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HCAL 725/2021
[2026] HKCFI 312
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 725 of 2021
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BETWEEN
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Andry Weliyanto |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board/
Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |
Putative
Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Jeffrey Chau:
1. Form 86 be amended, naming only the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office as the Putative Respondent and the Director of Immigration as the Putative Interested Party.
2. The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By a Form 86 dated 20 May 2021 (the “Form 86”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision by the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “TCAB”) dated 4 May 2021 (the “TCAB Decision”), which, inter alia, affirmed the decisions of the Director of Immigration (the “DOI”) dated 5 May 2016 and 6 June 2017[1].
2. I amend Form 86 on my own motion to name only the TCAB as the putative respondent and the DOI as the putative interested party.
3. The Applicant requested for a hearing of this application and he attended the same. When asked, he said he had nothing to add.
Background
4. The Applicant was a national of Indonesia. In gist, the Applicant had issues with his creditors/suppliers to due to non-payment of his debts and Ms R2’s father since he disapprove of their relationship. The Applicant fears that they would harm, ill-treat and/or kill him were he to be refouled to Indonesia. The Applicant’s personal background, the relevant facts and relevant procedural history have been sufficiently set out in the TCAB Decision, which can be viewed through a hyperlink.[2] I shall therefore not repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, TCAB’s abbreviations and descriptions are adopted herein.
Discussion
5. The leave application operates as a filtering process and there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision: Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23]. It is sufficient to state my observations after considering the TCAB Decision and the materials adduced by the Applicant.
6. I remind myself that in a judicial review, this court does not provide a further avenue of appeal. While I also remind myself that in non-refoulement cases, I would adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the TCAB given the seriousness of the issue at hand, this court would not usurp the role of the TCAB, which together with the DOI are the primary decision-makers. A finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the TCAB, and this court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the TCAB: Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)]. There must be a reasonably arguable case with a realistic prospect of success before leave for judicial review will be granted: Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.
7. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly: Ho Loy v Director of Environmental Protection (unreported, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016) at [142], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit.
8. The Applicant did not state any grounds on which the relief is sought, and hence did not point to any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality of the TCAB Decision in the Form 86.
9. As can be seen from the TCAB Decision, the TCAB took into account all the evidence available and found that on the basis of the same, applying the correct legal principles in respect of, in substance[3], all applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism, the Applicant’s allegations were insufficient to make out any of the applicable grounds [60-67]. In it pertinent to note that the TCAB accepted the basic facts the Applicant alleged. See for example [47], but found, importantly, that the Applicant did not face a real risk that the creditors/suppliers would inflict harm on him so severe it would amount to Proscribed Harm against him [48-50, 55]. The TCAB further found that Applicant would not suffer harm so severe to amount to Proscribed Harm against him because of Ms R2’s father disapproval of him [54, 55]. The TCAB’s findings were nuanced, careful and cannot be faulted. Given the TCAB’s said unimpeachable findings, the Applicant’s case is bound to fail.
10. All in all, I do not see any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the TCAB Decision, despite rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. The Applicant’s intended challenge to the TCAB Decision is not reasonably arguable, and accordingly the application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.
Dated the 16th day of January 2026
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(Edison Ho)
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant
on 16/1/2026
Andry Weliyanto
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil. |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 16/1/2026
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 3699/16/5/117/I331
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
RBCZ 9001749/17 (Formerly RBCZ 2001325/14)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
[1] The complicated history of this case is summarised in [7]-[18], the TCAB Decision.
[2] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2021/HCAL000725_2021_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
[3] See [16-18], TCAB Decision. Although the TCAB, correctly in my view, did not assess whether the Applicant substantiated a well-founded fear of torture as defined in s.37U of the Immigration Ordinance [67], Cap 115, it in essence assessed the new claims against risk of torture (in the USM Claim) under BOR 3 [18]. Any such claims were bound to be rejected in view of its findings in any event.
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