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BETWEEN
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Irudayaraj Kulandai Jesu |
Applicant |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board |
Putative |
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Respondent |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:
Leave to apply for judicial review be refused.
Observations for the Applicant:
1. The Applicant is a 39-year-old national of India who arrived in Hong Kong on 23 September 2016 as a visitor with permission to remain as such up to 7 October 2016 when he did not depart and instead overstayed, and on 11 October 2016 he surrendered to the Immigration Department and raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that if he returned to India he would be harmed or killed by his former girlfriend’s family who disapproved of their relationship. He was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim.
2. The Applicant was born and raised in Padathanpatti, Tamil Nadu, India. After leaving school he worked as a farmer in his home district for 10 years before working as a salesman in Karaikudi where he met his girlfriend from a wealthy family in 2013 and started dating her despite objection from her family over his poor caste status.
3. Due to her family’s disapproval of their relationship the Applicant and his girlfriend one day in 2016 decided to elope to someplace away from their home district, but their plan was discovered by her family that her father and uncle came to stop them from leaving, during which they beat the Applicant with wooden sticks violently before taking his girlfriend away.
4. Thereafter her father and uncle came to the Applicant’s home to threaten his parents to keep the Applicant from his girlfriend, and then made false charges to the police against the Applicant that led to his arrest for theft and public nuisance and was detained for 2 days before he was eventually bailed out by his uncle, whereupon the Applicant fled from his home district to avoid the threats from his girlfriend’s family by moving from town to town.
5. However, when he later heard that his girlfriend had been forced by her parents to marry another man against her wish that she shortly thereafter committed suicide, and for which her family blamed him and had sworn to kill him in revenge, the Applicant felt it was no longer safe to remain in India, and so on 22 September 2016 he departed for Hong Kong where he subsequently overstayed and then raised his non-refoulement claim for protection, for which he completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 7 May 2018 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation.
6. By a Notice of Decision dated 6 July 2018 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).
7. In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from his former girlfriend’s family upon his return to India as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that there is no evidence of any real intention of them to seriously harm or kill him other than to stop him from seeing his former girlfriend, that in any event it was a private relationship dispute between him and her family only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in India with a large population of 1.2 billion people spread across a vast territory of more than 3.2 million square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other areas of the country away from his home district in large cities such as New Delhi or Mumbai where it would be difficult if not impossible for anyone to locate him.
8. On 19 July 2018 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which he attended an oral hearing on 8 April 2020 before the Board during which he gave evidence and answered questions raised of his claim by the Adjudicator for the Board. On 16 November 2020 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision.
9. In its decision[1] the Board accepted the Applicant’s claim of fear of harm from his former girlfriend’s family who disapproved of their relationship but found no reliable evidence of any real intention of them to seriously harm or kill him other than to stop him from seeing her, and that in any event it was a private dispute between them only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant upon his return to India as well as reasonable internal relocation alternatives for him to move safely to other parts of the country away from his home district without any risk of being located by anyone that his claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.
10. On 13 January 2021 the Applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, and in his supporting affirmation of the same date he put forward the following grounds for his intended challenge:
(1) That the Board reached the decision wrongly in assessing his non-refoulement claim as the decision was not fair or reasonable as required by the Wednesbury test in failing to recognize that his life must be protected by the criminal law from extra-judicial killings that he may face if deported back to his home country;
(2) That the Adjudicator failed to give the Applicant sufficient time and chance to arrange relevant evidence for his non-refoulement claim as well as his appeal;
(3) That the Board failed to appreciate or place proper or sufficient weight or importance to the presence of State Acquiescence in his case which led to an unfair outcome of rejecting his claim without realizing that he was tortured at the behest of the state law enforcement agencies and politicians that the state would be rendered liable to the Applicant by cause of the state and its public officials failing to provide reasonable protection for its citizens under the duty of due diligence;
(4) That the Adjudicator acted unreasonable and was procedurally unfair by placing too much reliance on COI but failed to take into account the Applicant’s personal background and experience in assessing his claim;
(5) That the Board had listed relevant COI which supported the Applicant’s aversions that the police in her country would not be able to protect but failed to consider or give sufficient weight to such evidence and instead ruled otherwise against the Applicant’s case which was a clear case of unfair attitude shown by the Board which in itself is enough to render its decision void;
(6) That the Board failed to attain the high standard of fairness required by the Wednesbury test in failing to take into account the Applicant’s argument that corruption and incompetency of the administration in the Applicant’s country is still a very serious problem as various human rights organizations had compiled reports that stated testament to the Applicant’s assertions;
(7) That the Adjudicator was procedurally improper and unfair when assessing whether or not to accept the Applicant’s explanations and unreasonably required him to respond to questions that he was not in a position to offer any response;
(8) That the Adjudicator made a ruling to dismiss the Applicant’s appeal based on findings which the Adjudicator ought to allow and thus the decision was irrational.
11. These are however all just bare and vague assertions of the Applicant containing a few key words or phrases but without any necessary or relevant particulars or specifics or elaborations as to how they apply to his case or how the Board or the Adjudicator had erred in the decision, or in what way was the decision unfair or unreasonable or that the Adjudicator had acted procedurally unfair or irrational, or how did the Adjudicator fail to take into account of relevant COI or being selective or improperly rely on irrelevant COI, or what relevancy were state acquiescence or extra-judicial killings to the Applicant’s case or what evidence is there to suggest that the Applicant has ever been tortured by law enforcement agencies or politicians when on the factual basis of even his own case that it was a private relationship dispute between him and his girlfriend’s family only without any official involvement or political element at all. As such, and as none of these assertions were properly elaborated or presented with any relevant particulars or specifics by the Applicant or at the hearing of his application, I do not find any of them reasonably arguable for his intended challenge.
12. As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
13. In the Applicant’s case, the fact is that it has been established by both the Director and the Board in their respective decisions that the risk of harm in his claim if real is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for him to relocate to other part of India, there is simply no justification to afford him with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.
14. In the premises, and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.
15. For all these reasons I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, I therefore refuse to grant leave and accordingly dismiss his application.
Dated the 6th day of January 2026
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(Chung Lai Fan, Christine)
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant on
6 January 2026
Irudayaraj Kulandai Jesu
Applicant’s ref. no.:
Nil. |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 6 January 2026
Torture Claims Appeal Board
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 12581/18/7/331/IN2507
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 1705/18 (formerly RBCZ/11558/17)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1