嘉信大廈業主立案法團 v. 張笑媚

CAMP 216/2024 & CACV 33/2026 (Heard Together),

[2026] HKCA 312

On appeal from [2024] HKLdT 71

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 216 OF 2024

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM LDMP NO. 6 OF 2023)

________________________

________________________

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 33 OF 2026

(ON APPEAL FROM LDMP NO. 6 OF 2023)

________________________

(Heard Together)

________________________

________________________

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

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Hon Chu VP (giving the judgment of the Court):

Introduction

1.  On 23 August 2024, the respondent was found guilty of contempt by His Honour Judge S H Lee (“Judge”)  sitting as a presiding officer of the Lands Tribunal (“Tribunal”)  for failing to comply with the Judge’s order made in LDBM 106/2022[1]. On 9 September 2024, the Judge sentenced her to one month’s imprisonment and ordered her to pay the applicant’s costs on indemnity basis. 

2.  The respondent applied to the Judge for leave to appeal the judgment and order on committal.  The Judge refused the application on 21 October 2024.[2] By a summons filed on 4 November 2024 in CAMP 216/2024, the respondent made a renewed application for leave to appeal to this Court.  

3.  At the rolled-up hearing of the summons, we dismissed the respondent’s summons on the basis that leave to appeal is not required, and ordered that the costs be in the cause of the appeal.  With no disagreement from the applicant, we extended the time for the respondent to appeal, directed that a notice of appeal be issued by noon of 16 January 2026 and dispensed with service of it. We proceeded to hear the appeal, treating the hearing as the appeal hearing. 

4.  After hearing counsel’s submissions, we dismissed the appeal against the conviction and sentence and ordered the respondent to pay the applicant’s costs on indemnity basis, summarily assessed at HK$ 124,000.

5.  On 14 January 2026, the respondent issued the notice of appeal in CACV 33/2026.

6.  We now give our reasons for the judgment.

Background

7.  The facts of the case and the litigation history set out below are largely taken from the Agreed Background Facts and Agreed Chronology prepared by the parties.  

8.  The applicant is the Incorporated Owners (“IO”)  of Kar Shun Building (“Building”).  The respondent was formerly the chairman of the management committee (“MC”)  of the IO. 

9.  Pursuant to a notice issued by the respondent in December 2021, an annual general meeting of the IO was held on 14 January 2022 (“AGM”).  At the AGM, the respondent retired from office.  A new MC was elected, and 趙敏湘 (“Ms Chiu”)  became the chairman of the newly elected MC.  We shall refer to the MC which the respondent last served as chairman as “Former MC” and the MC elected at the AGM as “New MC”. 

10.  Shortly afterwards, the respondent commenced proceedings in the Tribunal (LDBM 24/2022)  seeking a declaration that the AGM was invalid.  She withdrew the application on 27 May 2022.  Notwithstanding this, on 1 June 2022, she issued a notice to the owners of the Building (“1/6/2022 Notice”)  in which she alleged that the AGM was invalid.  The notice was signed by the respondent and affixed with the chop of the IO.

11.  Meanwhile, the New MC made several requests to the respondent to hand over the books and records, documents and properties of the IO that were in her possession or control.  Apart from oral requests made by Ms Chiu, there were also four letters dated 16 and 17 January, and 14 and 21 July 2022, to which the respondent did not respond.

12.  On 9 August 2022, the IO issued an application in the Tribunal (LDBM 106/2022)  applying for an order that the respondent, pursuant to Paragraph 5A, Schedule 2 of the Building Management Ordinance, Cap. 344 (“BMO”)[3], deliver up to the secretary or chairman of the New MC, the books or records of account, papers, documents and other records in respect of the control, management and administration of the Building together with any movable property belonging to the IO that are under her control or in her custody or possession.

13.  Despite being served with the papers of the application, the respondent did not file any opposition to the application.  She did not attend the call-over and mention hearings[4]. At the trial of the application on 10 January 2023, she was again absent.  Ms Chiu gave evidence for the IO.  At the conclusion of the trial, the Judge granted the IO’s application.  Paragraph 1 of the Judge’s order requires the respondent, pursuant to Paragraph 5A, Schedule 2 of the BMO, to deliver to the secretary or chairman of the current MC of the IO within 14 days from being served with the order, any books or records of account, papers, documents and other records in respect of the control, management and administration of the Building together with any movable property belonging to the IO (collectively “IO Documents and Properties”)  that are under her control or in her custody or possession (“Delivery Up Order”)[5].

14.  On 16 January 2023, Ms Chiu served the respondent personally with a sealed copy of the 10 January 2023 order which was endorsed with a penal notice.  According to Ms Chiu, whose evidence was accepted by the Judge, the respondent on being served with the order said she would not hand over and they had to find them themselves (我不交，你們自己找吧).

15.  On 17 January 2023, the respondent applied for leave to appeal the 10 January 2023 order.  The Judge heard the application on 10 February 2023, and by his decision handed down on 16 February 2023 dismissed the application[6]. On 22 February 2023, the respondent applied for legal aid to appeal the 10 January 2023 order.

16.  The time for complying with the Delivery Up Order expired on 30 January 2023 (i.e. 14 days from 16 January 2023, being the date of service of the order).  The respondent did not hand over any document or property of the IO to the secretary or chairman of the New MC. 

17.  By a letter dated 10 May 2023, the IO’s former solicitors demanded the respondent to return the IO Documents and Properties and warned that contempt proceedings would be instituted if she failed to do so. 

18.  The respondent replied by letter dated 12 May 2023 (“12/5/2023 Letter”), in which she said her legal aid application was pending, and therefore the request to transfer documents on or before 17 May 2023 could not be acceded to (所以你們要求2023年5月17日或之前移交文件未能做到).

19.  On 5 July 2023, the IO applied in LDBM 106/2022 for leave to commence contempt proceedings against the respondent for breach of the Delivery Up Order.  The Judge granted leave on 22 August 2023.

20.  On 4 September 2023, the IO commenced committal proceedings against the respondent in the Tribunal (LDMP 6/2023).  On 8 December 2023, the respondent filed an affirmation to oppose the application.  The trial took place before the Judge on 16 and 17 April 2024. 

21.  By his judgment handed down on 23 August 2024, the Judge found the respondent had breached the Delivery Up Order and was guilty of contempt.  On 9 September 2024, the Judge sentenced the respondent to one month’s imprisonment and ordered her to pay the costs of the IO on indemnity basis, summarily assessed at HK$150,000.  The respondent was taken into custody following the sentencing.

22.  On 24 September 2024, the respondent, who was by then legally represented, applied for leave to appeal the committal order and sentence.  On the same day, the Judge granted her application for stay of the committal order on condition that she paid into the Tribunal HK$50,000 as security.  She was then released from custody, by which time she had served 16 days of her sentence.

23.  The Judge heard and dismissed the leave to appeal application on 21 October 2024.  On 4 November 2024, the respondent commenced CAMP 216/2024 to renew her application for leave to appeal to this Court.  Subsequently on 31 December 2024, the Judge extended the stay of the committal order pending the determination of CAMP 216/2024.

Leave to appeal is not required

24.  We deal firstly with the issue of whether the respondent requires leave to appeal.

25.  The Tribunal’s power to make a committal order is provided by section 10(1A)  of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance, Cap. 17 (LTO”), which states that “… the Tribunal has the same jurisdiction, powers and duties of the Court of First Instance in respect of the punishment of a person guilty of contempt.”

26.  In respect of appeals from the decisions of the Tribunal, section 11(2)  of LTO provides:

“Subject to section 11AA and the provisions of any Ordinance relating to appeals from the Tribunal, any party to proceedings before the Tribunal may appeal to the Court of Appeal against a judgment, order or decision of the Tribunal on the ground that such judgment, order or decision is erroneous in point of law.”

27.  In respect of section 11AA(1), it provides that subject to subsection (2)  (which does not concern us), “no appeal may be made under section 11(2)  unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Tribunal or the Court of Appeal.”

28.  As to provisions of other Ordinance relating to appeals from the Tribunal, section 50 of the High Court Ordinance, Cap. 4 (“HCO”), which concerns appeal in cases of contempt of court, provides in subsection (1):

“Subject to this section, an appeal shall lie from any order or decision of a court, other than the Court of Appeal, in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt of court, including criminal contempt; and in relation to any such order or decision this section shall have effect in substitution for any other law relating to appeals in civil or criminal proceedings.”

29.  Section 50(4)(a)  further provides that in section 50, “court (法庭)  includes any tribunal or person having power to punish for contempt”.

30.  Before the rolled-up hearing, we drew counsel’s attention to section 50 of HCO and invited submissions on whether the respondent requires leave to appeal the committal order.  Mr Choi for the IO submitted that in the light of section 50 of HCO, leave is not required for an appeal from the order or decision of the Tribunal made in contempt proceedings, citing this Court’s decision in Sin Chan Kam v The Incorporated Owners of Wai Sun Building [2025] HKCA 637 at [9] and Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026, vol 1 §59/20/1.  On the other hand, Mr Ma, together with Miss Wong for the respondent, contended that leave to appeal is required because section 50 of HCO is impliedly repealed as being inconsistent with sections 11and 11AA of LTO which were enacted after section 50.  

31.  In our view, it is clear from section 50(4)(a)  of HCO that section 50(1)  applies to the Tribunal, and the section “shall have effect in substitution for any other law relating to appeals in civil or criminal proceedings”, which must include sections 11 and 11AA of LTO.  It follows that section 11AA(2)  of LTO, which requires appeal from orders or decisions of the Lands Tribunal to be brought with leave of the Tribunal or the Court of Appeal, does not apply to appeal from cases of contempt.  A party therefore does not require leave and may appeal as of right against a judgment or order of the Tribunal made in cases of contempt.

32.  We do not agree with Mr Ma’s submission that section 50 of HCO is impliedly repealed by sections 11 and 11AA of LTO.  Fundamentally, there is no inconsistency between these sections.  First, section 11(2)  expressly states that it is subject to the provisions of any Ordinance relating to appeals from the Tribunal.  Second, section 50(1)  expressly provides that it shall have effect in substitution of any other law relating to appeals in civil or criminal proceedings.  There is thus no room for the application of the doctrine of implied repeal.  

33.  For the above reasons, we are of the view that the respondent could have appealed as of right against the Judge’s judgment finding her guilty of contempt and the order on sentence.  The application for leave to appeal made to the Judge and the renewed application for leave made to this Court were unnecessary.  We had therefore dismissed the respondent’s summons in CAMP 216/2024.

Extension of time to appeal

34.  However, the time for the respondent to appeal the Judge’s judgment and order on contempt has long expired[7]. Mr Choi very fairly suggested in his submission that this Court could extend the time for the respondent to appeal and proceed to hear the appeal, given that the parties had fully prepared to argue the case.

35.  Under rule 30D of the Lands Tribunal Rules, Cap. 17A, the Tribunal or the Court of Appeal may, notwithstanding that the time for appeal has expired, extend the time for bringing the appeal. 

36.  While the applications for leave to appeal were erroneously made, the respondent has throughout manifested an intention to appeal.  Having regard to the procedural history of the case, and considering that personal liberty is involved in contempt proceedings, we consider it appropriate to exercise our power under rule 30D of the Lands Tribunal Rules to enlarge the time for the respondent to appeal the Judge’s judgment finding her guilty of contempt and the order on sentence.  We had therefore granted the time extension, directed the respondent to issue a notice of appeal (in the same form as the draft notice of appeal filed in CAMP 216/2024)  by noon of 16 January 2026, and dispensed with service of it.  As counsel had prepared to argue the case, we had further treated the rolled-up hearing as the appeal hearing and proceeded to hear the appeal.

The Judge’s decisions

37.  At the trial of the contempt application, Ms Chiu gave evidence for the IO, and the respondent, who acted in person, elected to give evidence.

38.  In seeking to show that the respondent had control, custody or possession of IO Documents and Properties, Ms Chiu referred to a number of matters, six of which were accepted by the Judge.  They are: (1)  the respondent’s response on 16 January 2023 when being served with the 10 January 2023 order (see [14] above); (2)  the statement made by the respondent in the 12/5/2023 Letter (see [18] above); (3)  the 1/6/2022 Notice issued by the respondent which bore the IO chop; (4)  she had repeatedly requested the respondent to return IO Documents and Properties but to no avail, and on one such encounter the respondent responded that she would break the law if she handed over them (我一交出便犯法); (5)  members of the Former MC told her that the respondent had kept items belonging to the IO; and (6)  the management company informed her that the respondent had kept items belonging to the IO.  (1)  and (2)  were mentioned by Ms Chiu in her affirmations filed in support of the contempt application and (3)  to (6)  were mentioned in her oral evidence together with two other matters that the Judge did not rely on[8].

39.  Ms Chiu also testified that due to the respondent’s breach of the Delivery Up Order, the New MC did not have the bank books and chop of the IO, and books and accounts of and contracts made by the IO.  The IO was thus unable to operate its bank account and access its funds, issue and sign documents until after a new chop was made, prepare accounts and audit report, and carry out its day-to-day operations properly. 

40.  The thrust of the respondent’s evidence is that although she had been the chairman of the MC for some years, all along she did not hold any documents or properties of the IO, which were kept by the management company on the IO’s behalf.  She said that, as chairman, she only needed to convene and preside over meetings, and to give oral instructions to the management company.  She denied having in her possession any item belonging to the IO.  She also complained that she was being singled out as a target when the Former MC had other members. 

41.  The Judge found Ms Chiu an honest and reliable witness and her evidence inherently plausible, and accepted her evidence.  The Judge, on the other hand, rejected the respondent’s evidence, finding her not credible having regard to the quality and inherent implausibility of as well as inconsistencies in her evidence.  Where her evidence conflicts with that of Ms Chiu, the Judge preferred the latter. 

42.  On the evidence accepted by him, the Judge held that the only reasonable and irresistible inference is that at the time the respondent received the 10 January 2023 order from Ms Chiu, she still had in her control, custody or possession documents and properties of the IO (including the chop of the IO), but she had not handed them over to the secretary or chairman of the New MC when the time for complying with the Delivery Up Order expired on 30 January 2023.  In coming to this finding, the Judge had regard to the following matters:

(1)  The events set out in [13] to [18] above.

(2)  The six matters referred to by Ms Chiu (see [38] above).

(3)  The respondent’s admission that:

(3.1)  during her office as the MC chairman, she had received from the management company documents relating to the Building. 

(3.2)  prior to the AGM, the secretary and treasurer of the Former MC had resigned.  The secretary, upon resignation, was required by the BMO to hand over to her all documents and properties of the IO. 

(3.3)  on 3 February 2023, the secretary of the Former MC confronted her and accused her of holding up documents (收起文件).

(3.4)  on 1 June 2022, she retrieved the chop of the IO from a cabinet in the management office and personally affixed it on the 1/6/2022 Notice.  This shows that she was in control, custody and/or possession of the IO chop, which was part of IO Documents and Properties.

(4)  No other members of the Former MC had queried or taken out proceedings to challenge the validity of the AGM and the New MC.

(5)  Until the 12/5/2023 Letter, the respondent never denied having control, custody or possession of documents and properties of the IO.

(6)  The respondent did not dispute that up to the trial of the contempt application, she had never handed to the secretary or chairman of the New MC any document or properties of the IO.

43.  The Judge was further satisfied that the respondent had knowledge of the content of the Delivery Up Order and the penal notice endorsed on the 10 January 2023 order, and her non-compliance with the Delivery UP Order was not due to inadvertence but was intentional.  The Judge held that the IO had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent had intentionally breached the Delivery Up Order and was liable for contempt.

44.  The Judge dealt with sentencing on 9 September 2024.  The respondent declined to make any mitigation despite being offered an opportunity to do so by affidavit or orally at the hearing.  In determining the sentence, the Judge first took into consideration the legal principles discussed in the authorities[9], including that imprisonment was a sanction of the last resort and the term should be as short as possible.  The Judge then took into account the circumstances of the case, namely: (1)  the respondent had breached a mandatory court order; (2)  it was not a technical breach, although it was not the most serious of its kind; (3)  the breach was contumacious, which was an aggravating factor, and there was no evidence to show the respondent had difficulty complying with the order; (4)  the respondent had not purged the contempt, nor had she offered to do so; and (5)  the respondent had not shown any remorse. The Judge considered that the circumstances of the case were such that there was no other alternative but to pass a custodial sentence so as to signal the importance of complying with court orders.  He was also of the view that there was no basis for exercising the discretion to suspend the sentence.  He accordingly committed the respondent to one month imprisonment. 

This appeal

45.  The respondent’s notice of appeal raises two grounds of appeal.  Ground 1 relates to the conviction and contends that the Judge erred in finding the IO has discharged its burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent had control, custody or possession of the documents and records of the IO on or at any time after 16 January 2023.  Ground 2 concerns the sentence and contends that it is wrong in principle.

Ground 1 – Contempt proved beyond reasonable doubt?

46.  Under Ground 1, four points were made:

(1)  The Judge wrongly drew an irresistible inference by relying on: (i)  the respondent’s oral statements made to Ms Chiu on 16 January 2023 and in the 12/5/2023 Letter; (ii)  the respondent’s use of the IO chop to issue the 1/6/2022 Notice; (iii)  the respondent’s multiple encounters with Ms Chiu in November 2022, during which Ms Chiu requested without success that she returned the documents and properties of the IO; (iv)  the statements of members of the Former MC that the respondent was in possession of documents and properties of the IO; and (v)  the confirmation from the management company that the respondent possessed documents and properties of the IO.

(2)  The Judge erred in relying on the presumption of continued possession, relying on Re Bramblevale Ltd [1970] Ch 128.

(3)  The Judge, whilst taking into account the respondent’s evidence that she took the IO chop from the cabinet in the management office and applied it to the 1/6/2022 Notice, failed to give due consideration to her evidence in cross-examination that a notice had since been put up and it had been a while that no access was allowed (佢哋以家都黏咗通知喺度唔可以進入好耐啦), which indicated that she could no longer access the management office.

(4)  The Judge erred in failing to have regard to (i)  Ms Chiu’s evidence that before becoming the chairman of the MC, her understanding of the IO was limited (一般); and (ii)  Ms Chiu’s belief that the respondent had possession of IO Documents and Properties is speculative.

47.  The respondent placed heavy emphasis on the fact that the IO carried the burden of proof and had to prove on the criminal standard that the respondent had breached the Delivery Up Order.  This is not in dispute and the Judge was keenly aware of it[10]. However, one must not lose sight of the fact that the Delivery Up Order was made after trial where evidence had been received, and on the Judge’s finding of fact, albeit on a civil standard, that the respondent had as of the date of the order remained in control, custody or possession of IO Documents and Properties and had failed to hand them over to the New MC[11]. The Delivery Up Order itself establishes that at the date of the order (i.e. 10 January 2023), the respondent had IO Documents and Properties in her control, custody or possession.  It was against this backdrop that the Judge held that, having regard to the evidence identified by him (see [42] above), the only reasonable and irresistible inference is that on 16 January 2023 when being served with the order, the respondent had in her control, custody or possession documents and properties of the IO, and she had not handed them over to the secretary or chairman of the New MC when the time for complying with the Delivery Up Order expired on 30 January 2023.  

48.  The thrust of the respondent’s arguments is that the evidence does not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent had control, custody or possession of IO Documents and Properties on 16 January 2023 and/or thereafter.  It is firstly argued that the five matters relied on by the Judge (as particularised under Point (1))  collectively only show that the respondent had control of the IO chop on 1 June 2022 and there are at least three possibilities, namely (a)  the respondent no longer had control of IO Documents and Properties after 1 June 2022; (b)  the respondent never had control or possession of IO Documents and Properties; and (c)  the respondent continued to have control or possession of IO Documents and Properties after 1 June 2022.

49.  Possibility (b)  can be disposed of right away, not least because of the respondent’s admission that she took the IO chop and affixed it to the 1/6/2022 Notice.  Ms Chiu’s evidence, which was accepted by the Judge, also renders this scenario improbable.

50.  Possibility (c)  is what was found by the Judge.  His conclusion is based on an array of primary facts, and not just the five matters identified under Point (1).  In the light of the evidence and primary facts accepted by the Judge, possibility (a)  is simply untenable.  Firstly, in addition to the statements of the management company and other members of the Former MC that the respondent had kept items of the IO, the secretary of the Former MC had confronted the respondent and accused her of holding up documents.  Secondly, despite many oral and written requests for return of documents and properties of the IO, it was not until the 12/5/2023 Letter that the respondent indicated that she could not comply with the requests.  Even then she did not say she did not have any of the IO’s documents or items.  Her responses to Ms Chiu’s oral request and when being served with the order are also telling.  Thirdly, the Judge had rejected as being incredible the respondent’s evidence, which included her assertion that throughout her office as chairman of the MC she did not hold documents or properties of the IO.  Fourthly, the respondent admitted that she had never handed over any document or property of the IO to the New MC. 

51.  There is, in short, overwhelming evidential basis to support the inference drawn by the Judge, which is the only reasonable and irresistible inference to be drawn from the primary facts found.  The respondent’s argument that the Judge erred in relying on the presumption of continued possession is misplaced.  As the discussions above show, the Judge did not rely on any presumption.  He drew an irresistible inference that the respondent remained in control, custody or possession of IO Documents and Properties based on the evidence accepted by him and the primary facts as found by him.  The circumstances in the present case are very different from those in Re Bramblevale Ltd.  The case has no relevance.

52.  The respondent’s access to, and her use of, the IO chop in connection with the 1/6/2022 Notice plainly contradict and discredit her assertion that she never had control, custody or possession of IO Documents and Properties. Even if her evidence that access to the management office was no longer readily available was to be taken into account, it would not have supported possibility (b)  and/or undermined the Judge’s conclusion that she had control, custody or possession of IO Documents and Properties at the time the Delivery Up Order was served on her and she did not comply with it.  Further, as pointed out in Mr Choi’s submission, it was after some prevarication that the respondent came up with this exculpatory remark, which is inconsistent with her earlier evidence that she had no knowledge about the cabinets in the management office.  The Judge, having rejected her evidence, cannot be criticized for not considering this statement made by the respondent.

53.  Similarly, the fact that Ms Chiu did not have much knowledge about the affairs of the MC before she became the chairman would not have affected, let alone materially affected, the findings made by the Judge.  Given that she had been informed by members of the Former MC and the management company that the respondent had kept items of the IO, and in light of the respondent’s responses to her requests for handing over of documents and properties of the IO, Ms Chiu’s belief that the respondent had IO Documents and Properties cannot be said to be speculative.

54.  For the above reasons, Ground 1 has no merit.  The appeal against the Judge’s finding that the respondent was guilty of contempt therefore failed. 

Ground 2 – Sentence wrong in principle?

55.  Ground 2 contends that the sentence was wrong in principle in that (1)  the Judge erred in regarding the wilful nature of the respondent’s contempt as an aggravating factor; and (2)  the Judge had taken irrelevant factor into consideration by repeatedly highlighting the remarks made in La Dolce Vita Fine Dining Co Ltd v Zhang Lan.

56.  In respect of the first complaint, Mr Ma submitted that the Judge should have considered all the circumstances of the contempt, including whether it was contumacious or unintentional, and a contumacious contempt should not be automatically deemed an aggravating factor.  It was said that the Judge erred in failing to do so.  We disagree.

57.  In his reasons for sentence, the Judge held that the respondent’s breach of the Delivery Up Order was not technical or unintentional but was a contumacious breach as she was not happy with the Tribunal decision.  This is a finding open to him on the evidence before the court, and there is no appeal on this.  The Judge considered this to be an aggravating factor.  We do not understand Mr Ma to be arguing that the Judge was not entitled to take into account that it was a contumacious breach.  His complaint is that the Judge should not “automatically” deem the respondent’s contumacious breach an aggravating factor without analyzing or considering the facts of the case.  This, however, is not what the Judge did.  The Judge recognized that contumacy was an aggravating factor but he did not stop there.  He had given due consideration to the circumstances of the case, including that the respondent wilfully refused to obey the order because she was not happy with the Tribunal decision, and it was not shown that the respondent had difficulty in complying with the order. Given that the respondent had given no explanation for not obeying the Delivery Up Order, the Judge cannot be faulted for regarding her contumacious breach as an aggravating factor.

58.  Before the Judge, the respondent did not point to any facts or circumstances of the case that would lessen the gravity of her contumacious breach.  As the Judge noted, she refused to put forward any mitigation.  Before us, Mr Ma submitted that the Judge had neglected the respondent’s advanced age, her lack of previous criminal or contempt record and other personal circumstances, such as she was a retiree and she served as chairman of the MC on a voluntary basis and derived no benefit from it.  We do not accept these submissions.  None of these were before the Judge, whether by way of evidence or submissions.  It is not a fair criticism to say that the Judge neglected to give consideration to them when it was the respondent’s own choice not to advance any mitigation. 

59.  Mr Ma also sought to argue that the Judge did not properly consider that imprisonment should be the last resort and that the term of imprisonment should be as brief as possible.  Firstly, these arguments have gone beyond the grounds of appeal.  Secondly, the Judge had considered whether there could be other sentencing option and, for reasons that he had given, decided that imprisonment was the only appropriate sentence.  The respondent has not shown any basis for this Court to interfere.  On the length of the imprisonment, Mr Ma referred to rule 69 of Prison Rules, Cap. 234A, and argued that the respondent would not be entitled to remission under the rule despite her good behaviour.  This is wholly irrelevant as the Prison Rules have no application.  While we note that the respondent had already served 16 days of the one-month term, there is no room for us to intervene or shorten the term when the Judge’s sentence is not wrong in principle.

60.  We turn next to the second complaint that the Judge should not have regard to La Dolce Vita Fine Dining Co Ltd v Zhang Lan which pertains to an injunction order.  In La Dolce Vita Fine Dining Co Ltd, the defendant was held in contempt for breach of a disclosure order in aid of a Mareva injunction.  We see no relevant distinction between that order and the Delivery Up Order in the present case.  The nature of the breach is the same in that in both cases the contemnor had acted in defiance of a court order that required performance of certain acts.  As with the defendant in La Dolce Vita Fine Dining Co Ltd, the respondent’s breach was deliberate and intentional.  The Judge did not take into account irrelevant matter in considering the principles applicable to sentencing for contempt of court discussed in La Dolce Vita Fine Dining Co Ltd, and in considering that imprisonment is an appropriate starting point.

61.  For the above reasons, Ground 2 is unarguable.  We had therefore rejected the appeal against sentence and ordered that the respondent be committed to prison to serve the remainder of the term.

Costs

62.  Costs should follow the event.  The respondent, having failed in her appeal, should pay the IO the costs of the appeal, including the costs of CAMP 216/2024.  Having regard to the nature of the underlying proceedings and the circumstances of the case, the costs should be assessed on indemnity basis. 

63.  The IO had provided a statement of costs for summary assessment, which shows that its solicitors had agreed to charge HK$124,000, notwithstanding that the total costs and disbursements are well in excess.  We had examined the statement and are satisfied that this is a reasonable amount.  Accordingly, we have ordered the respondent to pay the applicant the costs of the appeal and CAMP 216/2024 on indemnity basis, summarily assessed at HK$124,000.