HUSSAIN MUMTAZ v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 1978/2020

[2026] HKCFI 2173

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 1978 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 15 January 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 2 December 2025, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 15 September 2020.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 2 December 2025, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 16 December 2025. Thus, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the Summons and his supporting affirmation dated 15 January 2026, the applicant did not give any reason why he was late in making the appeal. There was also no ground given for his intended appeal.

8.  At the hearing of the Summons on 10 April 2026, the applicant first said that he received the court’s letter late because it was sent to his old address and he received it when he went back to his old address to check. However, when he was asked to provide his new address, he gave the same address that was used to send to him the court’s letter containing the court’s order and decision. The applicant then said that he did not know if he received the court’s letter at his new or old address, but he received a call from the court and he went to the court where he received the court’s letter.

9.  When I told the applicant that he had given two versions of the event, he then said that he went to the old address and did not receive the court’s letter there. Hence, he went to the court to receive it.

10.  It is clear that the applicant has given inconsistent accounts of how he received the court’s letter containing the order and decision. There is no truth at all that he collected the court’s letter containing the order and decision from the court, as the letter was sent to him by post at the address that he identified as his new address. Thus, there was no reasonable explanation for his delay in lodging the intended appeal.

11.  When the applicant was asked for his grounds of appeal, he merely said that the problem back in his country had not been resolved and that was why he could not go back. Thus, the applicant did not provide any valid ground of appeal either.

12.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

13.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

14.  In the circumstances, there is no proper excuse for the applicant’s delay in lodging the appeal and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review. I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

15.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.