RE NGUYEN VAN DUONG

CACV 163/2022, [2024] HKCA 539

On Appeal From [2024] HKCA 266

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 163 OF 2022

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 150 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the judgment of the court):

1.  On 28 March 2024, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 20 March 2024 (“the Judgment”)  ([2024] HKCA 266). In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Judge”)  dated 14 April 2022, by which the Judge dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2022] HKCFI 1098).

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.  Section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 (“the HKCFAO”)  provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.  In his Notice of Motion, the applicant asserted that he would be killed, tortured or beaten by his creditors and the gangsters if refouled and that internal relocation would not be feasible given his health. He further alleged that the Immigration Department failed to consider his human rights under various legislations but failed to elaborate on these assertions.

5.  Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged his written submissions on 5 April 2024.  In those submissions, he reiterated the factual basis and procedural history of his non-refoulement claim.  He also cited various legal authorities in relation to the high standards of fairness and Wednesbury unreasonableness but failed to specify with particulars how they were relevant to his current application.

6.  In our view, there is no merit in his application.  The matters raised in his Notice of Motion are all general and bare allegations without any specific particulars or explanation.  General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  Furthermore, his complaints are mainly directed at the Director’s and the Board’s Decisions.  He fails to give any specific particulars as to how the Judgment has erred. His allegations do not constitute proper grounds of appeal and are in any event devoid of merit.

7.  Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

8.  Accordingly, the applicant fails to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.

9.  For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit.  Accordingly, the Notice of Motion is dismissed.