NAEEM EHSAN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 1608/2020

[2026] HKCFI 3267

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 1608 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  On 1 September 2025 I refused to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) in dismissing his appeal regarding his non-refoulement claim upon finding that none of the grounds put forward by him reasonably arguable for his intended challenge, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in the process before the Director of Immigration (“Director”) or the Board or in their decisions, and that there was no reasonable prospect of success in his intended application.

2.  The Applicant now by a summons issued on 5 November 2025 (of which has only recently been brought to the court’s attention) seeks leave to appeal against that decision out of time, as the 14-day period for him to file his appeal under Order 53 rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A ended on 15 September 2025, and hence he was some 6 weeks late with his intended appeal.

3.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing against a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted: see Re MK HCMP 2609/2016, 10 January 2017; Chu On Fong Winter v The Appeal Panel (Housing) HCMP 982/2017, 20 July 2017; Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017; Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; and Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346.

4.  In the Applicant’s case, a delay of 6 weeks must be considered as substantial and inordinate, for which he explained in his affirmation that he never received the decision in the mail, and that it was only later that he was so informed by his immigration officer, but by then he was already out of time with his intended appeal.

5.  The court record shows that the decision was sent on the same day of 1 September 2025 to the Applicant’s then reported address but was subsequently returned through undelivered post, and upon enquires with the Immigration Department for his latest address, the decision was sent again to the Applicant on 20 October 2025 without being returned through undelivered post, and hence by the time when he issued his present application on 5 November 2025, the Applicant was in fact only 2 days late with his intended appeal, which cannot on any views be regarded as significant, and hence I propose to focus on the prospect of success of his intended appeal.

6.  However, the Applicant has failed to put forward any proper or valid draft or proposed grounds of appeal, or any particulars of any error in the decision or why it may be reasonably arguable that the decision was unfair or unreasonable either in his summons or his affirmation. As such, and in the absence of any error in the decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not see any prospect of success in his intended appeal either.

7.  In the premises, and for the reasons given, it would be futile to extend time for what appears to be a hopeless appeal. Accordingly, I refuse the Applicant’s application for leave to appeal out of time, and dismiss his summons.