs”) and related proceedings The Applicant’s NRCs have been rejected by the Director and his appeals/petitions to the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office had all been rejected. His application by way of HCAL 1602/2020 for leave to apply for judicial review (“JR Leave Application”) was dismissed on 17 November 2025. His subsequent appeal against refusal of the JR Leave Application (CACV 1103/2025) was dismissed on 15 October 2026. On 27 October 2026, he applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The present detention and is review The present detention commenced after the refusal of the JR Leave Application. Shortly after the commencement of the present detention, on 16 January 2026, the Immigration Department requested the Consulate General of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in Hong Kong (“CG”) to issue a replacement travel document to the Applicant. Throughout the present detention, the Applicant expressed his unwillingness to return to his home country and refused to cooperate in completing the reentry formalities. Despite the Applicant’s uncooperative attitude, through the efforts made by the Immigration Department, CG issued a travel document to the Applicant on 4 June 2026. A repatriation flight was schedule for 30 June 2026 but the removal operation had to be aborted due to the Applicant’s refusal to cooperate. On 23 July 2026, the validity of the travel document was extended to 23 January 2027. Another repatriation flight has been arranged to depart on 19 November 2026, shortly after the hearing before me. In the latest review of the present detention, the Applicant’s release was considered to be unwarranted for the following broad reasons: The Applicant’s Removal from Hong Kong is imminent; There was no legal impediment to the Applicant’s removal; The Applicant’s and cooperative behaviour delayed the issuance off the travel document, which unnecessarily prolonged the detention; The Applicant had a history of failing to report recognizance. The fact that he had a close friend in Hong Kong had been taken into consideration but did not outweigh other factors against the release of the Applicant. The Applicant’s submissions The Applicant’s grounds set out in his written materials may be summarized as follows: The appeal against the refusal of the JR Leave Application has not been determined; His removal is not going to be possible within a reasonable time; He fears for his own safety if repatriated; His friend, a permanent resident, is willing to act his guarantor. At the hearing, the Applicant confirmed the accuracy of the above summary. He handed up additional documents, and by reference to them, supplemented as follows: (1) he reiterates that he has a guarantor and he has been living at the same address for more than 10 years, (2) he disagrees with the assessment that there are risks of him (re)offending or absconding, emphasizing that he has no criminal records and there were legitimate reasons for his previous failure to report recognizance, (3) he refused to cooperate with the first repatriation operation because CACV 1103/2025 had by then not been determined, (4) he recognizes that he cannot remain in Hong Kong indefinitely but he needs to be releases so that he can solve his problems in his home country, (5) he has a right to freedom and (6) throughout the present detention, he had only been offered interpretation assistance on very few occasions. The applicable principles The applicable principles are set out in Harjang Singh v Secretary for Security [2022] 4 HKLRD 99. I have in particular borne in mind the summary set out at §164 thereof. I remind myself that the burden is on the Respondent to an application for a writ of habeas corpus to justify the lawfulness of the Applicant's detention. Under Section 32(4A) of the Ordinance, the detention of a person shall not be unlawful by reason of the period of the detention if that period is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances that justify its length, including (1) whether the person's removal is directly or indirectly prevented or delayed by any action or lack of action of the person, (2) whether the person poses, or is likely to pose, a threat or security risk to the community, (3) whether the person's removal is directly or indirectly prevented or delayed by any action or lack of action of the person, including the person not obtaining, or not providing assistance to obtain, any authorization from the relevant authorities of a place outside Hong Kong that is required for the person's entry to that place and (4) factors that directly or indirectly prevent or delay the person's removal that are not within the control of the Director. The Court of Appeal has provided guidance in Johnson Benjamin v Director of Immigration & Anor [2023] HKCA 1368 on, inter alia, how the court ought to approach a detainee's own unreasonable behaviour or conduct in assessing the reasonableness of the length of his detention. It is stated at 29(3): “In our view, in general, any period of a detention which is caused, necessitated or prolonged by a detainee's own unreasonable behaviours or conducts should not be counted or regarded as an unreasonable period of detention for the purpose of determining whether an originally lawful detention has become unlawful, unless there are other circumstances to show otherwise. This is so, as if otherwise, it would result in an absurd situation where the more unreasonably and uncooperatively a detainee behaves in seeking to frustrate or delay the procedures or process necessary to prepare for his removal, the more likely he is to be released. That cannot be the intention of the Hardial Singh principles.” In particular, on the issue of a detainee's refusal to cooperate in completing reentry formalities, Johnson Benjamin §37 observed as follows: “… In our view, even if there is an ongoing non-refoulement claim, there is no reason in principle why it is not reasonable to expect an applicant to cooperate with the relevant authorities to obtain the necessary travel document to facilitate his removal once the non-refoulement claim is disposed…” Analysis During the present detention, the Applicant is and has been detained pursuant to the section 32(3A) of the Ordinance. It follows therefore that there is and has been prima facie lawful authority to detain the Applicant. The question which falls for determination is whether the detention has become unreasonable in all the circumstances, and hence unlawful. The starting point is the period of detention, namely 309 days, against which the various other factors must be weighed and balanced. I accept that, throughout the period of detention, the intention of the Director is to remove the Applicant and that has been the only purpose of the Applicant's detention. HS1 is satisfied. I also accept that the Director has acted with diligence and expedition to effect the Applicant's removal. HS4 is satisfied. The foregoing is amply demonstrated by the efforts made for the issuance of a replacement travel document and the arrangement of a repatriation flight. As at the commencement of the present detention, by reason of the Updated Removal Policy, there was no longer any legal impediment to the Applicant’s removal as the JR Leave Application had been refused by the Court of First Instance. Despite the Applicant’s failure to cooperate in completing the reentry formalities, the Immigration Department managed to remove the practical impediment by liaising with CG for a travel document to be issued by alternative means. Had the Applicant cooperated, a travel document would have been issued earlier. Further, had the Applicant cooperated, he would have been released on 30 June 2026, albeit in the form of removal from Hong Kong. In this connection, two points bear emphasis. First, the fact that CACV 1103/2025 had not been determined as at the first repatriation operation did not justify the Applicant’s refusal to cooperate in the repatriation operation, given the effect of the Updated Removal Policy. Secondly, as regards the Applicant's fear for his own safety if repatriated, as has been stated and repeated in many previous decisions, an application for a writ of habeas corpus is not an opportunity for the applicant to continue to assert the concerns underpinning his NRC and the court in his habeas corpus application will not look at the merits of any such claim. The latter observation in the preceding paragraph deals with the Applicant’s wish to be released to resolve his problems at home. Following the abortive first repatriation operation on 30 June 2026, the Applicant commenced the present proceedings. As noted above, a second repatriation operation has been scheduled to take place imminently, shortly after the today’s hearing. In the light of the Applicant’s clear criminal record, I am prepared to proceed that there is no undue risk of the Applicant being a threat or security risk to the community. Whilst I am also prepared to proceed on the basis that the Applicant’s previous failure to report recognizance, given its short duration, in and of itself does not give rise to undue concern over the risk of absconding from a historical perspective, I accept the Respondent’s submission that, on a forward-looking basis, there is a real risk of the Applicant absconding, taking into account his reluctance to return to his home country, his resistance to the first repatriation operation, his “weak” local connection, and significantly, the imminent second removal operation. Such risk, if it materializes, will defeat the purpose for which the power of detention is conferred. I do not regard the fact that the Applicant has offered a guarantor has the effect of outweighing the risk of absconding identified above. Overall, weighing the period of detention against all the other factors, I am satisfied that HS2 and HS3 are met. Conclusion By reason of the above matters, I am satisfied that the Applicant's detention, and likely foreseeable future period of detention (at least until the repatriation flight to take place on 19 November 2026) has been and will remain lawful. I wish to impress upon the Applicant that flatly refusing to cooperate with the impending removal operation (especially on the basis that his application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal remains extant), in and of itself will not assist his cause, as any prolongation of the detention will be viewed as having been self-induced. I therefore dismiss the present application with no order as to costs. (Jonathan Wong) Deputy High Court Judge The Applicant, acting in person Mr Ray Mok, Government Counsel, of Department of Justice, for the Respondents